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Emperor Frederick III and his Relations with the Papacy from 1440 to 1493. 
Thesis directed by Professor S. Harrison Thomson
Emperor Frederick III has been traditionally portrayed as the 
incompetent ruler who was responsible for the widespread disorder in fif- 
teenth century religion and politics. Such a concept was the result of 
limiting historical investigation to the political aspects of his reign, 
a field entirely unsuited to Frederick's disposition and temperament.
This study was motivated by the desire to achieve a more accurate evalu- 
ation of the Emperor by an examination of his activities in an area com- 
patible with his character, that of imperial-papal relations. In attain- 
ing this end, it was deemed essential to relate Frederick's position, 
both as Duke of Austria and as Emperor, to the age in which he lived.
The Emperor's relations with the Roman Curia were both develop- 
mental and regressive in nature. They followed an erratic course which 
was usually conditioned by current political pressures as well as the 
governing philosophy of a given pontificate. Frederick's attitude toward 
the ecclesiastical problems which faced him at the beginning of his rule 
revealed an intelligent grasp of the basic issues at stake. Convinced 
of the necessity of secular neutrality until the convocation of a general 
Council, the young ruler set about to bring religious peace to his realm. 
His enthusiasm was soon dampened by the electoral opposition which 
manifested itself at the Diet of Mainz held in 1441. The intensification 
of this trend, especially at the Diet of Nuremberg(1444), forced the 
Emperor to initiate a fundamental change in his religious policy. This 
reversal saw the abandonment of internationalism in favor of particularism,
and the recognition of the pope at Rome as the legal head of the Church.
By affixing his signature to the Concordat of Vienna Frederick acknow- 
ledged the failure of his previous ecclesiastical policy, and revealed the 
futility of stemming the contemporary institutional dismemberment by 
international arbitration.
During the remainder of his reign Frederick intentionally 
withdrew from the current religious scene, and made no real effort to 
solve the dilemma of the Church. Although sympathetic towards the 
crusade advocated by Pope Nicholas V, the Emperor never really made it 
a part of his imperial policy. Since Pope Calixtus III made all his 
decisions without consulting Vienna, there was little contact between 
the two institutions at this time. A substantial improvement in imperial- 
papal relations occurred when Frederick's former secretary, Aeneas 
Sylvius, ascended to the Apostolic Chair as Pius II. There was no 
reversal of underlying principles, however, since both parties con- 
tinued to act in the interests of their respective policies. Co- 
operation remained dependent on mutual need. Daring the last three 
decades of Frederick's reign, expediency and self-interest typified 
the bond between the traditional heads of Christendom. Pope Paul II 
chose not to rely on imperial goodwill and support, while Sixtus IV 
preferred to function as an Italian prince rather than as a leader 
of Christendom. Frederick's contacts with the Curia depended solely on 
the presence of a common interest, and political rather than ecclesi- 
astical issues constituted the basis of diplomatic intercourse between 
the two institutions.
In his relations with the Papacy Frederick revealed himself as 
an energetic, intelligent ruler and a accomplished diplomat. In his 
attempt to successfully bridge the multiple cross currents of his era,
he preferred arbitration to the use of force, survival rather than 
momentary glory. Possessed by a fanatic belief in the destiny of his 
dynasty, he endured humiliation and insult to ensure its continued 
existence. By nature kind and conciliatory, he was not above the weakness 
of an age in which deeit and misrepresentation dominated the relations 
between nations.
This abstract of about 587 words is approved as to form and content.
I recommend its publication.
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THE TIMES AND THE MAN
The reign of any Emperor in the later middle ages cannot be 
fully comprehended without a careful examination of the political 
and religious legacy which his era bestowed upon him. This is par­
ticularly true of the fifteenth century , a century which saw the 
continuation and augmentation of institutional forces it had not 
inaugurated, and experienced the development of trends it had not 
conceived. When Emperor Sigismund ascended to the Roman kingship 
the metamorphosis of western Europe was well advanced, both in form 
and content. The two major institutions involved in this transfor­
mation still represented theoretical entities in the minds of the 
contemporary population. It was essentially a matter of politics 
and religion, Empire and Papacy.
The fifteenth century Empire was structurally still a func­
tional organism, nevertheless as an international phenomenon, it 
tended towards a theoretical existence. Contemporary political 
theory still pictured the Emperor as the source of all law and tem­
poral jurisdiction, but no judgement found less response than his. 
Placed in the midst of Europe, the Emperor was to symbolize the 
spiritual unity of its races, but was himself regarded as a foreign 
element by the national states. The oldest and noblest title of 
the Imperial head was Operator pacificus.1 yet the fifteenth century
J. Biyce, The Holy Ran an Empire (New York, 1905), p. 259.
2reverberated with the clash of arms and the noise of battle, and the
Emperor was as often the besieger as the besieged. To all outward
appearances the Emperor represented an impressive but undefined con-
2cept. Yet in an age of unwritten law such a concept of government 
still played an important role. Despite many obvious idiosyncrasies 
the Emperor was still considered the highest feudal lord as well as 
the highest judge. After the Electors had chosen a new Roman King, 
they sought the confirmation of their privileges from the one they 
had just elected. The estates of the Empire literally rushed to the 
Emperor’s throne following an imperial election, in order to have their 
rights validated. Imperial power, however, was limited to the confir­
mation of privileges and the bestowal of rights.^ Theoretically the 
Emperor gave to the German Nation its highest law, the courts their 
highest authorization, and the German princes their status in the 
European framework. Simultaneously a universal disregard for its 
political authority prevailed.
^hen Sigismund arranged for his funeral, he ordered his body 
to lie in state for several days in order that "... alle mon jn 
sehen mochte, das aller der werlde herre tot und gestorben were."
E. Windeck, "Historia Vitae Imp. Sigismundi," J. B. Mencken (ed.)f 
Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum praecioue Saxonicarum (Lipsiae, 1728), I, p. 1278.
3
Contemporary vocabulary still reflected the old imperial 
traditions. After the Electors had chosen Frederick III they wrote: 
"Wir haben Ew. Kon. Gnade zu einem Haupt, Schutzer und Vogt der 
ganzen Christenhait erwahlt ..." J. Chmel (ed.), Materialien zur 
osterreichischen Geschichte. Aus Archiven und Bibliotheken (Wien. 
1838), II, p. 70. When the Electoral College went into session they 
swore "nach bester Vemunft kuren zu wollen das weltlich Haupt 
christlichem Volk ..." L. Ranke, Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter 
dgr Reformation (Berlin, 1839), I, p. 55.
Administratively there was little to substantiate any optimism 
for the Empire's continued existence. The lack of any central treas­
ury made the Emperor completely dependent on such income as his hered­
itary lands might provide. Consequently the status of imperial fin­
ances only worsened as the fifteenth century progressed, despite the 
efforts of Sigismund and Albert II to stabilize them by levying ad­
ditional taxes upon the Jews of their realms. Imperial inability to 
police the Empire was directly related to the financial embarrassment 
of the Emperor. Since no military force could be maintained to check 
the depredations of the petty nobility, justice had become a farce.^
In order to protect themselves, the law-abiding citizens of the Empire, 
both noblemen and commoners, had for many decades sought to maintain a 
semblance of order by relying on the so-called Vetjmgericht.5 When 
Frederick ascended to the imperial throne in 1440 even these courts 
had become extremely partisan and corrupt. The new Emperor was faced 
with an administrative problem of immense proportions. The future of 
the Empire depended on the restoration of internal order, a task 
which could not be accomplished without an army. An army needed a
K, , j, q, /u v * Qaagoflifo des Spateren Mjttelaltera von 1197 
? 5 ^ ittelalterlichen und Neueren Geschichte 
p 6M  and F* Meinecke. Munchen und Berlin, 1903),
IJ
T!!3 tem use5 ^  describing the special courts used in t a S w f ?  especially Westphalia during the fourteenth and fif- 
te®nJh centufies. The courts were usually of a territorial nature 
and had received their powers from the Emperor. Their sessions were
eericht ^51*5* verdict was publically announced. The Vehm-
fltv S^  T T®qn S? often indiscriminate use of the death"^- Wi^nH n p lndfr» Verne (Munster und Paderbom, 1888) ; P. Wigand, Dag Femgencht Westphalens (Hamm, 1825).
considerable monetary outlay to be effective, and the contemporary 
state of the Empire held little promise for imperial financial success* 
Albert's efforts to stamp out private war and effect a reorganization 
of the Empire at the Diet of Nuremberg in 1^38 were never fully imple­
mented due to his premature death.^
Externally the fifteenth century Empire proved exceedingly 
vulnerable. Two influences had a direct bearing upon the status of 
both Emperor and Empire. These were the well established spirit of 
nationality in Europe and the rise of princely independence within 
the Empire. By the fifteenth century Europe had been broken into 
separate bodies and the cherished scheme of a united Christian state 
appeared as an idle dream to all but the most traditional political 
theorists. The theoretical and political basis for the rise of the 
national dynasties outside of the Empire had been laid in the fourteenth 
century. It was not until the succeeding century, however, that these 
nations were in a position to challenge the supremacy of the Empire.
The problems of the Roman kingship during the fifteenth century par­
tially stemmed from the fact that France, Burgundy, Poland, Bohemia
and Hungary suddenly achieved international power and status in this 
centuiy.
The Empire might have retained its traditional position during 
this period if it had not had to face the rise of princely independence 
and political fragmentation within the Empire itself. The imperial
( L o n d o n h ^ r w . 2® ! ^  ^
weakness which allowe this development can be traced back to an event 
occurring late in the thirteenth century. With the election of Adolf 
of Nassau on May 5, 1292, the Habsburgs lost the imperial crown. The 
transfer of the crown from one princely house to another robbed the 
Emperor of his territorial and political might. Soon the dignity of 
the Roman King was based upon a past tradition rather than a present 
position. The election of Rudolf in 1273 had inaugurated a deliberate 
policy of selecting a well qualified, but territorially weak individ­
ual for the Roman Kingship. In order to maintain their status the 
Holy Roman Emperors were forced to follow a policy identical with that 
of the leading princes— territorial aggrandizement. In the subse­
quent struggles the lofty concepts which separated the Emperor from 
the princes disappeared, and the Roman King was little more than a 
competitor in the various rivalries.^
The institutional pattern which emerged during the later 
Middle Ages was stabilized in the Golden Bull of 1356. In place of 
the older monarchy, it confirmed the newly developed aristocratic 
federation. The German constitution never lost the impress which it 
received in the fourteenth century. Although the Electors were not 
very powerful princes in 1356, it was certain that the establishment
ihe feeling for the dignity and preservation of the Empire 
among the majority of German princes had declined by the fifteenth
V 0ir d th6 E”pe™ r ?r f0W  against him, whichever 
1+**?ivantag?* •* c- Hofler, "Betrachtungen uber das titsche Stadtewesen lm XV. und XVI * Jahrhunderte.f Archiv fur Kwr!* 
osterreichischer Geschichts-Quellen. XI (I853), I83.
6of primogeniture and of the indivisibility of territories would before 
long give them undue territorial power snd privilege, a situation in-
Charles IV was fully aware of the consequences of his action. This 
realistic monarch realized that the medieval Empire was at an end 
for all practical purposes. Its disruption could not be halted by 
the strongest ruler, for its former ally, the Papacy, was in no posi­
tion to give aid. Charles IV hoped to check the princely independence 
by establishing a bond of common responsibility in the German nation. 
His intention was to obtain such an overwhelming territorial strength 
for his house that its claim to the imperial throne could not be 
questioned.
The reign of Frederick III marked the rise of princely houses 
which were destined to play important parts in subsequent histoiy.
Such were the Hohenzolleras in Brandenburg; the House of Wettin in 
Saxony, Thuringia and Meissen; the Landgraves of Hesse in Middle Ger­
many; the Zahringers in Baden; the Wittelsbachers in the Palatinate 
and Bavaria, and the barons of Wiirttemberg in Suabia.9 The emergence 
of these houses directly affected the dignity of the Roman kingship, 
for Frederick's real power lay in his position as a Habsburg prince. 
Since by this time the imperial domains had been gradually seized or 
—
Bryce, Q&. cit., p, 23^.
Qconsistent with the exercise of efficient monarchical authority.
squandered such authority as the king possessed rested upon the terri­
torial powers which he held as a prince. The rise of princely indepen­
dence was accompanied ty a localized political fragmentation as well. 
The Emperor's nominal vassals, the ecclesiastics, nobles and cities, 
enjoyed almost complete independence. Interstate wars were frequent 
and the Emperor entered the struggles as a territorial prince rather 
than as an arbitrator. Separatism rather than internationalism char­
acterized the age. This complete lack of national sentiment threat­
ened the Empire with extiction. Frederick III ascended a throne 
ideologically outdated, politically unsound, and internationally 
meaningless. The Roman kingship of the fifteenth century featured 
the forms of the past, but retained little of the substance.
The difficulties which characterized the Emperor's position 
were not unlike the enigma vhich the Papacy faced. Nevertheless, the 
institution had enjoyed the universal recognition of the Roman- 
Germanic world, a feat never accomplished by the Empire. The analogy 
of the sun and moon was still a theoretical working reality, for the 
Papacy was more highly respected than fee Emperor.10 In the century 
long struggles involving the Papacy and the Empire, the former had 
emerged victorious while its secular arm had seriously suffered. No 
Roman king ever attempted to depose an Elector, a process rather fre­
quently, and often successfully carried out by the Pope. In addition
• i In *he establishment of a new school in the city of Basel 
imperial authorization was deemed unnecessary since fee Papacy was* 
he highest fountain.of Christendom. Likewise Frederick I of the 
alatmate continued in office solely on the basis of papal endorse­ment. Ranke, oe. 53^ ., p. 58. ™  ae
8to this* the organizational nature of the Church made it easy for the 
Pope to interfere in the internal affairs of Europe. Its vast mone­
tary power often made such interference more palatable. By 1440 this 
papal heritage had become less significant. The financial structure 
of the Roman Curia had been severely damaged by the Schism, while 
princely defiance of the Apostolic Chair had increased in intensity. 
The results of these changes became very apparent at the onset of 
the fifteenth century. In order to regain its strength, Rcrae was 
forced to follow a close policy of cooperation with the Empire, es­
pecially since the anarchy characteristic of the decay of an old 
system was rapidly gaining momentum. By 1440 both Emperor and Pope 
were keenly aware that they were facing a struggle for existence.^
The status of papal-imperial relations in the fifteenth century 
was dependent upon previous historical developments, especially since 
the period did not produce any unique changes, but rather allowed the 
emergence of previously established patterns. As on previous occa­
sions, the international power which had been victorious over Hairy IV, 
Frederick II and Lewis of Wittelsbach now made common cause with its 
former rival. The reason for this reorientation lay in the political 
trends of the times. A particularly noticeable force in this reversal 
of policy was the growth of princely independence within the Empire.
The separatism of the princely dynasties in the later Middle 
Ages led to a major change in the imperial-papal tradition. The Em­
peror, in order to protect himself against any infringement of his
H. Sybel, Dig Deutsche Nation und das Kaiserreich. Eine his- 
torisch-politische Abhandlung (Dusseldorf, 1862), p. 84.
9power was forced to seek some degree of papal alliance. With the in­
creased territorial greed of the nobility the Roman king’s territorial 
control in terms of his relations with his subjects became more ob­
scure. As a strong prince slowly absorbed the imperial lands within 
his domain the inhabitants of that land turned to him rather than the 
distant Emperor for protection. The secular princes soon considered 
the ecclesiastical dioceses within their realms as sources of revenue, 
a matter which caused grave concern at the Roman Curia. A renewed 
alliance between the Pope and Emperor was the only solution to the 
dilemma.
This almost constant humble friendship of the 
Luxemburgers and the succeeding Habsburgers with the Papacy, 
however, was nothing but an entirely natural policy deter­
mined by experience and necessity, a policy for which not 
^ r°r’ k'1*' rathef 'the princes as representatives of Jie differences and animosities among the German dynasties 
were to blame. . . . The Emperor, however, let the orinces 
have their way and accepted the certain for the uncertain, 
the friendship with the still powerful head of the church 
instead of the dangerous defense of secular sovereignty, 
bo natural was this relationship that.even the Great 
bchism could do nothing to change it. 2
Despite the friendly relations between Pope and Emperor, the 
latter was still obliged to heed the whims of the Papacy. When Adolf 
of Nassau attacked the Rhenish Archbishops in 1301, the restraining 
hand of Boniface VIII prevented him from enjoying the fruits of 
tory. Only the papal sojourn in France allowed Henry of Luxemburg
VIC—
12<J. Burckhardt, "Erzbischof Andreas von Krain und der let-r+A
S s n  & ^ v W 2- i 4 8 v
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to pursue his designs unhindered. Lewis of Bavaria made a remarkably 
successful effort to continue the tradition inaugurated by his prede­
cessor. He was not, however, a personification of contemporary politi­
cal thought as exemplified in Occam and Marsiglio. Lewis's vain at­
tempt to be reconciled with Pope John XXII revealed "that Lewis could
not free himself from the old view, that an imperial coronation belonged
13only to the Pope.” The era of Lewis indicated that "the new must be
14prepared under the protection of the old."
The conciliatory efforts of Pope Benedict XII marked the 
first emergence of a pattern which was to characterize the reign 
of Emperor Frederick III. Benedict's efforts to restore the fortunes 
of the Papacy produced an eager response in Lewis only because he was 
suddenly faced by a formidable political threat— the German princes, 
xhe concurring momentary lull in the status of their respective 
causes drove each to seek the other's aid. The desperate and 
humiliating pleas of Lewis were directly related to princely pres­
sures, for on July 15, 1338, the first princely alliance was formed 
at Rense. Scarcely a century later a similar threat was to
Meihe E. Sperling, St^ diot} %ur Geschichte der Kaiser-kronung und . Inauguraldissertation . . . Freiburg (Freiburg, I9I8),p. 48.
Cnvi« RUl+er* ~  IMwigs des Baiem mit der romischen
TT§Mn Geschichte des 14. Jahrhundertsubingen, 1880), p. 267. While he LLewis] sought to free the 
national crown from the Papacy, he secretly feared the eternal 
damnation which the papal maledictions threatened." Sybel, o£. cit..
lead to the Concordat of Vienna between Frederick III and Nicholas V
Princely caprice was directly responsible for the growth of 
the corporate spirit both within the Church and the Empire. The 
struggle for power which had previously been carried on by the 
Emperor and the Roman Pontiff, now identified itself with the 
separatistic trends of the times and filtered down into the lower 
social strata of the political and ecclesiastical framework.^
In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the corporate 
spirit was in its prime. The guilds at this time enjoyed 
the highest recognition; federations of towns as well 
as associations of knights and princes arose. As different 
as their aims might otherwise be, one thing was common to 
all these associations: the struggle for power. This 
spirit of the age influenced the Church to a greater ex­
tent than has been generally recognized; the various levels 
within its clergy also began to stir and strive for mastery.
It is true that no oath united them, but the corporate 
spirit, the common interest, acted as something equally 
powerful. Thus the cardinalate, the episcopate and the 
presbyteriate successively arose against the Pope, just 
as the town federations and the princely colleges had 
risen against their overlords. And like these secular 
powers, they too struggled among themselves for authori­tative influence.16
Thus the Bishop strove for secular power while the prince sought 
an ecclesiastical benefice. Both tendencies were adverse to the 
survival of either the Empire or the Papacy. The threat could only 
be met by mutual cooperation.
T3. .^K* ,A! C* H°fler, Kaiserthum und Papstthum. Ein Beitrae 2UE Philosophie der Geschichte (Prag, I862), p. 175.
A. Zimmermann, Die kirchlichen VerfassumrslcSninfi» -5™ yv 
Jahrhundert. Bine Sj^diTTB^slau, 188277'p. m .  P ~  ~ ‘
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In tracing the status of the Empire and Church during the
first half of the fifteenth century, the position of Austria itself
17cannot be overlooked. Because Emperor Frederick III was also duke
of Austria, and in view of the fact that the imperial administration
depended on its hereditary lands for support, its salient political
features during the fourteenth and fifteenth century deserve some
consideration. In 1365 Duke Rudolph IV of Austria was succeeded by
his two younger brothers, who ruled jointly as Albert III and Leopold 
18III. Their reign substantially weakened the political power of the 
dukedom, for in 1379 they divided the Austrian lands between them­
selves. The Austrian nobility soon took advantage of the situation 
and in I38O the Schaunburgs and Cilly revolted against Albert. When 
Leopold was killed at Sempach in 1386 the Austrian lands were tem­
porarily reunited. Albert was unable to consolidate his territory, 
however, and during his last years the power of the Austrian estates
17, . «Th® te™  "Austria" as used in the subsequent discussion must
oe qualified. Since there was no country called Austria until 1806. 
and as Austria was not an entity in the fifteenth century, this usage
I ? L aPP!ar/ ai! f  irregular. Nevertheless, a reasonable case can be made for the validity of the term. The Regensberg edict of 
1156 established the duchy of Babenberg as an individual unit of the 
Empire. At this time the duchy was a conceptual if not a
Bah^nv^ ° y * DesPite its varying fortunes under thef1 then the Habsburgs, the duchy had an individual and 
t h ^ w i S ?tence. When the dukes of Austria were not Emperors, 
linds l H + y Prerogatives within their hereditaryL  ^  administration as well as its relations to the rest
call SUt"S °f ^  e"Uty "hl°h ShaU
n * May®r and *• F. Kaindl, Oeaohirtitg und Kulturleben
grew almost unchecked, Albert III was succeeded by his eighteen-year- 
old son, who ruled as Albert IV, in 1395. A struggle with his Leo- 
poldine cousins soon ensued. In order to avoid war the eldest Leo- 
poldine, Wilhelm, was recognized a co-regent late in 1395. Wilhelm's 
brothers refused to be satisfied, and already in 1404 Leopold formed 
an alliance with Albert IV against Wilhelm and Ernest. Albert died 
late in 1404, tut his co-regent managed to keep his brothers in check 
until his death in 1406. The stage was new set for factionalism and 
complete chaos— Leopold cajoled the Austrian estates into appointing 
him as regent for the successor to Albert IV, the minor Albert V. A 
conflict with Leopold's ambitious brother Ernest, who held power in 
Styria, was now inevitable. In March, 1409, the future Emperor,
King Sigismund of Hungary attempted to arbitrate in the undeclared 
war. His efforts would have probably proved unsuccessful, had not 
a third party appeared on the scene. Early in 1411 the Estates of 
Lower Austria assembled at Eggenburg and declared their loyalty to 
young Albert V, whose claims to authority were the most legitimate. 
Ernest and Leopold now agreed to the arbitration of Sigismund, who 
had by this time been elected Emperor. The latter, in a decree pub­
lished at Ofen during October, 1411, declared that the fifteen-year- 
old Albert V was to be recognized as duke of Austria, but the settle­
ment lacked permanency in the sense that the young ruler was not 
likely to possess the firmness needed to deal with the great power 
of the Austrian magnates. When Frederick succeeded to the Austrian 
dukedom in 1435 he faced a serious internal situation. A tradition 
of separatism and political fragmentation was well established.
14
Since the death of Rudolph IV in 1365 no one ruler had held undivided 
control over Austria. Civil strife and conspiracy belonged to the 
order of the day. Politically, idealogically, and even religiously 
Austria had declined to the lowest point of its history.
The drama in which Frederick was to play his lengthy role 
suffered from an overabundance of leading characters, and the plot 
portrayed a struggle for existence rather than a mastery over circum­
stance. The man who hoped to emerge as a hero in this fifteenth 
century drama would have to meet the challenge of a tottering Empire, 
a decadent Church, and a rebellious dukedom. He would have to be an 
organizational genius who could clearly perceive the structural 
changes of the past century, and utilize the current aspirations in 
effecting a basic reform in the contemporary institutions. He would 
have to be a diplomatic genius whose brilliant manoeuvres curbed the 
aspirations of the national dynasties. Moreover he would need a 
great deal of wealth to bribe an ambitious prince or suppress a 
rebellious noble. In order to establish the universal rule of law 
in an age where precedence and position rather than principle deter­
mined justice, he would require the mastery of every artifice that 
jurisprudence could offer him. Finally our hero would be a ruthless 
tyrant who disregarded the sanctity of past traditions and was im­
pervious to great bloodshed. It is doubtful whether any person in 
the fifteenth century could have fulfilled all these requirements.
In Frederick III we have the case of a man who failed to fit 
the role he was required to play. This disqualified him in the eyes 
of the majority of subsequent historians. Yet the fact that Frederick
failed to fit his role does not nullify his ri$vt to fame or eliminate 
the possibility that he may have exercised a positive influence during 
his lifetime. Every man has a right to be judged on the basis of in­
dividual merit rather than on his performance in a role not suited to 
his temperament. Emperor Frederick III cannot be unequivocally con­
demned because he failed to fulfill the nationalistic aspirations of 
the nineteenth century historians who advocated German unification.19 
A valid interpretation of the man aid the policies he wished to pur­
sue can only be made in an area of his reign which was suited to his 
character— the field of imperial-papal relations. This viewpoint 
allows a new insight into the personality of a man whose failures 
are generally acknowledged, but whose real motives and goals are 
rarely ascertained. The object of this study is not to excuse Fred­
erick’s political incompetency, but rather to offer examples of his 
personal competency in areas where he was not required to identify 
himself with the temperament of his age. It contends that Frederick's 
apparent failure to uphold the political traditions of the institu­
tion he was required to lead is not an adequate representation of his 
character or a valid measure of his Emperorship.
The man who was to lead the Empire for nearly fifty three
15
19
. ~ thls connection see J. Ficker, Das Deutsche Kaiserreieh
M  SSUJSB teersalen und Nationalen Bgziehungen \;
ybel, oj). £i£*» J. Ficker, Deutsches Koenigthum und Kaiserthum. 
Sitgegnyng aji£ die Abhandlung Heinrichs von Svbel: Die Deutsche
aailflQ and d&s Kaiserreieh (Innsbruck, 1862); 0. WydenbiS,"m^------
Heutsc^e Motion und d^s Kaiserreieh, Eine Enteeenumr «„f Hi* nnf.Ar
daagglfesL EUal acKMwww sch ru t voj, h. E & g f f e c h f i S l T T
BiSiffliaas. transl. H.
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years was the first bom son of Duke Ernest of Austria and his second 
wife, Eimburgis, a member of the Masovian family.20 Duke Ernest had 
previously been married to Margaret, the daughter of Duke Bogislaus 
of Pommerania. She died childless in 1410. In 1412 Duke Ernest went 
to Poland to marry Eimburgis, a devout and religious woman. The 
mother of nine children, tradition has it that she was especially 
strong, pressing nails into the walls barehanded, and breaking horse­
shoes with ease. The more plausible of her virtues, however, in­
cluded her piety and tender disposition, character traits later ac-
21quired by her son Frederick. Duke Ernest died on June 10, 1424,
The nine year old Frederick, together with his younger brothers,
Ernest and Albert, and his sisters Margareta, Anne and Katherine,
then went to live with his uncle, Duke Frederick IV of Tyrol. This
was in fulfillment of an agreement made between the two brothers on 
22July 27, 1409. The guardianship which Frederick of the Tyrol exer- 
cised over the future Emperor lasted from 1424-1435*
Sources regarding Frederick’s early life and training are vir­
tually non-existent. It is not known where Frederick spent a con­
siderable part of his life as the ward of Duke Frederick. His mother
20
September Slf lil”  ' "as born at Innsbruck on
in , l.^o! m n tt)’. 2a“  ^Maca? (Vienna, 1758),
22
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apparently located herself in Neustadt.2^ Eimburgis survived her hus­
band by only five years. On a pilgrimage to Maria Zell she died at 
Dirnitz on September 28, 1429, and was buried at Lilienfeld. Fred­
ericks younger brother, Duke Ernest, passed away in 1432 and found 
his final rest at Neustadt. Meanwhile a dynastic tie of considerable 
importance was established when Margareta married Duke Frederick II 
of Saxony. Saxon support in subsequent years saved Frederick from 
extinction in several critical situations.
In 1431 Duke Frederick, at the age of sixteen, had reached 
his majority according to traditional Habsburg practice. His guardian, 
Frederick of Tyrol, chose to postpone the official ratification of 
the young duke1s independence until his younger brother Albert had 
also reached his majority. The possibility of division within 
Habsburg ranks, especially due to a young ruler, was no illusion, 
furthermore, the fact that the youth of Frederick might instigate 
Emperor Sigisnund towards territorial aggrandizement could not be 
ignored. Young Frederick proved mature enough to submit to his 
uncle * s reasoning and allowed himself to be gradually inducted into 
government service. Thus during this period money matters, promis­
sory notes and even border disputes were settled by the signatures of
Frederick of the Tyrol, and Dukes Frederick and Albert of Austria.24 
The Tyrolean Duke, in order to ensure the stability of his own lands,
17
23
It is quite possible that Eimburgis played at least a minor 
part in the government of Austria. For three years Christian of 
Arnvels, the viceregent of Camiola, corresponded with her concern­
ing a promissory note which he, as a government representative, owed her. Chmel, Materialien. It 1, No. 24.
24See Ibid., I, 1, Nos. 100, 109; Ibid.. I, 2, No. 4.
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desired a united front in Austria, especially in view of a possible 
imperial victory in the Hussite Wars. These fears were not unreasonable, 
for it was well-known that Sigismund had a policy of demanding the sub­
mission of any noble family without any consideration of its earlier 
privileges.2^
In 1434 the second ward of Frederick of Tyrol, Duke Albert the
Younger, reached his majority, and accepted the title, Albert VI.
Frederick of Habsburg was not long in seeking his independence, and
during the second half of the year his struggle for self-rule became
more pronounced. It is of interest to note that Pope Eugenius IV
issued four bulls dated August 29, 30 and September 15, 1434, in which
he gave the papal blessing to young Frederick in answer to the latter's 
26petition. The gesture on the part of Eugenius laid the groundwork 
for later imperial support at a time when the Pope's position and in­
fluence at the Council of Basel was rapidly fading. Frederick's moti­
vation in his petition was free of political connotations and was a 
gesture of personal piety.
A number of extant documents of the year 1434 testify to
27 28Frederick's newly found independence. Duke Frederick the Elder,
however, was hesitant in formally bestowing Frederick's lands upon
him, in part due to the uncertainty surrounding territorial division,
25lMd., I, 2, No. 27.
26Ibid.. I, 1, No. 116.
27Ibid., I, 1, Nos. 115, 118.
28_The term is used to distinguish Duke Frederick IV of the 
Tyrol from young Duke Frederick of Austria.
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but mainly on account of his own land interests. The land councils 
which supervised much of the government were still subject to Fred­
erick the Elder. Both Dukes corresponded with Duke Albert the Elder 
(Albert V, who somewhat later became Ebperor Albert II) on this mat­
ter, who apparently assumed the role of an arbitrator.2^ The letter
of Frederick the Elder revealed that he had had some previous cor—
30respondence with Count Herman of Cilly and Emperor Sigismund con­
cerning the matter. Their reactions to his proposals seem to have 
been favorable, for Frederick the Elder noted that his ward had 
shown him a letter from Albert, the proposals of which young Fred­
erick seemed prepared to follow. The old Duke also noticed Fred­
erick's request to Albert the Elder for trusted councilors— a request 
which the latter deemed feasible. Albert suggested that the council­
ors be allowed to advise Frederick the Elder and Frederick the 
31Younger, in order to influence both for the good. Young Frederick1! 
correspondence was an early indication of his tendency towards diplo­
macy and concilliation— a frame of mind which his century could tol­
erate. Frederick the Elder was still reluctant to act.
29
rJliefTH*-,Friedr^Cks.des *ltern 311 H* A1brecht (December 4, I, 1, No, 1. A second letter to the same address 
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30The relations between Frederick the Elder and Herman of 
inf? that the Austrian dukes were so apprehensive concem-
tSf+ 4 collaboration of the Cillys with Emperor Sigismundthey were willing to use their own subjects as mediators.
31
divi<,inn S 1? PJ0P0S^  have been given to better facilitate the 
to arise. mediate the opposing interests which were sure
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Notwithstanding this rare moderation and compliance,
Duke Frederick the Elder could not be persuaded to an 
immediate surrender and settlement. Several moons 
passed before the affair was settled through the ener­
getic arbitration and decision of Duke Albert the 
Elder, and Frederick the Younger received what he was 
entitled to.32
Emperor Sigismund considered both wards as of age and inde­
pendent. On February 3» 1436, he made a declaration which stated 
that the Austrian Jews were to retain their privileges. Young Fred­
erick and Albert were asked to prevent any infractions of the decree.-^ 
Although Frederick the Elder was not mentioned in the pronouncement, 
he was still reluctant to give up the regency.-^
Finally in May, 1435, a solution was arrived at through the 
efforts of Albert the Elder.35 He stipulated that the Elder Fred­
erick was to return all lands formerly owned by Duke Ernest. Until 
such a time as the land was officially divided the two Fredericks were 
to have mutual possession of Upper and Lower Austria. The entire mat­
ter was to be completed by May 25, 1436. In case of any disagreement 
during the course of the negotiations, Duke Albert would decide the mat­
ter. When the terms of the agreement had been fulfilled, young Frederick
-^Chmel, Friedrich IVf I, p. 21.
33Chmel, Materialien. I, 1 , No. 121.
3^
As late as March 3» 1^359 Frederick the Elder undertook all 
matters regarding a financial transaction by W. Mecz, who sold his 
estate in West Plankenstein below the Gunabitz, even though the bill 
of sale carried the names of Frederick and Albert as well as Fred­
erick the Elder. Ibid.. I, 2, No. 122.
35J. Hormayr, Uber Minder.iahrigkeit. Vormundschaft. und Gross- 
j&hrigkeit im osterreichischen Kaiserstaate (Wien, 1808), Beylage VIII, p. 180.
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should renounce his minority and wardship to Frederick the Elder, by 
a formula originating with Albert V. Both dukes were to forget the 
past, and live in friendship and love. The past was to be forgiven
O £
and forgotten.
The internal history of Austria from 1424-35 was highly complex 
and involved. Austria had numerous institutions and spiritual com­
munities; many of the landed estates were in the hands of foreigners. 
The nobility held a high position and exhibited marked tendencies 
towards independence; the same was true of the middle classes. The 
history of Frederick's minority indicated that any efficient adminis­
tration of the laws could only be fostered by the undivided and supreme 
power of a central r u l e r . T h e  Austrian lands were not yet able to 
bear the absence of the regent, since a strong landed nobility of 
diverse interests ruled. The position of Frederick the Elder was
36Chmel, Friedrich IV, I, P. 216.
37In Austria, the ownership and transfer of property was 
generally subject to great confusion. Power and the accumulation of 
property were directly related. Consequently no universal property 
laws could be enacted. Those individuals in possession of estates 
and ground rents as well as those having rights of cognisance and 
feudal dues all opposed an overall code of justice if it interfered 
with their petty interests. No humanitarian laws could ever be 
evolved on a national scale so long as these conditions existed. 
Chmel gives a rather pointed analysis of -the situation. Referring 
to Styria, Carinthia and Carniola he notes! "A map of these 
provinces, as they existed in the year 1425, would be as educational 
as it would be difficult to produce. This map would have to indi­
cate the immediate possessions of the territorial noble, all his 
castles, fortresses and towers; . . . then the provinces of the 
foreign territorial lords, the Archbishop of Salzburg, the Bishops 
of Bamberg and Freysingen, the Counts of Gorz, etc.; then also the 
possessions of the more respected and powerful dynasties of the 
land, the Cilly, the Stubenberge, Pettauer, Ungnade, Kreig, etc.; 
above all the map would have to indicate all the important estates 
of a numerous and wealthy clergy." Ibid.. I, pp. 12-13.
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weakened by his enmity towards Qnperor Sigismund. Added to this was 
the fact that the regent faced not only a diverse nobility and clergy, 
but also a caste of individuals whose moral idealism was thwarted or 
entirely eliminated by the disintegration and demolition of the whole 
medieval state structure. The dissolution of all bonds of obedience 
and faithfulness led to a return of barbarism and club-law. Examples 
of selfishness and caprice abounded. Under these conditions Fred­
erick began his reign. By his side was his younger brother— diametri­
cally opposed to Frederick— and guided by few of the religious con­
siderations which at times motivated Frederick.
During the minority of Frederick Austria continued in the ec­
clesiastical patterns of the past. Along with such strong and inde­
pendent bishoprics as Salzburg, Seckau, Gurk, and Lavant, many 
monasteries dotted the country-side. The Church possessed approxi­
mately one third of the total land area of Austria. In spite of 
this endowments were still available for the establishment of new 
monasteries. What the clergy did with its possessions was another 
matter. The monasteries as well as the individual land-holding 
prelate often displayed a lack of spiritual discernment and even 
temporal humanitarianism in the use of, and enlargement of their 
respective states.
The status of the Austrian nobility (1424-35) cannot be de­
duced with any finality, for the development of various princely 
families was only partly completed. Their salient characteristics 
and their importance for Austria cannot be conclusively demonstrated. 
By the end of Frederick's reign the term consolidation could be
applied with certain reservations, as the extreme individuality of 
the petty nobility had been curbed by the interests of a few leading 
houses. Meanwhile a form of wealth other than land saw the establish­
ment of a new middle class, who gradually assimilated the wealth of 
the land as the fifteenth progressed.38
On May 25, 1^ 35, Duke Frederick was to take formal charge of 
the Austrian lands as Frederick V. The elder Frederick had until 
December 25 of the same year to choose either Upper or Lower Austria. 
Subsequent to this decision the young Dukes were to receive their 
share of the lands. To confuse matters, all three were to be co­
owners of all the lands for a period of six years. If young Fred­
erick had proved an aggressive, uncompromising individual a serious 
family quarrel would have developed.
The difficulties which Frederick faced during his early
\
regency were in part due to the obstinacy of his uncle. In order to 
facilitate the administrative transfer called for by the agreement 
of May 25, 1^ 35, Frederick the Elder sent a commission to Neustadt.
A few weeks later it reported its findings.39 These indicated that 
the old Duke was making a very substantial effort to keep Frederick 
dependent upon him. Such documents as concerned business and property 
rights remained sealed. In addition the war supplies could not be 
touched by the young Duke. Other points of the agreement were also 
bypassed for only a few letters of submission from the territories
38Md., pp. 181-201.
The report is given in Chmel, Materialien. I, 2, No. X.39
transferred to Frederick the Younger are extant.4^ A letter written 
on June 30, 1435 by Conrad Kreig, the steward of Frederick the Elder, 
indicated that he was not at all interested in a final settlement.4*
T T  4 2hen a personal letter to his uncle brought no results Frederick 
apparently complained to Emperor Sigismund, but whether the latter 
took any action is uncertain.
On July 27, 1435, Frederick again wrote his uncle a carefully 
worded letter in which he referred to the large amount of transfer­
able property which his father owned. Since most of it had not yet 
arrived in Neustadt he requested that Frederick the Elder forward 
such articles as might be found. The young regent also added an 
urgent request for the register of the officialdom in Austria.44 
The mounting tension between the two rulers became apparent towards
the end of 1435. After some initial correspondence in November,
451435, Duke Frederick the Elder requested an extension of the land 
division scheduled for December 25, 1435. Frederick the Younger 
proposed a meeting to discuss the matter. If these negotiations




w,. , ,, The sftu?tion involved the transfer of movable property
CiSS. w 3 3 3 I n ^ . T » . * * l u  telonged t0 Frederlok the *U er-
42 nChmel, Materialien. I, 1, No. XI, pp. 30-31.
43_Ibid., No. XII, pp. 31-32.
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failed, consideration would be given to the extension of the termi­
nation date. Frederick again complained that seme of his father's 
valuables had not yet bean sent; this applied especially to the 
silverware. The letter betrayed a note of urgency, but its demands 
were tactfully stated and moderate.
On December 11, 1435* the young ruler was again forced to
46demand that the problem of the land division be settled. Four
4?months later he repeated the request. In this letter he also re­
quested the official files relating to the administration of Austria. 
The material was to be given to his servant, Hans Hauczinger. Cor­
respondence dated as late as March 30, 1436, indicated that all the
48treasures of Frederick's father had still not been returned. The
next day saw a request for a number of specific articles belonging
49to his father's estate. Despite his uncle's intentional delays
50Frederick remained warm and conciliatory. At this point the 
Correspondence between the two Fredericks seems to have ceased, and 
the final solution of the matter remains unclear.
The rivalry and ill feeling between Frederick and his younger 
brother Albert marked another difficulty of the early regency,
46Ibid.. No. XVII, p. 35,
47Ibid.. No. XX, p. 37.
48Ibid., No. XXI, pp. 38-39.
49Ibid.. No. 148.
^Frederick's continued trust of his uncle is evident from a 
letter dated May 31, 1^ 36. M m  No. XXIII, p. 40.
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Albert the Elder, aware of the widespread repercussions the situation 
could produce in Austria, arranged a special meeting to establish a 
working agreement between the future Emperor and his younger brother 
Albert. Had the agreement 1^ arrived at been observed by both parties 
much ill feeling may have been avoided at a later time. The chief 
aspects of the treaty were as follows:
1) They (Frederick and Albert) would not separate as regarded 
business matters in the administration •
2) Frederick as the oldest member of the family was to assume 
leadership in all matters relating to family and government, and in 
all other "merklichen" matters.
3) Should Albert the Younger be removed from the bodily 
presence of Frederick, for any reason whatsoever, he could only 
exercise such powers as Frederick bestowed upon him.
4) Officially, Frederick was to collect all the rent and 
interest due the Dukes, but was to supply his brother with the neces­
sities of life in order that he might live "furstlich und schon."
5) None of the estates owned by the family were to be sold 
without the express permission of both brothers.
6) Frederick was to issue all letters of privilege to the 
nobility "in unser ainer namen und insigl."
7) Frederick also promised not to marry without his brother's 
knowledge, counsel, and favor.
The agreement confirmed Frederick's right to be the sole ruler
51AS printed in Ibid.. No. XXII, pp. 39-40.
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of Austria. The relationship was to last for a period of six years, 
the duration of the nominal rule of the three Dukes over Upper and 
Lower Austria. Sigismund did not congratulate Frederick on his new 
status. In part this was due to the provisional nature which char­
acterized the early regency. Since an imperial recognition of this 
nature usually involved a formal charter of privileges, the temporary 
arrangement in Austria did not merit an official gesture involving 
any degree of permanence.
In order to reveal a more complete picture of the early years 
of Frederick's personal reign in Austria and to dispel the view that 
young Frederick was a lazy and ignorant ruler who survived only on 
the strength of past laws and traditions, a survey of the multiple 
functions of his government must be made. The future Emperor was 
not slow to assume a considerable degree of financial control over 
his lands. One of his first ventures in non-ecclesiastical financial 
affairs was the bestowal of the stronghold of Rabenstein in Lavant- 
thale on George Goss during July, 1435.52 A considerable number of 
such acts marked Frederick's early reign. They signified an aggres­
sive administration and an intelligent appreciation of the realities 
of the Austrian financial structure. In addition to these grants 
Frederick was also rather generous with life annuities, monopolies, 
and temporary land grants.53
52
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Through his honest evaluation of faithful service and conse­
quent liberality in its recognition Frederick won many friends and 
trusted advisors. Official administrative positions were carefully 
filled. Trustworthiness was not the only virtue required. A man’s 
former position and area of influence related rather directly to the 
position he would fill. Thus the Count of Vegel, a man of dynastic 
power equal to that of the Cilly, was appointed to the captaincy of 
Camiola. Similarly Conrad Meichsner whose father had been control­
ler of the dukedom of Mauth in Carinthia, received his father's 
55position. In all the appointments there was no evidence of arbi­
trary or capricious action on the part of Frederick. Past experience 
and ability rather than favoritism were the prerequisites for the of­
ficials of his government.
Extant documents demonstrate that Frederick carried on an ex­
tensive economic program especially in terms of financial transactions 
and the transfer of estates.56 Although a definite trend Is difficult 
to determine in this connection,57 the Duke's widespread activity in 
this area would tend to discredit the view that he was lazy and in­
different towards all matters of government. The intense economic 
and territorial involvement which typified the young Duke's adminis­
tration of his hereditary lands was not unrelated to the course he
54Dipl. Frid. j. N. 17, fol. 28 (69).
55Ibid., fol. 22 (60).
A rather detailed account of the various transactions of Frederick can be found in Chmel, cit., I, PP! 2S 5!
Some instability was apparent in the Austrian economic
would pursue as King of the Romans. All of Frederick's subsequent 
connections with the Papacy were conditioned by his position as a 
prince of his hereditary lands rather than a co-ruler of Christendom. 
This factor did not eliminate an active ecclesiastical policy, never­
theless the Duke's attitude toward the Papacy was in essence dependent
upon the pressures facing Frederick as a Christian prince, not as a 
universal ruler.
Frederick's toleration and goodwill brought at least a nomi­
nal response from the independent and entrenched nobility of Austria. 
An atmosphere of mutual trust prevailed and the regent was not slow 
to make the best possible use of this for the welfare of his domains. 
When Count Stephan of Montfort appointed Frederick and Albert the 
guardians of his cousin's children in the event of his death, Fred­
erick bound himself to this task by issuing a formal declaration of 
58his intent. The only real princely opposition during this period 
cane from the Cilly. The latter were to remain a trouble some element 
throughout Frederick's entire reign. The localized territorial 
policies of this powerful clan gravely weakened Frederick's inter­
national position, for it kept him concerned with purely Austrian 
affairs. The only method by which Frederick managed to maintain a 
relative p«ace between the nobles of the various provinces was com­
promise. When the Carinthlan noble John Ungnad held a certain Peter
29
not^participants ( H .
XXVIII. The document 1S Polished in Chmel, op. cit., I, Beilage,
Gradner captive, and demanded a ransom for his release, Frederick 
acted as arbitrator in the dispute. The Duke ruled that Ungnad was 
to compensate his prisoner for the injustice done to him. 59 Personal 
advantage rather than Austrian nationalism was often the basis of 
loyalty. Although Sigismund Wolfsauer and his two sons swore alle­
giance to Frederick they simultaneously requested that the stronghold 
of Kapfenstein be returned to them. 60 The episode also revealed that 
foreign influences tended to control the activities of the native 
landed nobility for a subsequent dispute with Archbishop John of 
Salzburg was directly related to Wolfsauer's submission. 61
Such external interference took variant forms. During Fred­
erick's pilgrimage to Jerusalem, Emperor Sigismund, with complete 
disregard of the rights and consultative prerogatives of Frederick, 
raised his brother-in-law, Count Frederick of Cilly, to the position 
of a duke.62 Despite Frederick's protests. Sigismund was detemined 
to force the recognition of the Grand Dukedom of Cilly. In answer 
to Frederick's objections Sigismund wrote:
, ' : vfdu> erzellest in dinem briefe vil sache . . . 
als wir dir vorgeschnben haben also ist noch vnser ernste 
begerung, vesticlich gebot vnd meynung, das d u ^ T e g ^ !  
ten vnsere Sweger mit alien eren vnd schrifften haldest .
30
59Dipl. Frid. j. No. 17, fol. 42 (105). 
Chmel, Materialiea, I, 1, No. 159. 
61Ibid., No. 160.
^ j i 2^ f p 's ^ a| i^ S °(‘H ^ ^ ri82i)fCT' Beil^frn
Geschee aber dez nit So verstunden wir wol, du woltest vns 
in vnsem keyserlichen gewalt greiffen. Dez wir billich 
vertragen weren vnd wir musten vnd wolten vns in den sachen 
halten in masze . . .  (wie) wir dir in den ersten vnsem 
briefen geschriben haben.^
The Cilly consequently revealed a strong spirit of independence that 
was based entirely on their awareness of Sigismund's support. When 
Duke Frederick objected to Count Frederick's confiscation of an es­
tate, the latter bluntly replied ”. . .  hat yeraand zu vns icht zu 
sprechen . . . wellen wir vns verantwurtn vor vnserm herren dem 
Kaiser. Even thougi such lawlessness was detrimental to the wel­
fare of Austria it would have been folly for Frederick to use force. 
After the death of Sigismund on December 9, 1437, Frederick was still 
forced to pity a cautious game. He managed to induce Albert II to 
appoint certain days for negotiations with the Cilly but the action 
produced no results.65 While Borne armed conflict did take place, it 
would seem reasonable to suppose that this occurred after the death 
of Emperor Albert, for both parties wished to remain in his good 
graces. This tension between specific territorial lords and the
regent anticipated the pattern of events in Austria during the next 
fifty years.
Religiously, Duke Frederick was unreservedly committed to 
traditional Catholicism. Throughout his reign he maintained a
31
63Chmel, Materialien f I, 2, No. XXVI; See also E M Li oh 
nowsky, -e.§chiTchte de§ Houses Habsburg (Wien, 1842), Vf No! 3728.
64Chmel, SB. cit., I, 2, No. XXVIII.
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tradition of kindness and benevolence towards all types of ecclesias­
tical institutions within his own domains. Nevertheless, his religi­
ous framework revealed that he was not above the superstitions of 
his day. His personal notebook^ repeatedly bore the marking AEIOV. 
Moreover, these symbols were widely used in the public monuments of 
Austria. In subsequent centuries no fewer than three hundred various
explanations for the letters were given, most of which saw them as
6fta symbol of Austrian political ambition, In all probability, 
however, the matter related to the current belief in the magic power 
of minerals and precious stones in particular. The power inherent 
in the minerals could only be made effective by a secret formula 
known only to the owner. Since Frederick was a great collector of 
rare gems the inference is obvious.
It is very likely that he wanted to establish 
a magical relationship between his own person and 
the objects designated by the vowels, and perhaps 
also protect them from destruction . . . Emperor 
Frederick Ill's AEIOV is most probably a play of 
magic letters or mystic numbers.
^Preserved as Codex, Vind. Pal. n. 2674. In part published 
by Chrael, Friedrich IV. I, Beylage XXX, pp. 576-593.
67'This is the estimate given in the most conclusive study of 
the subject to date. A. Lhotsky, "AEIOV. Die 'Devise' Kaiser 
Friedrichs III. und sein Notizbuch," Mitteilungen des Instituts fur 
osterreichische Geschichtsforschune. IX (1952), 161.
68The most widespread interpretation was that put forth by 
Peter Lambeck, the director of the Imperial Library under Leopold
I. It read "Austrie est imperare orbi universo."
^Lhotsky, o£. sit., p. 175.
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Frederick's father, Duke Ernest, continued a family tradition 
when he journeyed to Jerusalem and became a kni$it of the Holy Sepul­
chre. His son's religiosity soon led him to follow in his father's 
footsteps. Eugenius IV graciously granted the young Duke a retinue
of one hundred individuals. Simultaneously, he was confirmed as a
70knight of the Holy Sepulchre. When Frederick had received safe
conduct from the Duke of Venice, Franciscus Foscari,^1 and obtained
sufficient loans from Austrian sources to finance his venture, he left
Trieste for Palestine on August 9, 1436. Approximately fifty barons
and nobles from Styria, Carinthia, Camiola, Tyrol and Austria ac- 
72companied him. Little is known of Frederick's actual experiences. 
The Duke apparently had a great interest in the customs and cultures 
of the lands he traversed, for in his Diarium he noted the Turkish, 
Arabic, Armenian, Syriac, Hebrew and Greek alphabets.*73 A few
70J. Chmel, Materialien. I, 1 , No. V, p. 40. The Bull was given 
at Bologna, July 11, 1436. Concerning Frederick Eugenius said, "Eximio 
devotionis affectus quem ad nos et Romanam ecclesiam gerere dinosceris 
meretur." In a second Bull issued on the same day Frederick was 
granted a special confessor by the Pope, who was able to absolve him 
from all sin in case of sudden misfortune or death. Ibid.
71Ibid., I, 1, No. IV, pp. 39-40.
The names of the individuals who accompanied him were pre­
served in his diary. Chmel, Friedrich IV, Beilage XXX, o. 581. In 
the pilgrim literature of the fifteenth century a Middle High German 
poem has been preserved describing Frederick's journey. It lacks 
originality, however, and is almost identical with his personal diary. 
n s significance lies in its literary and linguistic qualities. See 
ft# Kohricht, Jerusalemfahrt des Herzogs Friedrich von Usterrpi^h n
fp itq fr-m  ifit Bmiw iw  aLitoiQRif . x x iii  ( i 8 a ) ,  pS X S H H
formation is found in ¥. A. Neumann, "Die Jerusalemfahrten der Xlteren 
absburgischen Fursten," Berjchte und Mittheilungen des Altertum- 
Yereines zu T&eii, XVIII (1879), 138-1481 -------------
73Chmel, ob. cit., I, Beilage XXX, p. 582.
financial transactions also occured in the course of the pilgrimage.^ 
Following a possible stopover at Cyprus^ Frederick returned to Austria 
during the last weeks of 1436 and was in Vienna-Neustadt in the first 
days of January. Frederick's pilgrimage had little relation to his 
subsequent ecclesiastical policies. It served only to identify him 
as a true son of the Church— at least theologically.
A further facet of Frederick's religiosity related to the ad­
ministration of the ecclesiastical establishments in his hereditary 
lands. The history of the Austrian lower clergy during this period 
was comprised of a series of events which indicated trends, but 
hardly established an overall pattern. Commercial activity dominated 
the scene. Endowments were established, church lands exchanged or 
sold, and pensions renewed or inaugurated. The materialistic orien­
tation which characterized the inhabitants of the ecclesiastical es­
tablishments brought them into conflict with the landed nobility.
The sources concerning Styrian monastic activity during this 
period are fragmentary. A number of the monasteries carried on in 
good agricultural style, especially in the nurture of grapes and the 
manufacture of wine. In this tradition Abbot Paul of the Cistercian 
monastery at Neuberg purchased a fine vineyard from Stephen Mynnimtau 
on May 11, 1435. By a special charter confirmed by Duke Frederick,
74Ibid.. p. 280.
^^Frederick's notes on the duties of members of a certain 
Cyprian society would suggest this. The poets account of the matter 
was very factual. Rohricht, op . cit.. p. 40.
?6Chmel, 2E. cit., I, p. 330.
the monastery was allowed the commercial sale of wine on its own
77lands.' Quarrels, incited by rival economic interests, were often 
initiated by the monasteries themselves. In conflicts of this 
nature, the Duke tended to favor the ecclesiastical establishments.
The nunneries of Styria also experienced a tangible betterment of 
material circumstances. The Prioress of the cloister at Graz,
Dorothea Neuendorfferin, was never short of ready cash. Her many 
debtors included none other -than Frederick himself.78
similar trends characterized the lower clergy of Carinthia. 
Frederick's tendency to favor ecclesiastical over secular claims 
often brought him into direct conflict with the nobility of the 
provinces. When the Bishop of Gurk, Schallerman, swore fidelity 
and friendship to Duke Frederick,79 the Count of Cilly iranediately 
proceeded to seize a number of castles in the Bishopric. Frederick 
responded by sending troops into the area. In Carinthia as in Styria 
Frederick was often engrossed in the minor administrative problems of 
a specific religious establishment. On one occasion he stipulated 
that every priest at the parish of Memberg was free to will his 
earthly possessions as he saw fit.80
Duke Frederick also functioned as an arbitrator in monastic 
disputes. On May 1, 1438, Duke Frederick set a date upon which the
77Chmel, Materialien. I, 2, No. XXV.
78A detailed account of the commercial activity of the cloister is given in Chmel, Friedrich IV, I, pp. 334-40. cloister




provost of the monastery of St. Andrew in Lavantthale was to appear 
before the provincial court at Graz and place his charges against the
O-ineighboring Benedictine monastery of St. Paul. After some procras- 
82tination the provost was finally ordered to appear personally before 
the Duke* The matter was further complicated when the provost turned 
to the Archbishop of Salzburg for aid* The latter accepted the case, 
and on December 23» 1439» handed down a decision against the Abbot of 
St* Paul* An appeal to the Council of Basel probably did not material­
ize, for the Archbishop ordered the monastery to adhere to his ver-
Oo
diet. The process of law in this particular matter brought to light 
the large degree of independence the Archbishoprics enjoyed. Even 
though the monastery of St. Paul had committed its cause to Duke Fred­
erick, the latter avoided contesting the decision of the Archbishop,
General unrest did not hinder the prosperity of the religious 
institutions in Camiola. Again Frederick's personal participation 
was in evidence. On July 30, 1437 he allowed the Cistercian monastery 
of Sittich free use of the fort it had built in the city of Rudolphs- 
wert in order to protect its holdings. 84 Bequests, territorial dis­
putes, land acquisitions and the sale of agricultural produce typified, 
the monastic pattern in Camiola. A novel fund raising technique 
found application in the Bishopric of Pettina. On November 3, 1438,
8lIbid.f No. 207.
02
The hesitancy of the provost was based upon an ecclesiastical 
aversion to secular courts, rather than a fear of injustice.
83Chmel, Friedrich IV, Beilage XLIV.
8*fDipl. No. 17, fol. 62 (153).
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Bishop Martin decreed a forty day plenary remission of sins for all
who visited the monastery and contributed to its upkeep. As in other
areas, the personal religious qualities of Duke Frederick continued
to attract the honor and goodwill of the religious orders of his
realm. On May 14, 1438, the general of the Carthusian Order issued
a letter proclaiming Frederick's brotherly bend with the order.®5
A year later on May 24, 1439* the general of the Order of Augustinian
Hermits gave a similar letter to Frederick in view of his patronage 
86and friendship. Frederick's religious benevolence was matched by 
a pious court life; at least existing records reveal the presence 
of several court chaplains.87
In the interests of internal stability Frederick concluded a 
treaty with Bishop Anton of Bamberg in Graz on February 3, 1436. The 
imperial decree read:
Das wir vleissikchlich betracht vnd angesehen haben 
die lawttern trew und lieb die der Erwirdig vnser lieber 
frewnd her Anthoni Bishof zu Bamberg zu uns had. Vnd 
haben dadurch vnd auch darurab daz all vnser vordem 
seligen sein Gotzhaws in guter gehayra vnd lieb gehabt 
haben vns vnd vnsem erben zu demselben Bischouen verainet 
und verpunden alle die weil er lebt und darnach drew ancze 
Jar nachheinander.””
The freedom of the Bishopric was personally guaranteed by the Duke.
In exchange for this protection the Bishop put the territory at




Frederick's disposal in the event of any emergency in Carinthia.
In view of this agreement Frederick established an alliance between
Styria and Carinthia, which was valid against all except the Pope,
the Empire itself, and the Archbishop of S a l z b u r g . An attempt was
also made to transfer seme of the non-productive areas of Bamberg's
holdings over to Frederick, but although Emperor Sigismund agreed to
the procedure the final transaction of the matter apparently never 
91took place.7
One final area related to Frederick's ecclesiastical adminis­
tration was the Archbishopric of Salzburg. Archbishop John fostered 
an aggressive administrative policy throughout the period from 1435- 
1440. Despite his separatism John never entirely disregarded the 
young Duke for he realized that Frederick represented a good source 
of potential military aid. The Habsburger allowed John every possible 
immunity, Salzburg as the chief diocese of central Austria extended 
its influence not only to the clergy under its jurisdiction, but 
throughout the whole land. Since the Archbishopric manifested a 
marked trend towards autonomous jurisdiction a collision with the 
leading nobility was inevitable. A mixture of undefined temporal and
89The Bishopric of Bamberg was not unrelated to international 
politics. One of its more renowned sons was Peter of Schaumberg 
whom Frederick sent on several important diplomatic missions. J.
Kist, Das Bamberger Domkaoitel von 1399 bis 1566. Ein Beitrag zur 
Ge.schichte seiner Verfassung. seines Wjrkens und seiner Mitglieder 
(Historisch-Diplomatische Forschungen, ed. L. Santifaller, Vol. 7, 
Weimar, 1943), p. 90.
90Dipl. N. 17 fol. 26, 2? (66).
89
91Chmel, 0£. cj£.., I, 1, No. 186.
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spiritual powers of necessity conflicted with those of the secular 
lord.
Such a collision occurred ivhen Frederick made his pilgrimage
to Palestine. Upon his return Frederick sat in judgement upon the mat-
92ter but the final outcome of the dispute remains uncertain. Appar­
ently Frederick could not provide a satisfactory judgement for John 
turned to Emperor Sigismund in order to clear himself of the accusa­
tions against him. The Emperor's action was illustrative of the juris­
dictional complex facing the regent of Austria. By a mandate issued 
on July 25, 14-37, Sigismund decreed that no one could bring the Arch­
bishop before the courts of Styria, Carinthia, and Caraiola.93 A 
decree addressed specifically to Duke Albert the Elder, Duke Fred­
erick the Elder, Dukes Frederick and Albert the Younger, the Dukes 
of Bavaria and the Counts of G'orz and Cilly warned that anyone at­
tempting any sort of action against the Archbishop of Salzburg would 
find no further assistance, protection, or abode within the confines 
of the Empire.
Traditionally the marshalship of the Archbishopric belonged 
to the Dukes of Styria. This position became vacant when the last of 
the Kuchler family died. Thereupon Archbishop John gave the position 
to the von Nussdorf family without consulting Duke Frederick. The 
latter made no attempt to interfere with John's decision. The internal 
administration of the Archbishopric was carried on in a similar spirit.
92Chmel, Friedrich IV, I, pp. 294-95.
93Aschbach, 0£. cit., IV, Beilage VIII, p. 515. The main as­
pects of the mandate are reproduced in Chmel, 0£. cit., I, pp. 296-97.
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Archbishop John confirmed land transfers, offered protection to the 
citizens of his lands, heard their disputes and settled their dif­
ferences, He represented the final court of appeal within his 
realms.7 Salzburg's relation to the Austrian regent was rather 
simple. In view of the continued centralization and independence 
which characterized the Archbishopric, Frederick's status was that of 
a protector, on whcm Salzburg could rely in case of internal revolution 
or external invasion.
The proximity of the Salzburg Archbishopric to the Austrian 
hereditary lands had a direct bearing upon Frederick's relations with 
the Papacy since Archbishop John was a staunch supporter of the Coun­
cil of Basel. The legate of John, Jacob Frieshammer, participated in 
all the acts of the Council against Eugenius IV and was a member of 
the delegation sent to inform Felix V of his election as anti-pope.
When the Council of Basel requested John to recognize the new Pope, 
the Archbishop called a provincial synod on January 25, 1440. Appre­
hensive of such radicalism, John asked for an affirmation of the Coun­
cil's actions from the University of Vienna. Salzburg's anti- 
Eugenius position had widespread repercussions in the lower dioceses 
of its jurisdiction, and brought an element of religious discord in­
to Frederick's realms.
In the heyday of conciliarism the Roman Curia made a special 
point of befriending the secular rulers of all realms in order to 
divert the threat to papal supremacy which the movement represented.
^Chmel, 2E* £it., I, pp. 302-03.
Frederick's devotion to traditional Catholicism made him a supporter 
of the Roman See by inclination rather than by a definite policy.
The kindness Eugenius IV showed Frederick on his Palestinian pilgrim­
age had doubtlessly awakened the Duke's sympathy for him. The Pope 
continued his calculated friendliness towards Frederick, On August 
25* 14-3?, Rome decreed that the regent of Austria could choose a
confessor to his liking. Likewise, Albert the Younger was given "das
95Privilegium eines tragbaren Altares." Eugenius' friendship was not 
without utilitarian motives, however. At an imperial diet held in the 
summer of 1438 he attempted to use Duke Frederick as an influence upon 
Emperor Albert II, since he was well aware that Frederick's tact had 
won the respect of the Emperor.Nevertheless sane aspects of genu­
ine friendship were in evidence. On July 7, 1439, Pope Eugenius IV 
joyfully informed Frederick of the proposed union between the eastern 
and western churches. The Pope requested that the Duke offer public 
prayers and hold processions on behalf of the success of the venture. 
Even the prospects of a possible crusade to the Holy Land were dis­
cussed.9'7
Internally, the Austria over which Frederick ruled on the 
eve of his imperial election was an administrative complex. A sharply 
strstified society existed in all three provinces, each rank possess­
ing its traditional freedoms and privileges. This resulted in a dis­
tinct lack of political control. Although Frederick had wisely
95Chmel, Materialien. I, 1, Nos. 165, 190.
96Ibid.. No. 215.
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surrounded himself with many of the greater lords of his realm and al­
lowed himself to be influenced by them on many occasions, he still ex­
perienced unrelenting opposition from the Counts of Cilly, The Arch­
bishop of Salzburg was closely allied with the Cilly, In control of
such significant Bishoprics as Brixen, Chiemsee, Freising, Gurk,
98Lavant, Passau, Regensburg and Seckau, he represented a political 
and religious force which could not be ignored. The provinces of 
Styria, Carinthia and Carniola combined produced only one half of 
the revenue which the province of Austria provided." Any territorial 
disturbances were therefore devastating to a delicately balanced 
econon^ T.
The lesser nobility manifested a strong spirit of independence. 
Their purposes were often selfish and imnediate; they were not averse 
to betraying a loyalty or even engaging in criminal activities. While 
most of the lower aristocracy had pledged their loyalty to Frederick, 
the latter, rather than rely on such an unstable and impoverished 
element, chose to undergird the middle class of his domains. The loy­
alty of the class was further enforced by the ranks of the lower clergy. 
Inspired by Frederick's religious qualities the majority of the lower 
ecclesiastical hierarchy fully supported Frederick, or at least did not 
oppose him. Since the spiritual control of the religious institutions 
lay in the hands of Salzburg and its satellites, however, Frederick 
derived only a minimum advantage from these. Essentially foreign 
influence dominated such Bishoprics as Passau, Regensburg and Freising,
v ttC* Eu^iL’ S-ierarchia Catholica Medii Aevi (Monasterii,y f P* 2o4f 
"Chmel, op, cit., I, i# pp. 82-98,
*3
and the governor of the region had great difficulty in making his 
influence felt in these realms. Fiscally, most of the monasteries 
were subject to the feudal lord of the area, who made sure that very 
limited revenue reached the ruler of Austria. Even the moral support 
of the lower clergy could not be counted on since Salzburg even con­
trolled freedom of thought to a large degree.
At the beginning of his regency, Frederick was faced with a 
divided church. He ruled a kingdom that had not been united under 
one head for 60 years. The spirit of independence and self-interest 
was very strong. For many Frederick was little more than a temporary 
regent. His power was curbed on all sides, and the increased oppo­
sition of his brother Albert promised no radical change. Austria's 
traditional friendship with the Papacy made her a scapegoat for all 
enemies of Rome. A ruler burdened with such diversity had to give 
his full attention to the unification of his lands. In Frederick's 
case this was a hopeless task. Internationally this situation made 
his position exceedingly vulnerable, for even as King of the Romans 
Frederick's policies were dependent upon the stability of his Austrian 
lands.
Thus far in our introductory study, we have concerned ourselves 
with the political and religious setting of both the Empire and Aus­
tria prior to Frederick's ascension to the imperial throne in 1440.
The picture is not complete, however, without at least a brief study 
of the character of the man under discussion. The era of Frederick 
III cannot be fully comprehended without an analysis of the man who
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to fill such an important position in the fifteenth century; a man who 
had remained an enigma to history, and whose personal attributes dis­
qualified him in the minds of contemporaries and moderns alike.
Emperor Frederick III was one of the most unique and problemati­
cal Habsburgs ever to rule over the Holy Roman E m p i r e . N o t  a man of 
great physical strength, he was nevertheless broad-chested and of con­
siderable stature. Although subject to his mother's religiosity, he 
displayed little of her restless activism. His long unanimated 
face, smooth white hair, mild restive eyes, as well as the calculated 
pace of his gait betrayed a phlegmatic tendency distinctive in the 
history of the Habsburg d y n a s t y , T h e  very nature of his character 
prevented the excesses often attributed to the princely depotism of
the fifteenth century. Averse to drunkenness and a riotous court 
102life, ^ Frederick preferred fruit to the traditional delicacies
^®A. Wandruszka, Das Haus Habsburg. Die Geschichte einer 
europaischen Dvnastie (Wien, 1956), pp. 87-88.
■^G. Voigt, Enea Silvio de* Piccolomini als Papst Pius der 
Zweite. und sein Zeitalter (Berlin, 18$6), I, p. 250,
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'J. Grunpeck, Die Geschichte Friedrichs III und Maximilians 
I (Vol. Ill of Die Geschichtschreiber der deutschen Vorzeit. ed. G, H, 
Pertz, J, Grimm, K. Lachmann, L. Ranke, K, Ritter, W, Wattenbach, 
transl. T, Ilgen, Leipzig, 1891), p. 24. Joseph Grunpeck was bom 
in 1473. A man of diverse talents he soon gained an honorable posi­
tion at the court of Maximilian as an astrologer. Following the 
death of Maximilian, he continued his profession under Charles V, 
Grunpeck had little understanding of the political or administrative 
problems of the period. The historical value of the work lies in 
its character portrayal of Frederick as well as its reflection of 
contemporary court. Most of the characteristics usually attributed 
to Frederick are based on Grunpeck's account. Since the work was 
undoubtedly written to improve his personal status, the less positive 
virtues of both Frederick and Maximilian were left out. See A.
Czerny, "Der Humanist und Historiograph Kaiser Maximilians I, Joseph 
Grunpeck." Archive fiir osterreichische Geschichte. 73 (1888), 346- 
354,
of the imperial court, and was veiy adept in the art of conversation.
His personality displayed a consistant moderation rarely encountered
in a fifteenth century princely court. Honesty and conscientiousness
104were also on his list of virtues.
The character of Frederick III manifested a remarkable ability 
to exercise patience and endure insult. The ruthless and egotistical 
diplomacy of his time evoked an occasional ebullition of rage from 
the Emperor, but his even temperament prevented any rash action. When 
his wife, Leonora of Portugal, chided him for his pedantic and un­
revengeful mannerisms, he philosophically noted that the tongues were 
born free and must have expression. Moreover, time itself revenged 
all things. When Vienna was surrounded by insurgents, and its
Aneas Svlvius Piccolomini, "De Liberorum Educatione," 
QsO-ia (Basel, 1571/, p. 969* Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, "Penta- 
logus, B. Pez (ed.), Thesaurus Anecdotorum Kovissimus (Augustae Vin- 
delicorum, 1723) 9 IV, 3» pp* 681, 683; L. Ranke, Deutsche Geschichte 
im Zeitalter der Reformation (Berlin, I839), I, p. 97.
104T.- Buyken, Eneas §.ilvic Piccolomini. Sein Leben und Werden 
bis zum Mskoeat (Koln, 1931), p. 42. By way of a general characteri­
zation Aeneas Sylvius commented: "The prince himself is catholic and 
pius, lively, quite wise, serious, honest . . .  and a supporter of 
soberness." Letter to Francesco Pizzolpasso wrotten on May 1 1,
^°lkan, Der Briefwecksel des Eneas Silvius Piccolorrrirn (Vol. 
“ I of Fontes Rerum Austriacarum. Diplomataria et Acta. Wien, I909), 
•*-t P» 129.
105r ••runpeck, 02. cit., p. 13. A similar or perhaps the same 
event is also recorded by the imperial official John of Hinderbach, 
who accompanied Frederick to Rome in 1450. Hinderbach later completed 
m s  II s Historia Friderici III. See J. Hinderbach, "Historiae 
ereum, a Friderico Tertio Imperatore gestarum, continuatio," A. F. 
Kollar (edj, Analecta Monumentorum Omnis Aevi Vindobonensia. ( W a 
et Sjudio (Vindobonae, 1762), II, p. 622. --
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sophistication evident in Italy and even Burgundy. The renaissance 
forms of art and learning received little sympathy in Vienna. Scho­
lastic theology was still highly admired, much to the disgust of 
Aeneas Sylvius. 110 The Emperor's only concession to renaissance 
ideals occured at Frankfort in 1442 when he placed a laurel wreath
upon the head of Aeneas, 111 and in Nuremberg in 1487 when Konrad
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Celtis received a similar honor. ^ German was firmly established as 
the language of the imperial court, and most of Frederick's diplomacy 
within the German Nation was carried on in that tongue. Occasionally 
even the papal legates corresponded with the Emperor in German, as for 
instance Nicholas of Cusa. Frederick had, a good mastery of Latin, 
however, and could converse in it with some facility. 113 The fact 
that almost fifty substantial volumes of Frederick's personal 
library are still in existence would suggest that he was something
110Voigt, op. cit., pp. 281-284.
11K, Schottenloher, "Kaiseliche Dichterkronungen im 
Heiligen Romischen Reiche Deutscher Nation,” Papstturn und Kaiser- 
tym Forschungen zur Politischen Geschichte und Geisteskultur des 
ffittelalters. Paul Kehr zum 65. Geburtstag dargebracht, ed. A. 
Brackmann (Munchen, 1926), pp. 65O-65I.
112v • Bezold, "Konrad Celtis, 'der deutsche
^rzhumanist , Aus Mittelalter und Renaissance (Munchen und Berlin, 1918;, p. 86.
113. ln March, 1492, the Saxon envoy Pfotel had. an audience of 
a political nature with the Emperor. In a report submitted to his 
superiors Pfotel noted the Emperor's switch from German to Latin dur­
ing the deliberations. C. Hofler, "Frankische Studien IV. Urkund- 
liche Beitrage zur Geschichte der Hauser Brandenburg und Oesterreich 
der Lander Ungarn und Bohmen," Archive fur Kunde Osterreichi seh«r 
^chichts-gugllen, VII (I851), No. 118. p. 132. It seems reasonable 
to assume that Frederick's negotiations with the Pope during his 
visits to Rcme were accomplished without the aid of an interpreter.
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of a scholar or at least a bibliophile of considerable stature.
This was not the case, however. Frederick's collection of books was 
controlled by no definite principles of selection or educational val­
ue. The fact that the content of many of his works dealt only with 
imperial and even personal history would suggest that egotistic 
orientation conditioned this pursuit. "Emperor Frederick III possessed 
many books, but no library in a higher sense, for no controlling philoso­
phy, no principle of selection, no specific educational ideal can be ob­
served. He collected books of all types because he viewed them as 
objects of value."11*1'
Frederick's political outlook was closely related to his per­
sonal character. His persistant love of peace and distrust of arms 
made him an object of universal ridicule. Even Aeneas Silvius spoke 
of his ”. . .  remarkable abundance of tranquillity and leisure.wl -^5 
Already at this time the Habsburg house displayed "a deep scepticism 
concerning the success of arms, a traditional love of peace, which 
realizes the inevitability of battle and war, but only reluctantly 
commits the fortune of its dynasty to the decision of the battlefield." 116 
Political emergencies endangering the welfare of Austria were solved 
by procrastination. A diplomatic envoy, though well endowed with the 
gift of persuasion, proved powerless against this weapon. In his
"^^hotsky, og. cit., p. 134.
11^Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, "De Europa," Opera Geographica 
et Historic^ (Helmstadii, 1699), p. 269.
ll6Wandruszka, op. cit., p. 88. Grunpeck informs us that 
Frederick's favorite saint was George, who protected in war and even 
aided in waging war. og. cit., p. 23.
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Diarium Frederick confidently wrote: "All unalterable things are best 
forgotten. " 1 1 '7 In imperial diplomacy it was not a question of victory, 
but of perserverance. This basic maxim in later Habsburg diplomacy 
was already a functional reality during the reign of Frederick. He 
was a political realist to the point of immobility.
This phlegmatic tendency in imperial politics did not pre­
suppose an attitude of defeatism in Frederick's concept of Habsburg
U Sdynastic achievement. On the contrary he maintained a fanatical
and paradoxical faith in the destiny of his house. Frederick was
concerned with ultimate rather than immediate results, and sacrificed
the contemporary honor and glory of his dynasty in the interests of 
119ultimate survival. From the viewpoint of Habsburg dynastic his­
tory Frederick's importance cannot be overestimated. Avoiding war 
wherever possible, he sustained the claims of his house through a 
period of international turmoil that saw the downfall of several 
illustrious dynasties. Both in eastern and western Europe Frederick 
preserved Habsburg control and even managed to lay the basis for the
117'Chmel, Friedrich IV, I, Beylage XXX, p. 578.
118H. Sybel, o^. cit..p. 85.
119 Frederick.III possessed the intelligence and inclination 
for.diplomatic activity. But within himself he fostered a broad 
political outlook which found and retained the abiding and permanent 
amid the rapid changes of time and circumstance. . ." A. Bachmann, 
Deutsche Reichsgeschichte im Zeitalter Friedrich III, und Max I.
.Eas°nderer B^erucksichtigung der osterreichisohftn Staatens?esch3ohtft (Leipzig, 1884), I, p. 6. ------ ---------
subsequent rise of the dynasty under Maximilian I, During the
reign of Frederick III, imperial politics were the product of a
pedantic personality which combined procrastination and dynastic
ambition in such a way as to produce a retiring and often humiliating
steadfastness. Thirty years after Frederick's death, the policy of 
121this "helpless" Emperor enabled Charles V to impose his will upon 
Europe.
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120Wandruska, og. cit,, pp. 91-92.
121As pictured by L. Stacke, Deutsche Geschichte (Bielefeld 
und Leipzig, I896), I, p. 754.
CHAPTER II
THE ELECTION AND EARLY ECCLESIASTICAL POLICY OF FREDERICK III
The reign of Emperor Albert II established several basic, tend­
encies in imperial ecclesiastical policy, which were to attain a dis­
tinctive traditional status as the fifteenth century progressed. 
Sigismund succeeded in enhancing the position of the Reman King by 
assuming the role of an arbitrator in the current dispute between the 
Papacy and the Council of Basel. The Emperor was able to persuade 
Eugenius IV to accept his arbitration despite the fact that the Coun­
cil had been transferred to Ferrara. The Council of Basel, however, 
refused to cooperate. In the exercise of his new position, Sigismund 
closely adhered to a policy of neutrality in relation to both Pope and 
Council, Reiterating the position of the Emperor the Bishop of Vich 
wrote "I do not wish to support the Pope nor the others, but I wish 
to be equally appropriate to either side."1 During a meeting held 
in November, 1437, the Electors added another plank to the imperial 
program for ecclesiastical reform. It was advocated that the contem­
porary problems could only be solved by a third Council, removed from 
both Basel and Ferrara. The idea never emerged from its theoretical 
stage, for Sigismund died on December 9, 1437. During his reign 
three new trends had been introduced into imperial ecclesiastical 
diplomacy— arbitration, neutrality and the convocation of a third
. Beckmann (ed.), Deut sche Reichstagsakten unter Kaiser Sjg- 
ISund. 1435-1437 (Vol. XII of Deutsche Reichstagsakten. Gottingen,
1956), No. 160, p. 261. Cited hereafter as RTA, XII.
Council.
After Sigismund's death, the ecclesiastical situation rapidly- 
deteriorated. Pope Eugenius IV immediately reopened the Council of 
Ferrara in January, 1438. The final outcome of the conciliar-papal 
struggle now became dependent upon the positions assummed by the secu­
lar orinces. Consequently both participants felt compelled to present 
their cases before the temporal lords. The most obvious target of 
their solicitations was the Emperor, who, though politically powerless, 
was still regarded as one of the highest authorities in legal matters. 
Thus, from the moment of his election as King of the Romans, Albert II 
was besieged by representative legations from these two ecclesiastical 
bodies. Since the situation represented a contemporary and potential
threat to the unity of Europe, Emperor Albert and the Electors sought 
to alleviate the danger*
When the Electors gathered at Frankfort for the new imperial 
election, both parties of the schism attempted to force their position 
upon them. The Electors returned an evasive answer. They declared 
that the ecclesiastical problem could only be solved in conjunction 
with the newly elected Emperor. The insincerity of their position 
was soon demonstrated, for shortly after Albert's election on March 18, 
1438, the Electors published their own policy on the church question.
It called for secular neutrality until such a time as an ecumenical 
Council solved the dilemma.2 The Electors now sought to gain fee
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brecht II* ^ yttt JLeipfrstagsakten unter Konig Al-
1957) ii£g jog (12i ‘ ? ?  of geuj^ clje Reichst^sqkt.en, Gottingen,• “os* L?°* 144» 130, 131. The electoral declaration of L,troi ity is traditionally designated by the terns P r o t e s t ” ,°H
lallan. In essence they represent no more thin a desertion Sfthe
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support of the Emperor for their new program. When the electoral 
delegation reached Vienna, however, it found both conciliar and papal 
legations soliciting Albert's favor. Albert, who felt that none of 
the participants in the struggle had purely Christian motives, joined 
the Electors and declared his neutrality in the disputed
Albert, however, was not free to ignore the ramifications of 
the ecclesiastical schism. The relations between Pope and Council 
steadily worsened, culminating in the deposition of Eugenius IV by 
the Council of Basel on June 25, 1439. In order to halt the further 
dismemberment of the Church the Emperor had summoned an imperial Diet 
during March and April, 1439. The assembly was held at Mainz and wit­
nessed the presence of delegates from Albert II, the King of France, 
Castile and Portugal. The Rhenish Electors attended in person. The 
task which faced the Diet involved the reformation and restoration of 
the Church. Although the assembly endorsed the reform decrees sub­
mitted by the Council of Basel, it could not agree upon a common basis 
of procedure in the termination of the schism. In its helplessness it 
scheduled another Diet for Frankfurt on November 1, 14-39. The meeting
i S S S f  phfSff evident 111 electoral position. The first was a 
^  •?laf inst r cont®mPorary state of the Church, while the second appealed to a new Council as a solution to the problem. There is
^  nf* T 8r\ y valid^ ion f°r the origin and development of the af L  L  secuiar neutrality. Consequently, widespread disagreement 
John nf T oriSlnator of this mentality exists. G. Voigt designates 
John of Lysura and Gregor Heimburg as the fathers of neutrality. Enea
itSlin 1 R^T°T°minii#^ ^  ££in ZeitalterCnn^T?’ ?! A similar view is advocated by J. Hefele,
(fre*burS in Breisgau, 1869), VII, p.771. Puckert
N ^ 1^n-- 1th®1h° T 1t0 Archbish°P Raban of Trier. Die kurfUrstlich* Neutralitat wafarend des Basler Concils (Leipzig, 185877 p. 67. -----
3RTA, XIII, No. 166.
failed to materialize due to Albert's death on October 27, 1439. 
Arbitration, neutrality and the convocation of a new Council had all 
formed a part of Albert's ecclesiastical program.^ The Diet of Mainz 
saw the inauguration of a new practice— the postponement of the ec­
clesiastical issue from Diet to Diet.
This pattern typified the religious legacy which the Austrian 
duke was to inherit. It had already acquired a distinctive inflexi­
bility that tended to force the individual into its mould. What was 
true of the religious framework also applied to the Empire as a whole. 
The institutional framework did not suppress the formulation of an 
ideology, it simply forbade its expression. While some men were aware 
of the nature of the disease which afflicted the organism they were 
powerless to initiate a cure. In the fifteenth century the medieval 
church-state structure was rapidly being replaced by a new order, yet 
few of its leaders could comprehend the trend of the times. Problems 
were therefore solved by expediency rather than by law. This consti­
tuted the basic sphere of operation within which Frederick III was 
required to execute his church policy. He had no choice but to reject 
the ideological heritage surrounding the two traditional heads of 
Christendom. Its theoretical connotations were only used to substan­
tiate or validate the immediate policy of the King of the Romans.
The news of Albert's death on October 27, 1439, spread 
rapidly throu^iout the realm. Such stability as the Empire had
W a°A?Knt uf ii® P°litical Problems facing Albert seeW. Wortry, Jorpjr Albrecht II. 1432-1422 (Vol. XIII of Prager Studien
Prag^^O^^Il/pp. S % ChtSWiSSenSChaf^  edited by A* Bachmann-
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gained by Albert's rule was soon lost. In accordance with the Golden 
Bull the regency over the Rhenish and Swabian lands went to Lewis 
of the Palatinate and his guardian Otto. 5 Since Albert II had 
adhered to the princely neutrality, Lewis was ostensibly free from 
any participation in contemporary religious problems. When the Coun­
cil of Basel elected Lewis's uncle, Duke Amadeus of Savoy, as Pope 
Felix V, however, the Count was required to tread warily lest he 
be accused of nepotism by Pope Eugenius IV and his followers.6 If 
Felix V came to Basel, family proximity might well end Lewis's neu­
trality. It was also customary for the protector of the Council to
be appointed by the head of the Empire in accordance with the wishes 
n
of the Council. Lewis and Otto wished to avoid all appearance of
K. Zeumer, Die Goldene Bulle Kaiser Karls IV (Quellen und 
Studien zur Verfassungsgeschichte des Deutschen Reiches im Mittel- 
alter und Neuzeit, Weimar, 1908), II, 2, pp. 19-20.
6The mother of young Lewis, Countess Mathilde, was the sister
of Duke Amadeus of Savoy. For accounts of the election of Felix V
see J. Hefele, Conciliengeschichte (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1869). VII
p. 783ff; N. Valois, L^ Papa e±, la Concile: 1418-14 (Paris, 1909),
-11, p* lolff*
n
On October 11, 1431, Sigismund had appointed Duke Wilhelm of 
avana as protector of the Council "mit willen und gunst” of the 
latter. H .H erre(ed .), Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Kaiser Sjg-
X of Deutsche Reichstagsakten. Gottingen, 1956), 
t, j * Jhe Position was again reassigned on September 29, 1434
durich bete willen des heiligen conciliums." G. Beckmann (ed.)t 
..-gfflsche Reichstagsakten urrter Kaiser SigjnuncL (Vni yt n-r
anSSSS;
^isinunds: 1410-1422 (Innsbruck
+ l  i  e - protectorate of Margrave Wilhelm of
Hachberg (inaugurated by Sigismund on January 17, 1436, Ibid. No 11 
257) remained in effect until the Margrave left Basel
Iw + - anSW?r a request frora the Council, Albert had authorized 
iKo  £ °£ w n6W protector on November 13, 1438. On January 4, 
ra+ . "f^rg  was elected to this position. The latter's 
position automatically became vacant when he journeyed to Frankfort to
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collusion with the Council yet at the same time were uncertain as to 
whether they should concern themselves with the appointment of a pro­
tector without the consent of the Council.
While the secular rulers were concerned with enforcing their 
professed neutrality the participants in the schism made feverish ef­
forts to advance their respective positions. In their attempt to 
facilitate a new election the Rhenish Electors had met at Mainz on 
August 14, 1439. A pledge for unity which had been accepted at this
Diet was reaffirmed at a second meeting held at Frankfort on November 
8
11, 1439. On November 13 the three ecclesiastical Electors again 
met at Mainz and decided to convoke another Diet at Lahnstein.^ Pope 
Eugenius IV had dispatched a special delegation headed by Jacobus de 
Oratoribus to Frankfort, but it arrived too late to present its peti­
tions. As rapidly as possibly de Oratoribus left for Lahnstein.
When he arrived he found that Felix V had also sent a legation.
The exact dates of the Diet of Lahnstein cannot be determined.
7
u u Participate in the election of a new King of the Remans.
S  i InffiyiP ^iphstfrgsakten unter Kaiser Friedrich III .. 
(v°l« XV °f Deutsche Reichstagsakten. Gottingen, 1957),
P. 9. The inactivity of Konrad at the Council of Basel reflected 
the current trend towards neutrality on the part of the secular rulers, 
g
+r.=n+"+^%^«h^ f f ^ n"?ie Deuts?he..Konige und die kurfiirstliche Neu- 
S o )  J ’ A^hi^g fur Osterreichischft Geschichte. 75
• l v  * 217-18. This pledge to unity was to be
DeceSe?i3 lSq Ct°+SM0f Sa*°n? ’ BrandenburS ^  the Palatinate on 
+ S ’ ’ M©rgentheim, but it remains uncertain as to 
whether this was ever accomplished.
a-Un ™!,T?+S/ ® etine J** Archbish°Ps of Trier, Cologne and Mainz 
also resulted in a mutual assistance pact. A. Goerz (ed.)t Regesten
—  ^ U i  M s Johann II. 814-1503 (T?fc--
It was probably held in mid-December, 1439.10 Its agenda included the 
final ratification of the friendship pact between the ecclesiastical 
electors, the election of the Emperor, and the church problem. The 
legation from Eugenius IV enjoyed a certain advantage over the repre­
sentatives of Felix V. They were allowed to argue the case of their 
master and even presented the Electors with a memorandum.11 It request- 
ed that the Electors honor the recognition given Eugenius IV at the 
Nuremberg Diet of October 16, 1438. The petition was rejected pending 
the election of a new Emperor. The only tangible result of the Lahn- 
stem deliberations was an agreement by which the electors of Trier,
Mainz and Cologne agreed to pursue identical policies in the coming 
election.1^
Meanwhile the church schism was momentarily overshadowed by 
the imperial election. The common candidate which the spiritual 
electors had pledged to support was none other than Duke Frederick 
of Styria. They were interested in a candidate who was likely to 
obtain the approval of the majority of the secular Electors. Their 
anxiety was entirely justified for the secular princes, alarmed by 
the broad temporal claims of the ecclesiastical electors, would
In reference to its date de Oratoribus noted "circa 
sancte Lucie." RTA, XV, No, 119(2). circa festum
note 3; 1%i SB. £11-, P. 70, foot-
s + +? ^ s ^^eement was n°t made "in ausdrucklichem Geeensatze" 
against the secular electors as suggested by Puckert, era. fit n lhA
W  H o 7, dld not " * « “ * a n t a g o M ^ S A l
’ I. ? ’ ^  Archbishops pledged mutual support in order to pre"’ 
serve their freedoms and privileges in £ P
antagonistic. Privileges in case the new Emperor proved
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probably present a united front at the imperial election.
According to Chapter I, article 16, of the Golden Bull1-3 the 
Archbishop of Mainz was required to announce the date of a new elec­
tion one month after the death of the previous monarch. Each elector 
was required to appear in Frankfort either personally or by represen­
tation, within three months after he had received the directive of the 
14
Archbishop. The election date was set for January 28, 1440.
Although the proposed election poised serious internal problems 
in the electoral constituencies of Bohemia and Saxony,1^ the city of
13Zeumer, oq. cit., II, pp. 12-13.
The directives of the Archbishop of Mainz were issued in 
German for the first time in 1410. Apparently the decision to use 
german entirely came with the election proceedings of Albert II.
The announcement of a new election after Albert's death was prob­
ably formulated in German although only the directive addressed to 
Frederick of Saxony is available. RTA, XV, No. 73.
In B°^erala it was a question as to whether the widowed queen 
Elizabeth or the Bohemian Estates should choose an electoral repre-
AnH?ti7e,i ' ^ C0r?in!  U° the stipulations drawn up by Charles IV on 
p 11 '• ^ » .e Bohemian Estates had this power only if both 
male and female lines of the ruling house became extinct. P. Chlum- 
u * d i p l o m a t i c u s  et epistolaris Moravian (Briinn, 1858). VII
that thP ?reC®?ts °f the Golden Bul1 °n the other hand, forbade’
that the Bohemian kingship be given to a female member of the royal
Bohemian + r er’ 7 IIf lf P* k2ff' 11 stipulated that if the 
Bohemian throne should be unoccupied by a male ruler, the Estates
ff^+ureSP°? °r the electoral vote* The Bohemian situation was
further entangled by the Hussite party which opposed the house of
Luxemburg and supportedHabsburg designs. F. Palacky. Geschichte von 
Bohsen (Pr g> l8^ )f ni> 3 ^  Ad«tod to this w ~ the imS i ^  
nent arrival of Albert's child, Ladislaus Postemus. WhSJ the
1439* l llJ S • «"e Archblsh°P °f Mainz reached Prague on December 9,
+1! i  f  • wldow» Elizabeth, appointed Duke Wilhelm of Saxony 
K + S l ^ m i a n  representative. RTA, XV, No. 75. The Bohemian 
states, insisting on their rights, appointed the Burgrave of Meis-
the’Elector°1 rill60* T*}e latter was §iven credentials for both
College and the Archbishop of Mainz. He was also pre­
sented a statement justifying his position. RTA, XV, Nos. 77-79 
In Saxony a quarrel between Duke Frederick II of the house of Wettin
F r a n k fo r ta s  host to the Electors, completed, the arrangements 
necessary for their accomodations. The dignitaries arrived in 
Frankfort on January 28, 1440.i? On the evening of the same day a 
conference was held between representatives of the city council and 
the Archbishop of Mainz concerning sane technical aspects of the oath 
required by the Golden Bull of all Electors. 18 On the following day 
the traditional oaths were administered in the church of St. Bartholo­
mew. Since the oath confirmed the constitutionality of each of the 
Electors, the Bohemian and Saxon problems soon came to the fore. Due 
to the uncertainty of Bohemia's position, Henry of Plauen was not al­
lowed at the proceedings. The position of Duke Frederick II of Saxony 
was finally settled when an agreement was drawn up between the Duke 
and the Archbishop of Cologne, 19 who together with the Archbishop of
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and Duke Bernhard of Lauenburg occupied the stage. Although Duke Fred- 
erick had cast the Saxon vote in the election of Albert, Bernhard's
I 3 ?vfeub5r n* ®eanS nullified* In sPite of protests of the latter, 
the, Aghbishop ofMainz finally invited Frederick II to the election.
.. l6I °r * ?escription of Frankfort in its role as the electoral 
city see G. Beckmann, “Das mittelalterliche Frankfurt am Main als
. .. , P^e the peculiar status of the Bohemian kingship, the city 
hesitated to admit the Burgrave of Meissen for same time. RTA, XV 
No. 85; Beckmann, op. s ii., 79; J. Chmel, Regesta Fridericilfl. ' 
2 ^ ^  taBOSSIia (Wien, 1859) No. 2 . Only aftir the ArciSshop's
^th  the city council of Frankfurt was the Burgrave allowed 
into the city as the representative of the Bohemian crown. RTA, XV,
Nos. 89 90; J. Janssen, jVankfurts Re_ichscorresponden7. nebsTlndem
1326 Ms 1112 (Freiburg, 1 8 6 6 ^ 2)T li7  
Nos. 8, 12; Beckmann, JLoc. c^t. ’ *
18Zeumer, op. cit., II, 2, pp. 13-14.
r* ^  935 Lacomblet (ed.), Urkundenbuch fur die
keschichte des Niederrheins (Dusseldorf, I858), IV, pp. 28O-81I
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Trier had previously supported Bernhard of Lauenburg. 20
Since the precepts of the Golden Bull allowed a thirty day
electoral limit, the Electors postponed the actual vote in order to
devote time to the discussion of ecclesiastical problems. Although
the details of the deliberations have not been preserved, it would
seem reasonable that at least a part of the discussion was devoted
to a clarification of the electoral position towards the church
schism. In all probability the meeting was not concerned with pre-
21
election alignments.
. . . he Archbishop of Cologne had already supported Lauenburg 
claims during Sigismund's election. J. Aschbach. Geschichte K=i
}m ) ' 111 * P- 306. This transfer of loyalty^
S e i  suSestS S P n0t involve a vote P^chase as has 
been^suggested. See Puckert, 02. cit., p. 152; J. Hansen. Westfalen
k ^ p S S S S ?  <Vo1* 34 of Publicationen aus den
r ^  ^ a^s^ ch3-ver?, Leipzig, 18 88 T 77 r^r T T K r ^rs ~
£ n + j  n —  4usgyige des Mittelalters; 1438-1486 (Biblio 
IbSH feutschaE, G^oUsbie, Stuttgart md Berlin! 190577 1 7 1 . 5 9 7 ^  
,*r. a*lter» Albrgcfrt Achilles yon Brandenburg. Bureeraf 
mJluratsrs. Eia Zgii aai Lebensblld (Vol. X of Q.iialisn 
-— £ur Gggphfofyt, d§s Hauses Hohenzollem. Berlin, 1911),
21 -
m- , Eckert felt that financial considerations not only deter- 
mined the vote of Saxony but also that of the Count of the Palatine
t  ? t , WaS 0n an ®ntry in the Mem°rand enbuoh of Duke FredI
S^onv HieSr+T & substa”tial expenditure in the interests of 
, « S error was ^ue to a misinterpretation of a fifteenth
century symbol for the arabic number 4. Chmel, Friedrich"IV I
rnrt nf he read 50,000 Gulden instead of 4,000. The money was
part of a security given in advance a<* = Vn. . was
of Princess Ann to Duke W l l l ^  d0Wery
made May 21 1442 F R-i r.v.+^ ~ »n t , final payment was 
den Jahren 1438 bis J T S 1* "  Erbfolgestreit in
m i  Kacsi, Erganzungsband ^ 8 8 9 ? ! ^
Some disagreement concerning imperial candidature did occur
as Margrave Frederick of Brandenburg supported the candidacy of
22
Lewis of Hesse. Nevertheless Frederick of Austria was considered 
the most likely candidate from the very onset. 23 The Empire re­
quired a ruler with considerable power and administrative experience. 
Only an energetic and ruthlessly determined man could hope to restore 
it. Since the Electors were well aware of Frederick's peace loving 
nature, the popularity of his candidacy was directly connected with 
the electoral designs of self-aggrandizement. The internal conditions 
of Austria as well as the Empire held little hope of producing a 
strong Emperor.
On February 2 the Archbishop of Mainz together with the other 
Electors, and ten witnesses as well as two notaries, entered the 
Church of Bartholomew. After the singing of Veni sancte smrit,,s and 
the celebration of mass24 Henry of Plauen, the Bohemian representa­
tive took his belated oath. 25 The elector of Mainz then entered the 
vestry of the church with the witnesses and the notaries. Duke 
Frederick of Styria received five votes, while Lewis of Hesse regis­
tered the oJier two. In accordance with customary usage the minority 
withdrew their candidate and announced their support of Frederick. 26
22
RTA, XV, No. 91, article 9d.
23
Ibid. f article 9.
24
See Ibid., pp. 126-128.
25-r
iM d ., No. 91, article 9b.
26t
ifeid., No. 95, article 1,
The result of the election was then proclaimed to the citizens of 
Frankfort in the presence of the Electors by John of Erlenbach. 27 
On February 3 , 1440, the election decree was formalized and a dele­
gation was sent to Frederick to inform him of his election and solicite 
28
his response.
At the Lahnstein Diet the papal representatives, Jacobus de 
Oratoribus and Nicholas of Cusa, were directed to present their cases 
to the Electors at Frankfort. Meanwhile both men had informed the 
Pope of their activities in Lahnstein. 29 This report motivated 
Eugenius IV to send a letter30 to the Electors admonishing them to 
establish peace in the realm, presumably by punishing the anti-Pope 
and his supporters. The Pope's moderate tone was indicative of his 
desire to avoid any misunderstanding with the Electors which might 
have led then to favor Felix V. Eugenius did not condemn their 
assumed neutrality and assured the Electors of his approval of their 
declaration at the time it was enacted. However, since the Council 
of Basel violated the Elector's peaceful intentions ty the election of
62
2?
* r'e Frederick of Saxony wrote to Nuremberg RTA XV Nn o£ 
the Count of the Palatinate notified StrassSIS^d  Ota S id  
the city of Aachen was contacted by Frankfort, Chmel, l ^ h 'i ,
28p
A r c h b l e h o X i b ^ ^ ; ^ ? ^ ;  ST
only arrived in Austria in W a  His s i ™ ^ ™ ’ howeTer' the latt*r 
tion decree with that o V ^ e r ^ ^ , a t K C T  ^
29RTA, XV, No. 71.
3°Ibid., No. 113.
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an anti-Pope, their neutrality would have to be abolished in favor of
the legal Pope, Eugenius IV.
31
On the same date Pope Eugenius forwarded another letter to 
Jacobus de Oratoribus and Nicholas of Cusa. The letter betrayed no 
attempt to influence the imperial election in any way. Eugenius IV 
may have been informed as to the nature of the Lahnstein delibera­
tions and in the interests of his own cause exhibited a passive atti­
tude. In accordance with this position the papal representatives 
were instructed to make their representations after the election.
They were then to influence the new Emperor towards a rejection of the 
Council of Basel and Felix V. The directives were never carried out
as the documents were confiscated when the papal emissaries journeyed 
32
through Basel.
The Council of Basel and Pope Felix V were not slow in forcing 
their interests upon the international state of affairs. A delegation 
including the Council's president, Cardinal Louis of Arles and its 
guardian, Konrad of Weinsberg left for Thonon on December 3, 1439.33 
The legation met with Felix V on December 15 in Ripaille.^ The
31Ibid.. No. 114. January 10, 1440.
32Ibid., No. 119» article 2.
3\onumenta Conciliorum Generalium saeculi decimi ouinti. Con- 
ffiUAw Basileense Scriotorum (Vindobonae, 1886), III, p. 449. Cited 
hereafter as Monumenta Conciliorum. The names of the individuals com- 
prising the delegation are given in G# Beckmann, Concilium Basiliense 
vkgPfi.ilium BatsUiense. Studien und Quellen zur Geschichte des Concils 
Z2H Basely Basel, 1926) VIf p# 727# Cited hereafter as Concilium 
Basiliense.
pnumenta Conciliorum, III, p. 450.
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imminent imperial election probably formed a part of the agenda at 
the meeting, especially in view of the enlightenment Konrad of Weins­
berg could offer. It was decided to send representatives to Frankfort.
35
Felix V, empowered by the Council, chose Bishop George von Vich and 
the Archdeacon of Metz, Wilhelm Huyn, to head the delegation. In view 
of the coming imperial election the delegation made immediate prepara­
tions for its departure to Frankfort. Konrad of Weinsberg requested 
safe passage from the Count of the Palatinate. On January 20, 1440, 
the Count wrote a letter granting the request, but noted that the 
city council of Frankfort would only allow the Electors and retinue to 
enter the city. Otto therefore advised the delegation to travel to 
Speier, Worms or Mainz and wait until the completion of the election.
On January 24, 1440, the Council of Basel ratified the commis­
sioning of the delegation. On the following day Cardinal Louis of 
Arles was authorized to determine the instructions and empowerment 
which the proposed delegation was to have . 3 '7 It was stipulated that 
the representatives of the Council were to have no power to negotiate
OO
a new meeting place for the Council/ The group, together with
35
As early as November 7, 1439, it was decided that the Pope 
send ambassadors and be empowered to prepare "litteras necessarias 
directxvas ad reges et principes." Concilium Basiliense. VI, p. 702.
36RTA, XV, No. 115.
37
™ ™ No* ll6, articles !-3. Concilium Basiliense. VII,
PP* J f - j 7#
RTA, XV, No. 116, article 3. The instructions by which the 
delegation was to abide are not available. A suggestion of their pos-
°M ?i omay h? evident in a !etter of Felix V to Duke Frederick, 
ibid., No. 142, article 2. ’
Konard of Weinsberg, left Basel no later than January 25 or 26. The 
majority of the delegates stopped in M a in z.^9 Konrad of Weinsberg, 
together with Johann of Bachenstein**'0 and an unidentified individual 
continued on to Frankfort where the papal legate Jacobus de Oratori- 
bus, in company with the legal adviser of the Roman Court, John 
Tollner, awaited t h e m T h e y  arrived on January 28. Their sojourn 
was to be of short duration for on the next day the Electors re­
solved that the city of Frankfort should expel both the representa­
tives of the Council and of the Pope as well as Konrad of Weinsberg, 
The action of the Electors was either motivated by the oath^ of the 
Council's delegation which bound the latter to interfere in the pro­
ceedings of the imperial election or by the loyalty of Konrad of 
Weinsberg to the Lauenburg house in the Saxon-Lauenburg electoral 
dispute. On January 30 both the legations left Frankfort.43
Txie return of the representatives could not have occurred
prior to the afternoon of February 2, when the gates of Frankfort re-
44
opened. The representation from Basel came without its leader, the 
39
Ibid., No. 88; Janssen, og. cit., II, No. 13; Chmel,
Sgggsta, Nos. 2, 4; See also Beckmann, oe. cit.. p. 79,
4*0
That Bachenstein accompanied Konrad is evident from RTA 
XV, No. 123, article 4. ---
^See Ibi£., No. 91, article 6 and No. 125, article 1. No 
existant record indicates the presence of Nicholas of Cusa.
42
.Ibid., No. 116, article 1.
43lM d ., No. 91, article 6.
Ibid., No. 91, article 11.
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Bishop of Vich.^ The interviews between the Electors and the ecclesi­
astical representatives apparently took place between February 3 and 6,
but the order of the meetings cannot be determined. Then John of Ra-
gusa presented the case for the Council of Basel.46 After justifying
the deposition of Eugenius IV and the election of Felix V he declared
that the assumed neutrality of the Electors must be terminated in
favor of Felix V, and the Council of Basel. Following John of Ragusa's 
47
lengthy oration Archdeacon Hugonis of Metz took the floor. He pre­
sented the events leading to the deposition of Eugenius IV and re­
quested the Electors to pledge their obedience to the new Pope.2*'8 
Somewhat later the Bishop of Vich also delivered an oration.49
The speech of the papal legate Jacobus de Oratoribus was rather 
defamatory. He recalled the contents of the proposals made at Lahn- 
stein50 and the Elector's promises to give him satisfactory answers 
at Frankfort. Oratoribus complained of the treatment he and Nicholas 
of Cusa received in Basel, especially as related to the confiscation
45
Ibid., No. 117, article 1.




article The record of the actual oration
5°Ibid. . No. 71.
51Puckert, p. 156; also RTA, XV, No. 119.
The Elector's answer to both parties was non-committal. They 
declared that the difficulties of the Church could only be dealt with 
by the newly elected Emperor who was now the patron aid protector of 
the institution. After his arrival in Germany a solution would be 
reached by him in consultation with the Electors. 52 In view of the 
attack of Ragusa and the proposals of the Archdeacon of Metz the 
Electors made a special point of justifying their neutrality. The 
basis of this evasiveness can at least in part be determined from a 
letter sent to the Cardinal of Arles by the Archbishop of Mainz. 53 
The Electoral College felt that an Empire-wide settlement of the 
Church question could only be achieved by an imperial Diet, under the 
personal direction of the Emperor.
On Februaiy 14 the representatives of the Council returned to
Basel. On the following day John of Bachenstein and the Bishop of
Vich gave a report of the proceedings to the general assembly of
the Council. The Bishop also presented a second report at a later 
date.5*
On his return home, Oratoribus was kidnapped by Siegfried of 
Zulnhard and taken to the castle of Steineck while under the protec­
tion of the Count of Helfenstein and the city of Dim. Through the 
mediatory efforts of the Count of WSrttemberg he was finally freed. 55
52— ’ XV- *20 and 121; PUckert, oe. sit ., p. 156.
iaaiao4 l M  ei la m  ( ^ o n % 9o £ T p : f e f g g j 21
^CoBsUisa gasm ens*, vii, pp. 6<m>5; rta, xv, n„. 123.
c. F. Sattler, Geschichte des Herzoetums WUrtembero- unter
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He reached Florence in mid-March.
The massive weight of the church problem now rested upon the 
newly elected Emperor. Both parties were quick to press their conten­
tions upon the already overburdened Frederick. On February 9, 1440, 
Duke Frederick heard of his election. During this time he was in 
Vienna-Neustadt where the widow of Albert II was about to deliver a 
child, over which he was to assume guardianship. Simultaneously 
Frederick was the ruler of an exhausted land, constantly subject to 
the threats of aggressive bordering states. Domestic difficulties 
also reached an all-time peak, for Duke Albert the Younger's demands 
became most overbearing. The conditions prevalent in Frederick's 
own land could hardly tolerate the secondary attention they would 
receive with Frederick's acceptance of the Emperorship.
Frederick III remained in Vienna-Neustadt after his election 
to the imperial throne. The Council of Basel learned of Frederick's 
election on the evening of February 5, ^  while Felix V was informed 
of the event a few days later. Both parties quickly appraised the 
new situation and sent their congratulations, for they were well 
aware of their precarious position. The chief advocate of Frederick 
at the election was the Elector Jacob of Trier, a staunch supporter 
of Eugenius IV. Since some knowledge of the Emperor's sympathies 
must have been previously detected by the Council, the conviction that 
the German Empire might now declare itself for Felix V and the Council
55
& £  Bflgiqgung dSE graven (Ulm, 1765), II, p. 127. See also 
Beilagen Nos. 65, 66a.
^RTA, XV, No. 151, article 1.
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could not be realistically maintained. Pessimism did not prevent an 
optimistic activism, however. On February 9, 1440, the Council of 
Basel issued a congratulatory bull in Frederick's honor. Pope Felix V 
followed suite with a similar document on February 11.-^ The Council's 
Bull noted the kindness of Frederick's predecessors to the Church and 
admonished the Emperor to bypass the neutrality then in vogue and give 
his entire support and obedience to the Council and Felix V. The ball 
also invited the Roman King to the coronation of Felix V scheduled 
for Basel on March 15, 1440, and suggested that if Frederick should 
desire a coronation he need not seek a pope in a faraway land, for 
Felix was close at hand.^
The Basel legation returned from Frankfort on February 14,
1440. In its subsequent report59 it suggested that the Electors 
had indicated distinct doubts as to Frederick's acceptance of the 
election.60 Since the church question had been delegated to the
RTA ™ 5?Mhm6l!j §Sgvfna,r.H°w 5T; Chmel* Materialien, I, 2, pp. 72-75; 
w ;  ir Sr ,* ;  LicJfowsky. Geschichte des Hauses M & -
Jggg (Wien, 1842), VI, Urkunden, Nos. 32, 33; Puckert, 0£. cit., p.
58
Chmel, Friedrich IV, II, pp. 13. 14. The bull of Felix V 
was drawn up by his secretary, Aeneas Sylvius. It further encouraged 
Frederick to accept the honor conferred upon him for the benefit of
a?d the Em^ re- Felix did not hesitate to exalt his own 
course of action, namely, the acceptance of the Apostolic Chair in 
his old age•
59RTA, XV, No. 120.
60x
1 1 j n ^fwe1* to a letter of congratulation Frederick openly 
acknowledged his indecision concerning his election. Ibid., No. 104. 
The .Letter was written on February 22, 1440. The furthiTevents of
h l l ?  n  J r  S ,  Frederick's difficulties. The widow of Al­
brecht II, Elizabeth, gave birth to a son, Ladislas Postumus. V.
Arenpeckii, "Chronicon Austriacarum," H. Pez (ed.), Scriotorfis Rerum
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newly elected Emperor, the Council had to reckon with the possibility 
that the matter would be dealt with in the Diet scheduled for Mainz 
on November 11, 1440. Meanwhile the conciliarists gained a momentary 
advantage with the capture of the documents bound for Frankfort and 
with the imprisonment of Oratoribus at the castle of Steineck. Pope 
Eugenius IV was not aware of the situation. The Council immediately 
capitalized on its good fortune. A legation representing the interests 
of Felix V and the Council was appointed.61 The directives ty which
Affiriyywn (Lipsiae, 1721), I, p. 1253. Shortly after the birth 
of Ladislaus young Wladislaw of Poland was forced into proposing
pSInJf! J? +Wiu°W ° f Alb6rt IX* This action was used t0 Justify
oland s claim to Hungary which followed on March 8, 1440. The decla-
+?!\°n+? made tor Wladislaw's marriage to Elizabeth if
Pr°Ved+Wllli"g* Since her child was heir to his father's 
lands, the annexation of Hungary could be legally justified. Chmel,
f?* Ir» ®fllag® x* 0n March 12, 1440, the Polish king wrote
F r S r S  nr * °i conSratulation on his election. He also informed 
Frederick of his newly acquired position as King of Hungary. A. F.
S J f *  lo^entorum Omnis Aevi Vindobonensi« (Wien,
11J L 8?-?33*. The Polish claim to the Hungarian crown wls 
the determining factor in Frederick's acceptance of the Emperorship 
On April 6 Frederick confirmed his intention to become
t h e ^ d i L ^ 6 ° f °Ur Beloved La^  in Vie^ a .  Simultaneously
«  T  hlS/ 0unger br°ther Albert reached a new height,
S L I T  i that seriously weakened Frederick's position as Emperor.
, * * » P» 22ff. The whole affair proved a critical fsc
tivpf1 5!-brefkd°™  of Habsburg control in Bohemia and Hungaiy. Ac-"
to S l S t 1the rifteh ^ nfUSi^  T  h°USe 0f Cilly* wh0 attempted exploit the rift between the two brothers. In view of an +i,OM
problems a territorial Diet was scheduled for Vienna in April 141*0
P* 837- A Plot to pat Duke A ^ r t  S  kvarU* 
S*Jn u0n! °? Bohemla added to the difficulties. M. Freyberg
“ d (Stuttgart und Kbingen,
v ( The idea of sending a delegation did not originate with ? «n T
V (as possibly suggested in RTA, XV, No. 154 article^1?-  s  =££■
the legation was to operate envisaged six areas of concentration. 62
1) The legation was to congratulate the Emperor on his elec­
tion and tactfully inform him of the strenuous efforts made by Felix
V and the Council on his behalf. If Frederick had already accepted 
the Roman Kingship the briefs originally prepared for the Frankfort 
election were to be presented. Articles 3-7 .
2) The recognition of Pope Felix V by the ISnperor was to be 
advocated by the representatives. Articles 8, 10-13.
3) The legation must persuade the Emperor to formulate a 
definite policy regarding the Council of Basel. Articles 14-17.
4) It was suggested that Frederick should reject any policy 
of neutrality as well as any resolutions which might be drawn up by 
the Electors in connection with the church question. The scheme also 
included a treaty between the Emperor and the Council of Basel. 
Articles 20, 23. The legation was to hint at the possibility of an 
imperial coronation by Pope Felix V, and if feasible, suggest a 
marriage between Frederick and Margarethe,6^ the daughter of Felix V. 
Articles 18-20, 23-35.
5) The conciliar delegation further attempted to justify the 
appointment of the Cardinals and other officials to the court of 
Felix V. Articles 21, 22.
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The instructions given by Felix V were almost identical to 
those of the congratulatory Bull of February 11, 1440. An abridged 
copy of the original document (now lost) is given in Ibid., No. 153. 
The instructions furnished by the Council of Basel are given in 
Ibid., No. 157.
^Margarethe was the widow of Louis of Anjou. Pope Felix V 
had apparently given Konrad seme secret instructions in connection 
with the proposed marriage. Chmel, o£. cit., II, p. 15, footnote 2.
6) Frederick was directly requested to exert his influence on 
the princes and dignitaries participating in the imperial diets, in 
order to facilitate a freer flow of wealth into the Council's 
treasuries. Articles 26-28.
The other instructions were essentially concerned with the 
legations official calls on Dukes Albert and Sigismund of Austria, 
Henry of Bavaria, the Archbishop of Salzburg, the Bishops of Passau, 
Freising and Regensburg, and the University as well as the city coun­
cil of Vienna. Throughout their journey the members of the legation 
were to be concerned with justifying the dethronement of Eugenius IV, 
and extolling the work of the Council of Basel.64
In addition to the directives issued by Pope Felix V and the 
Council of Basel, the delegation was entrusted with a number of other 
authoritative documents. They were furnished with a copy of the bull 
published by the Council in honor of Frederick III on February 9,
1440. Their diplomatic armour further included former letters of 
safe conduct from Emperors Albert and Sigismund, the so-called Golden 
Bull of Emperor Sigismund (November 22, 1432), and an official justi­
fication of the Council's supremacy in ecclesiastical affairs. The 
entire list of all the decrees of the Council and thirty-seven offi­
cial seals completed the legation's legal equipment. John of Ragusa
was especially empowered to act as an official representative of the 
Council.
The date of the legation's departure for Vienna as well as the 
route of their journey cannot be determined. Their first audience
^^ f^tTA, XV, No. 157, Articles 9, 32, 40.
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with Frederick took place on April 6, 1440, at which time they prob­
ably discharged a part of their commission.Since this was the 
date of Frederick's official acceptance of the imperial crown in 
Vienna-Neustadt, the legation' s president, John of Ragusa, delivered 
an oration to suit the occasion.66
A second audience was granted the delegation after Frederick 
arrived in Vienna. At this interview Ragusa delivered a second 
oration. 6’'7 No further negotiations were held, however, for Austrian 
and Hungarian matters occupied Frederick. The legation was requested 
to submit its demands in writing. The resultant oetitiones68 sum­
marized what had already been orally presented concerning the deposi­
tion of Eugenius IV and the election of Felix V, safe conduct and 
financial matters. Articles four and five of the instructions were 
not reiterated in the written petitions. Apparently the members 
sensed the unrealism of the proposed imperial visit to Basel in view 
of the fact that the Emperor and the Electors had, in all probability, 
already agreed that the church problem could only be settled by a 
congress of all the princes of the Empire. The marriage project was 
also set aside as Konrad of Weinsberg had arrived in Vienna in mid-
Ibid., Nos. 159, article 1 , 162 article 1 .
66This was evident from his report in Ibid.. No. 159.
No. 160.
Ibid.. No. 162.
April to pursue these designs. 69
Frederick’s attitude to the petitions of the Council was parti­
ally manifested in the letters of safe conduct he granted to the lega-
70
tion. The Emperor, like his predecessor, gave no favorable response
to the deposition of Eugenius IV. The document noted, however, that
the possibilities for peace within the church would be weakened if the
71
Council of Basel were dissolved. In part this statement reflected 
the uncooperative attitude recently manifested by Eugenius IV.72 
Frederick agreed that some financial aid should be given the Council 
by the princes and dignitaries, but action on the matter would only 
be taken at a later date.'^ The Emperor also granted a special letter 
of safe conduct to the four leading members of the delegation.^4
The efforts of the legation met with partial success. Although 
the Roman King had not taken action against Eugenius IV or the neu­
tralists, he had not endorsed their policies. Encouraged by the more
69
Some actual negotiations seem to have been held concerning
i f ~ o m  a rePresentative of the Teutonic Knights,
1 Tuderbach, to the Grand Master reported "daz Kosper Slike
ft d®~ babest zein tachter gibet dem Romissen kunig--" 
Published from the Komgsberg Archives in Ibid.. p. 270, footnote 1.
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1* ;  m >  » •  OT- « 3 .
71
it +0 Th! Coun?H  “ ^interpreted Frederick's statement, and felt 
it to be a recognition of Felix V and the work of the Council.
72
No. 160 Frederick had formed of this by Felix V. RTA, XV,
article ^ fincillUffl -ftsiliense, VI1# pp. 166-168; RTA, XV, No. 165, 
?Z*RTA, XV, No. 164.
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favorable state of affairs, Pope Felix abandoned his hesitancy to 
come to Basel personally, and arrived there on June 24, 1440.75
The imperial decision to settle the ecclesiastical conflict 
by a congress to be held at Mainz was made between April 6 and 16. 76 
In preparation for this event, the princes of the Empire were invited 
to meet in Nuremberg to consult with the Emperor. Religious problems 
did not constitute the chief interest in the deliberations. The 
princes were more generally concerned with the restoration of peace 
xn the land. During this time Frederick was not a participant in the 
electoral neutrality.77 This action was not a product of weakness or 
indecision, but representative of the Emperor's wisdom in choosing a 
vantage point from which he could best judge the ecclesiastical prob~ 
lems at the proposed assembly*
At the April meeting between Frederick and the Electors the
75
«»+ ♦>,. p— Qi?;i^  S&siliense, VII, p. 167. The legation from Vienna
found * r S ®ituated at Lausanne. In his company they
Bacoi p j Oudge—advocate of the German Nation and the Council of
return to Basel! S r a ™ 6"  ^  ^  * *  * * * * *  t0 
7^
that the E W ^ «  t r7  HanS ?ei sler to the city of Frankfort noted 
that the Electors had presented their "werbung" to Frederick It
was dated April 16, V M . RTA, XT, p. 181, footnote!.
eriok's d ^ i r e ^ 1^ ? .  haS*J*en lnterpreted as illustrative of Fred- 
Schlick S m S S heU “ T 1;  ”Kaspar
S r ro X Sd e ^ .s^ g cS  ^ the ^
Nuremberg Diet was scheduled for September 29, 1 4 4 0 Although
79
these negotiations concerned such matters as imperial law and fi-
00
nances, the church problem itself found expression in a decree af-
O-l
fecting the welfare of the clergy. The document represents an at­
tempt to curb secular interference in ecclesiastical affairs, especially 
in connection with property. It was particularly directed towards the 
clergy in Trier, Mainz and Cologne, and attempted to enforce the laws 
of Frederick II and Charles IV in this regard. The Electors of these 
areas as well as the other princes affected were to punish infrac­
tions of the laws unless the evils were rectified within a given time. 
Emperor Frederick was particularly concerned with the vehmic juris­
diction of Westphalia. The Archbishop of Cologne was finally installed 
as governor of the territory. The finished document incorporating
O p
these terms was to be presented at Nuremberg. In connection with 
this Frederick sent an order to the vehmic judges requesting their 
full cooperation in aiding the Archbishop to restrict the vehmic 
jurisdiction to its original territorial allotment.8'3
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?8The letter written by Hans Geisler (April 16, 1440) to the 
city of Frankfort gives the date of the Nuremberg Diet as September 29. 
Janssen, 0£. cit., II, No. 21.
79RTA, XV, No. 167.
No. 170.
8lIM d ., No. 171.
82
x , , ,  ^fSand, D&s Fgmgericht Westphalens aus den Quellen daree-
s M l i ,  M g  lit a2Sii angedruckten Urkunden erlautertTHamm. 1 8 2 5 ^ "
RTA YV XT / f ’ ^  funster und Paderborn, 1888), p.
y f A Z :  R  % 81 ChBe1’ Sagssia- *°-
83rta, XV, No. 169.
Konrad of Weinsberg, working in the interests of the Council, 
now attempted to complete the program which had already been outlined 
for the imperial election. The instructions given to his representa­
tive, Hermann Offenburg, at least betrayed such a procedure. The date 
of Offenburg's arrival in Vienna cannot be established. From the
m
letters which Pope Felix and Cardinal Arles sent to Konrad (Febru­
ary 12 and 26 respectively) it seems evident that Konrad had apparent­
ly not yet conceived the idea of sending a legation to Vienna. In­
stead he seems to have considered a personal appearance at the imperial 
court. On March 5 Konrad informed the Cardinal that his "dreffenliche 
botschaft" had been forwarded to the King. 85 Apparently the Cardinal 
desired Weinsberg's personal presence at the court in Vienna in the 
interests of the Church and the Council. The possibility that the 
Cardinal's desire to see Konrad in Vienna coincided with the arrival 
of a new papal and conciliar legation in that city cannot be over­
looked, for Konrad's presence at the court would greatly have facili­
tated the legation's chances of success. Private circumstances pre-
86
vented Konrad's personal journey to Vienna. In his place he sent 
Offenburg who had already represented Konrad before Frederick in 
December, 1439. Offenburg left for Vienna during the first part of 
March, whether alone or with the legation remains uncertain. 87 In
77
Ibid., Nos. 150, 151. 
85I W * ,  No. 158.
86Ibid.
87f
Peter r„+?n w Ch the treasurer of the Council of Basel,
necessarv f ^ i n d he had suPPlied Offenburg with the 
necessary funds for hxs journey. Ibid., No. 166, article 1.
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part Offenburg's instructions concerned the financial administration
of the Empire. In the main, however, they were associated with such
ecclesiastical matters as the schism and Konrad's role as the protec-
88
tor of the Council. The details of Offenburg's efforts cannot be
determined. It is reasonable to suppose that Offenburg, like the
previous conciliar legation, was required to subnit his petitions
89
in writing. Mot long after the presentation of the petition Konrad 
himself arrived in Vienna. Personally, Konrad desired a decree from 
Frederick ordering the Archbishop of Mainz, the Bishops of Bamberg 
and Wurzburg and the Count of the Palatinate to guard his property in 
the event of his absence at the imperial court. This request together 
with a number of other financial concessions was granted by the Em­
peror. In other areas Konrad's efforts brought few results.
The Vienna sojourn by the conciliar delegation and Konrad of 
Weinsberg represented one phase of the multiple activity evident 
during the first months of 1440. The feverish attempts of the Coun­
cil of Basel and of Pope Felix V to attain a position of permanency 
within the shifting sands of the institutional framework reflected 
the tenor of the age. A general uneasiness permeated the political
®®The instructions have not been preserved but their general 
character can be deduced from the material in Ibid., Nos. 158. 166 
article 3. ’
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A S ™ *t No* 167* The document was probably written by




The original date of the Nuremberg Diet had been set for Sep­
tember 29, 1440, November 30 was given as the date in the official
91
invitations sent at the end of May, When Frederick realized he 
would be unable to reach Nuremberg at this date the Diet was once 
more posponed to January 6, 1441. Meanwhile, the prospect of an 
imperial Diet led the traditionally independent Rhenish Electors to 
consolidate their position. If the coming Diet promised the termi­
nation of Frederick's neutrality a unified support of either Felix V 
or Eugenius IV was imperative to insure the survival of at least 
some semblance of church order in Germany. Furthermore, such loyalty 
as the Electors manifested would undoubtedly influence Frederick's 
position. A letter, apparently written by the Emperor and requesting
90
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Between March and December, 1440, negotiations of a ooliti- 
Ca~ were held between the Counts of Wurttemberg and the Swabian
and Frankish cities. Chmel, Regesta. Nos. 100-131; RTA, XV, Nos. 175- 
211. These cities also carried on diplomatic intercourse with sane of 
the lesser nobility of the region. RTA, XV, Nos. 212-226. A solution
p°^\^nrfSt !," the land was finally attempted by the Elec­
tors of the Palatinate, Mainz and Brandenburg in June and July of 1440.
A series of meetings were held at Maulbronn, Bischofsheim and Ohringen.
t0 the 00nta"P°raiy P*>W*M. BH i ;
„„ „ '* 9lF?? *£* ^ t a t l o n  to the oity of Frankfort see Janssen,
t^n o°u H*/S* Senckenberg (ed.), Sammlung von ungednmk-.
ien und rargn gchriften (Frankfurt am Mayn, 1751), I, pp. 36-37; for
Nsft™ R6® h*+ iS11?1*’ 222 Ronischen Reiches Teutsch^r
■ - ^^ R^ chsta^stheatrum wie selbiges unter Kevser Friedrichs V 
merhochsten Reperuag (J e n a .T ? ^ , I, pp. 13-14. Georgisch 
led.;, Regesta chronologico-djplomatica. in quibus recenaant.nr
srnis ggneiisfflmuamiaSi documenta Bibliss (Snkcofurti et Lipsae, 
1741; II, p. 1094; Chmel, o£. cit., No. 62. ’
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the advice of the spiritual Electors on the church question, initiated 
the Electoral response.92 For the purpose of clarifying the issue 
Archbishop Dietrich of Mainz called a territorial synod at Aschaffen- 
burg for August 16, 1440.
The importance of the meeting called by the Elector of Mainz
go
did not relate to its composition or manner of procedure, but 
rather to its final resolutions and formulations. Dietrich had sub­
mitted the problem to the faculties of theology and law at the Univer­
sity of Erfurt prior to August 8. The University responded with a 
strong endorsement of the Council of Basel. It advocated that a solu­
tion to the ecclesiastical dilemma was only possible by support of all 
the Council's actions, including the election of Felix V.9^ Despite
9 2
The tone of a letter written by Dietrich of Mainz to an 
unidentified individual suggests that the author of the letter was 
none other than the Emperor. The contents of the letter are pub­
lished in V. F. de Gudenus (ed.), Codex diplomaticus anecdotorum res 
Mfiguntinas illustrantium (Francofurti et Lipsae, 1?58), IV, pp. 262- 
64; see also Puckert, ojo. cii., p. 162. Archbishop Dietrich of 
ologne, in direct response to the imperial request, consulted the 
University of Cologne. RTA, XV, No. 250. F. J. Bianco, Die alte 
Unxversit^t Kojin und die _spatern Gelehrter-Schulen dieser Stadt
n i  v o ?,* i ?P* 222-2lf* A special meeting on the issue was held 
on October 8, 1440. J. B. Schneider, "Ein Unbekanntes Kolner Provin- 
zialconcil des XV Jahrhunderts," Romische Quartalschri ft. fiir Christ-
footnote ^  Kjrchengeschichte I (18ft 7) t 371 f
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7116 Participants included all bishops under Dietrich's juris- 
iction, namely, Sigismund of Wurzburg, Albrecht of Eichstatt, Peter
W w ? * £rg’J *nrl°v f  Constance. Magnus of Hildesheim, Johannes of
Halberstadt, Konrad of Chur, Konrad of Strassburg, 
Friednch of .forms and Reinhard of Speier. RTA, XV, Nos. 233-240.
XT »„ ?8PJy University of Erfurt is published in RTA,
,»• 246; C E. Rulaeus, Histela Sniversitatis Parisiensis 
(Parisiis, 1670), V, pp. *62-471; seeU so Kickert, oit?  ^ p. 162-
H. Bressler Stellmy; doc deutschen Itaivgrsitii^su^aseler 
t o l l , SSB Sshisga und zur deutschen Neutralist ■ Wgur'adisser- 
tation J-eipsig^Leipzig; 1885), pp. 45-53; Bactaann, o£. 82.
the position of the University the synod did not achieve the unanimous 
conciliar orientated reaction Dietrich had anticipated, since a minor­
ity of the bishops still sided with Eugenius IV* ^
Dietrich of Cologne issued invitations for a synod in his 
diocese towards the end of August or beginning September* His 
couriers went beyond the territorial borders and solicited the pres- 
ence of representatives from the University of Cologne,^ the four 
orders of the mendicant friars and the Premonstrantians. All these 
non-regional groups responded to the summons. In the course of the 
meeting many divergent views were expressed. It culminated in a 
definite rejection of any concept of secular neutrality but left the 
schism itself untouched.^7
The results of these two provincial councils, while involving 
no direct participation on Frederick's part, intensified two trends 
which the King of the Renans could not ignore. It became evident 
that the complex problem of the traditional institutional structure 
could not be solved by the theoretical formulations of the secular 
princes. The popularity of the concept of princely neutrality was at 
a low ebb. Furthermore, it became rather apparent to the imperial 
court that a united ecclesiastical policy on the part of the rulers 
of Europe was highly improbable. Each temporal lord, including the
81
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m, TheJ e Probably included the Bishops of Hildesheim and Au?s- 
urg. The former dated at least one letter according to the ponti­
fical years of Eugenius IV. RTA, XV, No. 254; Gudenus, 0£. cj,t., IV,
P*
9 6
Bianco, op. ci£„ I, pp. 222-24; RTA, XV, 250.
97
p. , The bishops of Luttich and Minden supported Eugenius IV while 
the Bishop of Utrecht was loyal to Felix V. RTA, XV, No. 258, article 4.
82
Emperor, tended to define his relationship to the church on an indi­
vidual basis.
It was obvious to all concerned that the forthcoming Diet at 
Nuremburg would result in a partial clarification of Frederick's ec­
clesiastical policy. Eugenius IV and Felix V as well as the Council 
of Basel were not slow in realizing this. Pope Eugenius IV was the 
first to act. His primary object was to win the favor of Frederick. 
The Pope's representative left Florence in the middle of June, but 
was only able to present his petitions to Frederick in September, 
at which time Pope Felix and the Council of Basel also began to 
define their course of action.
Near the end of March, 1440, Eugenius IV had already been 
infomed of the events of the Frankfort Diet by Jacobus de Oratoribus. 
He had also read the official formulation98 of electoral ecclesiasti­
cal policy. The papal legate at the court of the previous Emperor, 
the Archbishop of Tarent, also returned to Florence during this tim e." 
Pope Eugenius IV was therefore well informed concerning German affairs, 
yet only after a considerable period of inactivity did he decide to 
establish diplomatic relations of one type or another with the Emperor. 
Doubtlessly the pending Diet of Nuremberg was the leading incentive in 
this attempt. On June 13 the Viennese Professor of Theology, Henry of 
Diest, was informed that he had certain duties to perform for the
98Ibid. t No. 121.
99
Compare S i d ., No. 157, article 12 and Wo. 262, article 3.
fWirn i \'^Tk> ,^ e5Ch^cht,e 3§r kaiserlichen Universitflt. m Wien 
(Wien, 185*0, I, 2, p. 69; H. J. Sibig , " B e i t ^ T S J o J e ^ i ^
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benefit of the Church and the Papacy. Diest1s reception at the imperi­
al court only transpired in September of that year, partially due to 
the internal problems facing Frederick during the month of August.101 
The professor must have made a highly favorable impression on
Frederick for on September 24 the latter appointed Diest as his 
102
chaplain. Eugenius' instructions to his legate seem to have fal­
len into four main categories.103 Diest was to congratulate Frederick 
on his election and express such flatteries as were traditional in the 
imperial elections; this was to be followed by the customary discourse 
on the duties of the Emperor. Next Diest presented the precarious 
situation of western Christianity, emphasizing especially the advance 
of Islam and the brazen disregard of papal supremacy by the Council 
of Basel. Finally Diest requested that the Emperor support the Roman 
Curia as represented by Eugenius IV.
der Wirksamkeit des Basler Concils in Osterreich," Sjtzungsbericht.fi 
£er Kaiserlichen Akademie dgr Wjssenschaften. Philosoohisch-Historische 
Classe. VIII (April, 1852), 6l4.
■^The widowed Elizabeth and Frederick's brother, Duke Albert.
102Chmel, Regesta. No. 146.
*®%TA, XV, No. 262. These instructions were not explicitly 
designed for Diest, but rather suggest a legation comprising a number 
of individuals. The document could not have been designated for the 
delegation sent to Germany in November, 1440, (John of Carvajal 
Nicholas of Cusa and Jacobus de Oratoribus), since it received no 
instructions regarding an imperial interview. The plurality of ad­
dress in these instructions may have included Jacobus de Oratoribus 
who had previously been in Gemany, but due to some unknown circum­
stance was now forced to remain in Italy for a time.
10k A
- . .. Article four of the instructions has not been preserved, 
but its general nature can be ascertained from the introduction.
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The conciliar orientated resolutions of the provincial synod
called by the Archbishop of Mainz awakened the Council of Basel to
the possibility that the neutrality policy of the Electors might be
terminated. The suggestion that the Archbishop himself favored Felix
V added fuel to the fire. Since the deliberations had also indicated
considerable support for Eugenius IV, a conciliar victory at the
forthcoming Nuremberg Diet was by no means certain. Therefore in
early September the Council decided to implement a previously planned
declaration against the secular neutrality and simultaneously issue a
105
request for obedience to Felix V. According to the record of 
Segovia,10^ the matter was discussed by Pope Felix and the Cardinals 
of Arles and Varambon from September 13-18. Due to the hesitancy of 
the Cardinal of Arles no final resolution was drawn up. In place of 
this, the delegates sent to each of the ecclesiastical Electors were 
to advocate the annulment of neutrality and the suspension of all 
support for Eugenius IV. Consequently Rudolf of Rudesheim was sent 
to the Archbishop of Mainz in mid-September while the prior of Saint- 
Paul-Trois-Chateaux, Michael Balduini, and Thomas of Dundrainan left 
in early October to visit both the Archbishops of Trier and Cologne.107 
Both were instructed to attend the synod in Cologne on October 8, 1440.
105Concilium Basiliense. VII, p. 207, lines 20-26.
10^Monumenta Conciliorum. Ill, pp. 503, 512.
10?
Valois, 02. cit., II, p. 2^4, footnote 1. Valois combines 
this delegation with one sent to the provincial council of Mainz in 
August, 1439. Valois confused the documents in Codex Reginae 102, 
relating to August, 1439, with those of Codex Palat. lat. 601 which 
related to 1440. The latter is identical with RTA, XV, No. 266.
Rudolf of Rudesheim returned from, his mission on September 23.10® 
He related that the Archbishop of Mainz had joined the ranks of the 
neutralists to prevent his bishops from joining Eugenius IV. He of­
ficially declared himself in favor of the Council. 109 Rttdesheim fur­
ther produced a letter from the Archbishop addressed to the Cardinal 
of Arles which excused the anti—conciliar formulations of the synod 
of Mainz, as products of minority discontent. 110
Balduinus and Abbot Thomas did not meet Archbishop Jacob of 
Trier. In view of the pending synod at Cologne they sent the Arch­
bishop their credentials and a memorandum defining their intentions.111 
Since the memorandum represented the basic essence of the conciliar 
attitude to the electoral and also the imperial neutrality, its major 
stipulations were of the utmost importance. Briefly summarized the 
document stated:
1. It is the duty of every Elector, especially those of 
ecclesiastical rank, to see that the authority of the general coun­
cils remains intact.
2. Such as rebel against this authority are to be punished by 
the addressee (Archbishop Jacob) as well as the King of the Romans.
3. Since Eugenius IV has been declared a heretic, all support
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•^°^RTA, XV, No. 265, article 1 .
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Ibid., No. 263, article 1 and No. 265, article 1 .
110p
Compare Ibid., No. 263, article 1 and No. 264.
Jacob of ?66V T^ eMmem°randum was obviously intended for
the Archbishon nf r ? °f f11?2 had already been contacted and 
the Archbishop of Cologne was visited by the delegation in Cologne.
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given him of necessity is injurious to the Catholic faith.
4. The doctrine of the supremacy of the Council was recogn- 
nized by Emperor Sigismund as well as Albert II, and is presently 
recognized by Frederick III . Furthermore, it is irreligious and im­
pious for anyone to advocate a contrary doctrine.
5. Schism is the result of a false faith. The originator of 
error is thus also the originator of schism.
6. Since Pope Eugenius IV disagrees with the Council and has 
advocated certain doctrinal errors, he is the originator of the 
schism, and all who support him err in the faith.
7. If the assertion is validated that the Holy Spirit has 
spoken and will speak through the Council of Basel, doctrinal errors 
will be easy to avoid,
8. Since the Council of Basel deposed Eugenius IV and elected 
Felix V it is the duty of all Christian kings and nobles to pledge 
obedience to the new Pope.
The overall impact of the memorandum was probably very limited. 
Archbishop Jacob was too shrewd a diplomat to give up such choice 
political instruments as the electoral neutrality or the freedom from 
papal supremacy. As already indicated the delegation experienced more 
success in Cologne. It was allowed to present its credentials as well 
as execute the mission with which it was entrusted. 112
By mid-October, 1440, the possibility of terminating the
^he report of Balduinus concerning his mission was re­
corded by the general secretary of the Council, Jakob Huglin. Ibid..
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electoral neutrality seemed quite favorable, especially in view of the 
positive reactions of the Archbishops of Mainz and Cologne. Which 
Pope would be favored was uncertain at this point, however. Since 
the position of the Archbishop of Trier was as uncertain as it was 
crucial, Pope Felix and the Council made a special effort to win the 
favor of the Archbishop at a special meeting held in October. Due 
to the tremendous odds at stake in any religious venture at that 
time, the delegation under the Archdeacon of Metz, Hugonis, achieved 
little or no success in their venture. 113 In a sense all of the ef­
forts of the Council of Basel to gain support were foredoomed to 
eventual failure. A divided Church attempting to maintain itself 
as the final court of appeal for all temporal and spiritual matters, 
yet functioning on the level of secular politics, could not hope to 
command the honor and respect necessary for the leadership of Europe. 
This consideration did not for a moment hamper the conciliar efforts 
to influence the Emperor on its behalf. Nevertheless, Felix V was 
crowned Pope without any imperial sanction.
Consultations held in August, 1W ) , produced a new scheme 
designed to gain imperial favor. Felix V, Konrad of Weinsberg and 
the Cardinal of Arles approved a plan whereby the Council of Basel 
offered to pay at least a part of Frederick's expenses when he
113Hansen, o^. cit.. I (Urkunden und Akten), Nos. Jk, 35;
RTA, XV, No, 26?; Puckert, o^. cit.. p. 162; Dr. Lager, "Jakob 
von Sirk, Erzbischof und Kurfurst von Trier," Trierischfts Archiv. 
Heft_II (1899), 6; W. Rossmarm, Betrachtungen uber das Zeitalter 
der Reformation (Jena, 1858), p. 152.
journeyed to Nuremberg.11^ The Council thought to use funds still due 
from the Archbishoprics of Mainz, Magdeburg and Bremen. An element 
of utilitarianism characterized the plan, however. The Emperor was 
to enforce the collection of these funds. In essence the scheme re­
quired Frederick to compromise his neutrality in favor of the Council 
by interferring on its behalf.11^
The implementation of this plan only went into effect some­
time after October 6, 1440. ^  The reason for Konrad's delay in the 
fulfillment of his obligations may have been due to his desire to
consult with the Archbishop of Mainz on the m a t t e r . T h e  actual 
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instructions revealed the elaborate scheming as well as the 
brazen presumptuousness of the Council, which was still functioning 
in terms of the temporal supremacy of the Church. The instructions 
briefly touched upon the negotiations of Konrad with Felix V and 
the Council in Basel; then immediately launched upon the proposed 
financial aid to Frederick. The legates were to gradually increase 
the offer of financial aid from one quarter to one half of the total
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I^IRTA, XV, No. 2?0, article 35.
u ,.uTh! entire Plan is published in Ibid. . No. 270. Strangely 
enough, the document was drawn up in German.
Tke instructions given to the legates sent to Vienna were
not dated On October 6, 1440, a letter indicating the imminent ar-
l i t  °d delegation was sent to the Emperor by the Count
Pai ^ lnaJf* IfeM- N°. 268. It seems reasonable to assume 
that the delegation left shortly afterwards.
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TK., suggested by the correspondence presented in
iBld., p. 313, footnote 3 .
-j
As given in Ibid. r No. 270
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revenue from the indicated sources, depending on Frederick's reaction 
to their proposals. The papal representatives were instructed to 
take great care lest they involve the Council and Felix V too deeply 
in imperial affairs without receiving adequate guarantees from the 
E m p e r o r .N e x t  the legates were to acquaint Frederick with the 
manner of collecting the above indicated revenues.120 The instruc­
tions concluded with some carefully concealed schemes aiding Konrad 
in his private enterprises;121 among others was a request for per­
sonal freedom from the jurisdiction of the district courts. Fred­
erick's reaction to the proposals of the Council is nowhere preserved; 
in this instance silence may well be indicative of failure, for had 
a scheme of such a magnitude been accepted by the Emperor, a sizeable 
correspondence would have been necessary to carry the plan into effect.
Lack of progress in achieving its end failed to lessen the 
Council's determination. Since the tenative date for the Nuremberg 
Diet was set at November 30, both Popes set about to solicit such 
support for their cause as could be found.122 Pope Eugenius IV sent 
John Carvajal, Nicholas of Cusa and Jacobus de Oratoribus. The 






In this connection a letter from Pope Felix V to Count Pala­
tine Stephan is of interest, for it betrays a note of urgency as well 
as an attempt to gain wide support. See Ibid.. No. 273; the letter is 
also noted in Georgisch, 0£. cit., II, p. 1097; E. Martene (ed.), and 
U. Durand (e d j, Thesaurus Novus Anecdotorum (Lutetiae Parisiorum.
1717), I, p. 1790.
123Ibid.. No. 292, article 6e.
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credentials and specific instructions are not available, but at least
three papal letters transmitted by this legation have been preserved.
124
One of them was directed to Frederick III. The letter adhered
closely to the pattern established by the general instructions.
Eugenius IV demanded that the Emperor squelch the schism and pledge
his obedience to the rightful Pope, for only in this manner could
125
peace be restored in the Empire. A second letter addressed to
the city of Frankfort inquired about the nature of the delegation
the city was sending to Nuremberg.
The other letter was addressed to Duke Henry of Bavaria; it
contained a simple but direct request for support at the Diet of 
126
Nuremberg.
The Council of Basel began specific preparations for the Diet 
towards the end of October. They included a bull justifying the 
Council's procedures against Eugenius IV.127 On November 10, 1440, 
a seven member committee was elected to prepare the necessary instruc-
*1 pQ
tions and credentials for the delegates of the Council. The formal 
124
RTA. XV, No. 274.




The bull was known by its first words "Grande periculum.”
It was issued on November 8, 1440. J. D. Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum
I m  gt Am£lissirna Coilfigfla (Graz, 1961), 29. PP. 355-368; Monumenta 
Conciliorum. Ill, pp. 517. 530. ----- 54
1Z% A ,  XV, No. 281, articles 2-3.
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selection of the delegates took place on November 12, 1440. They
were instructed to advocate the recognition of Felix V as Pope and
secure the acceptance of the Council of Basel as the supreme authority
in Catholic Christendom.'*'3^ Credentials were also prepared for the
131 _
individual princes and dignitaries of the imperial Diet. The
132
delegation left Basel on November I2* and arrived in Nuremberg on 
133
December 31* An unexpected situation awaited them.
The international crisis had found another turn in the sequence
134
of events. The political fermentation in Austria, Bohemia and Hun­
gary caused Frederick to postpone the Nuremberg Diet. The new meeting
129
129Ibid.. Nos. 281, article 6a and 282, article 2; Concilium 
Basiliense. VII, pp. 277-283.
13% o  official copy of the instructions is extant. Only a 
general statement on the powers of the delegates was recorded by 
Segovia. Honumenta Conciliorum. Ill, pp. 516-517; E2A, XV, No. 282, 
article 4.
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Included among these were Dukes Albrecht and Henry of 
Bavaria (Ibid.. No. 277/; the Archbishop of Salzburg (Ibid. . No. 292, 
article 3 and No. 297); and the Archbishop of Nuremberg (Ibid.. Nos.
278, 282).
132Ibid.. No. 281, article 7.
133Ibid.. No. 242, article 6.
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After the Emperor's final settlement with Elizabeth con­
cerning the status of Ladislaus (Chmel, Regesta. Nos. I65, 166, I69), 
a number of Bohemian nobles came to Vienna-Neustadt and offered to 
recognize Ladislaus as King of Bohemia. An agreement could not be 
reached on the matter and it was left to the discernment of the next 
Bohemian Diet which was to meet in Prague on February 2, 1441. Palacky, 
ojD* cit., IV, I, pp. 55-56. The Prague deliberations resulted in no 
settlement. Hufnagel, 00. cit., pp. 276-277. Frederick's difficulties 
were further magnified by the continued struggle between Elizabeth and 
Wladislaw of Poland which now developed into actual war. A. Huber, 
Geschichte Osterreichs (Geschichte der europaischen Staaten ed. A.H.L. 
Heeren, F.A. Ukert and W. Giesebrecht. Gotha, 1888), III, pp. 23-24.
was to be held at Mainz on February 2, 1441. In addition to this the 
Diet was transformed into a Congress. Although no official decree 
was enacted to facilitate such a modification, the reality of the new 
situation became apparent when the imperial delegates arrived on Feb­
ruary 14. They were empowered to act only in ecclesiastical problems, 
and came specifically to a Congress rather than a Diet.
In order to achieve a sense of religious internationalism in 
the Congress and to insure some sort of validation within the ranks 
of Catholic Christianity, England and France could not be ignored. 
Frederick realized that only two alternatives were open to him. The 
church schism should either be halted by the application of force on 
the part of the major powers or by the convocation of a new Council. ^ 5  
Since the church parties conceived of their mission in terms of public 
and personal propaganda directed towards the more important personal­
ities in attendance, the Emperor was faced with a problem of immense 
proportions.
In his attempt to solve the religious dilemma of the Empire 
Frederick III sent official invitations to England and France. His 
negotiations with England were directed by Archbishop Dietrich of 
Cologne, a staunch opponent of Eugenius IV.136 The Archbishop sent 
two legates to deal with Henry VI of England. After the conclusion 
of a treaty between King Henry and the Archbishop on August 23, which
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„ 0T,0 ~,35This solution found popular support but egotistical motives 
were often mixed with genuine enthusiasm. Bachmann, 02. cit., pp. 33-
ansen, o£. ci£., I, p# v?ff.
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pledged friendship and some military aid, ecclesiastical matters domi­
nated the discussions. Judging from the isolated accounts1-^ 7 Henry VI 
was apparently a cooperative participant in the talks. A subsequent 
correspondence developed between Frederick III and Henry VI which was 
mainly concerned with England's participation in the forthcoming Diet and 
Congress. Only the letters of Henry VI have been preserved.^ 9  
The prolonged and rather persistent nature of the Emperor's negoti­
ations with England indicated the serious intentions of the Roman 
King in dealing with the ecclesiastical problems. His purpose in 
seeking the cooperation of both England and France1^0 possibly re­
presented a plan by which the Church was to operate within the 
political institutions of the times. Whether or not the Emperor
137
Two letters, both dated September 2, 1440, and addressed to 
Dietrich of Cologne have been preserved. RTA. XV, Nos. 306, 307; 
Lacomblet, ,2E« cit., TV, pp. 286-287. G. Williams (ed.), Memorials of 
iilg. Reign of King H^?ry Official Correspondence of Thomas Bekvnton.
^ecretary to gjpg Hgnry V I., jnd Bishop of Bath and Wells (No. 56 of 
Rerum Britannicarum Medii Aevi Scriptores. London, 1872;, II, pp. 71-75.
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The term "Diet and Congress" best describes the Mainz assembly. 
In official terminology it remained a Diet, while in practice it func­
tioned as a Congress. In the fifteenth century the term "Diet" was us­
ually applied to a meeting of the constituents of the Empire and was 
international only in as far as concerned the geographic area represented. 
A Congress generally solicited the participation of the major European 
powers, and made a pretense towards internationalism. The subjects 
deliberated at a Congress were almost entirely limited to such current 
religious issues as had a direct influence on the welfare of Europe.
139ftTA, XV, Nos. 308, 309, 311; Williams, op. cit.. II, pp. 94-95.
140
An imperial invitation to the Congress of Mainz was sent 
directly to Charles VII of France. _RTA.XVf No. 302; Muller, on. cit.,







luanj-uarum ocnp^ores urgentorati, 1717;, II, pp. 401-02. The 
this event was carried directly to Bourges where a synod of the 
can Church was in session. Monumenta Conciliorum- III. r>. wk. 
n* 171 pPe ?e Beaucourt, Hi^tqire d e a r ie s  Vli (Paris, I 885 
Rl I,,1* + oor}?s Personally journeyed to Bourges on August 23, 
On August 28 the representatives of Eugenius IV presented their
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wished, to subject the state to the church cannot be conclusively 
demonstrated. His later policy may well have included submission to 
the Papacy, but this move was certainly not contrary to imperial 
interests. Frederick's immediate goal for the Mainz discussions 
was apparent. Any solution to the schism had to be a European solu­
tion; therefore it was necessary to eliminate those potential fac­
tionalisms which would foster future schismatic tendencies.
International diplomacy did not prevent the participants of
the schism from soliciting last minute support. Pope Eugenius IV,
not to be outdone by the Council of Basel, made a strong bid for
the confidence of the Archbishop of Trier. His ambassador was the
skillful Nicholas of Cusa. The Pope's offer was designed to appeal
to a greedy Elector. Jacob had not yet paid the Papacy for the right
to his Archbishopric, a debt which he had pledged to pay by September
or early October, 1440. Cusa's proposal was simple. If the Elector
supported Eugenius IV all his debt as well as the fines incurred by
141
nonpayment would be cancelled. Jacob agreed to the terms offered 
him. In order to reap the fullest benefit from his political
before him; the next day those of the Council followed suite. On 
September 2 Charles declared himself in favor of Pope Eugenius IV, 
largely because of the illegality of his suspension. The French King 
was careful to emphasize that this attitude was tenative until a 
Congress of all European powers was summoned. By this declaration 
Charles expressed his acceptance of Frederick's invitation and simul­
taneously outlined the position France would follow at the Congress. 
Two French representatives were sent to the Congress. Their presence 
was acknowledged on February 18, 1441, by Archbishop Jacob of Trier. 
RTA, XV, No. 313; Hansen, op. cit.. I , p. 48, footnote 3 .
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Rossmann, op. cit. . pp. 380-381.
investment Eugenius stipulated that the final release from the finan­
cial obligations would only come if the Archbishop could persuade 
the other Electors to pledge their obedience also,124-2 Eugenius offer­
ed a second inducement, Jacob had. unsuccessfully attempted to arrange 
for his brother, Philipp of Sierck, to succeed him as the Prior of 
Wurzburg. Legal processes had thwarted the scheme. Pope Eugenius
now promised to reverse the verdict if the Archbishop promised him
144
his support.
The Council of Basel also continued its preparations for the 
coming Congress. Since Henry VI of England had sent a pointed reply 
to Pope Felix V on April 23, 1440, no further efforts were made to 
win English favor. In contrast to this area of inactivity, the con­
ciliar delegates who had left for Nuremberg carried on a lively propa- 
145
ganda campaign. They were courteously received by the Archbishop 
of Salzburg, the Bishops of Augsburg, Regensburg, Bamberg, and 
Passau, the Dukes Albert, Heniy and John of Bavaria, and Margrave 
Albert Achilles of Brandenburg. None of their patrons had given 
them any promise of support except Albert Achilles and Dukes Albert 
and John of Bavaria. When the delegation heard of the transfer of
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142RTA, XV, No. 314.
143
7-, n ~ p ^  Ju?e! the Council of Basel invested Archdeacon
m ? 7 p .  m £ v r.of the Diooese of warrt” s. Concilia.
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When Jacob revealed some reluctance to act on his behalf 
Eugenius sent a pointed letter of encouragement. RTA, XV, No. 31?.
145
Ifcid., No. 292-, articles 1-5, 6a-6d.
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the Diet of Nuremberg to Mainz, it divided its ranks into two groups,
of which one returned to Basel while the other journeyed on to Mainz.
In Mainz the delegation soon learned of the attempt by the Archbishop
of Mainz to influence the other Electors towards declaring obedience 
147
to Eugenius IV. This was a great setback to the Council which had 
counted rather heavily on the Archbishop's support. When it was fur­
ther learned that several of the Electors had already been influenced 
by Dietrich, the delegation sent an urgent letter to Pope Felix, 
warning him of impending danger. The letter reached Basel on Feb­
ruary 9 and was read before the General Assembly the next day.1^  By 
February 25 the Council had decided to send its president, Louis of 
Arles, together with Cardinal Griinwalder and the Archdeacon of Metz,
149
Hugonis, to Mainz, They were to oppose any proposed transfer of 
the Council to a new location#  ^ This delegation of nearly one hun- 
dred individuals reached Mainz on March 5, 1441.
Emperor Frederick's attitude towards the salient aspects of 
the schism was evident in his preliminary preparations for the Congress.
146
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Ibid. . No. 292, article 6f.
147
Ibid., No. 357. article 2: Monuments.
556-694.
I48jy^ ^  360, article 1 .
_149,c.oncilium B^siliense, VII, pp. 315-17, 319-21; RTA, XV,
I>‘0» JJLO«
^ RTA, XV, No. 318, article 5c.
ITT N°* 35?’ article ^  5; Also Monumenta conciliorum.
ill, pp. 556-694; Perouse, o^. ci£., pp. 365-369.
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The imperial delegation sent to Mainz included the Bishops Peter of 
Augsburg and Sylvester of Chiemsee, Baron Albert of Potendorf, sand 
Thomas Ebendorfer, a professor of theology at Haselbach.152 The 
directives given to this legation best set forth the ends Frederick
153
hoped to achieve. At the onset of the Congress the imperial 
party was to offer an explanation of the postponement of the Nurem­
berg Diet and announce the intention of the Emperor to attend the
154
present meeting at his earliest convenience. Prior to any discus­
sion of the ecclesiastical problems the delegates were to confer with 
the Electors.155 Moreover, the imperial views on the issue should be 
heard before those of the Electors. In this connection the represen­
tatives of the Roman King were to state that the latter considered 
the convocation of a new Council at Strassburg the best remedy for 
the ecclesiastical dilemma. The implementation of this imperial 
proposal, however, was generously qualified, and made dependent upon
152
The selection of the delegation was a tribute to Frederick's 
impartiality. Since the Bishop of Augsburg had been granted his posi­
tion by Eugenius IV (December 19, 1439), he would undoubtedly support 
him. On the other hand the Bishop of Chiemsee and particularly Thomas 
Ebendorfer were staunch supporters of the Council of Basel.
153
These instructions were issued in German and are published 
in Chmel, Regesta. Anhang, pp. II-IV; RTA, XV, No. 320. They are 
on?ted*in Lichnowsky, cit., VI, No. 164 and Chmel, o£. cit., No.
zi r eva -^uati°ns of the document see Puckert, op. cit., pp. 
163-64; Bachmann, o ^ c i t . ,  pp. 77-79; H. Keussen, Die oolitische 
y,--^ Reichsstadte mit besonderer Beriicksichti trnntr ihrer
fkichsstandschaft unter Kaiser Friedrich I II . 1440-1477. Inaugural-
?QQ^rtati^ ‘ * * Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitat zu Berlin (Bonn, 1885), p. 14. ’
154
r A^ les 1-5• According to a letter written by Dietrich 
of Cologne Frederick was expected to arrive on March 26. Hansen,
££• Sit*, I (Urkunden und Akten), No* 310
1-^Articles 6-10.
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ob sich aber baide tail (the Elector and Princes) oder 
ir ainer darzu nicht verwilligen wolten, was uns dann 
darinne als Romischen kunig und vogte der heiliger kirchen 
geburet zu tun, des sein wir willig nach rate unserr frewnde 
der kurfiirsten, doch also daz wir ander Cristenlich darin 
auch mit uns haben, wann wir besorgen, uns ware mit unserr 
Deutschen nacion allein ain newes concilium nicht wol fur- 
zunemen.156
In view of the possibility of a new Council, the imperial
representatives could appoint a new protector, promise the Council
imperial protection, and guarantee the royal acceptance of its
decrees. If the Congress of Mainz did not authorize a new Council,
the matter was to be deferred until a later meeting at some unspeci- 
1 *>8
fied date. Frederick generously permitted his delegates to agree 
to any other solution which seemed satisfactory to the Congress as a 
whole. However, a solution which in any way nullified the neutrality 
of the Emperor in church affairs was unacceptable. Any proposal 
passed by the Congress that violated the imperial neutrality was sub­
ject to the personal ratification of Frederick.1^  The rest of the 
instructions pertained to the business affairs of the Empire and were 
not directly related to the church problems. 160
The instructions made it quite evident that Frederick wished to







the approval of the Electors and Princes of the realm.
l6°Articles 20-24.
avoid an endorsement of either party in the religious struggle. He 
probably felt that any action which the Congress took would not be 
universally valid and only serve to intensify the disorder within the 
Church. The convocation of a new Council offered the best solution to 
the problem. The imperial representatives considered this the chief 
aim of their mission and had in fact no authorization to deal with 
any other problems of the Empire. Such matters as related to the 
institutional problems of the Empire received little or no considera­
tion at the Congress.
The reign of Emperor Frederick III before the convocation of
the Diet and Congress of Mainz in 1441 was typified by widespread
political and religious activity with no clear object or purpose in
mind. Much of it was connected with the traditional effort to achieve
institutional stability after an imperial election. Despite their
external irrationality, the events already displayed several salient
tendencies which were to characterize Frederick's relations with the
Church in general and the Papacy in particular. The new King of the
Romans had no choice but to accept the religious heritage which his 
forebears left him.
One of the most prominent features of this heritage lay in 
the changing nature of the Church itself. Far from controlling the 
sword of temporal power, it now sought security from the territorial 
problems, rarely instigated by sincere doctrinal considerations.
The religious issues facing Frederick had both local and universal 
dimensions, for despite its territorialism the Church still main­
tained its claim to universality. The young Emperor perceived the
100
magnitude of the ecclesiastical dilemma he was asked to solve, and ex­
hibited a remarkable maturity, especially in view of the pressures 
exerted upon him by both the Council of Basel and the Papacy. While 
he apparently realized the necessity of the national state and made 
no attempt to resist its advance, his concept of the Church remained 
purely medieval. For him the religious issue was an international 
problem and could be solved only by the efforts of all the states of 
Europe. The invitations requiring England and France to attend the 
Mainz assembly were more than customary diplomatic gestures. They 
expressed the true attitude of Frederick.
The immensity of the religious problem, combined with Frederick's 
sincere desire to solve it, led him to accept another aspect of his 
heritage—that of imperial neutrality. The Emperor was careful to dis­
tinguish his position from that of the Electors during his early reign 
since he did not wish to restrict the internationalism of his ecclesi­
astical policy. For the Electors neutrality meant little more than 
political expediency, a fact which Frederick did not discern during 
his early reign. Such elements of unquestioning trust were soon 
eliminated in the course of subsequent years.
One of the chief hindrances to the effectual implementation of
Frederick's ecclesiastical policies was Austria. The dual nature of
Frederick's administration was also a legacy of the past. Even during
the first year of his reign Frederick's concern with his hereditary
lands prevented him from coming to grips with the schism. Austria
was to become one of the main reasons for the failure of the Emperor's 
early program.
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One factor distinguished Frederick's early reign from later 
times, namely, his energetic attempt to formulate his own ecclesi­
astical policy. The instructions given to the imperial delegation 
leaving for Mainz displayed a firmness not found during the Emperor's 
later reign. This independence proved temporary and superficial.
As in previous decades, the gulf between the theoretical formulation 
of a program and its ultimate implementation remained immense. This 
already became evident during the sessions of the Diet and Congress 
of Mainz.
CHAPTER III
THE IDEAL AND ITS ADVERSARIES
The deliberations at Mainz were mainly concerned with the 
church problem.1 Some preliminary discussions were held after the 
arrival of the Electors of Mainz and Trier, but the actual sessions 
only commenced when the Archbishop of Cologne appeared on the scene.
Both parties of the schism contributed to the historiography 
of the Congress of Mainz. The conciliarist Segovia provided the best 
extant document of the proceedings. H. Herre (ed.). Deutsche Reiehs- 
j&gsakten unter Kaiser Friedrich I II . 1440-1441 (Vol. XV of Deutsche 
Rejchstagsaktgn. Gottingen, 1957T/No. 357. Cited hereafter as RTA, 
XV; Monumenta Conciliorum Generalium saeculi decimi onlnti, Concilium 
Basileense Scriptores III, pp. 556-694. Cited hereafter as Monumenta 
kP-Qcjliorum, III . The report was an eyewitness account as well as a 
compilation of secondary descriptions. The other records of the Basel 
delegation were of a supplementary nature. Included among these were 
the notations of the Council's secretary, Hiiglin, and the letters sent 
from Mainz to Felix V and the Council of Basel. Papal contributions 
were not as extensive. Only one letter from Cardinal Nicholas of 
Cusa to Cardinal Cesarini survived. RTA, XV, No. 370. The correspon­
dence between the secular heads of government was chiefly concerned 
with the externalities of the Congress. See RTA, XV, Nos. 356, 358, 
361-364, 366. A very interesting but misleading document purporting 
to belong to the Congress of Mainz was published in Germany in 1523 
with the imposing title Teutscher Nation Notturft. die Ordnuns und 
.Reformation filler Stande 4m romischen Reich durch Kaiser Friedrich 
iii . The last edition of this work was published by G. W. Bohmer 
under the title Kaiser Friedrichs III . Entwurf einer magna charts 
fag-gatschlajg oder_&e Reformation djesejs Kaisers van Jahre 1441. 
(Gottingen, 1818hBohmer probably based his edition on the document 
^  1Qn0d T? M* Goldast in his Reichssatzungfin (Hann, 1609), I, pp. 
166-180. It was entitled "Kaiser Friedrichs dess dritten Reformation. 
m* j* ro®ischen Reich teutscher Nation furgenoramen und proponiert 
auff dem Reichstag zu Meuntz anno domini 1441." The work was actually 
a product of the sixteenth century Reformation and had no connection 
with the Congress of Mainz in 1441. Its refom ideology was based 
upon den allgemeinen Konzilier und Reichstagen des XV. und XVI. 
Jahrhunderts. . . . "  H. Werner "Reformation Kaiser Friedrichs III. " 
Sgatgchj geschichtsblatter, XIX, (1919), i9i ; Written by a member of 
the West German Imperial. Knighthood, it listed the grievances of the 
organization against the princes. It proposed a number of reforms, 
both political and religious, in the interests of the group. The
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One of the first official acts of the Congress was the formulation and 
ratification of the so-called Artsmentl Momntim.-2 Essentially the
standes S "  ^ laM die Besch'rart“  Reichsritter-
s S l e r t jL  Deutschl^ds wie sis auf dem Rittertag su Landau 
«»vu 4.4 Kamen. ^ > p. 190. An excellent critical
1909 See h docu!S"t 'V the abovre author was published in
rich'lll ® fe s0®enanr,te 'Reformation des Kaisers Fried-
■ V  ®ei°hs^eforaPlan der Westdeutschen Reichsritter- 
(1909)) 29lfb. -^ ^tgchrift. fiir Geschichte ufld Kunst. XXVIII
cus in yaS/ irst Published by Mathias Flacius Illyri-
veritatis. The use of the term "quad-
materSl Althou^ F? * “ T T *  ° f err°rS in the datinS of
^  (Francofordiae 2  Moenum, 16l3T l 5f
dess Concilii zu Basel vor^den S t "*? ”  j 6“ [*staS zu Meintz vor infang 
Keyser S t r id d e n  tand“  delib«'-irt und ihrer Mayestet
Ooldast. S S t o  * 1 1  S eq^ e« “^ geben* Ann° D0mini 5 2 6- ”
j. C L&ig , Dsnisshag1^R£ii !aai aij ‘ (L;ipZi ° j^ )“ I*h:“ fo“  *
S l l a k ^ a s ^ ^ r / ^ ^ 1"  t S ’l ®  S T j ,
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£  S S 5  S  ? “ “ . . f Xl ,
like Puckert and A. Bachmann xv 1I; .APrii* 1441. Scholars
latter asserted that the H e  S  *"! findings of Voigt. The 
Ersbischofs ron Trier ” w“  dravn up ”auf Betreiben des
nated near C a n L ^ F e b ^  2) T ™ s t  £ " 1 * * “ t “  ^
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document set forth a series of conditions to which any pope recog­
nized by the German Nation must agree. The chief stipulations of the 
document were:
1) The Pope was to accept and abide by the decrees of the 
Council of Constance which declared the supremacy of the Council 
over the Papacy.
2) The Holy Reman Empire was to have the final say in all 
mattere relating to elections, conferment of titles, collection of 
funds, distributions of pensions and like matters.
3) The Pope was to evaluate such conferments as were made 
during the schism and terminate all the legal processes arising out 
of the struggle.
4) The Pope must establish a pragmatic sanction between the 
Emperor, the Electors, and all others interested.
5) All papal concessions or laws which related to the German 
bishops or archbishops were to be clarified, and rectified where 
necessary.
Apparently the Emperor had not anticipated such a turn of 
events. The imperial delegation was not empowered to validate the 
Aylaamenta. Consequently the Archbishop of Trier was sent to Vienna 
to inform Frederick of the new developments.
The Congress of Mainz resembled a glorified debate. Each party
"indemnitates" formed the main body of the Avisamenta. The Avisamenta 
were not "geheiraen" (Voigt) resolutions of the sessions at Mgdnz^i 
contrast to offentlichen resolutions presented on April 7. They were 
Pj*el^ a r y  draft of proposals determined by German interests, 
while the April declarations (RTA, XV, No. 355) related to Christendom
Congress former w*s a product of the Diet, the latter of the
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was out to win favor for its cause. Nothing was spared in the effort 
to discredit one's opponent. In order to determine what influence 
this self-seeking had upon the imperial throne the essential principles 
governing the Congress must be ascertained. Superficially these were 
all but extinguished by the verbosity the occasion produced. The as­
sembly created an awareness of these forces but offered no solutions. 
These governing principles were conditioned by the ecclesiastical and 
political flux of the times. Their ramifications in relation to the 
reign of Frederick were immediate, and in the final analysis disas­
trous.
The Congress went into actual session with the arrival of the 
imperial delegates on February 14, 1441. Almost immediately a memor­
andum from Felix V was handed to the delegation. It was refused be­
cause the delegates were not certain as to whether they were empowered 
to receive such a document. The opening address was given by Thomas 
Ebendorfer. He urged the members of the Congress to establish peace 
and unity in the Church. What followed contributed little to such 
ideals. Until the arrival of the French delegates on March 5» the 
agenda of the Congress was mainly devoted to preliminary argumenta-
L
tion. Once the status of the Cardinal of Arles had been settled as 
well as some matters relating to the formality of procedure5 the
3RTA, XV, No. 340.
k
It was felt he could be recognized as a Cardinal but not as a 
legate, since Felix V had not yet been officially recognized as Pope.
. _ P 7’ articles 6-7h. The delegates of the Council
of Basel hesitated in entering upon any sort of negotiations with the 
electors as long as the latter maintained their pretext of neutrality.
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Congress continued to function in what was fundamentally an unofficial
6
manner. Thus the opposing parties had adequate time to debate their 
grievances. Masters trained in the art of debate now gave expression 
to their eloquence. On March 24 the views of the Council found ex­
pression in the addresses of the Cardinal of Arles and Thomas of 
7
Courcelles. When the Congress resumed on March 27 the advocates of 
Eugenius IV took the floor. Following an introductory speech by 
John of Carvajal, Nicholas of Cusa delivered an eloquent oration
g
that was warmly received by the Congress. It advocated an unequiv­
ocal endorsement of papal supremacy. The following day Segovia pre­
sented a nine and one-half hour refutation of Cusa's assertions. 9 
More words were added to the record of the Congress on March 29 when 
Carvajal and Nicholas of Cusa again had their say. In order to re­
duce the verbosity of the proceedings Archbishop Jacob of Trier
Because of the intense argumentation concerning the mode of 
Co»nMnr%  f!nCh d®legation advocated the convocation of a new 
SiLnce t^1S. ^  3180 156611 the suggestion of the Imperial
u , t0 proC6ed along these lines. As the final 
~  f  such an important decision needed the Emperor's
m S r ^ l C l S i .  Congress Proc^ded in its designated capacity
7
Monument a, Conciliorum, III, pp. 564-65; RTA, XV, No. 343*
g
Ros- 3W . y-MS. The last document includes 
Concilion™ ITT0"  ls found in Monuments
th?"propS2is fcioZLs s°cus“  of
<*BSi i i 5S T S t f E V " " *  See !teBsnla
10?
ordered the participants to limit their remarks to the essentials 
under discussion. The Archbishop left the Congress the next day to 
spend Easter in his diocese.
To clarify the basic issues under discussion, the imperial 
delegation drew up a list of specific questions to which each of the 
contending parties were to give their honest answers. This action 
was a credit to the intelligence of the members of the imperial dele­
gation.10 All the questions revolved around one key issue, namely, 
was the transfer of the Council of Basel to Ferrara justified? In 
this way all the issues which tended to divert the proceedings were 
eliminated.
As a partial answer to the questions proposed by Ebendorfer
IX
the delegation from Basel drew up a memorandum designed to prove 
that the Council of Basel had never been transferred to Ferrara nor 
dissolved, for the Pope (Eugenius IV) did not possess this power.
At this crucial point, the English delegation arrived at Mainz and 
expressed their opposition to the convocation of a new Council. Thus 
a variety of opinion dominated the Congress in early April. In es­
sence both the Electors and the English desired a direct recognition 
of Eugenius IV, but with approval of the Council. The French aid 
Viennese delegations advocated a new Council. Both parties therefore
°While the actual questions of the delegation have not been 
preserved they can easily be deducted from the answers which Nicholas 
of Cusa gave to them. RTA, XV, No. 352.
11
M 1» No. 353. The memorandum was probably drawn up during 
See Ibid. , pp. 569-70. A summary of the same is given on
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endorsed conciliar supremacy; they only disagreed upon the manner in 
which to end the conflict.
The above situation was instrumental in stimulating the formu­
lating of another memorandum by Ebendorfer.12 Its Immediate purpose 
was to influence the Electors towards summoning a new Council, Eben- 
dorfer's document apparently had considerable influence, for a meeting 
held on April 6 between the electoral, imperial and French representa­
tives, as well as German heads of state indicated a strong feeling in 
13
that direction. Only the English persisted in their opposition.
The above agreement, as it was formulated on April 7 , was 
probably the major achievement of the Congress of Mainz, Its major 
stipulations were:
1) A new Council was to be called at a new location in order 
to restore peace to the Church,
2) Both opposing factions were to agree upon one of the loca­
tions listed in the agreement. Should these refuse, the temporal
lords together with the King of France and the Holy Roman Emperor were 
to determine the place,
3) On November 1 , 1441 the temporal rulers were to meet with 
both of the contending parties in order to draw up an agenda for the
IbicL pp7^575l780* Ebendorfer's memorandum is evaluated in
13
IM d ., No, 355, The English were not listed in the subse
terns T T f  <°f W  1441 dUe t0  their non-compliance w£hits
II do ?47 4ft A* ¥  I 3?? ^  IfJ^ncile: 1*08-1450 (Paris, 1904),
* if* - i51*3?’ Thomas Ehendorfers Chronica regum omanorum. Krxtisch erortert und n_____ ,
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proposed Council,
4) The opening date for the new Council was set for August 1 , 
1442, but the Council could not begin to function until twenty days 
later.
5) In view of the magnitude of the Council, the kings and 
nobles of the Empire were to seek out and sponsor such men as were 
qualified to attend the sessions.
6) Pope Eugenius IV was foreseen as the Pope of the new 
Council. Nevertheless, he could not enter into any direct negoti­
ations and was expected to submit to the dictates of the Council.
?) The terms of the agreement were validated only if they 
received the ratification of both Frederick III and the King of 
France.
The Mainz Agreement of April 7 , 1441 constituted a definite 
milestone on the way which was eventually to lead to Frederick's 
affirmation of the Vienna Concordat of 1448. It represented the 
first major compromise as to the manner in which the ecclesiastical 
problems of the day were to be solved. The Emperor and the Electors 
abandoned all pretence of neutrality, a tendency liiich had already 
been foreshadowed by the Avisamenta of early February. Eugenius IV 
was unofficially recognized as the lawful head of the Roman Church, 
although the Electors were not above expecting return favors from the 
recipient of their benevolence. Frederick's representatives at the 
Congress had been warned against compromising their neutrality, but 
the prospect of fulfilling the Emperor's wishes overruled any
scruples they may have had. They had achieved their mission without 
making concessions of any kind. Since the terms of the agreement 
could only be substantiated by the consent of Frederick III and the 
French monarch, a sense of uncertainty characterized the agreement.
The Council of Basel was not slow to realize that the validation of 
the agreement might well be hampered by influencing the man whose 
signature would make it law. By the end of May a delegation was al­
ready on its way to Vienna.
The institutional disorder prevalent within the Holy Roman 
Empire received little consideration at the Diet and Congress of 
Mainz. A meeting intent upon elucidating some of the internal prob­
lems of the Empire was held only after the conclusion of the Congress. 
Those in attendance included the Electors of Mainz, Trier, and 
Cologne, the guardian of the Count Palatine, Otto, and the imperial 
representatives who had attended the Mainz deliberations. In spite 
of the unofficial character of the meeting, the participants affirmed 
that a new Diet, which both territorial and city representatives 
should attend, was to convoke at Worms on May 28, 1441. Its concern 




,. Their instruetions were very specific on the question of 
neutrality. Item ob unser frewnde die kurfursten oder ir rete von 
iren wegen begerten daz wir in treten solten in ir ainung, appella- 
cion und protestacion, darauf mugen unser sendpoten antwiirten, daz 
S1 *n 1J'em abschaiden von uns vemomen haben, wie wir zu disen 
zeiten bei der antwurte ze besteen mainen, die wir iren reten und 
sendeboten hie in der Newnstat auf soliche ire begere in unserm 
aufnemen des heiligen reichs getan haben, ob aber unser heiligen 
reichs getan haben, ob aber unser sendeboten daruber als vast 
angehalten wurden, so sullen si das schieben unz auf unser kumft 
gen Mencz." RTA, XV, No. 320, article 19.
Ill
within the Empire. Frederick's participation or representation was 
of course expected. The estates of the Empire were especially urged 
to attend since much of the current unrest was due to the conflict 
of the latter with the nobility of the realm.15 The deliberations 
of the Diet were of a local and territorial nature, for peace had to 
prevail at a territorial level if the Empire was to be secure. Un­
fortunately , the deliberations at Worms were limited to expressions 
of individual opinions. No meaningful resolutions were enacted,
The Mainz Agreement of April 7 , 1441, failed to provide a 
definitive or even a partial solution to the ecclesiastical complex. 
This was essentially due to the conditional and tentative character 
of its recommendations and the unofficial nature of the Congress 
which produced them. In order to end this state of affairs lengthy
negotiations between Frederick and an electoral delegation were held 
17
in June and July.
15c
Special mention was made of the Swabian League which had 
recently destroyed the castle of the Archbishop of Neufel. The reason 
for this action was explained in a letter addressed to Frankfurt and
Y- Kanter* Hang yon Recftberg, von fiohen- 
Ein Zext-und Lebensbild (Zurich, 1903), pp. 126-2?♦
J. Janssen, Frankfurts Rejchscorresnonden?. nebst anderen ver- 
HaBd£|n Mtenstucken von 1226 M i  1512 IFreibI^i7T 86^ 72T7 ll7 mSs. 
F J  J S *ttt^i vd?e* gc£e -eichstagsakten mter Kaiser
m  o f  t o * * ™ * * * .
17
t -i .  . Siffiultaneously a regional Diet was held at Constance from 
July 3 to 5. It owed its origin to the virtual absence of any negoti­
ations relating to territorial problems at the Diet and Congress of
La™ J|at ? ^ gf !v  m rlnCipleS leading towards a national peace were 
,  i e ?let was unable t0 formulate any binding resolu­
tions. A second Diet scheduled for August 16, 1441 failed to 
materialize*
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The electoral delegation, headed by Archbishop Jacob of Trier,
18
arrived in Vienna shortly after the middle of June. The delegation 
sought solutions to three major problems. They had to obtain the con­
sent of the Roman King to the terms of the Avisamenta. which implied 
the disbandment of neutrality. Secondly, the delegation sought to 
bring about the implementation of the decrees of the Congress of Mainz, 
especially the convocation of a new Council. Lastly, the tragic con­
ditions of the Empire, especially as they found expression in Vehm 
justice and taxation, were to be discussed with the Emperor, and if 
possible, action was to be taken to eliminate these grievances.
Frederick's immediate consent to the Avisamenta and the Mainz 
Agreement was probably delayed or even entirely frustrated by the 
presence of papal and conciliar legations in Vienna. The exact aim 
of Pope Eugenius IV in commissioning another delegation to Vienna 
cannot be determined. It was representative of a long series of 
attempts on the part of the Pope to cultivate the personal favor of 
the Emperor, and to bring about the termination of imperial neutrality. 
Such purely selfish motives also dominated the efforts of the Basel 
representatives. Stubbornly they continued to struggle for the impe­
rial recognition and protection of the Council of Basel. Simultane­




June 17, 1441—Regarding this date see RTA, XVI, pp. 19-20.
19
The bait used to entice the Archbishop was the Cathedral 
Diocese of Wurzburg. H. Herre, Concilium. Basiliense. Die Proto- 
jplle des Conqils 1440-1443 (Vol, VII of Concilium Ba s i 1isnss .
S.tudien sad &uellgn zur Geschichte £§5 Concils von Basel. 1910), 
pp. LIII-LV.
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The electoral delegation had its first audience with Frederick
20 pi 
on June 24. Frederick evaded the electoral proposals with the
pretense that his negotiations with the Austrian estates were still
in progress. The Archbishop of Trier offered to mediate the dispute
between Queen Elizabeth of Hungary and Frederick, as well as between
the Emperor and his brother, Duke Albert. 22 An agreement was finally-
signed on July 7 , 1441.
In accordance with his promise, Frederick III resumed his 
negotiations with the electoral delegation shortly after the conclu­
sion of the Austrian talks. The nature of these talks cannot be pre­
cisely determined. Conclusions must be drawn from one extant document. 23
20
RTA, XVI, No. 30, article 1 ; Perouse, op. cit., p. 371.
21RTA. XVI, No. 223.
22
lhe acts of the subsequent discussions between the contending 
parties were first published by A. F. Kollar in his Analecta Monumen- 
j o r y a A e v i  Vmdobonengja (Vindobonae, 1762), II, pp. 899-982.
ossibly the best evaluation of this material was done by J. Chmel, 
Ggachichtejaiser Friedrichs IV. und s_eines Sohnes Maximilian I . 
(Hamburg, 1843), II, pp. 107-123.
23
, . n .T^is document has been published in J. Chmel, Regesta Chrono- 
.j£gico-jjigloinatica Friderici Romanorum Imperatori s (Wien. 1859) An-
PP. VII—VIIIj RTA, XVI, No. 20. The document has been subjected 
a 'Z Z T L berpretations. Chmel, cit., p. vii noted that it was
L ^ lT n  tT J dxe1_nachstens zu schlichtenden Kirchenangelegen- 
heiten. Ithasalso been designated "eine Vereinbarung" between the 
Emperor and the Electoral representatives (W. Puckert. Die kiirfurst- 
iMhrend lasler Concils (Leipzig, I858)', p. I69); 
an Endbescheide presented to the Archbishop of Trier in which the 
mperor defined his attitude towards the schism. A. Bachmann, "Die 
deutschen Kbnige und die kurfiirstliche Neutralist (1438-14475. Ein 
1f ^ ragpz^  eic5sT ^  Ki?;chengeschichte Deutschlands. Mit urkund- 
?ififio? af®?’ --p-h'iy -QSterreichischfi Geschichte 
1+ III + #°T a®^Illlar document presented to all the Electors
S i e ^ c h s  III °« (0* Huf? ^ el. "Kaspar. Schlick als Kanzler
Friedrichs III ., Mittheilungen des Instituts tfir OsterreichisehP
!&^ lc^ sfo;schunpI lmJmiT7zW7^n$ob-
£  S E S iT E S f c ,:  - " " t of — *• ,,hioh prederick
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Despite its limitations, the document provides some clarification of 
Frederick's attitude towards the church problem. As overseer of 
Christendom, the Emperor felt that he was destined to arbitrate be­
tween the Papacy and the Council, a position which could only be 
maintained by complete impartiality. Electoral neutralism consti­
tuted a factional ideology. Any unconditional endorsement of con-
ciliar proposals would have restricted Frederick's ideal of himself
24as a peacemaker.
The King of the Romans was convinced that the schism could 
only be terminated by the summoning of a new Council, Since the 
Mainz Agreement was largely conditioned by French interests, England 
was disregarded in its practical application. In the zealous at­
tempt to facilitate the implementation of his ideals, Frederick al­
lowed an exception to the plan which called for the participation of 
all major European powers. This willingness to submit to the demands 
of the immediate situation already found expression in the directives 
which were drawn up for the Congress of Mainz, While strongly en­
dorsing the principle of neutrality, the Emperor was not opposed to 
using political force to end the ecclesiastical dispute. The instruc­
tions for the Congress of Mainz had already anticipated this.
Item mochte man ain kuraftiges concilium also mit beder 
tail willen ordnen und bestellen , . , ob sich aber baider 
tail oder ir ainer darzu nicht verwilligen wolten, was uns 
dann darinne als Romischem kunig und vogte der heiligen 
kirchen geburet zu tun, des sein wir willig nach rate un­
serr frewnde der kiirfursten. . . .25
24
As previously indicated the major restrictions upon the 
imperial representatives at Mainz related to neutrality. RTA. XV. 
No, 320, article 19, --
^Ibid.. No, 320, article 10,
The aims of the Electors were not substantially different from 
those of Frederick. The point of contention was one of methodology. 
Frederick desired that the princes of the Empire pledge their alle­
giance to one of the pontiffs only after their respective cases had 
been heard and evaluated by the new Council. Conversely, the Electors 
wished an unequivocal recognition of Eugenius IV, who in turn would 
summon a new Council. Then the decrees of Constance and Basel would 
be officially ratified. The Electors somewhat naively assumed the 
Popefs wholehearted endorsement of conciliar supremacy.
Frederick III did not minimize the advantages of the electoral
2jSscheme in case of its successful completion. Nevertheless, he was 
also deeply conscious of the disastrous consequences for both Church 
and Empire in the event of its failure. Therefore he attempted to 
eliminate all tendencies seeking to solve the Church problem apart 
from the participation of the major European powers,2^ At this 
juncture imperial policy betrayed no dependence upon electoral 
opinion. Frederick III carefully evaluated the proposals of the 
Electors but did not hesitate in subjecting them to his own plans.
The Emperor persisted in his attempt to solve the problems of the 
day through a new Council, The plan was not unreasonable. France 
had not yet ratified the Mainz Agreement and the possibility of
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iropsrial response to the electoral proposals as well as
tre^ t + M « rta yvt th%  delegation sent t0 Frankfort would sug- p? xiv^ article 3; also Chmel, op. c£t.,Anhang,
2 7Pribram, ci£., p. 136.
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reconciling the English to the idea of a new Council still existed. 
Invitations to the Diet of Frankfort were therefore also sent to non- 
Empire nations. To facilitate the coordination of imperial interests, 
Frederick resolved to attend the Frankfort sessions. Austrian admin­
istrative demands prevented this, however. The representation which
Frederick sent in his stead received directives identical to those
28issued for the Diet and Congress of Mainz.
Following a preliminary meeting between an electoral delegation
and the Emperor concerning church problems, several matters relating
29to the internal policies of the Empire came to the fore. These 
negotiations were completed near the end of July. A number of rela­
tively unimportant assemblies were initiated on a region al level 
during the months of July and August. Specific meetings were held
at Constance (July 3-5), Ulm (August 8), and again at Constance 
30(August 16). The concern of these meetings revolved around terri­
torial alliances designed for the preservation of peace within a 
given region.
The church schism aroused wide interest among the ruling 
houses of Europe. The representative of Henry VI, John Bekynton, 
had left Mainz towards the end of April and probably arrived in
Although the Mainz directives threatened to use political 
force to terminate the ecclesiastical dispute, their basic stipu­
lations exhibited Frederick's inclination towards peaceable arbi­
tration. They were not indicative of a fluctuating personality,
but rather typified a stalwart attempt to substitute diplomacy for brute force#
29
See RTA, XVI, pp. 26-34. 
3°Ibld., pp. 35-39.
Vienna during the last two weeks of May.3 His directives obligated
him to ascertain the time and place of subsequent meetings relating
32to the church schism. Bekynton was also to obtain a letter of safe 
conduct for the English delegation which had not attended the Mainz 
talks. Frederick was to be informed of the English king's opposition 
to the establishment of a new Council, and the favoritism shown to 
Eugenius IV in connection with it.33 An audience with Frederick per­
taining to these matters was held just prior to the arrival of the 
electoral representatives in June.3** In anticipation of the arrival 
of this delegation Bekynton remained in Vienna till at least July 4,
when the letter of safe conduct for the English delegation was formu­
lated.3^
A second series of meetings preliminary to the Diet of Frank­
furt were held in October and early November, 1441. The most important 
of these was the meeting between Charles VII of France and Emperor 
Frederick III. French internal conditions had postponed the King's 
response to the terms of the Mainz Agreement. 36 In a bid for time
11?
3V ,  XV, pp. 531, 574, 578.
32Ibid.. No. 311.
33Ibid., XV, p. 574.
34
(*a  ^ w ?eeting may have been held in mid-June. G. Williams
dencl’of2^ ^ ^ ^  ^  12222 Official Corresnon.I t e a  Bekynton, Secretary to King Henrv VI., and Bishop
77 “4"^ ^  iella (Wo. 56 Of Rerum Britannicanim Medii Aevi ScriD- iorg§. London, 1872), II, pp. 100-1021------------------±
3%TA, XV, No. 33.
35
, „ ™  ^enoh attitude towards the Mainz Agreement was to have 
been published by June », 11*1. jjafl.. Ho. 3557 article “
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Charles sent a general reply to Archbishop Jacob of Trier. The let­
ter made no mention of the proposed Council, but it indicated the
37imminent departure of a royal delegation to Eugenius IV. In order 
to forestall the commitment which such a move would entail, the Em­
peror requested Charles to delgy the departure of his legation.38 
Unfortunately Charles VII refused to heed the Emperor's request. He 
was determined to solve the ecclesiastical difficulties according to 
the stipulations of the Mainz agreement.3"^
Since Frederick was unable to attend the Frankfort Assembly 
the royal directives were again entrusted to the Bishops Peter of 
Augsburg and Silvester of Chiemsee. While the ecclesiastical section 
of the instructions reflected the pattern established by those issued 
for the Mainz deliberations, the consideration given to the institu­
tional problems of the Empire occupied more space than previously.**0
37
fv> ^  • J *  Hansen» ffeg.tfalen und Rheinland im 1 .^ Jahrhundert 
t . . °ne? aus den k* Preussischen Staatsarchiven Vol. 34. Leipzig, 1888), Urkunden und Akten, No. 38; RTA, XVI, No. 53.
38
u j.o XVI» No* Hansen, ojd. ci£., Urkunden und Akten,
39
n r> .A let*’er to this effect was sent to Jacob of Trier. It 
MarihJ°n °ct?berx -^2» 1441 • Hansen, op. c^., Urkunden und Ak­ten, No. 44. During this time two Diets of a territorial nature 
attempted to clarify their attitudes regarding the forthcoming Diet 
+Lfra? * The one was held at Ulm (October 7) while the other took place at Mergentheim (November 5)# See RTA. XVI, pp* 43-46.
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. 3 ®  directives were Published in German and Latin. The 
^ rSJcCrir:LC fd^tiais of both texts are found in RTA, XVI, Nos.
. * . *• a number of supplemental instructions relat-ng to both religious and political affairs were issued to the 
imperial representatives. They were only published in German, 
thmel, Regesta, Anhang, p. xiv; RTA, XVI, No. 64.
The essence of these directives has been rather severly distorted 
by past historians, an error due to the misinterpretation of docu-
i+l if 2 jio
mentary sources. Both Puckert and Bachmann regarded the in­
structions as a complete submission to the electoral interests.
This view presupposed a complete revision of Frederick's policy.
The document under consideration rather reflected the Emperor's cau­
tion and restraint in recognizing Eugenius IV as sole Pope. He was 
more interested in correct legal procedure than in an immediate 
solution to the dilemma. Furthermore, Frederick insisted that 
Regensburg, Augsburg, Strassburg and Constance were the only possible 
locations for the new Council. This action was a direct affront to 
the Electors, who had selected the city of Metz for this purpose.^
In brief, the Emperor's directives for the Diet of Frankfort revealed
no evidence of an "offene Kapitulation vor der kurfurstlichen Poli-
45tik. "
The contending parties were not slow in pressing their claims 
upon their potential supporters. The Council of Basel and Pope
Nineteenth century scholars knew only of the supplementary 
instructions. Article III suggested Frederick's capitulation to 
electoral designs. To foster the welfare of the German lands the 
legates . . sullen unser machtboten sich halten und tun, nachdem 
als dann bei dem vorgenanten tag ze Franckfort durch gemainen rate furgenomen wirdet." RTA, XVI, No. 64.
42Puckert, cit., p. 170.
43Bachmann, 02. c^., pp. 87-88.
RTA, XV, No. 355, article 4.
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^Hufnagel, og. cit., p. 284.
Felix V immediately wrote to the Universities of Vienna,^ Cologne^
48and Erfurt. In the previous year this trio had presented an en­
dorsement of the Council of Basel to the Archbishops of Salzburg,
49Cologne and Mainz. A letter was also sent to Duke Albrecht of 
50Bavaria. Since the Council of Basel had considerably more support 
among the temporal lords of Europe, its requests for support naturally 
exceeded that of Eugenius IV.^
When the Diet of Frankfort met on November 11, 1441, its 
absentees included the Emperor, and the representatives of England 
and France. Many of the secular princes of the Empire also failed 
to make their appearance. Thus the opportunity to construct and 
ratify a definitive scheme for the establishment of peace within the 
Church and Empire was lost. In the course of the proceedings the 
problems connected with the political and organizational aspects of 
the Empire were discussed but not resolved. Often those to whom a
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(ir- -.o i gaaskis&g der kaiser lichen Universitat zu Wien
v-^en’ I°54), I, 2, pp. 71-72; F. J. Bianco, Die alte Universitat 
M L S  ffild die sjaatern Gelehrten-Schulen dieser Stadt (gnln
I, Anlagen, pp. 214-16; RTA, XVI, Nos. 69, 71.
47RTA. XVI, No. 70.
48_
M m  No . 73.
49
. ^ * Nos* 246, 254. For the endorsement of the Univer-
S 2 £  I!'™* r PP: s**8™1**18 Sttisisnsis
* W ,  XVI, No. 74.
t> fl0nJy one letter ^ich Eugenius sent to Bishop Leonhard of Passau has been preserved. Ibid., No. 68.
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given problem pertained were not present at the Diet. 52 In view of 
the total situation, the ecclesiastical dilemma provided the most 
suitable though far from ideal subject for the deliberations.
The Diet officially opened on November 19. In his opening 
speech Ebendorfer gave a carefully phrased warning against a hasty 
recognition of Eugenius IV. 53 He reiterated Frederick's plan for a 
new Council which should judge the claims of both sides. The whole 
matter was of little interest to the Electors. The basic require­
ment for the inauguration of such a Council had not been met, namely, 
the presence of England and France at the Diet. The Electors soon 
began to concern themselves with the proposed recognition of 
Eugenius IV. The details of these discussions have not been pre­
served, but such official reports as were filed by individual dele­
gates give some indication of the main problems on the agenda.^ At 
the conclusion of the talks, the Electors secretly pledged to recog­
nize Eugenius IV as the rightful Pope as soon as the latter fulfilled 
the conditions laid down in the Ayisamenta Mpguntina. This secret 
agreement conditioned electoral policy for seme time to come. It 
was directly related to the problematical attitudes which the Electors
52
ollar, og. cit., II, p. 1044. Concerning the course of 
events Bishop Silvester noted " . . .  doch ward bey dem tag vil sach 
Tur sich genomen des Reichs vnd sunder der heiligen Kirchen notdurft 
vnd auch aus alien andern vmbstenten vnd notdurften vil p-eredt, vnd 
ward auch da nichts zu end beslossen. . ."
53RTA, XVI, No. 80.
54
The report of Bishop Silvester of Chiemsee was of such a
RTA* yvt6 ’ ? »  P.* 1044. Also the report of Segovia
111 XVI, No. 231, articles 8b, 14. Perouse, oe. ci£., pp. 373-79.
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displayed at the Diet of Frankfurt in 1442, The subsequent vacil­
lations of the Archbishop of Cologne were traceable to the same 
source. Only the Electors of Mainz, Trier, Saxony, Brandenburg and 
the Palatinate signed the treaty. When the Elector of Cologne re­
fused to participate in this action, he was consequently forced to 
formulate an independent policy, 55
Whether the pact was ratified before or after consultation with 
the imperial delegation is uncertain. It only signified the final 
conclusions reached by the participants. This conditional recognition 
of Eugenius IV provided the Electors with an opportunity for further 
negotiations with him. It also allowed time for the participation of 
the Emperor and the other estates of the Empire in the venture. Be­
cause of the limited participation in the Diet of Frankfort, the elimi­
nation of all pretense to neutrality by the Emperor and the Electors 
would have given the electoral scheme a definitive and indisputable 
status. The Electors had a set plan for the execution of their ideas. 
When the necessary negotiations had been completed with Eugenius IV, 
the final declaration in his favor was to be made at another Diet in 
Frankfort. It was only to convene with Frederick’s sanction.5^  The 
date was set for April 15, 1442.^
55The conciliar minded University of Cologne was probably a 
strong influence in determining the action of Dietrich.
56„Ebendorfer in his Chronica regum Romanorum located the 
proposed Diet at Nuremberg, Pribram, 0£. cit., p. 136.
57This date was given in the report of the Bishop of Chiemsee. 
Kollar, op. £ii«# II» p. 1043. Two letters written in the name of 
the city of Frankfurt set the date as of April 1, 1442. RTA XVI 
Nos. 93, 94; Janssen, op. cjt., II, No. 53.
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The Diet of Frankfort held in 1441 probably ended on December 5. 
At this time the ecclesiastical Electors were no longer in Frankfort 
and the other representatives were preparing to depart.^8 Superfici­
ally the enactments of the Diet were a tribute to electoral supremacy# 
A positive ecclesiastical policy on the part of the King of the Romans 
was not in evidence. Two factors limit the unqualified acceptance of 
this view. One, the Electors and not Frederick signed the pact. 
Secondly, the final ratification of the treaty lay in the power of 
the Emperor. The Diet of Frankfort had formulated an ecclesiastical 
policy, but to equate this with that of Frederick III would be a his­
torical oversimplification.
Meanwhile an event of considerable religious symbolism but of 
limited influence on the current ecclesiastical deliberations took 
place. The official coronation of Frederick III came amid the ter­
ritorial and family disputes which had already kept him from the 
Diets of Mainz and Frankfort J ®  Despite pressing problems Frederick
58' m , XVI, No. 93.
59t
Austrian ^  ProPosed coronation Frederick transferred his
cit S  nn 077 R? . 1 “  agency on July 16, 1441. Kollar, op. 
— — A PP* 9??~82\ f'11 was also made to achieve domestic
t* Negotiations between Frederick and the Counts of Cilly re­
sulted in a temporary truce from September 4, 1441 to April 24 1442
bu^g (wifn§Sm p)0‘vT w Lichnowsky» Geschichte des Houses Habs-S i n ^ A f E  * ?* I66! The raaj0r problem stm *K5d"Stoof the Emperor's brother, Albert. The arbitration of the 
r!«HT>+« Pf^ ?ri6P and latfr ^ e  Margrave of Haehberg produced no 
S n  L  i’ Nos* 383, 385. An effort to mediate be-
r i S V l r f  r n  ^  alS° pr°Ved fruitless* Chmel. Fried- hTT TZlno + Y mperor was able to attain some security by a peace treaty with Wladislaw of Poland in January, 1442.
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began his journey to Aachen. During his stop at Innsbruck^0 he con­
sulted with the Bishop of Trent^1 and the legate of Eugenius IV, 
Cardinal Julian Cesarini. The Bishop of Trent, Alexander of Masovia, 
probably informed Frederick of the proposed plans of the Electors, 
which envisaged the recognition of Eugenius IV. On April 14 Fred­
erick continued his journey with a large retinue.^ He arrived at 
Nuremberg on April 29.^  On May 21 the Roman King left Nuremberg, 
arriving in Frankfort on May 2?. Upon his arrival there was some 
agitation for the immediate summoning of the proposed Diet led by 
the Archbishop of Mainz. Since the majority of the representatives 
had come for the meeting were not authorized to discuss the ecclesi­
astical issue, Frederick decided to journey to Aachen. A number of 
imperial representatives remained in Frankfort to hear the claims of
His itinerary led him to Weis, Vocklabruck, Strasswalchen, 
Salzburg, Reichenhall, Lofer, Kitzbuhel, Rattenberg and Hall. J. See- 
rauller, "Frigdrichs III Aachener Kronungsreise," Mitthellunp-sn des In- 
•Stituts fur Osterrejchische Geschichtsf or schung-, XVII (1896), 625-59.
^Alexander of Masovia had been selected by Pope Felix V as a 
legate to the Emperor on July 14, 1440. Valois, o£. cit., II, p.' 371.
62_Segovia's report of the meeting is found in Monuments Concil-
1233413, HI, pp. 978-79. --------------
63
^  numbers of the retinue are given in Seemuller, on. cit., pp. 659-64. ’ --  *
k
t o j detailed account of this event was published by
J. Baader, "Friedrich III. Eintritt in Nurnberg 1442," Zeitschrin 
g g  dgut|?.he Kulturgeschichte, IV (I859), 696-724. Additional informa- 
txon is found in K. Hegel (ed.) Die Chroniken der frankischen Stadte 
T (~  ^ hroniken der deutschen Sfadte vom 14. bis in^s 16.
M r h m d e r t . Vol, 3, LeipzigV 1864), pp. 391.97, At Nuremberg, the 
forthcoming Diet of Frankfort was the subject of a special meeting,
t U V 11 W C*e'ka^ s a financial nature are known concerning it.Ibid., Ill, pp. 370-73.
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the contending parties. Frederick III left for Aachen on June 6, 1442, 
and arrived there on June 15. Two days later he was crowned by the 
Archbishop of Cologne.
Before the actual sessions of the Diet of Frankfort a complex 
series of preliminary negotiations took place.^ In harmony with 
their previously formulated policy, the Electors conferred with Eugen­
ius IV in March and April, 1442. The Electors were represented by 
Gregor Heimburg. In the course of the discussions the Pope accepted 
the electoral stipulations which had been drawn up at Mainz^
Eugenius IV acknowledged the supreme authority of the Councils and 
promised to summon a new Council at the earliest possible convenience.
65.A contemporary description of Frederick's coronation has not 
been preserved. The publication of Seemuller is of a later date and 
includes material not directly connected with the coronation. A publi­
cation by J. Hanse, "Zur Kronung Konig Friedrichs II in Aachen im 
Juni 1442," Zeitschrift des Aachener Geschichtsverftins. IX (1887), pp. 
212-13 revealed a document connected with Frederick's entry into the 
city and the subsequent coronation banquet. Hansen's claim to the 
document's validity must be disqualified for neither Frederick nor the 
Archbishop of Cologne are mentioned in the narrative. At no point is 
the account specifically related to the coronation of Frederick. The 
seating arrangement placed the Count Palatine to the left of Frederick. 
i.he order established by the Golden Bull placed him to the right. The 
document was probably a fragmentary letter in which a resident of 
Aachen answered a Cologne inquiry on the recent coronation ceremonies, 
unly two official documents relating to the events under discussion 
have been found. These lack in originality. See RTA, XVI, Nos. 101,
0r!e _ the more important meetings was called by the city of 
Ulm in conjunction with Cologne in order to deal with the depredations 
fostered by the courts of Veme. Invitations were sent to Nuremberg, 
Basel Speier, korms, Mainz, Frankfort, Aachen and Wurzburg. T. Lin- 
der, Die Vang. (Munster und Paderbom, 1888), p. 2.46.
67 XVI, Nos. 120, 121. The bulls of Eugenius IV on this 
occasion led several leading historians to view them as evidence of
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Shortly after Heimburg left, a representative of Henry VI of
68England, Andreas Hales, arrived in Florence. At the same time a
legate from the Archbishop of Cologne, Sebastian of Vise, made his 
6 9presence known. Church affairs were the chief concern of their 
missions. Both Henry VI?® and Dietrich of Cologne were strongly op­
posed to the convocation of a new Council. The latter advocated
71that a thorough evaluation be made of the claims of both parties. 
After this either the Council of Basel or the Council of Ferrara- 
Florence should be recognized. Both Dietrich and the Emperor agreed 
on the necessity of a universal Council, but, whereas Frederick 
wanted to summon a new body, Dietrich was content to make use of an 
existing one.
Following this meeting, Eugenius IV sent the Bishop of Lut- 
tich to consult with the Emperor. The legate probably encouraged
an ever increasing tension between the Electors and the Emperor. 
Puckert, op. cit., p. 171; Bachmann, op. cit.. pp. 91-92; Hufnagel, 
op. _cjt., p. 285; V. Kraus, Deutsche Geschichte im Ausgange des 
Mittelalters (Bjbliothek Deutscher Geschichte. Stuttgart und Berlin. 
1905), I, p. 87.
68The general activities of Hales as the English procurator 
to the Papacy are treated in A. Zellfelder, England und das Basler 
Kon&il (Vol. 113 of Historische Studien, Berlin, 1913)7 pp. 48,
100, 127-8, 209* 211. Hales' credentials provide the only evidence 
of his legateship in this instance. Beckington, od. cit., I. pp.
91, 117-118. ~
6%[A, XVI, Nos. 123, 124; Hansen, Westfalen und Rheinland.
I, Urkunden und Akten, No, 53.
70England's position towards the schism was officially formu­
lated by 1442. On May 28, 1440, Henry V had announced England's sub­
mission to Pope Eugenius IV, Zellfelder, op. cit., No. 22, pp. 366-70. 
Eugenius acknowledged him as the truest son of the Church. 0. Ray- 
naldus, Annales Ecclesiastici (Barri-Ducis, 1874), ad an. 1440, No, 6.
71Archbishop Dietrich was in full agreement with the memorandum
Frederick to recognize an existing Council, namely the one in F l o r e n c e . ^  
On April 26 Pope Eugenius declared that the Council of Florence was now 
transferred to Rome since its unofficial character tended to threaten 
the stability of the Greek Union of 1 4 3 9 A runner delivered the 
news to the Bishop of Liittich who was later to present the matter to 
Frederick in Aachen.
Meanwhile a meeting was held between the University of Vienna 
and the Council of Basel during March and April, 1442. In order to 
clarify his position on the ecclesiastical issues of the day, Arch­
bishop Frederick of Salzburg sent the theologian John Sachs to 
Vienna to consult with university officials. The meetings which were
held from March 11-18 resulted in a complete endorsement of the Coun- 
74cil of Basel. The only solution to the problems of the Church lay 
in a general Council, for all the resolutions formulated by the Diet 
and the Congress of Mainz as well as the Diet of Frankfort (1441) were in 
the final analysis unauthoritative. The action of the University of 
Vienna had only indirect influence upon the proceedings of the Diet
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drawn up by the University of Cologne on October 10, 1440. RTA. XV No. 254. ---’ ’
' ^ The exact nature of his instructions cannot be determined.
The letter of Pope Eugenius to Dietrich of Cologne on the matter spoke 
only in very general terms. Hansen, op. cit., Urkunden und Akten,
No. 53; RTA, XVI, No. 123.
73The bulls are printed in Monumenta Conciliorum. III. m. 991-994. ---------- * * w*
7^The endorsements were issued in three parts. One came from 
the University as such, a second from the theological faculty and the 
third from the law faculty. RTA, XVI, Nos. 126, 128, 129.
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of Frankfort (1442). It convinced Frederick anew of the need for a 
general Council, and bolstered his opposition to the electoral scheme 
for religious reform.
The Council of Basel, disturbed by the news of the imminent 
termination of the electoral neutrality, had sent a delegation to the 
three ecclesaistical Electors in mid-January. The report of their 
findings'^ only added to the consternation already present in Basel. 
The Archbishops advocated that the Council should not oppose a new 
Council and henceforth only stress the fact that it desired to re­
establish order in the Church. They also stipulated that Frederick 
should be ceremonially greeted by a conciliar delegation when he ar­
rived at the Diet. The last proposal was accepted by the Council of 
Basel. The directives which were to govern the conduct of the Frank­
fort delegation were relatively simple. The legates -were to express 
the Council's desire for peace within the Church and request a letter
76of safe conduct from the Emperor.
Due to the coronation at Aachen, the Diet of Frankfort was re­
scheduled to meet on July 8, 1442. During his absence Frederick had 
authorized the Margrave Wilhelm of Hachberg, Thomas Ebendorfer and the 
Bishops of Augsburg and Chiemsee to receive such delegations as pre­
sented themselves.^ These men set June 14 as the first day for
Monumenta Conciliorum. Ill, pp. 980-81; Perouse, op. cit..
p. 372.
76RTA, XVI, No. 138. It may be assumed that the legates ac­
complished their mission although no specific documentation to that 
effect has been preserved.
^Monumenta Conciliorum. Ill, p. 1006; RTA. XVI, No. 231, 
article 8a.
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ecclesiastical hearings. The Cardinal of Palermo, Niccolo Tudeschi,
rjQwas chosen to represent the Council of Basel.' Nicholas of Cusa 
defended the claims of Eugenius IV.
Tudeschi presented the Council's case from June 14-17. Nicho­
las took his turn from June 21-23. A written reply to the latter's
speech was drafted by the conciliar representatives and distributed
79among the various delegates that were present. Cusa was not slow 
Roto answer. Both men prepared special memoranda for the benefit 
of Frederick III and the Electors. The essence of Tudeschi's effort 
related to a defense of conciliar authority. It concluded with an
On
appeal to the Emperor to follow the "veritas fidei." Cusa argued
that the deposition of Eugenius IV and the election of Felix V was
invalid, since at this time the Council had already been dissolved
82and transferred to Ferrara.
The hearings concluded just before Frederick returned from
^RTA, XVI, No. 231, article 9. Segovia suggests that Tudeschi 
was chosen because of the many jurists present in the ranks of the 
imperial and electoral representatives. See also J. F. von Schulte,
Die Geschichte der Quellen und Literatur des Canonischen Rechts von 
Papst Gregor IX. bis zum Concil von Trient (Stuttgart, 1877). II* 
pp. 312-13.
79RTA. XVI, No. 211.
8°Ibid.. No. 213.
8lIbid.. No. 212; Monument a Conciliorum. Ill, pp. 1022-1125.
The verbosity evident in orations of this nature probably give the 
best explanation of the obvious inefficiency which typified the 
Diets of the fifteenth century.
^2RTA, XVI, No. 210. See also J. H. Wessenberg, Die grossen 
Kjrchenver sammlungen des 15ten und l6ten Jahrhunderts (Const an 7.. 1840), 
II, p. 440.
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Aachen. In order to inform the King of the events which had transpired 
during his absence, Ebendorfer compiled an excerpt of the arguments 
presented for and against the deposition of Pope Eugenius IV. Even the 
slanderous utterances which Nicholas of Cusa made about Pope Felix V 
and the Council of Basel were repeated. He judiciously avoided any 
personal commitment, however.
Shortly after the return of Frederick and the Electors an Eng­
lish delegation arrived at Frankfort. Its members were Bishop John 
of St. Asaph, Dean Adam Moleyns of Salisbury and Abbot Reginald of 
St. Peter in Gloucester. Moleyns, who acted as the spokesman for the 
group, severely critized the Council of Basel, on which he blamed 
the schism. He advocated an end to neutrality and the immediate 
recognition of Eugenius TV. Ebendorfer's spirited defense of Fred­
erick* s neutrality and even indifference led the English delegation 
to request an audience with the Emperor.®3 For some reason the re­
quest was not granted. Consequently on July 10 they presented a 
memorandum reiterating the salient aspects of their views. These 
were: 1) The termination of neutrality. 2) The subjection of the 
Council of Basel to papal authority. 3) The recognition of Eugenius 
IV as Pope. Apparently the English delegation then left the Diet 
and journeyed to Florence.
On July 10 Frederick also granted an audience to the represen­
tatives of the Council of Basel in the Franciscan monestary at
®3The general content of Moleyns speech can be deducted from 
the answer he received from Frederick's spokesman, Ebendorfer. RTA.
XVI, No. 214.
Frankfort. The spokesman for the delegation, Tudeschi, requested the
Emperor's permission for the delegation to attend the various sessions 
8*j,of the Diet. The delegation was informed however, that the Emperor 
could not reply to their request until he had been better informed as 
to the manner in which the Electors wished to solve the schism.8^
On July 11 Frederick received the papal representatives; the details 
of the meeting are not known.
The meeting between Frederick and the Electors followed almost 
immediately. The ecclesiastical representatives of both sides were
OZ
not allowed to observe the proceedings* While the talks resulted 
in a substantial clarification of opposing views, they also tended to 
split the ranks of the participants. Frederick continued to insist 
on a new Council* The Electors refused to compromise with the condi­
tions set forth in the Avisamenta Moguntina* The whole matter culmi­
nated in complete deadlock. Efforts at arbitration were not lacking.
87On July 13 a memorandum ' was issued by Canon of Magdeburg, Henry 
Tocke. It called for the termination of neutrality, but adhered to 
the basic premise of the supremacy of the Council, a principle revered 
by both the King and the Electors. Tocke warned against a hasty recog­
nition of Eugenius IV as Pope and advocated that both Popes withdraw
8k Ibid.. No. 231, article 12.
^Ibjd.. No. 231, article 12a.
86Thus Segovia's knowledge on the matter as well as that of 
the papal officials was virtually nil.
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^ Ibid.. No. 217.
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their claims until the convocation of a new Council. The conciliar 
representatives approved of Tocke's memorandum, but intensified its 
tone to meet their own ends. An attempt to exercise some influence 
over the Electors of Mainz, Trier and the Palatinate proved abortive
OObecause the delegation was not given an audience. Cardinal Louis
of Arles managed to formulate a protest which reached Frederick; the
Emperor's answer was vague, although it did indicate impending action
89on the church problem.
Another memorandum of unknown authorship^ gave support to the 
electoral view. The author noted that since neutrality had failed to 
eliminate the church schism, the validity of its future existence was 
questionable. Furthermore, it endangered the spiritual status of the 
Church, for it tolerated two ecclesiastical forms; this was a viola­
tion of a cardinal doctrine— the unity of the head of the Church with 
the body of the Church. The neutrality of the temporal lords was 
condemned by the spiritual leaders of the day, including the Univer­
sities of Erfurt, Cologne and Cracow. Lastly, the neutrality should 
be abolished because it fostered a competitive spirit within the 
Church that resulted in widespread unrest and disobedience.
A meeting coinciding with the publication of the above mentioned 
memorandum was held between the Electors of Mainz, Trier, Saxony and
88„Ibid.. No. 231, article 14.
89Ibid .. No. 231, articles 13a-13c.
90Ibid., No. 217a. A reference to the Mainz Agreement as well 
as the legal style would seem to indicate that the author was a jurist 
in the service of either Dietrich of Mainz or Jacob of Trier.
the Palatinate and the papal delegation. Meanwhile the Emperor con­
tinued his efforts to change the electoral policy. In order to stem 
the confusion fostered by the Electors, Frederick issued a special
decree warning all concerned against seizing properties whose status
92had been made uncertain by the schism. All temporal rulers were to 
halt these tendencies as best they could, and force restitution in 
cases where damage had been wrought. Although the decree was virtually 
unapplicable, it revealed the character of its originator. It was not 
the feeble positivism of a weak character, but rather the work of a 
heroic man exercising his authority amid the severe limitations which 
encompassed his position. Frederick was struggling against institu­
tional dismemberment and disintegration. Contemporary trends were not 
in his favor. The decree of July 19, 1442 exhibited only a small 
part of this colossal tragedy.
The next few days saw no modification of the electoral designs. 
Marked differences of opinion even characterized the ranks of the up­
per and lower nobility. An attempt to bridge these differences on 
July 20, 21 met with no success.^ An open meeting on July 23 brought 
matters to a head. When Thomas Ebendorfer had completed his report on 
the progress of the negotiations the Electors of Mainz, Trier, Saxony 
and the Palatinate audaciously asked Frederick whether he wished to
™  9Irhf„ raeeting was anticipated in the answer which Pope Eugenius IV gave to Heimburg's proposals. Ibid.. p. 212.
92Chmel.Regesta, Anhang, pp. XXIII-XXV; RTA, XVI, No. 218: 
Bachmann, og. cit., pp. 96-97; Kraus, 0£>. cit.. pp. 93-94.
93RTA, XVI, No. 248, article 3.
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solve the ecclesiastical difficulties according to their plans, or
Frederick, on the advice of friends gave his answer to this question 
on the following day. The procedural tactics adopted by Frederick 
marked him as an accomplished diplomat. He stated that the electoral 
proposals would be quite acceptable to him if the Diet as such felt 
that they were conducive to the peace and welfare of the Church. To 
facilitate this, the Electors were to promulgate the terms by which 
Eugenius IV would be recognized. These were then to be distributed 
among the various orders of the Empire who, in a special meeting from 
which the Electors and the Emperor were barred, would judge the 
validity of the electoral designs. The Electors were forced to 
comply. The special meeting of the estates9^ of the Empire was held
97on July 26. Their complete rejection of the plan came as an unex­
pected and unpleasant surprise to the Electors.
Amid the turbulence and unrest, the conciliar efforts to gain 
support continued. Immediately following the publication of the elec­
toral plans, the Cardinals Aleman, Tudeschi and Segovia obtained an 
audience with Frederick. 98 The Cardinals strongly objected to the 
electoral procedure. They correctly argued that the ecclesiastical
whether he wished to accept the position of the Archbishop of Cologne.9^
Q2l
Ifejd., No. 231, article 16.
95Ibid., articles 14, 16; Perouse, ojd. cit.. pp. 373-74.
is used in the sense 
ncluded in any elec-
9^RTA, XVI, No. 231, articles 15-15f.
98The audience was held on July 25, 1442.
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hearings held before the imperial representatives in Frederick's ab­
sence had related to dogma, consequently no scheme or plan of action 
could be formulated at this juncture. In order to impress the Elec­
tors with the complexity of the situation, Frederick ordered the 
Cardinals to reiterate their case at a special meeting with the Elec­
tors. The meeting was not held. Apparently the widespread opposition 
evidenced by the imperial states was sufficient to dampen both the 
enthusiasm and conceit of the ambitious Electors."
The meeting of the imperial estates culminated in a unanimous 
endorsement of six a r t i c l e s . T h e  immediate recognition of Eugenius 
was rejected. The question as to the justice of his deposition was 
deferred until a new Council convened. Essentially, this new body 
was only the geographic relocation of the Council of Basel. Neutrality 
would only be tolerated until the new Council met, at which time it 
should be terminated in favor of the same. If Pope Eugenius IV re­
fused to submit to the judgement of the new Council, its loyalty would 
be transferred to Felix V. Various aspects of these resolutions proved 
disrespectful and in violation of the schcmes drawn up at Mainz and 
Frankfort, and ended the hopes of the papists for a speedy re-establish­
ment of the authority of the Apostolic Chair. Emerging from the lower 
and more representative levels of the Empire, these articles testified 
to the widespread respect the conciliar movement had gained and to 
the impossibility of ignoring its implications.
"ibid.. No. 231, article 16.
^Tbid.. No. 221. Dated at Frankfort on July 30, 1442.
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The Electors fought against the ratification of these resolu­
tions without success. The King of the Romans and the estates of the 
Empire refused to alter their course of action. The implementation 
of their plans was soon begun. On August 2 the duration as well as 
the location of the proposed Council was discussed. A committee con­
sisting of four imperial representatives, four from the estates, as 
well as two representatives from each of the Electors was inaugurated. 
The Electors stubbornly sought to promote their own schemes in spite 
of this action. Pope Eugenius IV was to be recognized on a provision­
al basis. The new Council could evaluate the validity of his claims 
when it convened. Meanwhile the Pope was to publish a special bull 
in which he endorsed conciliar supremacy."^ The opposition party 
rejected any temporary termination of neutrality. In order to at­
tain greater support the estates wisely withdrew their demands for 
the relocation of the forthcoming Council. They also refrained from 
enacting any permanent legislation in connection with the Council
until both Rome and Basel were officially ordered to summon a new 
102assembly.
Frederick's policy coincided with that of the estates. When 
he gave his support to the proposals of the estates the Electors
101I M d .» P. 255.
"wanne unser heiliger vater babist Eugenius erkente und 
bekente in sinen bullen die decreta, wie und in welchen sachen die 
heiligen gemeinen concilia uber einen babist sin und gesamment werden 
sollen, . . .  das danne alle die, die in der protestacien und einunge 
sin, denselben unsern heiligen vater Eugenium fur einen babist furder 
billich haben und halten solten, biss in dem concilio anders erkant 
wurde." Ibid., No, 223,' article la. The electoral scheme is also 
published in Bachmann, op. cii., Beilagen, No. VIII. The main theses 
of the electoral position are found in the statement of submission 
which the Electors presented to Frederick on August 8, 1442.
137
quit the contest. After listing the chief tenants of their previous 
position they stated:
. aber als uwern koniglichen gnaden ein ander rat 
geben ist, der uwern koniglichen gnaden gefellet, . . .  so 
wollen wir folgen und unsern willen lassen sin, das uwir 
gnade und wir rait uwern gnaden understehin zu werben in dem 
concilio zu Basel, auch an Eugenio dem babiste, das ein ge- 
raeine concilium und die heilige kirche gnuglich versamment 
werde, also das uwer gnade und die herren, der sendeboten 
den egemelten rat uwern gnaden geben, die nit in der pro- 
testacien sin, nit zusagen ader zufalien und sich auch nit 
declariren noch zu dem concilio zu Basel noch zu dem babist 
Eugenio noch auch zu dem, der zu Basel fur einen babst uf- 
genomen ist. . . und so die sendebotten widderkommen sin, 
das danne ein tag in zwen monden gen N. gesetzt wurde, zu 
dem uwer gnade und wir komen^ader mit macht schicken sollen, 
der sendeboten relacien zu horen und zu rate zu werden, was 
in den sachen furter zu thun si.^®3
The proceedings at the Diet of Frankfort progressed rapidly 
after the electoral submission. A solution to the church question 
was presented by Caspar Schlick on August 9. It took the form of a 
document containing seven articles. They were identical to those 
drawn up by the estates during the first week in August.10^ A new 
ecumenical Council was the only solution to the ecclesiastical 
dilemma. Both Popes were expected to sufcmit to its jurisdiction, 
and its convocation would mark the end of secular neutrality.
The Diet's concern with the church question culminated on
103rTA, XVI, No. 223; Bachmann, op. ci£., Beilagen, No. VIII.
IQJtj,
RTA, XVI, Nos. 222, 226. With the exception of an intro­
ductory paragraph the text of the articles in No. 226 was identical 
to that in No. 222. The articles were therefore not repeated. They 
are also preserved in Monumenta Conciliorum. Ill, p. 1014. With the
exception of one, all the extant texts are undated and have no title of any sort.
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August 10, when two special delegations were formed. These were to 
be sent to Rone and Basel. Their mission— to order both parties to 
unitedly summon a new Council. On August 13 Frederick and the Elec­
tors agreed upon the program which the legations were to follow, and 
set the date on which they were to report their findings. The re­
lationship towards the Papacy and the Council during this period was 
carefully qualified.
Item sal sein koniglich gnade ermanen und ersuchin 
alle kurfursten und fursten, geistliche und werltliche, 
das sie die protestacien getruwelich hanthabin und von 
den obertretem die pene inbrengin und fordern zu bezalin, 
als vorgeriirt ist, als lieb in sie des heiligin riechs 
und unsers hern des konigs hulde zu behalten, uf das ein- 
ickeit in Dutschin landen blibe, als lange biss man anders 
zu rate wirdet, darumb danne der egemelt tag gein Nurem­
berg gemacht ist. 106
The directives for the delegation were also issued on August 13 
and carefully adhered to the above p o l i c y . T h e  same session saw 
the formulation of another document in which the King and the Electors 
vowed that the purpose of the papal and conciliar delegations was to 
facilitate the establishment of a new Council and entailed no disre­
gard of the religious authority of either party. It was stipulated
10 5n
On August 9 Frederick published a special decree supple- 
mentary to the one issued on July 19. It designated Frederick as 
the protector of the liberty of the Church and promised severe 
penalties to all who failed to heed its terms. Ibid.. No. 224.
m xv °^isU» *fo. 229, article 7 ; Bachmann, 0£. cit., Beilagen, 
wo. jjc. Bachmann1s published document from the Dresden Archives 
was wrongly captioned "1442. August. Nurnberg."
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A “ t* XVI* No» 228»* Bachmann, oja. cJi., Beilagen, No. X. 
Jhe instructions are available in Segovia's account (No. 225), and 
in a document formulated at the Saxon Court. The men who wrote 
these directives still saw in Eugenius the "sanctissimus dominus
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that this procedure did not constitute a recognition of any one
of the proposed Council was quite obvious. The electoral Protesta­
tion of March 1?, 1438, became the definitive document in Church- 
Empire relationships. The territorially enacted declaration of neu­
trality was now extended to encompass the entire Empire. Frederick 
officially announced his adherence to this policy on August 16. The 
Empire as a functional institution was declared static. No new 
policies could be legislated until the forthcoming Council established 
a new operational basis.
. . . also habin wir mit wolbedachtem mute und zitigem 
rate uns zusambt denselbin unsern kurfursten in sollich 
vorgemelt appellacien protestacien und union auch begebin 
wissintlich in kraft disses brives und globin bie unsem 
koniglichin worten, disse appellacien protestacien und 
union mit unsern egemelten kurfursten in alien iren puncten 
clauseln und artikeln, wie die in derselbin unser kurfursten 
brief daruber gemacht von worte zu worte begriffen sin, 
stett zu halten, den nachzugehn und dawider nicht zu tun 
durch uns selbst noch durch imands andem von unser wegin ane geverde.1^9
From an ecclesiastical viewpoint, the Diet of Frankfort had
noster" and "sanctitas sua." Segovia's account (also printed in 
Monumenta Conciliorum. Ill, p. 1020) was probably based on a first 
draft drawn up by the Electors. Segovia recorded only tenative 
proposals. This is especially evident in.comparing the account with 
that from the Saxon archives. The final edition of the instructions 
was probably completed on August 12, In this Eugenius is addressed 
only as "dominus Eugenius,"
group.1 oft Frederick's ecclesiastical policy prior to the convocation
108RTA, XVI, No, 227.
now completed its deliberations*110 The absence of the Emperor at 
the assemblies of Mainz and Frankfort (l44l) had given free rein to 
the diverse and independent elements in the Empire. All attempts at 
any permanent solution to the church problem found their final expres­
sion in postponement. In contrast, the enactments of the Council of 
Frankfort (1442) were a tribute to the genius and diplomatic skill 
of Frederick III, He proved a firm, unrelenting Emperor who, in 
solving a given issue, preferred intelligent deliberation to brute 
force. The program the Diet adopted was not initiated by a committee 
of royal advisors. Rather it represented the end product of Fred­
erick's long range planning and personal aggressiveness.111
The two delegations established by the Diet of Frankfort 
existed only to aid Frederick in the execution of his plans for ec­
clesiastical reform. Had their mission been successful, they would 
have had a purely instrumental function in the implementation of the 
Emperor's program. As such their work would merit no special treat­
ment. As a failure, however, it became a decisive factor in determin­
ing the course of Frederick's ecclesiastical policy.
Following the termination of the Diet a number of minor 
meetings were held in Mainz, Nuremberg, Ulm, Breisach and Konstanz 
in September and October. Their interests were solely territorial 
and political. See Ibid ., Nos. 269-277. Additional documentary 
material on these meetings can be found in J. P. Datt (ed.), Volumen 
Rerum Gemanicarum Novum sive de Pace Imperii Publica (Ulmae 16Q8)~
P. 731. ’
1 1 1 _
Frederick's activity at the Diet of Frankfort disproves 
Hansen's estimation of his motives. "From the beginning Emperor 
rederick III, a practical and calculating personality, was motivated 
by the desire to take his position with the party which promised him 
the best advantage . . . Hansen, op. cit. T I, p. 47.
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The imperial delegation sent to Basel arrived at that location
112on September 14, 1442. They were received by a Council whose
position had become increasingly perilous. A distinct perplexity and
apprehensiveness characterized the assembly. ^ 3 It found expression
in a special delegation that was sent to Frederick III on the pretense
of clarifying some of the conditions laid down by the imperial repre- 
114sentatives. After its return a bull was issued in which the Coun­
cil clarified its attitude to the Frankfort proposals. 1 -^5 The bull 
repeated the traditional claims of the supremacy and necessity of the 
Council. The Council declared itself willing to relocate of its own 
authority, but noted that the Emperor’s selection of a site would be 
respected. Three guarantees were requested: l) The personal presence 
of Frederick at the new Council. 2) A letter of safe conduct for the 
members of the Council. 3) A recognition of the validity of the
^?he representatives for Rome were scheduled to depart on 
October 16 in order that they might learn the results of the Basel 
negotiations. Ebendorfer presented the imperial proposals on Sep­
tember 17, 1442. W. Kaemmerer, Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Kaiser 
Friedrich III. 14^-1444 (Vol. XVII of Deutsche Reichstagsakten. 
Gottingen, 1956), No. 2. Cited hereafter as RTA, XVII.
113The Council's concern was well founded. Since the concil­
iar ideology did not fit the political needs of the time, the assembly 
experienced a substantial loss of prestige. In addition to this, many 
of the xnfluencial figures participating in it had left at this time. 
J. Hefele, Cone iljengeschichte (Freiburg im Breisgau, I869), VII. p. 807. *
ll4RTA, XVII, No. 1; Monument a Conciliorum. II, pp. 1215-1231.
/i5j* D* **ansi, Sacro,rum Conciliorum Nova et Amolissima Col- 
lectis (Graz, 1961), XXIX, pp. 368-372; RTA, XVII, No. 11; Monu^t.a 
, ^  IH, pp. 1231-1235; Muller, oe. cjt., I, pp. 203-206.
Council's presence at the coming assembly. In conclusion the bull 
emphasized that both the attitudes and actions of the Council were 
motivated by its concern for the welfare of the Church.
Meanwhile the pressure of imperial administration brought 
Frederick into the vicinity of the city of Basel. His journey was 
directly related to the reaffirmation of the privileges of the Swiss 
Confederation. The imperial sojourn was not conditioned by purely 
political motives. The marriage of Frederick to the widowed daughter 
of Felix V, Margarethe of Anjou, formed the basis of negotiations 
carried on at the court of Lewis of Savoy. The matter was postponed 
until a later date in the interests of preserving Frederick's claim 
of neutrality. The church schism constituted an important part of 
the deliberations with Lewis. Speaking on Frederick's behalf, 7 
Ebendorfer emphasized that his journey sought to aid the cause of 
peace in a world divided by schism. After lauding the friendship of 
the Emperor and the Duke, Ebendorfer devoted his attention to the 
deplorable condition of the Church, and severely criticized the impu­
dence of the sons of the Church. Thereupon he requested Lewis to 
join with the Qnperor in his struggle to heal the schism. Frederick 
continued on to Besancon. Consultations of a political nature
142
ip •  ^ , ,F°r Frederick's itinerary see P. N. Radle, "Itinerar Kaiser 
Friedrich's IV durch die Schweiz 1442,” Anzie^r fur Schweiz"ri
^ f g fochte> Jeue 2 (1874), 2 4 - 3 i n f T n t ^ e ^ nfdescr£tion• re£eption and activity in Freiburg is given in F. Ruegg, "Hohe 
Caste in Freiburg i/Ue vor dessen Beitritt zur Eidgenossenschaft " 
Freiburger G e s c h i XV (1908), l8-29. ’
11?RTA, XVII, No. 15.
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characterized his interview with Philip of Burgundy.11® Frederick’s 
itinerary now led him to Basel. The Council naturally made every ef­
fort to win his friendship and support. 119 In the name of the Emperor
Ebendorfer declared his master*s desire to aid the Church in every 
*j 20
possible manner. Nevertheless in this and subsequent speeches,121
the Roman King was careful to avoid such commitments as could have
122compromised his neutrality. The Pope's attempt to gain imperial
friendship throu^i Frederick's marriage to his daughter represented
one of the more unique aspects of the deliberations. The prospect of
a handsome dowary must have appealed to a monarch who was always short 
123of funds. The Emperor's sojourn at Basel produced another event of
U 8Lrhe discussions concerned Burgundy's relation to the Empire 
as well as Frederick s arbitration between Burgundy and Saxony on the Luxemburg dispute. Ibid.. No. 16.
119
Monuments ConciUorum, III, pp. 1237-1241; RTA, XVII, No. 17.
i?oRTA^ XVII, No. 18.
121Ifciii., No. 17, article 4. 
122_
. „ ,The exPose which Aeneas Sylvius presented to the Archbishop 
of Mailand on December 5, 1442, did not reflect Frederick's position 
at Basel, but was a later formulation of official imperial policy. R. 
olkan, Dgr Briefwechsel des Eneas Silvius Piceolomini. (Vol. LXI of Fontes
C w T  S ?ip t^ria et Acta* Wien* 1909), I, 1, No. XLI;Chmel, Friedrich IV, II, p. 183. . . . .  ,
123
rePort of the Emperor's visit to Basel made no attempt to hide these proceedings, "und alz unser herre der kunig zu 
asel ingerriten ist, ist min herre der grave von Genuff im daselbs
baRt6? !!+ hf  ^ S6r h6rre der die sach von der e wegenS  l antreffen ganz von sin selbs wegen von hand geslagen.
vr * * a r <?a£lnn no nuczit geendet noch beslossen worden."
R W S1y m  Hochberg to Jacob of Trier. November 25, 1442.
, J? general, the deliberations concluded on a note of
S ^ a L r L  W * v  Pk a °haplain of Dute Albert of Bavaria report­ed. auch m  aller liebe und freuntschaft von einander (Frederick III
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major consequence. Aeneas Sylvius Piccoloraini became Frederick’s
124state secretary. Frederick left Basel for Constance in mid- 
November ♦ A Diet of a political nature was held at this city from 
November 21-29. 125
and Felix V) geschaiden sind auf dise nacht. Gott Dank, dass er die 
zwei Haupter in lieb and freuntsehaft zii einander gefiigt hat." Ibid.. 
No. 19. Dated at Basel on November 16, 1442.
124Although Aeneas' Commentarii reveal unmitigated praise for 
the work done at Basel, his political and ecclesiastical ambitions 
were not bound by any one institution. During 1441 and 1442 Aeneas 
realized that the course of events held no future for the Council of 
Basel. Other prospects for advancement were not lacking despite the 
fact that he could not return to Italy. Thus in January, 1443, he 
joined the court of Frederick and followed his new master to Vienna.
A. Weiss, Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini als Papst Pius II. Sein Leben 
MidEinfluss ^uf die Literarische Cultur Deutschlands (Graz, 1897)
P* J ;.T; Buyk®2» Silvio Ficcolomini. Sein Leben und Werden bis 
— 2! —B^sK0Pa,t (Bonn und Koln, 1931). pp. 46-48. This genuine and per­
fectly unconscious power of self-adaptation to any condition was quite 
natural in his times. Concerning his transfer of lcyalty he noted:
^  Felicem omnes reliquerent, nec ejus papatum amplecti vellent, 
ego ad Fredericum Caesarem me recipi, nec enim volui statim de parte 
ad partem transire." J. P. Mansi, Pii II. P. K. olim Aeneae Svlvii
Til?? tt?61 ~ n-rq5-is ^ - tiones Politicae. et Ecclesiastics (Lucae,1759), HI, p. 149. Aeneas had acquired an exaggerated idea of his 
status when Frederick had crowned him "poet" at Frankfort in 1442. 
Chmel, Regesta, Anhang, p. XXIX; K. Schottenloher, "Kaiserliche Dich- 
terkronungen im Heiligen Romischen Reiche Deutscher Nation," Papsttum 
and Migert^m. Forschungen zur Politischen Geschichte und Geistekul- 
7^- des M3.tt,el^ lters Pa.u.1 Kehr zum 6$. Geburtstag Dargebracht. ed. 
Albert Brackmann (Munchen, 192?), p. 650. In contrast to the ease and 
honor he had envisaged at the royal court, his early sojourn in Vienna 
proved to be the most miserable time of Aeneas' life. In his De Curi- 
j!iwn_Mi§eriis he lamented "Would that I had never seen Basel, for 
then I should have died in my own country, and laid my head on my 
parent s bosom." Hated and persecuted by his fellow-clerks, forgotten 
and ignored by Frederick, he soon turned to vice as a solace for his 
wretchedness. G. Voigt, Enea Silvio de« Piccolomini. als Papst Pius 
£§r |wgite und s^yi Zeitalter ^Berlin, 1856), I, pp. 281-90. UndiT 
the tutelage of Chancellor Caspar Schlick, however, he was destined to 
influence the course of fifteenth century imperial and papal history.
, ^25ES® main item on the agenda of the Diet related to Swiss- Imperial affairs. RTA, XVII, p. 8, footnote 9.
In 1438 Pope Eugenius IV had given a favorable response to an 
electoral demand for a new Council. A delegation sent from the Congress 
of Mainz in 1439 failed to evoke the same response from the Pontiff.12^ 
By 1442 the Holy Father felt secure enough to completely reject the 
proposals offered by the Frankfort delegation. His action was condi­
tioned by circumstantial events. To submit to the confines of doc­
trinal precepts was not in the best tradition of the fifteenth century 
papacy, an institution governed by expediency rather than principle.12^ 
The imperial delegation sent to Eugenius IV was headed by Fred­
erick’s Chancellor, Caspar Schlick. The deliberations followed the
t 128 , „,usual sequence. After the visiting delegation had presented its 
129proposals, the Pope demanded some elucidation upon the rather gen­
eral declarations. " The imperial delegations complied to the 
request with a brief explanation of the decrees of the Diet of
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126RTA, XIV, Nos. 68, 70, 71.
"It was no longer the vigorous medieval power that had 
crushed the rising movements of the twelfth centuiy, had cowed 
Abelard, had uprooted the growing literature of Provence, had stopped 
the political speculations of Arnold of Brescia, had reasserted its 
sway over the rebellious intellect of Europe; but the Papacy of the 
Renaissance was the crippled power that emerged from the French cap­
tivity, the long schism, the bonds of the general councils, . . . 
emerged an object of general suspicion, degraded even in its own eyes, 
with no weapons but its own craftiness, with no aim but its own res­
toration. .^ . with no policy except that prevalent in Italy at the 
time. . . . M. Creighton, "Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, Pope Pius II,"




Frankfort. The Pontiff*s opposition to the decrees found expres­
sion in the procrastination evident in formulating an official reply. 
Finally, upon the insistence of the imperial representatives^3  ^
Eugenius IV outlined his policies and attitudes towards the proposed 
Council, His reply was extremely blunt, for Eugenius was well aware 
of the widespread sympathy which his cause had recently received from 
all sections of the Sknpire. While acknowledging the noble intentions 
of Frederick and the Electors, Eugenius stated that since the Council 
of Florence-Ferrara had achieved union with the Greeks, it was the 
only legitimate ecclesiastical assembly. To accommodate the wishes 
of the Diet of Frankfort, Eugenius proposed to move the Council of 
Florence to the Lateran and there investigate the possibility of its 
enlargement both representatively and organizationally.133
The Pope went on to declare that since the imperial representa­
tives were not empowered to deal with his new plans, a second dele­
gation would be necessary. In order to further insure imperial non- 
compliance with his radical terms, the Holy Father stated that any 
negotiations prior to the elimination of the professed neutrality 
seemed completely useless. The oration concluded with an exhortation 
inviting those concerned to leave Basel and with the papal party 
return to the house of the Lord.
No. 27.
132- Ibid.. No. 28. 
133
an earlv ^ U i o r u m  HI, p. 1270. The latin text withan early Gentian translation is also found in RTAt XVIIf No. 29*
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The imperial commissions which had been sent to the contending 
church parties were scheduled to give a report of their findings to 
the reassembled Diet of Frankfort on February 2 (Candlemas), 1443.1-^' 
The obstinancy of Eugenius IV complicated matters considerably. His 
action nullified any progress that had been made thus far in the 
schism, and laid the basis for the static nature which characterized 
the subsequent Diets held at Nuremberg. Moreover, Eugenius shattered 
Frederick’s "united-front" idealism, a leading tenet in his ecclesi­
astical policy. Consequently, many of the later efforts to heal the 
schism were of a fragmentary nature. They were held on a territorial 
and individual basis and instead of clarifying the issues, only added 
to the confusion and division already present within the Church. The 
resulting instability severely dampened such conciliar ideology as was 
still existent.
The Nuremberg Candlemas was not a Diet in the traditional sense 
of the term, since such a convocation usually required the presence of 
the princes as well as estates of the Empire. The interest of any 
Diet was usually centered upon matters relating directly to the Em­
pire. The deliberations at Nuremberg differed from this ideal in 
external appearance. The representatives of the univiersities dominated 
the proceedings while the delegations from the various estates of the
„ The decree as it had been formulated on August 13, 1442 
read: Item ist geratslagt, das ein tag zu Nuremberg sien sal uf 
unser liben frawen tag purificacionis nestkumftig, zu dem unsere 
hem der konig und die kurfursten und andere fursten, geistliche und 
werltliche, komen ader mit macht schicken sollen, der sendboten 
relacien do zu horen und zu rate zu werden, was in den sachen nach 
aller gelegenheit furder zu tun sie." RTA, XVI, No. 229, article 4.
Empire made no appearance. Nevertheless the meeting had been speci­
fically ordained by the Diet of Frankfort in order to solve the church 
problem, and thus functioned in a legitimate and official capacity. 
Frederick personally designated it a "gemeiner Tag," a term used only 
of official Diets. The absence of the cities was self-evident in 
view of the agenda of the Diet. During this time the stratified 
order of attendance which characterized the later Diets was not in 
evidence. Furthermore, in all the previous Diets the representatives 
of the estates had little or no part in the discussions concerning ec­
clesiastical affairs. At the Diet of Nuremberg as in previous meetings 
the university officials dominated in these matters. At the Diet of 
Frankfort (1442) the representatives from the estates were only con­
sulted when the ecclesiastical policy of the Diet had been completed. 
During this experimental era of imperial Diets purpose and content 
rather than fixed form determined the composition of an assembly.
The Nuremberg Candlemas was highly respected by the Electors of 
137Saxony and Brandenburg. The ecclesiastical Electors, however, were 
engrossed in political entanglements and no record of their
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Bemmann, Zur Geschichte des Deutschen Reichstages im 
XV. Jahrhundert (Leipziger Historische Abhandlungen, ed. E. Branden­
burg, G. Seeliger, U. Wilcken. Heft VII. Leipzig, 1907), p. 12.
136ndamit das heilig Romisch reich und sunderlich Deutsche 
lannd vor zuertrermung verwaret . . . darumb wir den egemelten gemey- 
nen tag gen Nuremberg geseczt haben." RTA, XVII, No. 30.
137The directives given to their representatives were very 
conciliatory. Bachmann, o^ . ci£,., Beilagen, No. XI; RTA, XVII,
No. 39.
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participation in the Diet can be found.^ Prospects for the success
of the Diet were seriously endangered when it became known that the
Emperor would be unable to attend the proceedings,Meanwhile Eugenius
IV sent John of Cavajal and Nicholas of Cusa to Nuremberg as his official
140 mrepresentatives. The preparations of the Council of Basel were more 
elaborate. A large number of memorandums and declarations against 
Eugenius IV were drawn up.^*
In order to achieve a greater influence at the Diet the Council 
planned to send a large delegation. This scheme was jeopardized when 
a dispute arose with Felix V. Problems of finances and a lack of 
qualified individuals further limited the execution of the Council's 
strategy.
The Diet was probably confined to a verbal battle between con­
tending parties. Since it was poorly attended, no attempt was made to
138It has been suggested that a preliminary meeting was held 
ty several Electors at St. Goar on January 17. Hansen, ofi. ci£., I, 
p. 63, footnote 1; Kraus, 0£. cit., p. 109.
139Aeneas, writing from Constance towards the end of November, 
1442, probably anticipated Frederick's absence when he noted: "incertum 
est, an Nurembergam venturi simus." Wolkan, o£. cit., I, 1, No. 39.
14°RTA. XVII, No. 37.
141Included among this literature was a propagandists pamph­
let by the conciliarist Tudeschi in which he revealed the disrespect 
eugenius IV had for the German Electors. Hufnagel, op. cit., p. 297. 
footnote 6; RTA, XVIII No. <*2. The Pope was also attlcted ty ihe 
P-f^ent of the Council, Alemann, in a letter sent to Frederick III. 
— » ^VII‘.N°. 4l* addition to this Segovia prepared a verbose 
speech against Eugenius. For some unknown reason he neglected to in­
corporate it into his conciliar history. Ibid., No. 43,
__Segovia's history minimized these events. Monumenta Concilia
orum, III, pp. 1255-125?; RTA, XVII, No. 33. ------- * ----- -
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promote any important legislation. The only possible recourse for the 
assembly lay in the convocation of a new Diet which could boast the 
presence of the Emperor and adequate representation.1^  The conclusion 
of the Diet was not in the recessus imperii tradition of later times.
The delegates issued a statement summarizing the position of the Diet, 
but took no further action. The document formulated on this occasion 
was little more than a letter of resignation. Its appearance did not 
presuppose a breach of traditional form but was an expression of the 
flexibility and unregimented character of the contemporary Diets. The 
Nuremberg Candlemas betrayed the spirit of anxiety and unrest which 
characterized the participants of the Diet, and the words which the 
concluding proclamation directed to Frederick revealed a concern for 
the welfare of the Empire and were not an attempt at self-preservation.1^
143At its conclusion the Diet correctly discerned the cause of 
its ineffectiveness when it stated: "Meher ist eyntrechticlich ge- 
ratslaget, das bie sollichem tage nymands abewesen, der darczu ge- 
fordert were und nicht komen wurde, keyn vorhindern brengen solie, 
es werde dannoch durch die, so alsdanne daselbs geginwertic sein 
werden, sollichem tage nochgegangen nach notturfft." Bachmann, o£. 
£11., Beilagen, No. XII. The apathy evident in connection with the 
let was well reflected in a letter written to the city of Lubeck bv 
the court secretary Hans Gysler. "ich hab euch am neisten zu guter 
mass von des tags wegen zu Numberg geschriben, do man dann von der
T S °?noilli »lrt. aber ich versehe mieh nicht, das lemt endlichs von fursten dohin kom#n RTA XVII p* 69, footnote 3# -- * 1
. ... , . sollich vorberurt melden und begern ist auch evn-
^gefatslafet’ das 3116 vorgeschriben meynunge an unsern herren, den kunxg, gebracht werden durch die sendboten, die von 
siner kuniglichen majestat wegin yecz hie zcu Nuremberg sien, und
eeschribi^ I T l &T kUnig’ Sine rae^vnunge ^ff dissen vor-geschriben ratslag unsem herren, den kurfursten, dornoch schrifft-
U"d e^entlxch zcu wissen thu, also furderlichst das gescheen 
° 311 Severde. Bachmann, o^. cit., Beilagen, No. XII.
The period from Frederick's election to the Nuremberg Diet in 
February, 1443, clearly illustrated the main principles of Frederick's 
early ecclesiastical policy. The simplicity of the scheme was mis­
leading. An international religious Council was to judiciously 
evaluate the claims of the contending parties. Its verdict would 
restore a centralized ecclesiastical authority, but the nature of 
this institution was not defined. In essence Frederick's policy con­
stituted a direct recognition of conciliar supremacy. The plan was 
entirely workable at the time of its conception and presentation, and 
the Emperor displayed an admirable integrity in its subsequent execu­
tion. Frederick's solution of the ecclesiastical dilemma at the Diet 
of Frankfort in 1442 was a tribute to the diplomatic genius and per­
sonal astuteness of the young King. Nevertheless, when the Nuremberg 
Diet met in February, 1443, Frederick's ideal for church reform was 
entirely discredited by opposing forces. The Electors, having failed 
to defeat the Emperor politically, resorted to their second line of 
defense— apathy. The church parties were interested in the Council 
only as far as it served their immediate advantage. The medieval 
concept of church unity was severely undermined by the contemporary 
religious territorialism. Frederick's temporary success had been 
achieved by his personal presence at Frankfort. His absence at future 
diets soon obscured this monument to his early reign.
CHAPTER IV
FROM INTERNATIONALISM TO TERRITORIALISM
The Nuremberg Diet held on November 11, 1443, was both con­
ceived and nurtured by the assembly held in February of the same 
year, and displayed the same structural relativity that had typified 
the earlier Diet. The imperial estates received no invitations.1 
Such invitations as were sent by Frederick failed to designate the 
Diet as a general assembly. The Emperor's action indicated the 
course the deliberations would follow, since the estates were rarely 
consulted on ecclesiastical affairs. The strategic importance of the 
iet was appreciated by all concerned. Its significance was exempli­
fied by the detailed preparation and spirit of anticipation which 
characterized the participants. This initial optimism soon declined 
when it was learned that the Roman King would be unable to attend.2
fact °f Nure”berg.and Fr?nkfort deeply resented the
since Fr«vJAri^ ir h rece^v *}° invitation. The event was unexpected 
Ipt+Lo w ? spoken of a widespread participation in several 
rich ITT WrvKf ^ r,,» tSChe ^Chstagsakten unter Kaiser Fried.
£ ?  S S l  h Z l  °f  % » » ^ p§ ^ B t Wsakten7 G g t t f e :  I9 5 S ,Nos. 60, 61. Cited hereafter as RTA, XVII; R. Wolkan. Der Brief
(Vol. ucxi „f FontS 5SS' 
Austriacarum. Diplomataria et Acta. Wien, 1909), I, 2, No. 28.
to Austri^iSF r p S \ WaS i"tentional* Immediately upon his return to Austria, Frederick was faced with a number of comolex political
situations demanding a solution. The Emperor's dismte with his
l S 3 j cZTl I T  flnati7 Seitled in Vienna-Neustadt on March 30,J. Chmel, RegesU Chronologjco-Dinl F r t H * ^  ttt *
guardianship of the Tyrolean lands expired in 1443. Ibid No 1481 
Subsequent disorders caused by the Cilly finally s ^ o p ^ h e n  Fred
No l496aSSTnraJ Protectorship in July of the same year. Ibid.No. 1496. In Hungary Frederick was required to assert his auth^Ity
At the imperial court, the interest in the ecclesiastical prob­
lems was often maintained by those individuals whose fortunes were in 
some way connected with it. The most prominent of these was Aeneas 
Sylvius. By the end of 1443 he had become one of the Emperor's chief 
envoys, especially in religious affairs. Thus when a memorandum from 
Bishop George of Vich arrived in Vienna early in 1443, Aeneas Sylvius, 
in the name of the Emperor, cautiously rejected the demand for church 
unity. Nevertheless, he coveted the prelate's good-will in the mat- 
3
ter. In his Pentalogus Aeneas referred to another meeting concern­
ing ecclesiastical affairs that was held between the Emperor, Caspar
Schlick, Aeneas, and the Bishops Silvester of Chiemsee and Nicodemus 
4of Freising. Since the latter died on August 13, 1443, the meeting 
was probably held during the Nuremberg Candlemas.5 Some light on the
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5 u Ladislaus Posthumus, for Wladislaw of Poland made no
of ?Sire f°r th® throne of HunSary following the death
c L S n  i f?- r V16W °f the Turkish danSer pope Eugenius IV sent ardinal Julian Cesanni to mediate between Poland and Austria. R.
olkan, Der B_pefwechsel des Eneas Silvius Piccoloralni (Vol. LXI of
ontes Rerum Austnacarum. Diplomataria et Acta. Wien, 1909), I
r p J w !  r ^ UCe waf. thieved. Thereupon the Bohemians became restless. In the negotiations which were held, they agreed to
was6never ^atified!StemUS “  ^  aS Frederick's agency. The matter
The letter was published by Wolkan, op. cit#. I 2 No XTTT 
^  hi"- ItS d*t* s^ °uld be^reTtric ted' to' midi
Ij, -
II, p. 156 Eube1, — —  archia £atholica Mgdii Aevi (Monasterii, 1914),
imperial position towards contemporary church matters comes from a 
letter of Aeneas Sylvius. It was written in April, 144-3, and addressed 
to one, Hartung of Koppel. Aeneas differentiated the imperial view 
on the ecclesiastical dilemma from that expressed by Koppel on a 
previous occasion. He advocated the preservation of neutrality for 
the time being, but stipulated that the struggle between Pope and 
Council must be brought before a Council.
Not long after this formulation, Aeneas received the lengthy 
rebuttal of papal claims which had been presented by Segovia at the 
Diet of Nuremberg (February) . 7 In addition to the official corres­
pondence on religious subjects, several ecclesiastical dignitaries 
also made their presence known at the imperial court. Among the 
most prominent were Cardinals Alexander, Cesarini and Carvajal. In 
brief, the court of Frederick displayed considerable interest in 
religious affairs during 1443, however, this concern was not directed 
by a purposeful objective.
In the Empire itself, political intrigue was rampant. Since 
this influenced the course of later diets and thus also the church 
situation, the major ramifications of these processes cannot be 
overlooked. The Frankfort Diet of 1442 had only attained a temporary 
truce in a dispute between Saxony and Burgundy. Although the matter 
was committed to Jacob of Trier for arbitration, Saxony began to
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W k a n ,  0£. cit., I, 1, No. 47; A. F. Kollar, Analecta Non,, 
mentorum Gmnis Aevi Vindobonensia (Vindobonae, 1762), II, p. 791ff7’
RTA, XVII, No.. 43; Chmel, cit., II, p. 232, footnote 3.
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consider the possibility of an alliance with Savoy. In essence the 
talks between the Elector of Saxony and Felix V (as head of the house 
of Savoy) constituted a rash breach of the recently reinstated neutral­
ity. Thereupon Saxony attempted to make the rather localized Luxem­
burg dispute into an Empire-wide issue. The Saxon effort proved of 
little avail, for Luxemburg was taken over by Burgundy without any 
serious struggle. Burgundy's intrusion upon Luxemburg marked the 
beginning of an eventful process which was to eventually separate a 
number of the old states from the Empire, and entirely undermine the 
authority of the imperial diets.
gThe Saxon-Savoyen negotiations present a difficult problem 
interpretatively, but illuminate some curious aspects of the church 
problem. The talks were held at Lausanne before Felix V rather than 
at Geneva, where the father of the bride lived. The number and char­
acter of the privileges allowed by the Archbishop of Trier were by 
no means incontestable when judged from the standpoint of the elec­
toral neutrality. Felix V was forced to express his final reaction 
to the Archbishop's proposals immediately. Furthermore, certain Saxon 
documents remained in the archives of the Trier electorate without
OThese negotiations involved a marital arrangement whereby 
Carola, the daughter of the duke of Savoy was to marry Frederick of 
Saxony, the son of the Elector. The details of this scheme involved 
liberal financial commitments. J. DuMont, Corps Universel Diplomatic 
du Droit des Gens (Amsterdam, 1726), III, 1, No. 84, p. 122.
9RTA. XVII, No. 50. In this document Kaemmerer presents a sum­
mary of the major aspects of the discussions and provides such refer­
ences as would be necessary for a detailed pursual of the subject.
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the permission of the Saxon dukes.10 Jacob of Trier avoided the recog­
nition of Felix V as Pope by carefully wording the terms of the agree­
ment.11 Certain conditions governing the financial payments Felix V 
was to make appeared only in the document left by Jacob of Trier.
The reason for these payments was not stipulated, however, the regu­
lations governing than corresponded exactly to those of the agreement 
made in 1440 by which Felix V had promised to pay the Archbishop of 
Trier a large sum in exchange for his oath of obedience.12 Quite 
aside from this, the proceedings at Lausanne revealed Jacob to be a 
bit of a rogue rather than an "honest broker."
It would be impossible to consider the Saxon-Savoy marriage a 
private affair. The bridegroom, Frederick, was the heir to the elec­
toral powers Saxony possessed. The prospective grandson of Felix V 
and his immediate family could not be expected to enforce the vow of 
neutrality which Saxony had sworn to honor. Just previous to this, 
Emperor Frederick had been in an identical situation, yet acted far 
more decisively and honestly.13 The Savoy-Saxon affair was primarily
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10The documents were never returned although Saxony made a 
specific request for them. RTA, XVII, No. 53.
^egovia did not hesitate to upbraid the Archbishop for his 
questionable^actions in his account of the proceedings. Monumenta 
Conciliorum Geaeralium seculi decimi fluinti. Concilium Basileens* 
Scrytorum (Vindobonae, 1886), III, pp. 1265^266. Cirfdl^ffter 
as Monumenta Conciliorum. Ill; RTA, XVII, No. 52.
(Vni Herp, Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Kaiser Friedrich III(. ol. XV of Deutsche Reichstagsakten. Gottingen, 1957), No. 314.
ten Kegieryng Cfana.. 1713). I. p. 2 5 9 l ^ t a F xX, Ho.'~2T ^
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a direct result of the Luxemburg problem, yet the temperament and 
spirit of its later development betrayed a trend -which in its maturity 
was to effectively block any substantial solutions to the problems of 
the Church and Empire. It was a harbinger of an ominous era in which 
the temporal advantages gained by territorial politics blinded the 
participants to the possibility of effecting peace and unity on a 
permanent international scale. Frederick's ecclesiastical policy was 
governed by an international awareness and could only succeed within 
that framework.
Due to insurmountable difficulties the Council of Basel had
been unable to send its legation to the Diet of Nuremberg.^ To
rectify this omission the Council sent a delegation directly to
Vienna. Its composition was finalized after considerable difficulty.1^
The legation's head, Cardinal Alexander, was instructed to visit both
16Frederick and the Polish King. He was the Emperor's maternal uncle 
and was also related to the Polish Monarch. Alexander was to counter­
act the activities of Cesarini in Poland and Hungary. The conciliar 
representatives arrived in Vienna in early May. Their activity
14RTA, XVII, No. 33.
^Segovia's Chronicle gave a minute expose of the matter. 
Monumenta Conciliorum. Ill, pp. 1255-1263.
Frederick issued a letter of safe-conduct to Alexander 
on April 5» 144-3. S^A, XVII, No. 56; Chmel, Regesta. No. 1402; 
„* * Lichnowsky, Geschichte des Hauses Habsburg (Wien, 1842), VI, Urkunden, No. 537.
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invoked only a limited response.^ The efforts of Cesarini and Car­
vajal proved far more successful than those of the conciliarists,'*'® 
of whom no record concerning their consultation with the Emperor has
been preserved. In addition to this, the Council received no invita-
19tion to attend the new Council proposed by the Emperor.
The new Diet scheduled for November motivated Eugenius IV to
send a papal delegation to Vienna. Carvajal was the main spokesman
for the party. Although the Cardinal was granted an audience with
Frederick, he did not succeed in altering the policies which Fred-
20erick hoped to apply at the forthcoming Diet.
The Diet of Nuremberg finally met on November 26 instead of 
21November 11. The proceedings of the Diet were temporarily delayed
17Segovia, in loyalty to his cause, gave a rather favorable 
account, RTA, XVII, No. 58.
l8Several letters of Aeneas Sylvius held little hope for the 
future of conciliarism. Wolkan, 0£. ci£.f I, 1, No. 86; RTA, XVII,
Nos. 145, 146, 147. Two letters of Frederick convey a similar spirit. 
Wolkan, I, 2, Nos. XLII, CX.
19The Council of Basel officially dissolved on May 16, 1443.
It stipulated, however, that an unofficial body would remain in ses­
sion either at Basel or Lausanne. C. J. Hefele, Conciliengeschichte 
(Freiburg im Breisgau, I869), VII, p. 807.
20Several letters written by Aeneas attest the reality of this 
meeting. In a letter to Cardinal Louis Aleman, the royal secretary 
observed that Carvajal was making a very determined effort to win Fred­
erick for Eugenius IV. Wolkan, I, 1, No. 80. The same impressions 
were conveyed in a second letter to Aleman. Ibid., No. 86. In a third 
letter addressed to Carvajal, Aeneas carefully delineated the views of 
the Cardinal and Emperor. Ibid., No. 92.
21Although the title of invitation to the Diet was addressed to 
all princes of western Europe, it was not sent to Poland, the Dukes of 
curgundy and Savoy and the Margrave of Ferrara. RTA. XVII, No. 60; 
Monumenta Cpnciliorum, III, pp. 1321-1325; B. Martene and U. Durand, 
jhesaurus Novus Anecdotorum (Paris, 1717), I, pp. 1802-1804. While
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due to the absence of the Emperor. In order to avert a possible repe­
tition of the February meeting, the members in attendance drafted a 
declaration urging Frederick's immediate attendance. A few insigni­
ficant meetings were held while awaiting Frederick's answer; their 
concern was probably the church problem. The Emperor was unavoidably
delayed in Austria and the Diet was rescheduled for Frankfort for
22 23May 21, 1444. Then the meeting was promptly adjourned. The geo­
graphic area which the members of the Diet represented made Frederick's 
attendance imperative. His absence constituted a major setback to the 
interests of an international imperial policy. The lack of any central 
leadership served only to diffuse the attitude of indifference that was 
already prevelant.
Nevertheless, the church schism instigated considerable argu­
mentation during the course of the abortive Diet. A memorandum pre­
pared by Nicholas of Cusa for Stephan Huffener of the University of 
Leipzig provides some insight as to the course of the ecclesiastical
this may have been an oversight by the imperial chancellory (RTA.
XVII, No. 66), a more plausible explanation would probably relate 
it to the contemporary international tensions. The only univer­
sities consulted were Paris and Bologna. Ibid.. No. 62. The Uni­
versity of Bologna endorsed Frederick's actions. See Ibid.. No. 68 
as well as a critical evaluation of the document on p. 123.
22
0. Hufnagel, "Kaspar Schlick als Kanzler Friedrichs III.,” 
|p--1rthejlungen des Instituts fur osterreichische Geschichtsforschune. 
arganzungsband VIII (1911), Beilagen, No. 3, 457-59.
23.
- /achrnann‘ !Die deutschen Konige und die kurfiirstliche 
Neutralitat (1438-1447). Ein Beitrag zur Reichs- und Kirchengeschichte 
Deutschlands. Mit urkundlichen Beilagen," Archiv fur osterreichische 
Geschichte, 75 (I889), Beilagen, No. XIII, 228-30; RTA.'XVII. No. 101.
discussions. Nicholas was especially concerned with silencing the 
conciliar objections to papal supremacy; his memorandum compared 
favorably to Carvajal1s attack on Tudeschi during the February meet-
25ing. Unconsciously this papal document was a tribute to the deter­
mination and zeal still evident in conciliarism in spite of the obvious 
advantage its enemies enjoyed. It seems reasonable to assume that the 
abortive course of the November Diet resounded with the traditional 
oratory and debate of the great masters, but since the meeting pro­
duced heat rather than light, its place upon the stage of history 
was doomed to oblivion.
The termination of the Diet also compared favorably with that 
of the February meeting. Its call for a definitive imperial Diet 
betrayed a greater sense of urgency than that of its predecessor.
The princes of the Empire were specifically charged to commence pre-
27parations for a new assembly. It was also stipulated that the new 
date set for the Diet could not be changed under any circumstances.2^
2k RTA, XVII, No. 99.
25Ibid.. No. 4-5. For a critical evaluation of the date of 
the document see Ibid., p. 69.
26The meeting was concluded despite the fact that Frederick's 
representatives were fully authorized to deal with the church question. 
Item ab unser gnedigster herre, der Romische kunig, von hinderniss 
wegen, als obinbegriffen ist, gein Nuremberg personlich y nicht komen 
mochte, das er alsdanne sin machtboten mit vollem gewalt, in der heili- 
gen kirchen sachen zu handeln und zu beslissen ane widerhindersich zu 
brengen, zu dem egenanten tage gein Franckfurt schichke." Bachmann, 
ojd. cit., Beilagen, No. XIII, pp. 228-30.




Ibid.t No. 101, article 7.
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Such momentary assertiveness did not eliminate the general sense of
frustration which characterized the Diet.
Interest in the perspective Diet was overshadowed by two events.
In the east the Turkish threat continued while in the west the Armag-
29nacs threatened the peace of the Empire. Despite this tense inter­
national situation the Diet was to deal only with the church schism. 
The states of the Empire had displayed a growing disregard of the 
schism. Frederick's failure to implement his program added to their 
discontent. Frederick may have been afraid to face the existent prob­
lems. On the other hand, any attempt at a definitive church reform 
would have required to solve the multiple tensions within Austria and
OQ
the Empire, and even this task was beyond the powers of any one man.
29„For a further discussion of this aspect see H. Gerber,
rankfurt a. M. und der Reichskrieg gegen die Armagnaken, 1444-45
fLgchive fur Frankfurts Geschichte und Kunst. Folge 4, IV (1933)
~JV R,* Thortnen, "Friedensvertrage und Biinde der Eidgenossenschaft
Alt ’ BaSler Zgitschrift fur Geschichte undAltertumskunde r XV (1916), 119-129.
30
. . “Orae stability was achieved during this period. Frederick 
signed atwo year pact with his brother Albert, which was extended 
for another three years at the Diet of Nuremberg. Chmel, Regesta.
Ulrirh XVII» p. ll3ff. An agreement with Duke Frederick andUlrich Ciilipromised additional security for Austria. Chmel, 0£.
, 1531-1534. The Emperor also received pledges of allegiance
1587 JiS jurisdiction* IMd., Nos. 1573, 1575,
i n ? *  ' ' Frederick's efforts met with less successelsewhere. When the King refused to allow the sixteen year old Sigis-
Z  KUf r.ia t0 officially take over the government o f ^ e  Tyrol inhabitants rose up m  rebellion. Unrest in Austria itself 
assummed such proportions that a general decree against such violence 
was issued on June 14, 1444. A dispute between supporters of Ladis
Chraelf 2g £  ^  ^
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At his earliest convenience Frederick began his preparations 
for the oft-postponed Diet. In this activity he had to contend with 
an atmosphere of mistrust which had been generated by his forced 
absences from the previous imperial diets. The unrest evidenced by 
the various states of the Empire.was not yet of an intensity that 
warranted any modification in Frederick's design for church reform.
The invitations to the Diet of Nuremberg received a very favorable
31 32 33response. The Universities of Vienna, Leipzig, and Cologne
sent their letters of endorsement. All the Electors with the ex­
ception of the Archbishop of Mainz expressed their willingness to 
attend the Diet. As Chancellor of the Holy Roman Empire the presence 
of the Archbishop of Mainz was indispensible. Consequently a second 
invitation was sent to him.
. . . uf diesem tage gehandelt werden sollen die 
hoechsten sache, die in der Cristenheit gesin mogen, das 
ist der heiligen kirchen, damit die in einigkeit muge 
gebracht werden. . . .  wir solten dine liebe vor alien 
andern alhie gefunden haben als den nechsten und als einen 
dechant und vorgeer unser kurfursten, der auch die grossten 
provincien aller Dutschen lande hat . . .34
Originally only the princes of the Empire had been invited because
they were best qualified to deal with the schism. Just prior to the
31RTA, XVII, No. 118.
32Ibid.. No. 123.
■^T. J. Lacomblet (ed.). Urkundenbuch fur die Geschichte des 
Niederrheins (Dusseldorf, I858), IV, No. 263, pp. 318-320; RTA.
XVII, No. 164.
3**RTA, XVII, No. 146; Chmel, op. cit... No. 1683; Lichnowsky, 
op. cit.. VI, Urkunden, No. 815.
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convocation of the Diet the estates were also invited to attend, for 
a new point had appeared upon the agenda— "des heiligen richs und 
dewtscher lannd sachen . . . "  doubtlessly brought about by the re­
newed warfare with the Swiss Federation.-^ 5
The Diet of Nuremberg held in 1444 revealed a rather wide­
spread sympathy for the conciliar ideology. Among his secret or 
open supporters, Felix V could count the Electors of Trier, Cologne 
and Saxony, Duke Albert of Bavaria-Munich, Count Palatine Stephen of 
Simmern, Duke Albert of Austria, as well as the Universities of 
Cologne, Erfurt, Vienna, Paris, Cracow. The Bohemian clergy— together 
with the Bohemian administrator Ulrich von Rosenberg, the Grand Duke 
Casimir of Lithuania, the Dukes of Stettin, Walgast, Pommerania,
Milan, and king Alfonso V of Aragon all added to this list.^
The church schism, as the Diet would have to deal with it, was 
aggravated by a number of vacant bishoprics which would have to be fil­
led in favor of one or the other parties. Among these were Wurzburg,"^
3%TA, XVII, No. 136.
N. Valois, Le Page et le Concile. 1418-14-SO (Paris, 1909),II, pp. 258-260.
37Duke Sigisraund, the son of the Elector Frederick of Saxony, 
had been elected to assist in the administration of the Bishooric of 
Wurzburg during the rule of John of Brunn. A. Amrhein, "Gotfrid IV 
Schenk von Limpurg, Bishof von Wurzburg and Herzog zu Franken 1442-’ 
55, Archly dgs Hjstorischen Vereins von Unterfranken und Aschaffen- 
burg, 50 (1908), 47-48. After the death of Bishop John, Sigisraund1s 
position was reaffirmed by the cathedral chapter and ratified by the 
Archbishop of Mainz on February 3, 1440. He was installed as Bishop 
by Felix V. A quarrel of such intensity developed between the Bishop 
and his cathedral chapter that Frederick III was called upon to judge 
the matter in 1442. After an investigation of the affair (Monumenta 
..onciliorum, III, p. 1325-1326), Frederick removed Sigismund and
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Brixen, 38 and T r e n t . T h e  list also included Freising and Constance. 
The Emperor's personal interest in the Bishopric of Constance was 
rather evident. The Bishop of Constance had added the Bishopric of 
Chur to his holdings, an area which the Council of Basel had given to 
the Cardinal of Palermo, Tudeschi. Frederick corresponded with the 
Council on the matter and urged that it should not interfere with the 
bishop of Constance for that would be "against the union of Germany
40and the King of the Romans for the sake of the peace of the church." 
Frederick had already interfered in the Bishopric of Freising as early 
as May 29, 1443, in the election of a new provost of the cathedral.
and replaced him with Gotfrid of Limpurg, the dean of the cathedral. 
The Archbishop of Mainz, in conjunction with Eugenius IV, thereupon 
pronounced Gotfrid the Bishop of Wurzburg. Since this did not termi­
nate the struggle the matter was included in the agenda of the Nurem­
berg Diet in 1444.
OQ
The Bishopric of Brixen was vacated by the death of Bishop 
George on December 17, 1443. Eubel, jjg. cit.. II, p. 111. In spite 
of Frederick's effort to delay a new appointment until the Nuremberg 
Diet met (J. Cugnoni, Aeneae Silvii Piccolomini Senensis qui oostea 
fuit Pius II Pont. Max. Opera Inedita (Roma: 1883). Nos. XXXIV,
XXXV, XXXIII; Wolkan, op. cit., I, 2, Nos. LXV, LXVI,JJVII), the 
cathedral chapter of Brixen chose their canon, John Rottel as the 
new Bishop on January 4, 1444. Felix V confirmed the appointment 
on July 15, 1444. Chmel, Friedrich IV. p. 240, footnote 2; F. A. 
Sinnacher, Bevtrage zur Geschichte der bischoflichen Kirche Saben 
und Brixen in Tyrol (Brixen, 18287, VI, Beylagen, No. 9, pp. 427-431.
^9With the death of Cardinal Alexander of Aquileja on June 2,
1444, the Bishopric of Trent became vacant. Eugenius IV appointed 
the abbot of St. Laurentius in Trent as the new Bishop. Eubel, op.
, II, p. 256.
^Monumenta Conciliorum. Ill, 1252. Although Frederick's 
letters are non-existent, subsequent letters written by the Archbishop 
of Mainz and the Count of the Palatinate were of a similar content to 
those of the Emperor.
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After the death of Bishop Nicodemus de la Scala on August 13 of the 
same year a serious struggle ensued between the church parties and 
the imperial administration. Caspar Schlick sought to secure this 
appointment for his brother Henry while the Council of Basel supported 
the candidature of Cardinal Grunwalder. Frederick informed the Coun­
cil that Henry was to obtain the Bishopric and that they should give 
their ratification to his installation.^1 Schlick had notified Pope 
Eugenius IV of the death of the Bishop on August 15. 1443. The chan­
cellor expressed the hope that the cathedral chapter would respect 
the wishes of Frederick since most of the Bishopric's property lay in
Austria. Schlick reminded the Pope of his promise to aid his brother
42and recommended its fulfillment. The chancellor sent a second let­
ter to a cardinal at Rome and observed that the promotion of Henry
2*3would serve the best interests of Eugenius. Another letter was sent 
to an official in the immediate vicinity of the Pope which pointed out
that the Pope's support of Hairy constituted a blow against the Council
44of Basel as well as the imperial neutrality. On September 12 Eugenius
IV officially recognized the candidacy of Henry Schlick for the Freising
^Ibid.. p. 1323ff; Wolkan, 0£. cit., I, 2, No. XLVIII. The 
first letter was addressed directly to Basel while the second to the 
Cardinal of Arelat. Moreover, several members of the imperial court 
wrote personal letters to the individual members of the Council urging 
that the Emperor's wishes be respected. See Segovia in Monumenta. Con­
ciliorum. Ill, p. 1336.
^^Wolkan, op. cit.. V, I, 2, No. XXX; Hufnagel, op. cit.. 
pp. 336ff.
^3wolkan, op. cit.. I, 2, No. XXXI.
^Ibid.. No. XXXII.
Bishopric. On October 14 Caspar Schlick expressed his gratitude 
to Eugenius IV and the College of Cardinals for the kindness shown 
to his brother
The church problem progressed through various stages of develop­
ment at the Nuremberg Diet of 1444. The first of these concerned the 
traditional theoretical disputations as to the highest church authority. 
The matter of neutrality occupied a prominent position in the proceed­
ings. Christian of Zinna declared that it was an imperative necessity 
until the convocation of a new authoritative Council.^7 The representa­
tive of Philipp III of Burgundy, Bishop Guillaume Fillastre of Verdun, 
notified the assembly of his lord's rejection of a third Council and 
advocated the termination of neutrality in favor of Eugenius IV.48 
An anonymous university representative bluntly stated that the contin­
ued procrastination in rendering obedience to the Council of Basel was 
condemnable and contrary to true faith.49 The customary justification 
for the deposition of Eugenius IV also found expression in skillfully 
constructed arguments asserting the conciliar supremacy over the 
papacy. 50 Defensive declarations in favor of Eugenius were not lacking,
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45
^ome, V. A. Reg. 363 fol. 203b-204a.
46Wolkan, 0£. cit., I, 2, No. LII.
^RTA, XVII, No. 165.
48, Philip's action in this regard is of interest for he wasrelated to Felix V. Ibid., No. 166.
49Ibid., No. 169.
5°Ibid., Nos. 1?0, 171.
and the able oratory of Nicholas of Cusa did much to enhance the for­
mer's position at the Diet,^ while his fellow legate, Carvajal, spared
52no efforts in furthering the papal cause.
A second stage of development, chronologically inseparable from 
the first, revealed a strong sentiment for an immediate solution to the 
ecclesiastical dilemma. In view of the diverse opinions manifested 
during the deliberations 3^ the necessity of internal church reform 
seemed extremely urgent.^ The projected solutions were in harmony 
with those of the contending parties. Nicholas of Cusa demanded the 
recognition of Eugenius IV and the subsequent convocation of a new 
Council on German soil.^  A brief drawn up by scholars at the Univer­
sity of Cologne urged Archbishop Dietrich to declare himself in favor 
of Pope Felix.^ The conciliarist Tudeschi presented a more subtle 
plan. He advocated a union between the princes and the Council of 
Basel. His plan called for a joint decree on the part of Frederick III 
and the ecclesiastical Electors which would include the recognition of 
the Council of Basel. The cases of both Popes could then be brought 
before this Council. The representatives of the University of
51Ibta., Nos. 172, 173, 179, 180.
5?Ibid>. Nos. 177, 178.
53Ibid., Nos. 174, 175.
^Ibid., No. 176.
55Ibid.. Nos. 179, 180.
>T ^Lacomblet, o£. cit., IV, No. 263, pp. 318-320; RTA, XVII,No. 164. ---
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57RTA. XVII, No. 167.
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Leipzig suggested that the problems be solved via special negotiations 
held between the prelates and the princes. The neutrality should be 
terminated and any thought of a new Council renounced.^®
The final stage reached by the deliberations at the Diet of 
Nuremberg involved an attempted synthesis and implementation of the 
projected solutions to the church problem. During the month of Sep­
tember Frederick ratified the decrees drawn up at Mainz on March 26, 
1439. Specific instructions were given for their execution.^  Fred­
erick then issued a document stating that a united church policy had 
been formulated between the Electors and the Emperor. It was ap­
parently little more than a united promise to terminate neutrality 
Almost simultaneously the electorate drew up a list of conditions 
that would serve as a guide to the new Council. In 1439 the Electors 
had only indicated the existence of certain malpractices within the 
Church. These were now made pretexts for the existance of a new 
Council. The chief points of contention concerned the nature of the
58Ibid.. No. 182.
^Ibid.. No. 183.
6°The document was used by Puckert, o^. cit., pp. 216-17 and 
is listed in RTA, XVII,^No. 184* It was probably lost or destroyed 
during World War II . Puckert implied that the declaration was issued 
near the close of the Nuremberg deliberations and represented the last 
positive effort on the part of the imperial court and the electorate 
to solve the ecclesiastical problems of the time, A joint declaration 
of this nature did not fit the temperament and setting of mid-October, 
since separatistic tendencies within the electoral camp allowed no 
united policy at this time. The united desire for an end to neutrality 
was a manifestation of the early enthusiasm which characterized the 
Diet. Frederickfs decree was a later formulation of this early atti­tude*
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papal power in certain marital dispensations and the jurisdiction
over certain monestaries. Furthermore, the financial aspects of the
papal curia were to be subject to the approval of a national Diet.
Ecclesiastical privileges were to be curtailed and any incorporation
of administration was to be dependent upon the approval of the diocese
involved, 1 Near the end of September the Electors also drew up a 
6 2second document relating to the re-establishment of a religious 
peace. It betrayed a superficial adherence to neutrality but the 
dominant undertones were those of self-preservation. The declaration 
marked a subtle attempt on the part of the oligarchically orientated 
Electors to ensure territorial independence and privilege following 
the elimination of central control. If Frederick and the princes 
failed to agree on the church problem and pledged obedience to rival 
popes, the action should not affect inter-territorial relationships. 
The subjects of one were never to be oppressed by the other because of 
religious loyalties. Should one pontiff impose censures upon a
,6l~ *  XVI?» No* 185; Hickert, OE. cit., pp. 214-16. Piickert's 
chronological analysis of the ecclesiastical deliberations at Nuremberg 
is vague and indefinite, for no critical documentary study on the Diet 
of Nuremberg existed furing his lifetime. In the electoral demands, 
uckert justifiably saw a proof of their selfish and independent ten-
anH°nA+ +£1S ! r  ^ hT Vr: Wa® only an expression of a general process 
^  ?r°?UC\  °f *he Diet of Nuremberg. Piickert's account sug.g sts that the electoral independence reached its apex at the end of the
m ®'/ reasonabl® but not essential deduction. The demands were 
SfSKr.'drf m +Jp ?ar^ er *n the session (late September) and served to 
Blw+iS f"!5 f!i church policy dispute between Frederick and the
r t t l iS to to ^ S eS e c t o r r a S t i v e ! Ct0ber ^  3 retalit0ry  
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This document was lost during W. W. II, however a reasonable
S nii?:servei u Baotaann- *• »>• w
non-supporting prince, the secular lords under his jurisdiction 
would not endorse these measures. In the event that anti-imperial 
forces should elect an anti-king the move would be resisted by all 
the temporal rulers of the Empire.
Frederick presented an official statement^3 regarding imperial 
policy on the church question on October 1, 1444. The basic themes 
were in full accord with the imperial position of 1442. The temporal 
rulers should not terminate their adherence to the neutrality policy 
until the convocation of a new Council, which was set for October 1,
1445, at Constance or Augsburg. Only Dietrich of Mainz and Frederick 
of Brandenburg agreed to Frederick's scheme. Without a careful study 
of Irederick's proposals and in accordance with the territorial 
policy formulated by the majority of the electorate, the rulers of 
Cologne, Trier and Saxony immediately presented a number of counter­
proposals aimed at nullifying Frederick's efforts.6^ The Electors 
stated that neutrality could only be applied to those princes who 
had accepted it prior to 1439. The latest possible date for the 
convocation of the new Council was set at June 1, 1445; it could be 
located at Mainz, Strassburg, Speier or Worms. The Council was free 
to hold such preliminary meetings as it considered necessary prior 
to June 1. Since the new assembly was essentially a relocation of
63_V„TT Bachmann, o^. cit., Beilage, No. XIV, pp. 230-31; RTA,
XVII, No. 187; Puckert, og. cit., p. 210ff.
64These counter-proposals were also presented on October 1, 
1444, apparently right after the imperial pronouncement. Bachmann, 
0£. cit., Beilagen, No. XV, pp. 231-33.
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the Council of Basel, its nature and composition would only experience 
a minor revision. In these counter-proposals, neither Felix V or 
Eugenius IV received any special commendation, however, the electoral 
endorsement of the Council of Basel as the nucleus of the proposed 
Council was indicative of their new policy. The Electors were no 
longer concerned with arbitration but only with the termination of 
neutrality in favor of the conciliar party. This policy was not con­
ditioned by intellectual, religious or even national considerations, 
but solely by the material and political advantages which it offered.
The church problem was again the major concern of the Diet on 
October 8. ^  The Archbishops of Magdeburg, Salzburg aid Bremen now 
added their stipulations to those set forth by Frederick and the 
Electors. The scheme manifested a remarkable concurrence to the one 
advocated by the Electors. The conditions governing neutrality were 
repeated verbatum. August 1, 1445 was set as the date for the new 
Council. Its location was left to the disgression of the Emperor. 
Universal obedience should be sworn to the Council as soon as it 
had transferred its seat of operation.
Diversity of opinion soon produced a notable decline in the 
national spirit of the Diet. In an attempt to avert further
^On October 6, John Scotus of the University of Cologne 
requested an unequivocal declaration of loyalty by the princes of 
the Empire. RTA. XVII, No. 189. The following day the conciliar 
delegation made a formal protest against the continued application 
of the neutrality policy. Ibid.T No. 190.
disintegration Frederick formulated a second statement of p o l i c y . 6^ 
Both the location and date of convocation for the prospective meeting 
remained unchanged. ' All temporal rulers as well as the contending 
church parties were to be present. Frederick officially declared the 
Council a general assembly in the tradition established by the Coun­
cils of Constance and Basel. As a concession to the conciliarists, 
it was stipulated that the dignity of the Council of Basel would be 
in no way impaired by its relocation. In order to humor the electorate, 
Frederick vowed to respect and honor the Council of Basel until its 
relocation. This policy was also endorsed by the Electors of Cologne, 
Trier and Saxony.^
Meanwhile a rather audacious move was made by the Electors on 
October 9. Unofficially usurping the imperial prerogative the Electors 
of Cologne and Trier and the representatives of the Archbishops of Mag­
deburg, Bremen and Salzburg as well as those of the Electors of the 
Palatinate and Saxony scheduled a meeting for December 8, 1445. Its 
avowed purpose— "urn ohne weiteres Verzichen und Hintersichbringen eins 
zu werden und zu beschliessen, wie sie allerbequemlichst, redlichst und 
bestandlichst aus der 'Protestation' gehen, der gbttlichen Meinung, dar- 
auf sie jetzt auf diesem tage zu NUrnberg geblieben sind, nachkommen
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, n The °ff,icial coPies of the decree were preserved in both Latin 
and German Bachmann op. cit., Beilage, No. XVII, pp. 235-36; RTA,
' p°: 193 * Gfft>ert, Historja Njgrae Silvae Ordinis Sancti Bene-
f p*357 • ^  d^^tir^gi^redxn Chmel, Regesta, No. 1?83; Lichnowsky, op. cii., VI, Urkunden, No. 927. 
October 1, 1445 at Constance, and as second choice, Augsburg. 
68RTA, XVII, No. 194.
und (sie) zu gutem Ende bringen mogen."6? The electoral initiative 
failed to solicit definitive support from the constituencies of the 
Empire, but considerable sympathy existed for Frederick's second scheme 
of reform. This found expression in a pact between the Emperor and 
Dietrich of Mainz, the Margrave Frederick of Brandenburg and Dukes 
Henry and Lewis of Bavaria whereby the participants pledged a united 
effort in restoring peace to the church and unity to the Empire.70 
The agreement was made on October 11, 144-5. Another agreement made 
on the same day called for a meeting between Frederick and the princes 
of the Empire on January 6, 1 4 4 5 . The events previously described 
represent the main lines of imperial-ecclesiastical developments 
until the end of 1444.
The Diet of Nuremberg did nothing but confirm the current
temperament that "diets were indeed pregnant, for each carried another 
73
in its womb." The Diet revealed the existence of a powerful party 
among the electorate which had reverted its sentiment in favor of 
Felix V. The contest between the two Popes was becoming a major factor
173
69
Bachmann, ojd. c^t., p. 140. The original manuscrint disap­
peared after 1945. It is listed in RTA, XVII, No. 195.
70
RTA, XVII, No. 196a.
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Ibid., No. 196b lists the existence of such an agreement, 
however the manuscript vanished during World War II.
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lh,LO t 1.1.i,An interesting summary of ecclesio-political matters from 
1442-lWf was penned by an unknown observer. See Ibid., No. 290.
73.
0 M: c^eight0^i - Sigtqrjr o£ the Papacy from the Great Schism 
to the Sack of Rone (London, 1903), III, p. 66. ----------
in German politics. It provided the Electors with a pretence to act
without the Emperor. If the conciliar sentiment had succeeded at
this time, imperial power would have been seriously jeopardized.
Even as the situation existed, Frederick's position as head of the
Holy Roman Empire was subject to reinterpretation. The independence
of the electorate forced Frederick to reformulate his ecclesiastical 
7k
policy. The internationalism which had characterized his approach 
to the schism was gradually curtailed and modified into a more flexible 
and individualistic yet less "neutral" policy. The new policy of the 
Electors was fortunately insincere. Characteristic of their selfish­
ness, they failed to identify themselves with the existent national 
reform sentiments. The endorsement of this desire, combined with the 
authority of the Council of Basel would have enabled the electors to 
establish a national order of their own liking. Instead their policy 
was oligarchical, not popular; they wished to eliminate imperial 
authority and centralism and had little regard for the national wel­
fare. They sought aid in France rather than in German nationalism. 
Charles VII, however, reverted to the Gallican desire to have the 
papacy at Avignon, for he was now freed from the pressure of the
English War. Consequently, the negotiations between him and the Elec­
tors proved unsuccessful.7"*
The prospects for a new universal Council were very dim. 
Nevertheless in October, 1 W ,  Frederick sent the Abbot of St. Blasien 
(Black Forest area) and professor Thomas of Haselbach to the church
Chmel, Friedrich IV, II, p. 303.
7%ckert, 0£. cit., p. 212.
fathers in Basel in an attempt to obtain their cooperation for the 
proposed venture. The Council delayed its answer, presumably due to 
the complexity of the situation.7^ Its answer was finally given on 
Januaiy 4, 1445. The Council re-emphasized its abiding desire for 
peace and unity within the church and contrasted its attitude with 
that of the audacious Eugenius, who persistently asserted the suprem­
acy of the papacy. Under these circumstances, it was felt that a 
relocation of the Council of Basel was not advisable. Correct pro­
cedure would require the recognition of the Council of Basel as worthy 
of the great tradition established by the Council of Constance.77
In 1445 the ecclesiastical situation remained one of the chief 
hindrances in the establishment of order within the Empire. The 
events of 1444 doomed any projected solution to failure. The partici­
pants who originally formulated the neutrality policy now advocated 
its elimination, while Frederick, who had never officially endorsed 
it, now insisted on its continuation. In spite of this diversifica­
tion, both parties made notable progress in promoting their own 
schemes for ending the neutrality.
The Council of Basel, sensing its new found advantage, made 
every effort to promote its cause. Frederick's efforts to restore 
tranquility within the church were appropriately lauded. Simultane­
ously he was reminded of the enthusiasm with which the Council had
always supported his actions, an attitude not evident in Eugenius IV. 78 
The conciliarists also sought to influence those in the proximity of 
the Emperor. The provost of the collegiate church in Neustadt, Wolf­
gang Gunther, was asked to act canonically and according to the dis­
pensations of Frederick in the collection of r e v e n u e s . " ^  Generally 
speaking, however, the Council of Basel depended largely on the recent 
manifestations of electoral sympathy. Nevertheless, keenly aware of 
the electoral insincerity as well as its declining status, the Council 
made a final appeal to Frederick and Caspar Schlick at the Diet of
Qo
Nuremberg held in January, 1446. Circumstancially the Armagnac War 
was a major setback for the conciliarists, for ironically the major­
ity of its supporters were the antagonists of Frederick and the 
Empire.
Eugenius IV found himself in more favorable circumstances.
Since Frederick's attitude was partially determined by the Swiss and 
French wars as well as the oligarchical policies pursued by the elec­
torate, Eugenius pursued his objectives with a distinctive advantage.81 
His policy of goodwill and friendship, conditioned by historical 
contingency, produced an illusionary contrast to the conciliar efforts.
1?6
79l m . ,  No. LVIII, p. 173.
80Ibil., No. LXVI, p. 189.
81
The details of the negotiations between Frederick and Eugenius 
IV cannot be reconstructed due to a virtual lack of data. The pro­
ceedings must be established in view of their final results.
177
Historically speaking, Frederick was a man who lived in a time of 
institutional flux. The harshness of this process was extremely 
depressing to the gentle sensitivity which characterized the Roman 
ruler. In this setting the Pope's goodwill, though motivated by 
selfishness, was suitably distorted by contemporary events so as to 
evidence a degree of sincerity.
82
In the midst of grave international events, Frederick stead­
fastly pursued his old plan for a new Council. Early in 1445 Aeneas 
Sylvius was sent to Rome to bear a proposal to Eugenius IV which was 
of a similar nature as that sent to Basel. A mission requiring the 
service of the first secretary betrayed the inauguration of a new 
policy, for the demands of the traditional administrative routine 
would have been satisfied by less official procedures. Aeneas set 
out on his mission in the highest spirits.^ In the negotiations be­
tween Frederick III and Eugenius IV there was scope for his clever­
ness and powers of intrigue. The wily Italian could not avoid feel­
ing some uneasiness about meeting face to face the man, against whom 
he had made so many venomous attacks. Contrary to popular feeling,^
82
While the news of the defeat of Varna filled Europe with 
consternation, the death of Wladislaw enabled Frederick III to settle 
the Hungarian affairs infavor of his ward, Ladislaus. Frederick's 
consultations with Eugenius IV were not entirely unrelated to this 
problem.
l0,,v *^/-^ * ^erdiere, .Essai sur Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini (Paris, 
1843), p. 26.
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At Siena, Aeneas' kinfolk were alarmed at his audacity in 
venturing into the presence of the Pope. "Ajebant Eugenium crudelem, 
injuriarum memorem, nulla pietate, nulla conscientia teneri, ministros 
scelerum penes se habere quam multes, nunquam reverti Aeneam, si 
pergat; In all this the future pope acted the part of a martyr to 
duty with considerable dignity. C. Fea, Pius II. Psnt. Max. i Calumniis
the Pope received his old enemy kindly and granted him a full pardon,85 
for exigencies of policy were stronger than personal animosities.
Aeneas1 mission accomplished little in terms of concrete 
results although his stay at Rome was not an uneventful one.8^ In­
directly, however, the diplomatic venture was to affect the imperial 
ecclesiastical policy rather directly. By his kindness Eugenius IV
had gained an agent in Gennany on whose devotion he might rely, be-
87
cause it was closely bound up with self-interest. While continuing 
to give lip service to imperial neutrality, the influencial secretary 
henceforth utilized the Emperor's faltering objectivity for the benefit 
of the Reman Curia. Meanwhile the Roman party at the court, headed by 
Schlick, saw no way of ending the neutrality except by summoning another 
Council, a matter entirely unacceptable to Eugenius. To Aeneas was 
left the task of formulating a unifying policy.
•the latter left Rome on April 1, 1445, and, after a brief 
visit in Siena, returned to Vienna. He announced that Eugenius would 
send an embassy to bring his reply to the Emperor. The envoys,
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Vindicatus (Romae, 1823), p. 88.
8fT: Suyken. Enea Silvio Pjccolomini. Sein Leben und Werden 
fe? *28 gBMkopfrt (Bonn und Koln, 1931), pp. 61-65; F. A. Gragg, 
;°Blraen'taries of Pius II, Smith College Studies in Historv.
XXII (October, 1936-January, 1937), pp. 33-35.
Lo. r f l a i l e d  accounts are found in Voigt, 02. cit., I, pp. 340-
II* L’ P P T T  71i J* H‘ Wessenberg, ojd. cit..
pp’ 87I89 — * ^  Humanist Pope (London, 1913$,
87Voigt, o e . cit., I, p .  343.
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Carvajal and Parentucelli, the Bishop of Bologna, soon arrived at the 
88
imperial capital. Negotiations were carried on throughout the 
summer of 1445. Then the delegates returned to Rome. The objects 
of Frederick's concern in the discussions failed to display any im­
mediate considerations of the major problems of a troubled Empire.
The King was desirous of being crowned by Eugenius in Rome; the 
Pope proved most cooperative in the matter. In this case Frederick's 
policy was doubtlessly determined by personal exigency rather than 
national interest, for the Roman coronation would bring one-tenth of 
all the church revenues in Germany into the imperial treasury, a sura 
which the poverty-plagued court of Frederick could well use.89 In 
order to assure better control over ecclesiastical institutions, 
Frederick was granted complete control over the bishoprics of Trent, 
Brixen, Chur, Gurk, Triest and Piben. 90 This move was designed to
88
Carvajal was accredited by Eugenius on April 2, 1445. Chmel, 
Regesta. I, No. 1910.
89
The imperial desire for a Roman coronation was apparently 
rooted in Frederick's belief that such a move would enhance his posi­
tion as Emperor. A number of later papal bulls and letters indicate 
the main topics of the 1445 negotiations. On February 1, 1446, Pope 
Eugenius informed Frederick that several bulls relating to recent 
discussions would soon be delivered by his legates C a rvajal and Thomas 
of Bologna, apparently a reference to the second visit of the legation. 
Chmel, Materialien, I, 2, No. LXX, p. 192; Chmel, Regesta. I, No.
2016. Another letter from January 31, 1446, concerned the church 
revenue due Frederick in view of his Roman coronation. Chmel. Material- 
iSa, I, 2, No. LXIX, p. 91; Chmel, Regesta. I, No. 2015. Other finan­
cial concessions confirmed Frederick's right to grant the one hundred 
prebends and benefices in his lands to deserving clerics. Chmel 
Kateria,lien) I, 2, No. LXXII, p. 193. Chmel, Regesta. I, No. 2018.
907 Chmel, Materialien. I, 2, No. UCXIII, p. 195.
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eliminate the quarrels which had permeated the region. Thus a large 
number of monestaries and other ecclesiastical institutions which had 
been subject to moral and administrative decay were brought under 
secular supervision. Furthermore, Eugenius IV allowed Frederick to 
select individuals of his own preference to supervise the spiritual 
institutions and enforce his rule upon them.^1 These papal conces­
sions gave Frederick a marked control over the clergy in his lands. 
Such privileges would never have been granted by the Council of 
Basel which steadfastly stressed the autonomy and independence of the 
church in spiritual and temporal realms.
The sacrifices of Eugenius IV did not fail to produce results, 
for such willing concessions to the imperial cause overshadowed the 
verbal assurances of goodwill sent by the Council of Basel. Once 
Friedrich had been won, the Pope hoped to eliminate this compromise 
in papal tradition by a vigorous reassertion of the traditional 
doctrines of supremacy.
Meanwhile the Electors sought to stabilize their position.
Their intrigues accorded with their selfish intentions. At a meeting
held on June 24, 1445, a plan for the convocation of an assembly of
the German Church was submitted. This national body would solve the
current religious dilemma. The assembly was to be summoned during the
first months of 1446. Electoral neutrality would remain in effect 
92
until this time. Pope Eugenius IV aided in consolidating the
^ I b i d ., No. LXXIV, p. 196; Chmel, Regesta. I, No. 2020.
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Puckert, ojd. cit.. p. 238; L. Ranke, Deutsche Geschichte im 
Zeitalter der Reformation (Berlin, 184?), VI, p. 8.
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electoral program by issuing a bull which separated the lands of the
Duke of Cleves from the dioceses of Cologne and Munster. The Electors,
though discomfited by the Pope's action, pursued their designs with an
avid determination. In their frustration they turned to France for
aid.93 On October 22, 1445, a marriage contract was negotiated by
the Archbishops of Cologne and Trier between Lewis of the Palatinate
94
and Margaretha of Savoy. Thus the Count became a mediator between 
the Electors and the French as well as an electoral ally. Meanwhile, 
the rest of the imperial supporters, Margrave Frederick of Branden­
burg and Dietrich of Mainz, refused to break their connections with 
the Swiss Federation in accordance with the Emperor's wishes. Also, 
their general lack of enthusiasm for the ecclesiastical issue made 
them a fair potential in the services of the rest of the electorate.
On November 26, 1445, the Electors summoned a special meeting 
at Leipzig at which they pledged unity and mutual support in the
95
event that their December meeting should arouse serious opposition.
A unique ceremonial procedure was observed at the meeting. The Bishops 
of Saxony, Thuringia and Meissen and the highest clergy of these areas 
had been invited. When they were formally asked in what manner the
9^As previously indicated, on October 9, 1444, the Electors 
had scheduled a meeting for December 8 at which the church problem 
would be discussed. At this time Lewis, Count of the Palatinate, 
joined the other Electors. Only the Archbishop of Mainz remained 
aloof from these proceedings. He is therefore not included in the 
above use of the term "Electors."
9^Du Mont, o£. cit., Ill, 1, No. 95, PP. 141-42.
95
Puckert, ojd. cit.. pp. 220-222.
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neutrality could be eliminated they replied in unison that this was 
possible only by an adherence to the Council of Basel and a recog­
nition of it as representing the universal Church. The prelates 
also recommended that the Council be relocated since a few still 
doubted the validity of the disposition of Eugenius IV. This presen­
tation was then endorsed by those qualified to do so. This meeting 
was not definitive in any sense. The church issue was a political 
device used to create a bond of unity in view of the threat posed by 
the Armagnac army. The subsequent electoral efforts to attain French 
favor in order to facilitate their own ecclesiastical and terri-
96
torial policies revealed a note of urgency and even desperation.
^ Shortly after the November meeting the Archbishops of Cologne 
and Treves conferred with the youthful Lewis of the Palatinate. They 
advised the Count to investigate "ob man das fremde Volk ohne grob 
Blutvergiessen und Abgang des Adels aus dem Reiche geteidingen moge." 
Consequently Lewis, as head of the imperial forces commissioned to 
fight the French, postponed a scheduled campaign for fourteen days.
In the meantime a special assembly of the princes, headed by Albert 
of Brandenberg, was held at Speier. It was decided that Lewis of 
the Palatinate should negotiate with the Dauphin at Rosheim. Chmel, 
Haterialien. I, 2, No. 51. Two parties soon developed within the 
anti-imperial group. The one party sought to defy Charles VII by 
negotiating with the Dauphin while the other sought to contact the 
French king directly. Thus Archbishop Jacob of Trier left directly 
for Nancy. Meanwhile, the Dauphin frustrated the plans made at 
Speier by leaving for Nancy instead of Rosheim. In view of this 
affront it was decided to declare war on December 6. This was 
averted when Jacob of Trier obtained French consent to send a repre­
sentative to Trier. The deliberations held on December 21 resulted 
in a further suspension of military conflict. The French promised 
to withdraw their troops from the imperial lands by the end of Feb- 
ruary, 1445. The details of this truce were to be worked out at Trier 
on February 10, 1445. In this whole matter the French were double- 
dealing, for they had previously written to Frederick requesting a 
meeting. When Frederick's affirmative answer arrived, the French 
were in the process of completing their pact with the Electors. At 
Trier (February 15, 1445) mutual defense pacts were drawn up between 
the French and Cologne (Lacomblet, ojd. cit., IV, No. 255, pp. 307-308),
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Instead of considering the national interest the Electors devoted them­
selves to territorial-oligarchical concerns.
Territorially the electoral schemes did net affect Frederick too 
seriously although they permanently doomed any unified solution to the 
ecclesiastical issue. In the course of their negotiations with France, 
the Electors gave due respect to the religious issues, but only as they 
would serve their political aims. In the wake of the French rendezvous 
some consideration of the ecclesiastical issue did ccme to the fore.
The Electors of Cologne aid Trier, determined to end German neutrality, 
assured several Saxon representatives that the Count of the Palatinate 
fully supported their plans. Moreover, in two weeks they personally 
intended to go to Boppard where a new meeting would be held,91!7 Since 
Frederick of Saxony was unable to attend this meeting personally he 
sent his secretary, Engelhardt, a fact which seriously disturbed 
Jacob of Trier, especially since the secretary had not been granted 
full mandatory powers to negotiate. These were soon granted in answer 
to Engelhardt's request, however. On Saxony's insistence, the partici­
pation of the Archbishop of Magdeburg was allowed.
The deliberations at Boppard brought few results in spite of 
the personal presence of the Archbishops of Cologne and Trier as well 
as the Count of the Palatinate. The whole matter was in essence an
Trier (J. N. Hontheim, Hjstoria Trevirensis Djplomatica et Pragmatica 
(Vindobonde, 1750), II, No. 8l6, pp. 398-399), and Saxony (DuMont,
o]3. cit., Ill, 1, p. 127), Religious issues motivated none of these 
pacts, for Jacob of Trier needed aid against the city of Soest, while 
Frederick of Saxony had lost territory to Philip of Burgundy,
^Puckert, o£. cit,, p. 232.
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oligarchical display of power against the Emperor. Church matters were 
used as an excuse for political intrigue. Thus the Boppard talks con­
cluded with the announcement of a further meeting to be held at Frank­
fort. The Diet was to achieve the termination of neutrality in favor 
of the Council of Basel.
Generally speaking, the radical electoral designs had not af­
fected the development of Frederick's ecclesiastical policy, although 
the political overtones of the proceedings sounded an ominous note. 
Frederick's tenative support of Eugenius changed into a permanent re­
solve to recognize the supremacy of Eugenius IV, Thus two main prob­
lems faced the Electors at Frankfort on June 24, 1445. The negoti­
ations between Frederick and Eugenius had reached an advance state. 
Secondly, the Pope had taken action against the Archbishop of Cologne. 
The Electors abruptly changed their course. Abandoning the conciliar 
cause, they now resolved to uphold German neutrality, a matter which 
Frederick had earlier advocated. They judged it prudent to retire 
from their separate position and once more make common cause with 
the King. Thus the neutrality of Germany was renewed for eight months,
at the end of which time the King was to summon an assembly of the
99
German Church or national Council, which was to be proclaimed to 
the various lands related to the Empire, including England, Scotland, 
Ireland, Hungary, Bohemia, Poland and Denmark. The convention was to 
be national rather than international, a depressing testimony to the
9®Ibid.. p. 236. 
"ibid., p. 239.
dwindling prestige of the Holy Roman Empire. In harmony with previous 
tradition, the Electors somewhat ironically declared the continuance 
of such conciliar rights as were established by the Council of Constance, 
They also recommended the settlement of the religious issues by means of 
a pragmatic sanction— an unconditional concession to the imperial initi­
ative.100 Once more the ecclesiastical question was also to be a 
national question for Germany, but the Zeitgeist which encompassed 
the problem was complex and should be carefully qualified. In the 
Frankfort meeting of 1445, Ranke saw the German Church still maintain­
ing an essential unity and seeking to rectify its relationship with 
its temporal head. This interpretation would only attain plausibility 
if the Frankfort deliberations were treated as a separate entity. In 
contrast to this, the Diet represented, the failure of a vfriole series 
of electoral negotiations with France and was a concession to expedi­
ency rather than national interest. The events prior the Diet gave 
little evidence for the existance of a German Church attempting to 
preserve a true unity. Granted that the German Church still had a 
claim to a national stature in 1445, it was evident that the problem 
did not revolve around the events succeeding the termination of neu­
trality, but the events inherent in this process. Constitutionally 
the end of German neutrality could only be decreed by the Emperor with 
the consent of the Electors. In 1445 the electoral policy faced at 
least a temporal bankruptcy. Frederick viewed their extension of
185
The fsn1iORank?,4T 32, 8; PUckert> °P* °it., pp. 238-239.
he final resolutions of the Diet were published by Ranke. He failed 
to indicate the sources of his document*
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neutrality as a political expediency, especially in the light of their 
recent audacity and virtual betrayal. Any subsequent action on the 
neutrality problem would come via particular rather than general action. 
In 144-5 the German Church may still have been structurally intact, but 
circumstances made its final disintegration inevitable.
The Emperor realized the possibility of a renewed alliance be­
tween France, the House of Savoy, and the German princes, a matter 
which might have easily resulted in the election of an anti-king.
The envoys of Eugenius IV, Carvajal and Parentucelli, spared no pains 
to enlighten Frederick of this danger. The summer of 1445 saw no 
definite agreement between the Emperor and the Pope. An imperial 
sympathy was obvious, however, for Frederick made no effort to nullify 
the Pope's action against Dietrich of Cologne. It was known in Vienna 
that the Archbishop had been sunrooned to appear in Rome,^^ yet the 
Emperor did not protest, even though the Archbishop of Cologne had 
been his sole electoral support during the events of 1442. Near the 
end of August Aeneas Sylvius wrote: "Neutralitas ista plerisque bene 
sapit atque idcirco perseverant. Regi o diosa est libentergue abji-
ceret earn, si principes sui concurrerent, ad quam rem fortassis aliquis
102
invenietur modus." Neutrality now found preference above personali­
ties. On September 13 Carvajal left Vienna to transmit Frederick's 
conditions for the proposed treaty. The terms which Carvajal had
Georg Voigt, "Die Briefe des Aeneas Sylvius vor seiner Er- 
hebung auf den papstlichen Stuhl," Archiv fur Kunde osterreichischer 
Geschichts-Quellen. XVI (1856), No. 155. p. 386.
^^Voigt, op. cit.. No. 176, p. 373.
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negotiated were accepted by Eugenius IV and an alliance was drawn up
in documentary form.
The terms by xvhich Frederick III promised his aid to Eugenius IV
103
were expressed in three bulls issued in February, 1446. The Pope 
granted Frederick the right to invest the six great bishoprics of 
Trent, Brixen, Chur, Gurk, Trieste and Piben. Frederick could nomi­
nate individuals with visitorial powers over the monasteries of 
Austria. Eugenius agreed to pay the Emperor the sum of 221,000 ducats,
and promised various other favors in the event of Frederick's visit to 
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Italy, Financially and administratively the pact proved advantage­
ous to Frederick, He obtained a much-needed supply of ready cash. He 
gained control over the chief bishoprics in his ancestral domains, and 
thereby greatly strengthened his power over Austria. By appointing the 
visitors of the monasteries he lessened the influence of the Archbishop 
of Salzburg, for the monasteries were now exempted from the latter's 
jurisdiction. Eugenius IV did not impair the rights of the Papacy, even 
though he exhausted the Papal treasury. Since the obedience of Germany 
had been regained, however, the Pope felt amply justified in mortgaging 
the revenues of his successors. The imperial infringement upon papal 
prerogatives was only of a temporary and superficial nature. The Pope
TVV_  Ti°3The buILs are reproduced in Chmel, Materialien. I, 2, Nos. 
L H n J H I V ,  See also Voigt, Pijjs II, I, pp. 3^-47; Creighton, oo, 
ext., Ill, pp. 72-74,
10k
This information is contained in a letter of Gregorius 
Heimburg to the Archbishop of Gran Prag. Voigt, 0£. cit*, I, Beilage
II. Eugenius was to pay 121,00 ducats and the rest was to be paid by 
his successors. J. M. Dux, Nicolas von Cusa (Regensburg, 18^7/, I 
Beilage IV. 9
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granted the nomination to the six bishoprics only for Frederick's 
lifetime. Frederick and his successors in Austria could not appoint 
the visitors of the monasteries, but only nominate several for papal 
consideration and election. The benefices granted to the King were 
not financially important ones. Furthermore they did not include 
appointments to cathedral and collegiate churches.
Frederick's pact with Eugenius IV lends itself to multiple 
interpretation. The Emperor might well be accussed of selfishness and 
inconsistency for he sought only to secure his own position in his 
ancestral domains and had no thought for the rights of the Church or 
his position in the Empire.1^5 The agreement, however, was not the 
product of the King's indolence or selfishness. An evaluation of 
Frederick's action must not be based upon the actual terms of the 
pact but rather upon the historical process which led to its finali­
zation. In essence the action was a reversal of ecclesiastical policy 
based on a calculated appraisal of the political atmosphere. Frederick 
perceived that the continued existence of the religious issue only pro­
vided a pretext for political realignment. No secular problems of the 
Empire could be settled prior to the church issue. The Roman King had 
attempted to pursue an honest and firm policy in ecclesiastical af­
fairs during the first four years of his rule. While its failure may 
be partially attributed to Frederick's absence from the Diets, the 
major cause of its continued frustration lay in the tactics employed
This approach is accepted by the major scholars of the 
period and is possibly due to Frederick's traditional portrayal as 
a weak ruler.
by the Electors. These rulers attempted to use the religious turmoil 
for their own ends. This trend was disguised by conciliatory gestures 
and made its first real appearance at the Diet of Nuremberg (1444).
The electoral defiance of the imperial throne only abated with the 
collapse of the French negotiations. Frederick's reorientation was 
the imperial answer to the audacity of the electorate. It was neces­
sitated by the German princes who were ready to abandon the German 
Church and make terms with anyone who would help them expand their own 
political power. It is significant that Frederick's contacts with 
Eugenius became "non-neutral" only after the events of the Diet of 
Nuremberg (lW), The refusal of the Council of Basel to participate 
in a new C o u n c i l , a n d  the independence of the princes left only 
one prospect for any immediate solution to the ecclesiastical dilemma—  
Eugenius IV.
Frederick's action gave an entirely new twist to the ecclesi­
astical problem. The idea of national reform was deliberately trans­
ferred to a territorial level. Moreover, the Pope gave up his claim 
to a large part of the Church in order to consolidate his hold on the 
part loyal to him. Frederick might easily be accussed of shattering 
the reform sentiment and of displaying unconsiderate independence.
His action was not a rejection of national refom but a recognition 
of its failure on a national scale. The Electors, among whom were 
several powerful leaders of the Church, had little desire for an
The Council's final rejection of Frederick's offer came 
on January k, 1W>. Chmel, Materialien. I, 2, No. LII.
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ecclesiastical reform which would in seme way curtail their temporal
jurisdiction. To them the reform cry was synonomous with political 
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expediency. ' Since Frederick^ move meant the consolidation of at 
least a territorial reformation, the electoral reaction was soon ap­
parent. Both parties now set about to consolidate their positions. 
All efforts at formulating a united policy on the religious issue 
were now abandoned.




Pope Eugenius IV, encouraged by his success with the Emperor, 
now attacked his enemies in Germany. On February 9, 1446, he issued 
a bull deposing the Archbishops of Cologne and Trier. In their places 
he appointed Adolf of Cleves and John, Bishop of Cambrai, the brother 
of the Duke of Burgundy.1 The Electors soon rallied to counter the 
Pope's action. On March 21 they met at Frankfort and formed a league 
for the preservation of their rights. The Pontiff was requested to 
confirm the decrees of the Council of Constance which upheld conciliar 
supremacy. Moreover, Eugenius was to accept the reforming decrees of 
Basel, withdraw all censures against the supporters of German neu­
trality, and agree to the convocation of a new Council within the 
confines of the Empire. Bulls were prepared which Eugenius was asked 
to sign. Only on this condition did the Electors promise to submit
■^L. Pastor, Geschichte der Papste seit dem Ausgang des Mittel- 
alters (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1925) I, p. 346; J. Chmel, Geschichte 
Kaiser Friedrichs |V. und seines Sohnes Maximilian I. (Hamburg, 1843), 
P» 388; M. Creighton, A History of the Papacy from the Great 
Schism to the Sack of Rone (London, 1903), III, p. 74. Unconsciously 
Eugenius supposed the Emperor to be strong enough to control the 
princes of his realm. The Pope's action was not entirely unjust. 
Jacob of Trier manifested few scruples vihen his dictatorial rule 
was threatened by political upheaval. W. Puckert, Die kurfiirstiiche 
Neutralitat wahrend des Basler Concils (Leipzig, 18587, p. 253. In 
the Rhenish principalities the Archbishop's authority often exceeded 
that of the Pope.
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to the Papacy. Thereupon the problems of Christendom were to be 
solved by the new Council. 2 Should the Pope refuse these terms, the
3
schism would be terminated by a recognition of Felix V.-'
In addition to these demands, the Electors outlined a detailed
plan for the inauguration and maintenance of a princely league. The
4
document contained ten articles.
1) The observance of friendship between the participants.
2) In the event of a dispute between members, the matter was 
to be solved by arbitration.
3) A policy of mutual assistance would be observed.
4) The termination of the church schism.
5) All individual matters must be discussed by the entire 
league prior to any action.
6) Every precaution must be taken against the dismemberment 
of the Empire.
W. Gunther (ed.), Codex Djplomaticus Rheno-Mosellanus. Ur- 
kunden-Sammlung zur Geschichte der Rhein-und Mosellande, der Nahe-und 
Uhrgegend. und des Hundsruckens. des Meinfeldes und der Bifel (Coblenz. 
1825), IV, No. 217, pp. 453-461. J. J. Muller (ed.), De§ Heil. 
Romischen Reichs Teutscher Nation. Re ic h st ag sthe at rum wie selbiges 
unter Kevser Friedrichs V. allerhochsten Regierung Pena. 1713)* I» 
pp. 276-282; V. F. Gudenus (ed.). Codex Djplomaticus Anecdotorum Res 
Moguntinas Illustrantium (Gottingen, 1743), IV, pp. 290-298.
r>
In anticipation of Eugenius1 rejection of the electoral pro­
posals, special briefs were prepared which stipulated that the Elec­
tors and not Felix V would determine the time and place of the next 
Council. The date was set for November 19, 1446.
Sliiller, qe. cit.. I, p. 312; also C. Brockhaus, Gregor von 
Heimburg: Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Geschichte des 1^. Jahrhunderts 
(Leipzig, 1861), pp. 59-60.
7) Action must be taken against the robber barons.
8) The league will come to the defense of any member who may 
be in danger.
9) Close supervision of arbitrational posts was to be enforced.
10) Provision was to be made for a subsequent renewal of the
agreement.
The electoral response to the Pope's radicalism appeared "dig­
nified and statesmanlike"^ in its documentary form. The nature of 
Eugenius' action could only invoke a reactionary response. This at­
tack upon the electoral privileges aroused a cry for unification that 
had not been heard a few months before. The basis of this reaction 
lay not in a desire to assert the principles on which the neutrality 
of Germany had been founded, but in a desire to regain political pre­
rogative. The fulfillment of the electoral terms by the Pope would 
have restored the previous status quo in the religious situation and 
given the electors their former freedom of action. The demand for 
neutrality came from those who had casually proposed a recognition of 
the Council of Basel in return for a number of concessions a few 
months before; even now they used the Council of Basel as object for 
political bargaining. Their conciliar proposals were presented with 
the knowledge that if Eugenius actually accepted them, minor innovations
Creighton, ojo. cit., Ill, p. 75. Throughout his whole treat­
ment of this era, Creighton cred5.ts the Electors with a considerable 
political broadmindedness and personal integrity. The matter cannot 
be evaluated solely from the standpoint of the document as such, but 




of one sort or another could delay the convocation of the Council in­
definitely. Previous experience proved the Electors well-qualified 
for this task. The conciliar banner was raised in a political and 
religious atmosphere which could no longer tolerate indecision under 
any conditions. With this clearly in mind the Electors presented 
their demands. The inevitable rejection of their terms then provided 
them with a justification for their subsequent actions. Furthermore, 
the essence of the electoral league involved the creation of a power­
ful organization for the enforcement of territorial designs. The 
mutual assistance and defense pacts were designed for protection 
against imperial interference, rather than the reconstruction of the 
Empire. The pattern of future events was to reveal the electoral in­
sincerity to an even greater degree.
The attitude which the Electors manifested against Pope 
and King revealed their great power, a power which even 
dared to dictate terms to the Emperor himself, and was 
completely impervious to his approval or censure. From 
this the split in the constituents becomes apparent. The 
various sovereignties, either separately or corporately, 
followed their own policies and designs in complete disre­
gard of the Empire.°
The Electors resolved to send envoys to Frederick III and 
Eugenius IV and stipulated that a satisfactory answer must be ob­
tained by September. These resolutions were the work of the four 
Rhenish Electors who were soon joined by the Margrave of Branden­
burg and the Duke of Saxony. The newly formed league was kept secret. 
Meanwhile an embassy was sent to Frederick III to explain the details
^Brockhaus, og. cit., p. 6l.
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of the new organization to the King and demand his adherence. The 
deputation was under the leadership of Gregory Heimburg. 7 Frederick 
was aggravated by the proposals of the Electors, nevertheless they 
were discussed by six counsellors sworn to secrecy.® Frederick was 
prepared to accept the proposals in principle, but expressed hesita­
tion on several points of detail. The envoys were instructed not to 
reveal the bulls to be presented to the Pope before the King had 
fully accepted the provisions of the Electors. Frederick considered 
this an offense to his dignity. He observed that
within his lands it was unknown practice to conclude an 
agreement unless each article was clearly understood, 
even if the ruler imposed it upon his subjects. The Elec­
tors had concentrated upon the agreement and carefully 
weighed the merits of each article: should he [Frederick] 
now consent to them without having seen them. 9
The envoys of the Electors stubbornly insisted that they had 
submitted everything to the King, nevertheless Frederick refused to 
join the Electors until they had shewn him the written proposals 
which they were to submit to the Pope. The basis of their refusal
7
iMd., pp. 62-63; C. Ullmann, Refomatoren vor der Reforma- 
tioa Zgrnehmlich in Deutschland und den Niederlanrien (HamWp 1841) 
p. 21/f. Heimburg, affecting what he wished to pass off as German 
honesty and plain spokenness, was unbearably insolent and rude. Ul- 
o ^ n+!- ,Heimburg as a precurser of the Reformation leaves
rZ'S 1?8-?0 desired- He fails evaluate Heimburg's character 
for what it really was. His glorification of Gregory as a personifi-
t h P ^ n ?  Ge™ an nationalism entirely ignores the possibility that
^  could also be related to his personal obstinacy
as well as hxs hatred of rivals.
Q
vsioi 3J r^ eriCk!S 0a? n°f Secrecy forbade him to consult with Car- 
w W h  f r r  ? of Bologna who had just brought him the bulls
which ratified his treaty with the Pope.
9Puckert, op. cit., p.  265.
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lay in the fact that they wished to hide their intentions of making 
common cause with the Council of Basel.^ Thus the electorate wished 
to control the King by intimidations and threats. Frederick refused 
to alter his position. The sole result of these deliberations was the 
proclamation of a Diet at Frankfort on September 1, 1446. Frederick 
let it be known that he was then prepared to consider the termination 
of the neutrality.
The electoral envoys proceeded straight to Rome after their
interview with Frederick.11 All the latter could do was to confide
the whole matter to Aeneas and send him post-haste to Italy to give
Eugenius a word of warning. The imperial secretary and his traveling
companion, the papal legate Parentucelli, arrived in Rome just in
12
time to warn Eugenius of the electoral deputation. Of his presen­
tation Aeneas said "The Bishop of Bologna, though he could not know 
all that the ambassadors of the Electors brought with them, still 
guessed and imagined much. ”13
10Ibid., p. 266. See also Creighton, o^. cit., Ill, pp. 76-77.
11Brockhaus, o^. c i t . ,  pp. 62-63.
12
Since it wa.s Parentucelli who hastened to inform Eugenius of 
the intrigue Aeneas must have been guilty of some double dealing. As 
imperial secretary, he was possibly aware of the whole matter. It is 
probable, however, that the nature of his office excluded him from the 
oath. Along the way he must have informed Parentucelli of the matter 
so that the latter knew what advice to give to the Pope. In any case 
Aeneas maintains that Frederick was not guilty of any betrayal for he 
had taken no oath of secrecy. Florence Alden Gragg, "The Commentaries 
of Pius II," Smith College Studies in History. XXII (October. 1936- 
January, 1937), 37.
13
Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, "Historia Rerum Friderici III. 
Imperatoris," A. F. Kollar (ed.), Analecta Monumentorum Omnis Aevi
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Aeneas proved a valuable asset at the papal Curia. He averted 
the danger that the Pope, by his contemptuous behavior, should give 
the Electors an immediate pretext for turning to the Council of Basel. 
Furthermore, since Aeneas was an official representative of the Em­
peror at Rome, he was called in to assist at the electoral audience. 
Thus the Pope had a pretext for not viewing the electoral proposals 
as such, but could treat them as the combined representations of the 
Emperor and the Electors. The answer returned by the Pope was of an 
evasive character. The Electors had taken every precaution to avoid 
this. When Eugenius objected that he was receiving a delegation from 
the men he had deposed, the deputation informed him that its creden­
tials were signed by the whole Electoral College.
Vindobonensia (Vindobonae, 1?62), II, p. 122. Aeneas' Historia 
Friderici III. Imperatoris has been the object of extensive critical 
investigation. The more prominent studies in this connection in­
clude G. Voigt, Enea Silvio de1 Piccolomini als Papst Pius II und 
sein Z_eitalter (Berlin, 1862 ), II, p. 320ff; V. Bayer, Dig Historia 
Friderici III. Imperatoris des Enea Silvio de' Piccolomini. Eine 
krjtische Studie zur Geschichte Kaiser Friedrichs III. (Prag, 1872).
A history of the compilation of the text was made by H. Kramer, 
"Untersuchungen zur 'Osterreichischen Geschichte' des Aeneas Silvius," 
Mjtteilungen des osterreichischen Instituts fur Geschichtsforschung. 
XLV (1931)» 23-58* 0. Lorenz in his Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen 
•IS Mittelalter (Berlin, I876), pp. 284-287 used Voigt and Bayer as 
his chief sources, but added no real contribution to their work. The 
work was treated from a legal and cultural-historical point of view 
by H. G. Gengler, Tiber Aeneas Silvius in seiner Bedeutung fur die 
geatsc^e Reqhtsgeschichte (Erlangen,~186o7. In general thefliitoria 
_giderici III* can be considered as a valid and rather important his­
torical work. Although complimentary to Frederick III it does not 
overlook his faults. Bayer, o£. cit., p. 13; Voigt, oe. cit., II,
P* 329. The work is probably the best contemporary account of the 
struggle between the Emperor and the princes of the realm. A good 
evaluation of the Historia is also found in R. C. Dales, "Aeneas 
oylvius Piccolomini: His Historical Works and His Influence on Ger­
man Historiography" (unpublished Master's thesis, The University of 
Colorado, Boulder, 1952), pp. 65-77.
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speaking for Frederick, recommended the ambassadors to the Pontiff's
kind attention. Heiraburg in a clear and incisive speech then set for-
14 -r.ward the electoral terras. Eugenius returned a vague answer. He 
noted that the deposition of the Archbishops had been decreed for 
valid reasons. He observed that he had never refused to acknowledge 
the authority of the Councils, but had only defended the dignity of 
the Apostolic See; that he did not wish to oppress the German Church 
but to act in its interests. Lastly, in view of the gravity of the 
electoral proposals, considerable time must be allowed to study them.^
Meanwhile Aeneas informed the Pope of the desires of Fred­
erick III. Eugenius was advised not to defy the Electors but to 
restore the deposed prelates to their former dignity without annull- 
ing their deprivation. It was also recommended that the Constance 
decree advocating conciliar supremacy should be accepted. Support of 
these proposals would assure Eugenius' universal recognition. Despite 
his friendly relations with Eugenius, Frederick did not adjust his 
ecclesiastical policy to suit the whims of the power-conscious Eugenius. 
Aware of the imminent danger of a major split within the German Nation,
14
Heimburg was tall with flashing eyes and a genial face, 
honest, straightforward and eminently national in his views and policy. 
S6e Ibid., p. 123.
15C. Fea, Pius II. Pont. Max. a Calumnis Vindicatus (Romae,
1823), p. 94; Kollar, loc. cit.: Chmel, 03. cit.. II, pp. 390-391.
Following the introduction of the electoral delegates, Aeneas,
l6Gragg, 02. cit., p. 37.
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Frederick proposed conciliatory action. His insistence upon a recog­
nition of the Decrees of Constance revealed the Emperor's continued 
determination to implement his original policy in the face of serious 
opposition. Frederick's action was a tribute to his diplomatic genius. 
Whereas an endorsement of the electoral designs at Vienna would have 
meant an end to the dignity and authority of the Roman Kingship, the 
papal recognition of the key electoral demands would have forced the 
Electors to pursue their proposed policy at a new Council or find a 
new course of action. In any case, Frederick would have attained a 
moral victory in the matter.
Eugenius, imbued with the tradition of papal supremacy, did not 
accept Frederick's counsel without reserve. The electoral ambassadors 
waited three weeks for a reply, Heimburg regarded the papal attitude 
as a. rejection of the proposals and left Rome without producing the 
briefs. The envoys were told that since they had no powers to negoti­
ate further (after Eugenius' vague answers) the Pope would send repre­
sentatives with his answer to the Diet at Frankfort. Simultaneously, 
the Council of Basel informed the electoral ambassadors that its 
answer to their proposals would be deferred until the convocation of 
the Diet,
The influence of the Diet of Frankfort would be far reaching. 
Since the policy of the Electors had not received imperial or papal 
sanction, a definitive action of one kind or another would surely be 
proposed. In this crisis the King entrusted his interests to the care 
of Margrave Albert of Brandenburg and Jacob of Baden, the Bishops of 
Augsburg and Chiemsee, Caspar Schlick and Aeneas Sylvius. This embassy
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was headed by Albert of Brandenburg, who had already shown his devo­
tion to Frederick by taking the field against the Armagnacs, and who 
was determined to counteract the intrigues between France and the 
Rhenish Electors. No representatives from Eugenius IV arrived at 
Frankfort, since the Bishop of Bologna had been delayed at Parma by 
illness.1'*
Only a few of the German princes or prelates were personally 
present at Frankfort. Although the four Rhenish Electors attended in 
person, the Electors of Brandenburg and Saxony only sent representa­
tives, as did most of the bishops and nobles. Louis of Arles came 
frcrn Basel bearing a decree which approved the relocation of the Coun­
cil. Consequently, the Electors were rather sympathetic to his cause. 
When Louis appeared in official regalia as the papal legate the imper­
ial ambassadors issued the usual protest that Germany was neutral.
The Archbishop of Trier denounced their conduct. He stated that the 
legates of Felix V were to be admitted while those of Eugenius IV 
excluded. The majority of the representatives consented to this 
view. The citizens of Frankfort, however, still loyal to the imperial 
cause, interfered and compelled Cardinal Louis to lay aside the in- 
signi of his office.
When the meeting opened, the opposing parties refused to co- 
1R
operate. Pope Eugenius IV made no substantial concessions. The 
17
Kollar, 02. cit.. II, p. 124. After his recovery Bishop 
Thomas went to confer with the Duke of Burgundy about the measures 
to be adopted towards the deposed Archbishops. He finally arrived 
at Frankfort after the Diet had commenced.
IB
Compare Puckert, op. cit., p. 278ff. with Kollar, op. cit..
p. 127.
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chief papal spokesman, Carvajal, was uncompromising and always prom­
ised less than he intended to perform and wanted more than could be 
19
obtained. The Papacy granted nothing which had been asked, and 
reserved to itself the full power to make all concessions temporary. 
Meanwhile the princes were goaded to exasperation by Heimburg's 
account of his experiences in Rome. The Emperor and the Pope would 
have found themselves in a precarious position, except for a curious 
combination of historical circumstance and human ingenuity. The 
human element found personification in Aeneas Sylvius.
The first move of the imperial secretary was to break up the 
electoral league by bribing four of the counsellors of the Archbishop 
of Mainz with 2,000 florins. Aeneas wrote: "At length it was neces­
sary to have recourse to gold, to which ears are seldom deaf. Gold
is the master of courts, it rules all things, and it conquered the 
20
Archbishop." Aeneas' action represented only a part of the total 
picture. On September 22 Albert of Brandenburg succeeded in inducing 
the representatives of his brother Frederick the Elector, the Arch­
bishop of Mainz, two bishops, and one or two nobles to issue a state­
ment that they had received an acceptable reply from the Pope. They 
also agreed to stand by one another in maintaining this opinion. In 
addition to this the Archbishop of Mainz was encouraged to reverse
^Fea, 0£. cit., p. 99. "Nam is semper minora pollicebatur 
quam facturus esset et ampliora cupiebat quam fieri poLent."
* f* ki piickert treats the stoiy of bribery as
L  pp.l8l ! S T RtS againSt U  are not conclusive. Fuckert,
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his loyalty by an offer of aid in the settlement of his domestic 
affairs. The originators of this bribe were Frederick III and Albert 
of Brandenburg, Now that two Electors had been won over, they only 
needed a pretext for their change of policy, Aeneas was not slow in 
providing the same. Taking the electoral proposals, he sat up one 
night "— and from the princes' rough draft, on the basis of which 
they wished to compose a letter to Eugenius, he constructed another, 
squeezing out all venom , . „ and amplifying all the motions which 
concerned the provision to be made for the nation, the reinstate­
ment of the archbishops and the respect to be shown the authority of 
the General Councils." 21 Thus Aeneas cleverly attained a key position 
at the Diet. The papal legates regarded him as the spokesman of the 
Empire, offering terms which Eugenius would be free to modify. The 
Electors gained the impression that the new edition of their ultimatum 
rested upon the authority of the Pope. The compromise was accepted by 
all parties in the Diet, much to the disgust of the envoys from Basel. 
If Eugenius sanctioned the new terms he would receive the obedience of 
Germany. Early in October the imperial and papal ambassadors agreed 
to submit to the Diet a proposal for sending a new embassy to Rome in 
order to negotiate with the Pope on the newly formulated conditions. 
The demands were not drawn up in general briefs as previously but in 
the form of separate articles.
haH ni™, ?*a^g’ 2E* P* °^* Sane modifications of the document
fhA S +  been proposed by the Bishop of Chiemsee at Vienna when
u f i e V eIV %  For the t e r a sominicus Mansi (edj, P n  H. P.M. olim Aeneae Svlvii Piccoiominei 
108^ ?neS fit Ecclesiastica<=> T l„„a0~~~g g ) p "
The document of the royal secretary served its purpose well, 
for following its publication the princely league was plagued with 
disunity and actual desertion. The Electors of Mainz and Brandenburg 
considered the new policy better than a breach with the King. The 
Count of the Palatinate and the Elector of Saxony believed that the 
new proposals expressed the essential essence of the old electoral 
demands. On October 5, 1446, the league that had been formed in 
favor of this compromise was openly avowed, and drew a considerable 
number of adherents. It was resolved that the articles be presented 
to Eugenius towards the end of December. The answer was to be 
brought to a Diet at Nuremberg on March 19, 1447. The Archbishops 
of Trier and Cologne found themselves deserted by the other Electors. 
Desperately they issued a decree on October 11, 1446, calling on the 
Emperor to confirm the original briefs prepared by the Electors. In 
the event of failure, the briefs should be framed according to the 
articles drawn up by Aeneas. These were to be presented at the next 
Diet and each Elector should be free to accept or reject them. This 
scheme was doomed to failure.
The disintegration of the electoral league was sudden and un­
expected; with it also fell the cause of the Council of Basel. Fred­
erick III, by the genius of Aeneas, had crushed the princely opposition 
in Germany. Eugenius, however, gained more than the King since the 
conciliar movement was abandoned and the convocation of a new Council 
was left to the Pope's pleasure. The ecclesiastical reforms made by 
the Council of Basel survived only as a pretext for further negotiations 
with the Pope. From a documentary viewpoint, there were apparently no
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special preparations by the Emperor for this crucial Diet, a situation 
in part due to the rapid sequence of events which preceded it. In his 
negotiations with Eugenius IV the King hoped to curb the pretentious­
ness of the Electors, but had not counted on a reaction of such magni­
tude. Frederick's position as Emperor as well as his ecclesiastical 
policy had faced extinction with the brazen self-assertion of the 
Electors. In the early stages of the Diet the imperial envoys were 
entirely at the mercy of the princes. The subsequent disintegration 
of the league left the initiative in church affairs to the Pope rather 
than Frederick. The talk of a new Council proved agreeable with Fred­
erick's sentiment, but when the responsibility for church reform 
could once more be transferred to a central authority, the pressure 
for reform from secular sources lessened. In connection with this, 
there was a growing tendency for the imperial church policy to become 
subserviant or at least auxiliary to that of the Roman Pontiff. The 
subsequent pattern of ecclesiastical events was not necessarily the 
product of theoretical planning or logical deduction.
The resolutions of the Diet of Frankfort still needed the 
assent of Eugenius IV. Carvajal had been opposed to all concessions 
at the Diet. In Rome, where the gravity of the situation in Germany 
was not fully understood nor the Frankfort resolutions fully appreci­
ated, papal obstinacy could still have ruined the newly formulated 
plans. Eugenius IV, whose health was failing, desired to see peace 
restored to the Church before the end of his days. The politicians of 
the Roman Curia were in favor of accepting the proffered terms, but 
theologians headed by John of Torquemoda opposed the move. Meanwhile
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Frederick III., the Electors, and the princes of Germany all sent 
their envoys to Rome. They all met at Siena and then rode into Rome. ^ 
On the third day after their arrival Aeneas Sylvius laid the proposals 
before the Pope. Such was his skill that he managed to satisfy the 
Germans without offending the dignity of the Pope.^  Eugenius replied 
by condemning neutrality but postponed his final answer. On the same 
day he suffered an attack of fever. The matter was thus referred to 
a commission of Cardinals whose position on the matter varied consider­
ably. With Eugenius' illness as an incentive, the articles of agree­
ment were gradually drawn up.
1) As regarded the summons of a new Council, the Pope agreed
to it without issuing a bull on the matter, since this might bind
his successor. The agreement was understood as personal promise to
24the King and the Electors.
2) In lieu of accepting the decrees of Constance and Basel, 
Eugenius agreed to recognize "the Council of Constance, and its decree 
Frequens and other of its decrees, and all the other Councils repre­
senting the Catholic Church." All mention of the Council of Basel was 
carefully avoided.
3) On the question of neutrality, Eugenius was willing to
22
For an account of the procession see the letter of Aeneas 
Sylvius to Frederick III in L. A. Muratorius (ed.), Rerum Italicarum 
Scriptores (Mediolani, 1784), Vol. Ill, pt. 2, pp. 878-98.
2^ Mansi, o£. cit., p. 108.
2Jj,
0. Raynaldus, Annales Scclesiastici (Barri-Ducis, 1874), 
ad. an* 1447, Nos. 5-7.
follow the example of Martin V in granting the Concordats of Constance. 
He recognized the existing owners of benefices, and agreed to send a 
legate to Germany, who would arrange a basis of understanding between 
the German Church and the Papacy. Meanwhile, the position of the Ger­
man Church was to remain unchanged.
4) Eugenius IV promised to annul the deposition of the deposed 
Archbishops if they were willing to concur in the declaration in his
favor. They would be restored to office only when they had recognized 
the Pope.
In order to enhance the papal glory and facilitate the negoti­
ations Aeneas undertook to publish Frederick's recognition of the Pope 
throughout Germany. Furthermore Frederick was resolved to receive a 
papal legate and at the same time order the city of Basel to withdraw 
its safe conduct from the Council. The Emperor was henceforth an 
ally of the Pope.
Eugenius was resolved to see the restoration of German obedi­
ence before he died. His uncompromising nature had wrought great 
desolation within the Church. France was almost independent of the 
Papacy; Germany was estranged; a rival Pope had received widespread 
support; in Italy Bologna was lost to the Church while the March of 
Ancona was still in the hands of Sforza. Yet at heart, the old Pontiff 
dreaded any sort of concession. Thus on February 5 he signed a secret 
protest setting forth that the German King and Electors had desired 
certain things from him.^ By this procedure the dying Pope
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2^Ibid.. No. 7.
was ready to enter into engagements which his successor might repudi­
ate. Meanwhile the German envoys were hesitant, for their action 
might divide Germany. John of Lysura argued that the envoys were not 
dealing with Eugenius alone, but with the Reman See, which never died. 
Aeneas firmly supported Lysura's position. Finally on February ? the 
envoys consented to submit to the Pope. In the Pope's chamber Aeneas 
read the declaration of obedience and Eugenius handed him the bulls 
of acceptance. Following a public consistory, Rome celebrated its 
triumph. The city blazed with bonfires, the next day was declared a 
general holiday and a special thanksgiving service was held. On 
February 23, 1447, Eugenius IV died.27 He had been a man of monastic 
piety and temperament; a man whose firmness of purpose may have graced 
an abbot, but expressed itself as obstinacy in the ruler of the Uni­
versal Church; a man subject to all the whims of circumstance; one
who experienced the deepest tragedy as well as the highest exhala­
tion. 28
In so far as it can be ascribed to any one man, this political
20?
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masterstroke was the work of Aeneas Sylvius. Diplomatically the 
methods of Aeneas left something to be desired, yet few men in his 
profession would care to record their xrorks with quite the same 
frankness. The first secretary probably prevented a major catastro­
phe in both the political and the ecclesiastical realms since he tem- 
prarily arrested the territorial dismemberment which threatened the 
Empire. The election of an anti-King at the Diet of Frankfort would 
have strained the institutional framework of the Roman kingdom beyond 
endurance. As long as Germany remained an aggregate of separatist 
interests, she could not be a centre of unity in either church or 
state. Politically she must be held together by the hand of the Em­
peror; ecclesiastically she could only unite under the central leader­
ship of the Pope.
Frederick's interest in church affairs was visibly dampened by 
the events of 1446, Until this time he was one of the leading figures 
advocating internal church reform and the just arbitration of the 
schism. The political emergency created by the ecclesiastical dabb­
l e s  of the Electors and the subsequent formation of the electoral 
league forced Frederick to revert to schemes for which no provision 
had been made in the imperial religious policy. Frederick's tempo­
rary flirtation with the Papacy was intended to counteract the un­
stable romance between the Electors and the Council of Basel. The 
permanent implementation of the King's temporary political expedient 
resulted from the force of immediate circumstances. Intertwined with 
the more obvious train of events which marked the end of conciliarism 
and German neutrality was a sense of extreme impatience and even
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desperation. While the attempts to settle the political-religious 
complex were not lacking, no definitive program had ever been adopted. 
When a solution to this oppressive situation was finally achieved by 
Aeneas Sylvius, the prospect of regaining imperial honor and authority 
possibly blinded Frederick to the price involved. In the final analy­
sis, the events of 1446 benefited the one least affected— Eugenius IV.
The death of Eugenius IV had filled the adherents of the Council 
of Basel with new hope. New attempts were made to reassert the con-
ciliar influence, especially on the part of Duke Lewis of Savoy, the
29
son-in-law of Felix V. Lewis succeeded in obtaining a contract with 
the Swiss Federation by which the dispersed members of the Council of 
Basel could seek asylum in Swiss territory.30 In the course of events 
ich finally led to the German submission to Eugenius IV, the King 
of France assembled a Congress of Bishops at Lyons in November, 1446. 
The participants agreed to recognize Eugenius IV, but simultaneously 
cautioned against a complete rejection of Felix V, in order that a 
new Council might be summoned at a later d a t e . ^ 1 Both Eugenius IV and 
the Council of Basel were informed of this decision. Meanwhile the 
death of Eugenius brought abcut a new ecclesiastical perspective.
29
The anti-Pope went so far as to write a querulous letter re­
quiring a certain Tommaso of Sarzana, who has presumned to mount the 
postolic Chair, and call himself Nicolas V to renounce his usurped
position at on C e, and to appear before his tribunal." Mansi, o d . cit.. 
aaai, p* lo9# --
30
J. Chmel, Materialien zur osterreichischen Geschichte, Ans 
Archiven und Bibliotheken (Wien, 1837), I, No. LXXXVI, pp. 213-219.
•^Chmel.__Friedrich IV, II, p .  422.
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The Electors who had vowed their support to the dead Pope initiated 
another romantic interlude with the King of France. The rulers of 
Trier, Cologne and Saxony again pursued policies which were strikingly 
similar to the traitorous schemes of 1444-45. When Charles VII pro­
posed a general Congress at which the problems of Europe were to be 
solved by arbitration, the Rhenish Electors immediately gave an af­
firmative response. The Congress scheduled for Bourges was an open 
attempt on the part of Charles VII to overshadow the ruler of the
Holy Roman Empire. England, Castile, Scotland, Burgundy and many
3?
others were represented at the meeting. ~ At the proceedings it was 
proposed that Nicholas V would only be recognized if he agreed to 
abide by the principles laid down by the Council of Constance. Fur- 
tnermore, the Electors requested that the French King agree to the 
convocation of a new Council, a concession which they had refused to 
grant their own Emperor. The Bourges Congress was concluded on 
June 15 and officially terminated on June 28, 1447. The assembly was 
then transferred to Lyons in order to facilitate the negotiations with 
the Council of Basel. Delegates to this second meeting came from 
France, the Duke of Savoy and the Council of Basel. Jacob of Trier 
attended personally. After some resistance, Felix V finally agreed 
to abdicate, but only on the condition that his cause be heard and 
judged by a new Council. Following this concession the Congress moved 
to Geneva in the fall of 1447. Here the detailed terms of the
32
The broad ambitions which motivated Charles VII in this 
Congress find adequate expressions in the letters of the Saxon legate 
the first secretary Engelhardt. Piickert, op. cit., p. 306.
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to recompense Felix financially and grant the former Pope a cardinal-
ship in his own territories. Felix had complete power in his own
33
domains during his lifetime. In all the arbitration there was little 
concern for the welfare of the Church or for national pride, since the 
assembly was characterized by a widespread tendency to pursue individ- 
ual interests# In the main, however, the electoral participation 
in this French dominated assembly was a political maneuver designed to 
hinder the execution of Fredericks own ecclesiastical policy. The 
Electors wished to use the church problem at their own convenience and 
to their own advantage# They had no intention of submitting to the im­
perial policy as it was being formulated at Aschaffenburg during July 
and August of the same year# The French Congresses provided the 
Rhenish electorate with a pretext for opposing Frederick’s position 
until they received a monetary concession from him#
Meanwhile Nicholas V made his first official pronouncement on 
the ecclesiastical issue# When Aeneas Sylvius waited on him to receive
a confirmation of the agreement which Eugenius IV had made with Ger- 
35many, he replied:
Dresden Archives, fol. 377 - "item so hat er (Felix) sein 
Lebtage alle Monat aus der papstlichen Kammer 2500 Ducaten, macht 
jahrlich 30,000. Item fur das Parlehen, das er in der Zwietracht 
der Kirche gethan hat, auf eimal 100,000 fl. und das in Stillem."
Quoted by Puckert, o^. cit.. p. 308.
^Ibid.. p. 309.
-^Aeneas acted as cross-bearer at the Pope's coronation on 
March 18, 1447. On March 30, he left for Vienna to bring Frederick 
the new Pope's confirmation of the engagements of his predecessor. 
Aeneas advised the Emperor to renew his declaration of obedience, and
abdication of Felix were drawn up. It was stated that Nicholas V was
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I will not only confirm but execute it. In ray opinion 
the Roman Pontiffs have too greatly extended their authority, 
and left the other bishops no jurisdiction. It is a just 
judgment that the Council of Basel has in turn shortened the 
hand of the Holy See too much. We intend to strengthen the 
bishops, and hope to maintain our own power most surely by 
not usurping that of others.36
The words of the new Pope pictured the entire state of ecclesiastical
affairs, yet they also indicated that the total scope of the church
problem had not yet been solved by the imperial and electoral pledges
of obedience. A reformation at all levels of the ecclesiastical
heirarchy was still a necessity, and a balance of power within the
same structure was equally important.
The conclusions reached by the King of France and the Electors 
stated that they were ready to acknowledge Nicholas V, if he promised 
to summon a Council on September 1, 1448, at a location to be deter­
mined by the French King. Nicholas was also to accept the Constance 
decrees and provide for his rival, Felix V .37 Despite its obvious 
insincerity, the plan revealed a trend towards conciliarism and rival­
ed any proposals ever made by Frederick III. The whole matter was 
executed by an alliance with the French King, at that time the enemy
order all men to receive the papal legates peaceably. Nicholas V 
also carried out his predecessor’s intention and appointed Aeneas 
to the Bishopric of Trieste. Gragg, o£. cit., pp. 44-45.
* iU36Murftori* 2E- Sit.. HI, pt. 2, p. 895. Nicholas V felt 
that the work which had been begun by force could best be completed 
by gentle measures. He wished to manifest the Papacy's power of 
healing and reconciliation. Christophe, oj). cit., I, p. 372.
37
Neither Pope Nicholas V or Felix V approved of this plan. 
J. Hefele, Conciliengeschichte (Freiburg im Breisgau, I869) VII
pp. 837-838. * '
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of the German Nation. The electoral schcmes betrayed anarchy and self- 
interest rather than a concern for the national welfare. They repre­
sented an attempt to obtain better terms than an alliance with the Em­
peror offered.
Expediency permeated all the electoral activity. In the midst 
of the French deliberations Jacob of Trier clarified his relations 
with the Papacy and sent the provost of the cathedral home to Trier 
to clarify and publicize his new position. Consequently he was no 
longer tolerated at Lyons. Archbishop Jacob exercised his traditional 
caution; his submission to the Papacy brought adequate recompense, al­
though his reputation momentarily floundered. Dietrich of Cologne 
secretly followed in Jacob's footsteps. 38 Early in 1448 an envoy of 
the Archbishop reached Vienna where he probably negotiated with Car— 
vajal. The Count of the Palatinate also attained a new perspective, 
especially in view of Frederick's material promises.39 The Elector 
of Saxony felt that his promise to remain faithful to the conciliar 
Pope until all matters were settled had been honorably kept. Envoys 
were sent to the Emperor as well as Pope Eugenius to bring the matter 
to a conclusion in the fall of 1447. Duke Frederick, rather conscious 
of his own generosity, felt quite justified in demanding territorial
33
Aeneas Sylvius was sent on a special mission to win over Diet- 
rich. At Cologne he was regarded by the University as an apostate. 
Aeneas found it necessary to justify himself in a letter addressed to 
the rector of the institution. His apology examplifies the Italian’s 
characteristic shrewdness. Fea, op. cit., pp. 1-16. A copy of the 
bull finalizing the Vienna Concordat reached the Archbishop soon 
afterwards.
39Puckert, op. cit., pp. 311-312.
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and administrative concessions from both the Emperor and the Pope.
40
He was not disappointed. The inauguration and development of German 
neutrality was conditioned by secular interests. This tendency pre­
dominated in its termination also. The entire episode of electoral 
participation was devoid of any desire for church reform and often 
directly adverse to it.
Frederick made every attempt to strengthen his own position.
He ordered a Congress to convene at Aschaffenburg on July 12. Under 
the presidency of the Archbishop of Mainz the assembly confirmed what 
had been done at Rome. At these proceedings Aeneas Sylvius repre­
sented the Emperor while Nicholas of Cusa appeared on behalf of the 
Pope. The assembled princes decided that Nicholas V should be pro­
claimed throughout Germany as the lawful Pope. In turn the Pontiff 
should confirm the Concordat which had been drawn up by his predeces­
sor. In order to settle the still extant differences a meeting was 
scheduled for Nuremberg. Meanwhile Frederick withdrew his safe-conduct 
from the Council of Basel and ordered it to disperse. A formal edict 
issued at Vienna on August 21, 1447, proclaimed the Emperor's endorse­
ment of the decrees drawn up at Aschaffenburg. All support of the 
Council of Basel and Felix V was forbidden.^1 Thereupon Frederick
40.
l£ld., pp. 312-313. At this time Dukes Otho and Stephen of 
Bavaria, the Count of Wurtemberg, and the Bishops of Worms and Speier 
also pledged their loyalty to Rome. Raynaldus, q q , cit., ad. an. 144?, 
wo. 1/. p. 4oy.
41
ii m  x, Chinel» Eaterialien, I, No. XVIII; Raynaldus, op. cit.. ad. an. 
1447, No. 17. The University of Vienna remained true to the conciliar 
cause. It was only driven to take part in the declaration by the threat
oi losing its revenues and benefices. The University found many
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solemnly repeated his declaration of obedience to the Pope in St.
4 2
Stephens Cathedral in Vienna.
The imperial-papal agreement was finally concluded at Vienna
on February 17, 1448. Later historians referred to it as the Concor- 
43
dat of Vienna. Prior to its actual signing a papal legate, Carvajal, 
was sent to Germany. The Cardinal was to determine the papal revenues 
which the German Church was to pay as well as any special privileges 
that could be granted it. Pope Nicholas V confirmed the agreement on 
March 19, 1448.^ Although the representatives of the Electors were 
present in Vienna at this time no formal Diet was inaugurated in order 
to mark the acceptance of the Concordat by the German Nation. Since 
the agreement was in a sense the product of the assembly held at 
Aschaffenburg, it is probable that its validation was automatically
sympathizers in Germany, and if Rome had now gained the victory, it 
was in no small decree due to the skill with which her envoys con­
ducted the difficult negotiations. A. Wappler, Geschichte der theo- 
loftischen Facultat der k.k. Universitat zu Wien (Wien, 1884), pp. 13- 
14; H. Bressler, Die Stellung der Deutschen Universitaten zum Baseler 
Konzil. Inauguraldissertation . . . Leipzig (Leipzig, I885), p. 75.
k2
Voigt, ci£., I, p. 414.
4 3 1|
In a broader sense the term Concordat, designates all agree­
ments between a prelate and a secular government or also with another 
prelate concerning singular points of ecclesiastical law." G. Phillips, 
Kirchenrecht (Regensburg, 1840), III, p. 674. Phillips carefully 
qualifies his definition for the term. Not every agreement drawn up 
in an imperial chancellery in the presence of prelates can be called 
a concordat. "On the contrary that expression has, interpreted tech­
nically, a much narrower meaning, in that only those contracts are 
understood by it, which the Pope, as head of the Church, concludes 
with the government of an individual state in an attempt to clarify 
its relationship with the Church." Ibid., p. 675.
J• Chmel, Regesta Chrorxologico-Diplorriatic^  Friderici III, 
Romanorum Imperatoris (Wien. I859), Anhang, pp, XCIV-XCVI.
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accepted by the participants.
The Concordat of Vienna was the net result of the Basel reform 
movement. The cry for reform found its basis in the oppressions tfiich 
each national Church experienced due to papal interference. The parties 
involved in the movement, however, failed to find a means of redressing 
these grievances without destroying the institutional basis of the 
Church. When the Council of Basel threatened to abolish the basis of 
papal rule it became involved in a contest with the Papacy itself.
This conflicted with the public opinion of Europe. The subsequent 
upheavel was used by France to regulate the relations of the Gallican 
Church to Rome by royal authority. Frederick III, after a vain attempt 
to arbitrate between the rival Popes, resorted to the Concordat. The 
Concordat of Constance was drawn up for only five years; the Roman Curia 
considered the Concordat of Vienna to be permanent.*4''5 While the Con­
cordat confirmed all that Eugenius IV had granted, it made no mention 
of a Council, and the promise of Eugenius IV lapsed through non­
fulfillment. Thus the German problem was stabilized by a private 
agreement between the temporal and spiritual rulers of Christendom.
The document clarified the basis of future relations between the two, 
and thougi very similar to the Concordat of Constance, it revealed a 
greater degree of Papal favoritism.
The main provisions of the Concordat were concerned with papal 
reservations and papal interference in elections. It recognized;
^For a very ample account of the agreement with special regard 
to Constance Concordat see Hefele, 22* cii., VII, 840-46.
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l) The reservations of ecclesiastical benefices contained in canon
law as well as those introduced by John XXII and Benedict XII. 2) The
appointment to bishoprics by free election, although the papal right
of confirmation was retained. The pact
admitted the right of Papal reservation to benefices whose 
holders died at the Roman Court or within two days journey 
from Rome, to vacancies caused by Papal deprivation or 
translation, to benefices vacated by the deaths of Cardinals 
or other officials Of the Curia, to offices held by any 
promoted by the Pope to a bishopric-.monastery, or other 
office incompatible with residence,
3) Finally, the dues to the Curia were to be paid in two portions
within two years. If the rates were thought excessive the Pope would
allow a reassessment. He was also ready to take into account any
special circumstances which might affect a given fiscal unit.
The papal restoration was complete. The only points which 
showed any concession to the German Church were provisions that the 
papal reservation should be exercised only in favor of Germans, and 
that the papal months should be accepted by the German clergy. These 
slight concessions to German individuality could easily be discarded 
by a negligent pontiff. While the Concordat guarded the Holy See from 
suddenly despoiled of a great part of its revenues, it failed to check 
the disorders in the Roman Church. In view of the sociological 
stratifications which characterized fifteenth century Germany the ab­
sentee patronage of the Papacy was beneficial. The potentila which 
this represented, however, was sharply reduced by the undisciplined 
and relatively uneducated German clergy as well as the reckless
46
Creighton, ££• cit.f III, p. 107.
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insistence upon the papal privileges by the successors of Nicholas V.
48
No mention was made of the Council of Basel or its decrees. Such 
reform as had been accomplished was now swept away by the reaction.
The Curia, unimpressed by the crisis which had threatened it, was 
only bent on returning to its past basis of operation, and showed no 
desire for any type of reform.
For Frederick III the Concordat represented the culmination of 
his recently inaugurated preventative policy. The Roman ruler felt 
that his papal alliance was the only means of checking the Electors, 
and preventing their further flirtation with France. He had no ground 
for opposing the papal power of reservation since this power had sub­
stantially increased his jurisdictional authority in Austria, The 
reason for Frederick's acceptance of the Concordat was circumstantial. 
French intrigue had jeopardized any potential agreement between the
47
J. K, Hergenrother, Handbuch der allgemeinen Kirchen- 
geschichte. Neu bearbeitet von J. P. Kirsch (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1925),
III, p. 238; An excellent description of the process by which the Ger­
man nobility took control of the episcopal and archiepiscopal churches 
is presented in C. Hofler, "Der Deutsche Adel in den hohen Erz und Dom- 
capiteln," Historisch-Politische Blatter fur das katholische Deutsch-
laad, XLIII (1921), 653-676, 745-768, 837-858.
48
The Council of Basel pursued a suicidal course. At Basel 
squabbles about the limitations of its powers took the place of the 
urgently needed work of reform, and ended by reviving the dreaded 
schism. The aversion to the Council increased and the old constitu­
tion became more firmly established than before. C. Hofler, "Die 
Romanische Welt und ihr Verhaltniss zu den Reformideen des Mittel- 
alters" Sitzungsberichte der Philosoohisch-Historischen Classe der 
Kaiserlichen Akademie ler Wissenschaften. 91 (1878), 463-64; W. Watten- 
bach, Geschichte des Romischen Paostthums. Vortrage (Berlin, I876), p. 
281. The final dissolution of the Council of Basel is well pictured 
in Pastor, o^. cit., II, pp. 41-42.
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papists and the conciliarists. The subsequent concurrence of the indi-
49vidual German princes to the Concordat, as well as the submission of 
Hungary and Venice^ left Frederick no choice tut to submit to the 
stipulations of the pact. The Concordat was basically of a temporary 
nature and therefore did not solve the underlying problems of the day. 
This was entirely dependent upon a General Council which the Pope 
was quite unwilling to call. The ecclesiastical policy of the Emperor 
was consequently of a provisional nature and often subject to expedi­
ency, for no institutional basis existed on which a permanent policy 
could be built.
But when we consider on one side the high demands of the 
electors, on the other the principle of the Reman Church to 
resist all innovation; when we appreciate the scanty pos­
sessions and power of Frederick, and the little reliance he 
could place on the support of the empire; we ought rather 
to applaud his address and good fortune, in persuading both 
parties to recede, in some degree, from their respective 
pretensions, than to blame him for terminating a contro­
versy which would have augmented the schism of the church, 
and might have exposed him to the loss of the imperial 
crown.51
Institutionally the Concordat represented a new stage of
4-9
P. Hinschius, System des katholischen Kirchenrechts mit bg- 
sonderer Rucksicht auf Deutschland (Berlin, I883), III, p. 139, 
footnote 2.
5°Chmel, Frjedrich IV, II, p. 44C. The bishops in Frederick’s 
Austrian domains found it necessaiy to follow the example of their 
temporal overlord. The Archbishop of Salzburg received a Bull for 
Nicholas V dated November 1, 1448, declaring that the Concordat in no 
way limited the right of the Archbishop to nominate to the bishoprics 
of Seckau, Lavant, and Chiemsee. J. C. Liinig (ed,), Deutsches Reichs- 
arehiy (Leipzig, 1715), XVI, p. 1015; P. M. Hansiz (ed.), Germanise 
Sacrae (Augustae Vindelicorum, 1729), II, pp. 481-483.
51W. Coxe, History of the House Austria (London, 1864), I,
p. 225.
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development. Neutrality was not eliminated by the Concordat but 
actually recognized. In the conciliar-papal controversy the Electors 
had rejected both the imperial and the ecclesiastical authority.
Their reconciliation in 1448 was only conditioned by material circum­
stances. At the Council of Constance a similar division had occurred 
but it was solved by true reconciliation. In Basel, however, the 
rulers of Germany, France, Italy and Spain came together to arbitrate 
but each went his own way afterward. The Concordat of Constance was 
concluded by prelates representing the various states; that of Vienna 
by the King in the name of the princes. The Electorate augmented its 
power while the individual bishoprics gradually lost control of their 
benefices, a matter not immediately evident, but significant in that 
it revealed a basic change in the inner structure of the Empire. Un­
knowingly, the Concordat of Vienna carried in its wanb the fetus which, 
after a gradual birth, became the foundation of the separatistic church- 
state in Luther's time. In a sense the document was only a demonstra­
tion of independence for independence sake.
The content of the Concordat itself hardly served the purposes 
of the secular princes. It represented only the decay of religious 
life in Germany. The document itself did not betray its political 
ramifications, because these were found in the concessions granted to 
the Electors. The welfare of the Papacy now depended on the goodwill 
of the princes, a pattern against all church tradition. This key fac­
tor in the dismemberment of the Council of Basel manifested itself in 
the continual increase of secular power in the administration of ec­
clesiastical affairs throughout the Empire.
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The Vienna Concordat originated no new ecclesiastical structure, 
but was merely a confirmation of tendencies long existent. The symbol­
ism of the age betrayed its essential essence. The fact that the Diets 
were called by papal or imperial initiative and were opened by the 
legates of the Roman Curia meant little. A judicial appeal to the 
Papacy was no guarantee of its authority since it often represented 
an attempt to gain such ends as were denied the individual by the Em­
peror. The only way the Papacy could effectively collect revenue from 
its German subjects was to allow sufficient funds for the princely 
purses. Frederick, theoretically the symbol of a united Empire, faced 
a political diversity rarely encountered by a single ruler. The 
authority of the imperial crown was non-existent; it had to be pur­
chased from the princes of the Empire and even then the quality of 
the commodity was carefully controlled. Conscientious Frederick had 
no choice but to adjust his ecclesiastical policy to the temperament 
of the age. The Vienna Concordat was the first indication of the new 
trend. In contrast to his early reign, Frederick's subsequent treat­
ment of church matters was exemplified by convenience rather than con­
viction. Frederick's policy reversal was not a sign of weakness but 
a rational recognition of the formidable separatists forces of the 
era. He recognized the futility of attempting to stem the institu­
tional disintegration by legislation. Consequently he ceased to initi­
ate ecclesiastical programs for the Empire and proceeded to adapt his 
policies to a given circumstance. The Diets held during the latter 
half of the fifteenth century were usually motivated by a specific
CO
incident rather than a general desire for reform.
The historical participants of a changing era are usually quite 
unaware of the significance of their times. This was certainly true of 
both Frederick III and Nicholas V, They were keenly aware of the 
events of their time and quick to use them to their immediate advan­
tage, but unable to foresee and control their long-range implications.
Nicholas V had the satisfaction of seeing the schism brought to 
ail end and the restoration of papal supremacy completed. Peace had 
also been restored in the Papal States and Northern Italy. 53 Nicholas 
was engaged in reorganizing papal finances, in planning the restoration 
of the buildings of Rme, and in increasing the treausres of the Vatican 
Library. The restoration of peace to the Church, after so protracted a 
period of conflict and confusion, was deemed by the Pope to be a fit­
ting occasion for the proclamation of a Universal Jubilee*^ A pilgrim- 
age of the faithful of every country to the centre of ecclesiastical 
unity seemed to be a splendid way to celebrate the termination of the 
schism* The move was well calculated to give fresh vigour to the
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It was ordained that only the Romans should hold magistracies 
and benefices within Rome. Nicholas1 greatest fortune was the death 
of Filippo Maria Visconti of Milan on August 13, 1447. Thus Francesco 
oforza withdrew his forces from the March of Ancona and left the Pope 
in undisputed possession. Taking advantage of the confusion which the 
death of Visconti produced in Milan, Venice attacked. Milan was 
driven to^  seek the service of Francesco Sforza who in playing both 
sides against each other emerged in control of Milan.
54
art v, JMbllnc Bul1 is Published in Part by Raynaldus, op. cit..aa. an, 1W9, No« 15*
223
conservative element in all of Christendom. The "golden year" opened 
on Christmas Day of 144-9. The concourse was immense and the chronic­
lers and historians of the period seem to be at a loss of words to 
describe it. Italy was peaceful and access to Rome was free. An un­
disputed Pope lent solemnity to the event. Cristoforo a Soldo, a
chronicler of the city of Brescia mentioned the presence of the Em-
55 6^peror at Rome. According to the Diario Ferrarese, Frederick III
came to Rome with the King of Hungary but was not recognized. A sub­
stitution of the year 1452 for 1450 was the basis of both accounts.
Whether Frederick attended the celebrations is doubtful, for an official
57record of such a notable visitor would surely have been preserved.
The princes of the Empire were well represented at Rome, however. These 
included Duke Albert VI of Austria,58 Count Frederick of Cilly, 59 and
55
"Istoria Bresciana (Memorie delle querre contro la Signoria 
di Venezia doll' anno 1437 sino al 1468 di Christoforo da Soldo Bres- 
ciano)," L. Muratori (ed.), Rerum Italicarum Scriptores (Mediolani, 
1732), XXI, p. 867.
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"Diario Ferrarese," L. Muratori (ed.), Rerum Italicarum 
Scriptores (Mediolani, 1737), XXIV, p. 196.
57
No mention of any pilgrimage is recorded in Chmel’s Regesta 
for the year 1450.
58
At Rome Albert was presented with a consecrated sword. M. 
Gerbert, Historia Nigrae Silvae (Freiburg, 1788), III, p. 36I; Chmel, 
_egesta, No. 2665. He was also empowered to administrate and lend out 
benefices. Gerbert, op. cit., I11, p. 162.
59
Aeneas Sylvius in his Historia De Buropa asserted that the 
Duke^attained little for the benefit of his soul at Rome. Aenea 
— P^.ccolqminex £.0.§tea Pii II. Papae Opera Geographic a. et His­
tories (Helmstadii, 1609), pp. 263-264.
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even Archbishop Jacob of Trier.^ The presence of the temporal rulers 
at the Jubilee proved effective propagandistically gts an expression of 
the new order inaugurated by the Concordat of Vienna, but was hardly 
realistic. The many pilgrims at the Jubilee may have been religiously 
motivated, but their superiors would scarcely have set aside their 
political ambitions in order to devote a year to purely ecclesiastical 
pursuits.
Ecclesiastically, the Jubilee year witnessed substantial vic­
tory for Nicholas. The Pope's new authority was still overshadowed 
by the prospect of the general Council which he had promised the French 
King. The French ambassadors at Rome urged the fulfillment of this 
promise. Aeneas cleverly eliminated this threat to the happiness of 
the Pope. In a speech before the Pope and Cardinals, he announced the 
betrothal of Frederick and his approaching coronation. He then went
on to demand, in Frederick's name, that any prospective Council should
6l
be held in Germany. Thus Nicholas V could answer the French ambas­
sadors that the princes of Europe were not unanimous in consenting to
Jacob of Trier apparently came to Rome to facilitate his re­
conciliation with the Papacy. Considerable temporal benefits accom­
panied his spiritual submission. J, N. Hontheim, Historia Trevirensis 
PiKlomatica et Pragmatica (Vindobonae, 1?53), II, No. 826, pp. 413-414.
^Mansi, oj). j£i£», pp. 140, 152. Mansi gives two speeches of 
Aeneas. In the first the demand is made for a Council in Germany, in 
the second the matter is not mentioned. Perhaps the first was what 
Aeneas delivered, the second was what he had prepared, and the demand 
for the Council was inserted to suit the occasion. Creighton, ojd. cit., 
, p. 117. It is more probable that the second speech was actually 
held. An account of the proceedings from January 15, 1451, written by 
the ambassador to the Teutonic Order indicates rather conclusively that 
the speech was presented. Voigt, o£. cit., II, pp. 19-20.
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a Council in France, This action stalled the conciliar threat in­
definitely and allowed the Pope to engage in other interests.
In the year of Jubilee, Aeneas was recalled to Vienna where
62important work awaited him. The Emperor, after a preliminary in­
vestigation, had decided to wed Leonora, daughter of the King of 
Portugal and niece of Alfonso of Naples. With these plans in mind, he 
turned to the Bishop of Trieste as his natural link with Italy, and 
sent him to Naples to negotiate the marriage. Aeneas accomplished his 
business successfully and it was agreed that Frederick should meet his 
bride at some port in Italy and then proceed to Rome for the corona­
tion, Throughout the course of Frederick's expedition into Italy he 
acted as mediator between the Emperor and the Italians, The whole epi­
sode stands out upon the pages of history as a gorgeous and somewhat 
antiquated pageant of which Eneas was the highly efficient stage-
63manager, ^
Aeneas Sylvius was not only concerned with the practical
Aeneas had risen considerably in the political-ecclesiastical 
world. Nicholas V recognized the importance of Aeneas' services to 
the Papacy and despite personal dislike for the man, he appointed him 
Bishop of Trieste when that See fell vacant in 1447. At the same time 
Caspar Schlick fell from favor at the imperial court, but this event 
did not deprive Aeneas of the Emperor's confidence. The monotony of 
his life at Trieste was broken by two diplomatic missions to Milan in 
144? and 1449. The commission given him in 1450 was probably a welcome 
pretext for again leaving Trieste. While on his way to Naples in the 
interests of Frederick III, Nicholas V conferred on him the Bishopric 
of his native city of Siena. Gragg, SOI, cit., p. 54.
A comprehensive study of Fredericks coronation is found in 
J* Martens, DjL§. Hgtzte Kaiserkronung in Rom 3A52* Inauguraldisserta- 
tion . ♦ . Leipzig (Leipzig, 1900)*
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preparations for the coronation but also engaged in seme international 
diplomacy during this period. It had suited Nicholas V to act moder­
ately and neither accept nor repudiate the Bohemian Compacts, but wait 
till an opportunity for ending Bohemia1s exceptional position pre­
sented itself. Aeneas was sent to Bohemia in 1^51, Besides the religi 
ous object of winning back the Hussites from their heresy, there was al 
so the political motive of strengthening the party of Frederick III in 
Bohemia, for the Bohemians seriously opposed Frederick’s guardianship 
of Ladislaus. At a Bohemian Diet held first in Prague and then Bene- 
schau, Aeneas besought the assembly to peacefully await the return of 
Frederick III from Rome since Ladislaus was too young to rule as yet.^ 
Another meeting between George of Podebrady and Aeneas produced no
65
tangible result. Aeneas had not converted the Bohemian heretics or 
won the Bohemian Diet. Nevertheless Frederick III recognized Podebrady 
as governor of Bohemia and so procured peace within that realm during 
his Roman journey.
When Aeneas returned to Vienna he was again sent to Italy to 
arrange for Frederick's coming, and receive his intended bride on her 
landing.66 Meanwhile Frederick prepared for his departure. When it
64
Gragg, 02. cit., pp. 55-56.
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A letter of Aeneas to Carvajal gives a full account of his 
controversy and provides a good description of the religious atmos- 
pherein Bohemia. R. Wolkan, Der Priefwechsel des Eneas Sjivjus pic_
"erU” Austriaca™"' Diplomat**, at
66 v
• rones, "Leonor von Portugal Gemahlin Kaiser Friedrichs 
k M^f^eifiSChen Habsbur^ers (1436-1467). Ein Lebens- und Zeit- 
Q 902) 651 n ^  Historisciier) Vereines fur Steiermark. XLIX
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was known that Ladislaus would also make the journey the barons of 
Austria, headed by Ulrich Eizinger formed a league and revolted against 
Frederick's rule. Mo action was taken by the imperial court, and Fred­
erick proceeded with his Italian expedition.^ From the standpoint of 
imperial ecclesiastical policy the details of Frederick's Italian so­
journ were unimportant. It had no political significance but was 
merely an antiquarian pageant. Nevertheless, when it was known that 
he was actually coming to Italy, a certain amount of trepidation pre­
vailed in the Italian cities. Their constitutional mechanism was so 
evenly balanced that the slightest touch might incline it one way or
another. Apparently the glamour of the imperial title still retained 
some power.
Ecclesiastically, Frederick's visit to Rome had a definite in­
fluence on the future course of imperial-papal relations. On March 8 
the King and his retinue came in sight of Rome. On the next day, in
Numerous eye-witness and narrative accounts concerning the 
coronation and marriage of the Emperor have been preserved. The most 
important include: Herman Keussen, "Bericht eines Augenzeugen Uber
2in E ^ o Ug g pri!dr\°hS 111 in Rom» seine Naming mit der Prinzes- 
sin Eleonora von Portugal und seine Kaiserkronung. 1452 Marz 8-23 "
S n n H f v 6'-]-TQ,rtf '1ahr» f ri ft’ ** (l920-2l), 317-32.1; Micolao Lanek-
e S i  III » H } ot0ri? DesP°nsationis et Coronationis Frid-
nei i n  H. Fez (edj, Script ores Rerum Austrian mm, TT r ,
M“dOCtf' "D«orlptio introitus Imp. FWderici urta,
subsecutae coronationis," J. Chmel. Reeesta. Anhano- ™
M~ 3 (eHF?rT a- "fXOnerpta «  t o f e s S  Principum Esten- 
XX ; 0 Fvilt c, ^ o a  a aUcMTO) Sflrlpt9re, (Mediolani, 1731),
(Wim, 1956) ’ i‘ p p % 22§ ^m !Sh m  Qeschlchtf,1, pp. 217-226; Martens, q q . cit., PP. 80-85.
spite of the uneasiness of Nicholas V, Frederick and Leonora entered
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Rome and were escorted to St. Peter's, where the Pope awaited them. 
Frederick knelt and kissed the Pope's feet, then the Pope arose, of­
fered him his hand to kiss, and in turn kissed his cheek. Frederick 
presented a massive piece of gold, took the accustomed oath of fidel­
ity, and was led by the Pope into the church. This meeting proved the
prelude to many friendly interviews between the twin heads of Christen-
70
dom. Frederick's coronation was set for March 19, the fifth anniver­
sary of Nicholas's coronation as Pope. 71 Meanwhile the Pope and King 
conferred freely within the Vatican. Their alliance was confirmed by 
mutual needs. Frederick consulted with Nicholas concerning the Austrian 
revolt. He wished the Pope to support him against the rebellious 
Austrians and compel them to submit to his authority as the guardian of 
the young Ladislaus. The Pope urged armed intervention in order to sub­
ject the perfidious race which had favored the conciliar movement, and 
even now had little respect for papal authority. 72 The mutual bond
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Aeneas, aware of the Pope's disposition, visited Nicholas and 
assured him of Frederick's pacific disposition. The Pope replied, "To
2i ! r p ? P62!  ^  n 0 t  S° ^  ^  t 0  b 9  t 0 ° t r u s t i n S ’" Gragg, o e .
SB. =il^PP.a66?72!Unt °f thS ■)°Urney fr°" Slena t0 Rcme 3ee Krones>
°Martens, oj. oil., PP. 52-5?.
71
., , Tradition forbade an uncrowned Emperor to show himself in thp
tJeyR^, Sederl0k.f0Und “ tedl0US t0the Romans by insisting on seeing the sights of Rome.
72
•;« v,- u-Aj.fu11 account these negotiations was recorded by Aeness 
in his Historia Frederici. KnTUr. ~r TI r “o. °y ,eas
Chmel, Iredericlilv; II, p. 719. ’ J1* P’ 282‘ See also
between Pope and Emperor was strengthened try these conferences. Fred­
erick besought Nicholas to give an additional proof of his favor by 
conferring on him the crown of Lombardy. The Pope performed this on 
March 16 despite the protest of the Milanese ambassadors. Thus Fred­
erick was crowned King of the Romans with the crown of Aachen, which 
had been brought to Rome for this purpose. The same day also marked 
his marriage to Leonora of Portugal,
Finally, on March 19 the imperial coronation was held.^ The 
Pope and Cardinals assembled before the high altar, while two pulpits 
were erected for Frederick and Leonora. Frederick took the oath of 
obedience to the Pope, and was made a canon of Saint Peter's and 
together with Leonora, received unction. Frederick donned the imperial 
tunic, mantle, and sandals, and was anointed with the sacred oil. The 
Pope said mass and Frederick and Leonora returned to their places until 
the time came for Frederick's investiture with the imperial insignia. 
Pope Nicholas then placed in the Emperor's hands "the sceptre which 
denotes Kingly power, the orb which stands for dominion of the world, 
and the sword which indicates the rights of warfare.^ Finally the 
crown was placed on his head. After Leonora had received her crown, 
the Pope and the Emperor walked hand in hand to the door of St.
Peter's, from whence they rode in procession to the ancient Basilica 
of St. Maria. On the bridge of St. Angelo the Emperor dubbed three 
hundred knights, and the day concluded with a banquet at the Lateran.
Martens, op. cit., pp. 63-71; Krones, op. cit., pp. 73-75.
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To make the ceremony more imposing, Frederick had borrowed the imperial 
insignia of Charles the Great* In Aeneas' estimation their venerable 
antiquity did not match the magnificent clothing of Frederick, and sug­
gested the thought that his predecessor paid more attention to his ac­
tions than to his ornaments. The keen eye of the wily Italian detected 
on the sword blade the outlines of the Lion of Bohemia, which revealed 
to him that the insignia only dated from the time of Charles IV. 75 
Much as Aeneas appreciated the splendid pageantry and the historical 
significance of the scenes which he witnessed, he was too clear 
sighted not to realize their fundamental unreality. Frederick had no 
power in Italy and no assertion of power accompanied his sojourn. The 
same artificial reproduction of a vanished past showed itself in the 
coronation ceremonies as well. The sword of Charles IV was an apt 
symbol of the imperial claims and of the decrepitude of the Empire.
Its outward display had increased in proportion to its inner loss of 
power. Aeneas prefaced his account of the coronation with an allusion 
to Daniel's vision. Once the legs of iron were a fitting symbol of 
the strength and cohesion of the Empire. "Alas! today it is burdened 
with little of its former power. It seems we have come to the era of 
the feet of clay." 76 The course of Aeneas' later existence exemplified 
an attempt to mold this clay as best his powers allowed. He was a
picture of a man quite aware of the true tenor of his age, but still 
unwilling to admit it. His judgement of Frederick's coronation was 
theoretically accurate but possessed the quality of a passing opinion 
rather than a true conviction.
In connection with the imperial coronation, the Pope issued a 
series of bulls in Frederick's favor. A number of personal privileges 
were involved, Frederick, and a hundred persons whom he might select, 
were empowered to select their own confessor,77 Furthermore, he was 
entitled to hold divine service for his personal benefit in an area 
which lay under an interdict,'*8 A portable altar at which a priest 
might say mass at any time was granted him, 79 Furthermore, he and his 
guests could indulge in milk and eggs during times of fasting.80 Ad­
ministratively, several bulls tended to increase Frederick's power over 
the ecclesiastical property in his own dominions. In case of need he 
could employ the services of unbelievers to help him in war, a pro­
vision which allowed him to use Bohemian troops against his Austrian
Si
subjects. For grave necessities he might impose "moderate taxes ac­
cording to ancient custom" on the Austrian clergy.82 He was empowered
77










to imprison and confiscate the goods of all ecclesiastical individuals
83who had joined the rebellion against his wardship of Ladislaus. 
Frederick might exercise the right of visitation over all the monas­
teries of Austria. He received a grant of a tenth from all the 
clerical revenues in the Empire.^ This grant had no precedent since 
no ecclesiastical situation had warranted the action or made it a 
suitable pretext. Nicholas V and Frederick III were determined to 
push their advantage as far as possible. The former was determined 
to snuff the last spark of conciliarism and reform, the latter to main­
tain his authority in the realm. While the King eagerly accepted the 
financial advantages which the coronation offered him, he did not wish 
to exploit the German Church in the process. Frederick's share of all 
the clerical revenues in the Empire was a papal loss. It did not re­
quire new taxation. In view of the crumbling Empire, Frederick had to 
use every opportunity to the best advantage. The close harmony and 
cooperation evident between the Pope and the Emperor was largely con­
ditioned by the Austrian revolt, for it represented a grave danger to 
Frederick's rule, Nicholas realized that his good-will in the matter 
would increase Frederick's loyalty to him.
The reactions which Frederick's sojourn in Italy and the whole 
course of the coronation provoked was an expression of the universal 
attitude toward the Empire as an institution, and only found expres­
sion in the direct attacks uoon the person of the Emperor. The
^Ibid., No. 2806; Chmel, Materialien. II, Nos, II, IV.
84Chmel, Rege§ta, No. 2829; Chmel, Materialien, II, No. X.
contemporary chroniclers were well aware of the institutional dismem­
berment of their time; since the Emperor was a symbol of the inter­
national state of affairs they found the reasons for the disintegration 
in his person rather than in the general tenor of the age. In this 
tradition Mathias Doring wrote: " . . .  other Emperors won their crown 
by arms, Sigismund and Frederick seem to have begged it."8^ Frederick 
was looked upon as a mere figure in an antiquated ceremony. The his­
torical tradition which surrounded axis relationships, the rampant 
separatism prevelant in Italy as well as the sophistication of the 
Italians themselves, left no room for any loyalty to a foreigner. 
Frederick's attempt to arbitrate between Florence, Venice and Milan 
came to naught. Frederick was soon aware of the caliber of his new 
dignity. Archbishop Antoninus of Florence said "Nothing appeared in 
him of the majesty of an Emperor . . . everyone could see how greedy 
he was, how he loved gifts and sought for them." 86 Thus Frederick 
traversed the Italian peninsula not as Emperor and lord, but merely 
as a tolerated guest, under the safe conduct of the princes and 
cities. Psycologically, the force of these circumstances could only 
have strengthened Frederick's determination to make the best use of 
every circumstance in his favor, religicus or political. The events 
from 1445-1450 had increased Frederick's reactionary tendencies. By 
1450 Frederick was no longer negotiating in goodwill and in harmony
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with his own convictions. His conduct was now in agreement with the 
spirit of the times, and personal interests preceded, imperial obli­
gations, The Emperor's general reactionary policy was in harmony 
with his personal temperament, however. It did not express itself 
in aggressiveness but in a pacifism bordering on defeatism. This 
tendency was to become more pronounced as the unrest within the Empire 
increased in area and magnitude.
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CHAPTER VI
THE DECLINE OF IMPERIAL AUTHORITY
During Frederick's absence in Rome, Austria, under the leader­
ship of Eizinger, revolted against imperial rule. Opposition in both 
Hungary and Bohemia was furthered by Hunyadi and George of Podebrady 
respectively. In addition to this, the leading nobles of Moravia 
banded together against Frederick's rule. The Austrian insurgents 
sent an embassy to plead their cause before Pope Nicholas V. They 
requested that the excommunication which had been threatened against 
their disobedience should be withdrawn. The Pontiff remained loyal 
to the Emperor. He informed the envoys of Eizinger that the revolu­
tionaries must lay down their ams. The representatives objected on 
the grounds that such a temporal situation was outside of papal juris­
diction. Nicholas angrily retorted that all affairs were subject to 
the judgement of the Apostolic See. The Austrians must obey or face 
excommunication. Thereupon the envoys returned to Austria and informed 
the insurgents that Nicholas held faith with the Emperor. 1 On April 4, 
14-52, Nicholas issued a threat of excommunication against Eizinger and 
his followers.2 He also wrote to Hunyadi and Podebrady, ordering them 
to give the rebels no help. The insurgents answered by appealing to a
W ^ i 8ypTiS l f 1? ? W ii "Historia Rerum Friderici III. 
XXVII, (Barri-Ducis, 18*).
Near the end of June, 1452, Frederick boldly entered Neustadt, 
and tried to gather his partisans around him. The Emperor hoped that 
the Pope's action would stabilize his position, but the Bishop of 
Salzburg would not allow the papal brief to be published. The Vien­
nese threw the bearer of it into prison. The theologians of the Uni­
versity of Vienna drew up a formal protest, in which they appealed 
from an ill-instructed Pope to one better instructed, or to a general 
Council. They asserted that Nicholas V had usurped the place of 
Felix V and professed themselves ready to join with the French in 
order to procure a future Council. Frederick was soon besieged in 
Neustadt and forced to agree to a resolution whereby Ladislaus would 
be handed over to the Count of Cilly. The Austrian troops would then 
be withdrawn. A Diet was to be held in Vienna during December, 1452.
The Papacy became seriously alarmed. It depended on Germany for 
a large part of its revenues. If Germany were to follow the lead of 
France and establish a national church, the Pope and the Curia would 
be reduced to penury. As any other state, the entire ecclesiastic 
system of the Papacy, its hierarchical ordinances, and all the princi­
ples upon which its universal government was conducted, could not
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endure if they were deprived of the resources by which they were fed. 
The subsequent Diet of Vienna justified Frederick's participation in 
the Concordat of Vienna, since princely despotism was more pronounced 
than ever. The Jubilee year had not changed the hearts of the princes. 
They were still more eager to aggrandize themselves than to reform the 
Church.
The date of the Vienna assembly was finally fixed for November 
12, but Frederick sent his three envoys, headed by Aeneas Sylvius, 
only after Christinas, At. Vienna were Dukes Lewis and Otto of Bavaria, 
William of Saxony, Albert of Austria, Charles of Baden, and Albert of 
Brandenburg, together with deputies from Hungary, Bohemia and Moravia,
Ihe preliminary session of the Diet gave the imperial envoys no 
hopes of any help from the German princes. The Austrians, who felt 
that they were masters of the situation, did not wish for any settle­
ment of the matters in dispute. They raised every kind of difficulty 
and the negotiations proceeded very slowly. It was now that Aeneas 
made one of his ablest and most powerful speeches.^ It was one of the 
few times the church question entered the agenda of the Diet. "The 
Austrians," he said, "have taken up the same position as the %ldensian
^  /lu -? Brandenburg insisted that the dispute between him- 
ttt J® y  0f Nuremberg settled by the Emperor. Frederick
r,aH"Soi wlsh.to alie^ate the cities by assenting to a notoriously Partial judgement against Nuremberg, but was powerless to withstand 
Albert and his confederates. Aeneas observed "that princes, being
? h ^ f o n UPiain0Kgft-,theiL inferiorS‘ rarely know how to behave towards p 4l7Se temper and behave with violence." Kollar,
Pin TT p6I!eaS!•orftion this occasion is preserved in J. D. Mansi,
—  — * -*-• Slim Aeneae Sylvii Piccolominet Senensis Orationes Poli-
gt Ecclesiastics (Lucae, 175.5), pp. 184-246.
heretics. They exclaim with haughty mien, 'What have we to do with 
the Pope. Let him say his masses, we rely on our swords.'" Aeneas 
then proceeded to examine the grounds of an appeal to a future Council. 
A Council was only justified if the Pope was guilty of heresy or schism, 
or if he had altered the government of the Church. Aeneas scoffed at 
the Councils of Constance and Basel as being tumultuous and disorderly. 
The Pope only could judge when it was desirable and expedient to con­
voke a Council. Moreover an appeal to the Universal Church was also
foolish, for how could they all meet together and appoint arbitrators 
to resolve their disputes.
The oration produced no effect, and the progressive debasement 
of Frederick remained unchecked. The arguments of Aeneas represented 
the position of the restored Papacy. He rightly assessed the moti­
vations of the princes in using a religious front to justify their 
avarice. The princely appeal to conciliarism was likewise unrealistic 
and its implementation would only have given its advocates another van. 
tage point in international diplomacy. The Diet was swiftly terminated. 
Albert of Brandenburg advised Frederick to accept the princely terns or 
prepare for war. The Emperor was obliged to give wav. The new bent 
which Frederick's ecclesiastical policy had taken proved fatal. It 
had not been able to save him from the caprice of the princes. By 
April, 1453, the iinperor who had been received with such pomp in Rome 
was left with only Carinthia and Styria. His influence ever Austria, 
Bohemia, Hungary, and Moravia was gone. The Papacy, as a partner of 
Frederick, shared his humiliation. At Frederick's request, Nicholas
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Frederick III found himself in perilous straits in the spring 
of 1453. Besides forcing Frederick to concur with their schemes at 
the Vienna Diet, the Electors ordered him to come into the Empire in
g
order to institute reform. Although Frederick at first resolved to
o
make the journey, his distrust of the Electors led him to reject these 
plans. The chief spokesman for the electoral position was the Arch­
bishop of Trier, Jacob of Sierk. Under his supervision, a special brief 
was formulated which outlined the program which the Electors proposed to 
follow.10 The brief called for a new Council on the basis of the Con­
st ituUo Frequens established by the Council of Constance. It en­
visaged a division of powers between Frederick and the Electors— an 
open declaration of political ambition.11 The secret agreement
recalled his admonition to the Austrians.?
7 ?G  ^V°lgt’ di« Piccolomini, als Paost Pius deri&eite ujid ssein Zeitalter (Berlin, 1862), II, pp. 86-89.
2er griefwechsel des Eneas Silvius Piccolomini
wl i m S  « f, ^ £ 1  Aust.riacarum. Diplomataria et Acta.Wien, 1918), No. 68; Voigt, flg. cit., H ,  p. 102, footnote 3.
9Wolkan, loc. cit.
entitled "Ratslag wie das heilige Riche wieder 
T i 5 ri^ 6 dutzschen Landen moge gemacht werden."
, * * ller’ 2SS Heil. Romischen Reichs Teutscher Nation. Reichs- 
iagstheatrum, wie selves unter Keyser Friedrichs V.
^ e r u n g  (Jena, 1713), I, pp. 512-514;
m  ^eitalter der Reformation (Berlin, 1847), VI, pp. 10-18 The ~  
document was drawn up before the fall of Constantinople s L e  the event is nowhere mentioned.
It has been advocated that the document ", , . is a state 
paper and accordingly exhibits much concern for the general welfare 
but contains nothing pertaining to the particular vifws a S  of 
the Electors. A Bachmann, "Die ersten Versuche zu einer romischen 
xgswahl unter Friedrich III," forschungen zur Deutschen Geschicht.f..
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asserted that the Pope, in fear of the Council, would withdraw many of 
his claims and "have more respect for the leaders of the German Nation, 
and freely give them that, which was now disallowed."12 In April or 
early May, 1453, Jacob of Trier sent his trusted envoy, John of Lysura, 
to Neustadt. The latter requested that Frederick might soon convoke a 
Diet within the Empire in order to consolidate that crumbling institu­
tion. Instead the Emperor chose to spend the summer in Gratz.1-^
International events soon forced the postponement of the issue. 
On May 29, 1453, the Crescent supplanted the Cross at St. Sophia. The 
news soon spread far and wide. Europe learned with dismay that the 
last vestige of the Empire of Constantine had disappeared. The West 
was entirely unprepared for such an event .and was deeply alarmed 
when it actually took place. When Frederick III heard the news he
28 »^ footno'te« This view appears extremely unlikely
of Vienna Th ^ att^tudes expressed by the Electors at the Diet
S^h H i d d e n ^  h,ardly be desl&nated a memorandum, uch a sudden act of magnanimity did not harmonize with the pattern
sL  h  b Policy before or after the formulation of the document
<*£: ’ 
lz
1438-1519 ;f r c|iiclrte ■“ > Avwetnre iss  iljttelalters:
gve g & . S i ’S  S l ^ r e  S e g o t l S s  
esi’D m a rer n lVely' AXS° ManS1, Ratis^n.
wept. The more realistic Nicholas V issued a summons to a crusade 
on September 29, 1453» which was heavily backed by papal finances.^
The Pope1s noble aspirations failed to fit the European framework.
The Holy Roman Empire had been the symbol of a central organization 
which was to regiment the anarchic tendencies of feudalism. In actual 
reality, however, feudalism prevailed over the theoretic ideal of a 
non-existent state. The old ideal of a united Christendom and a united 
Europe had become antiquated. The anarchy due to feudalism had made 
national monarchies a necessity. Thus the French King struggled against 
the Duke of Burgundy, England was involved with the ¥ar of the Roses, 
Spam was engrossed in bitter inter-state rivalries, Poland was at war 
with the Teutonic Knights, and Hungary and Bohemia were bent on main­
taining their nationality against their German King. In Germany, each 
prince was engaged in consolidating his own dominions. Frederick III, 
much though his religious temperament was offended, was helpless in the 
face of such diversity. Though Europe was faced by a danger the magni­
tude of which was never before encountered, its political separatism 
continued. The Crescent constituted a religious as well as a terri­
torial threat, yet it failed to kindle any religious spark within the 
imagination of European Christendom. Frederick's imperial position
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4-u tt Muller, oe. ci£., p. 419. Mathias Doring, ever critical of 
the Emperor, wrote s "In all this Emperor FrederickidlyLt at“ «e 
planting gardens and capturing birds." J. B. Mencken Serintores Rprim 
_srma^ icarum Braecipve Saxonicarnm (Lipsiae, 1730), III, p. 18."
15Raynaldus, op. cit., ad. an. 1453, No. 9.
became dependent on princely initiative. He consciously withdrew from 
the international scene— and with good reason, for the princely dis­
regard for the Emperor evidenced at the Diet of Vienna by Albert of 
Brandenburg increased in intensity. Henceforth the King's ecclesias­
tical policy became territorial and personal. His authority extended 
only over his hereditary lands. Internationally his religious ideals 
could only be furthered by appeal rather than force. This atmosphere 
characterized his efforts for a demonstration of unanimity on the part 
of the powers of Europe in the face of Turkish aggression.
The imperial-papal response to the Turkish menace was largely 
due to the activities of Aeneas Sylvius. His ideal envisaged more 
than the mere defeat of the Infidel. He perceived that the present 
was an unparalleled opportunity for the Pope to regain his prestige 
and to attempt the establishment of a new Pax Romany.under the guidance 
of the theocracy. 6 Aeneas immediately wrote to Nicholas V. After re­
flecting upon the historical significance of the Turkish invasion,
Aeneas urged Nicholas V to summon a congress of princes. 17 The state 
secretary then conferred directly with the Emperor on the problem. He 
wrote: "I have spoken much with the Emperor concerning the state of 
Christendom. I find him to be of a good disposition, but it
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lessly played *S°Sni°n‘*  °f hls °"" doubt-
17a c - Wollcan, 2E* £it.» I, No. 109; G. Voigt, "Die Briefe des
f  J y - T  VOr selner aof den pSpstliehen Stahl " ArohiviUE&HSls osieaeioMschgr OsaphicMa-augUm, WI (X856), No. 2 V ^
I Qimpossible to set him in motion." Aeneas obtained Frederick's per­
mission to appeal directly to the Pontiff in his name. Thereupon he 
wrote to Nicholas V and urged him
to counteract the Turkish threat with every means, and 
to effect the formation of league through a circular ad­
dressed to the kings, princes and free cities of western 
Europe; one must hurry to aid the Christian cause while 
the evil is still new. Certainly the zealous princes would 
follow the Pope, and he himself would fulfill his obligation 
with equal fervor.^ 9
This second appeal had been preceded by a number of letters to lead­
ing ecclesiastical officials friendly to Aeneas. He affirmed repeat­
edly that the Emperor had been won for his proposals. 20
At the end of December, 1453» the papal legate, the Bishop of 
Pavia, arrived at Neustadt in order to prepare for the convocation of 
a European Congress. Finally on April 23, 1454, the Emperor issued 
invitations for a European Congress to be held at Regensburg. 21 Fred­
erick promised to be present in person unless hindered by some serious 
22business. Aeneas now persuaded Frederick to write Nicholas V, urg­
ing him to send a papal delegate of Cardinal rank. The letter was 
drawn up with great care by Aeneas himself. Simultaneously, he wrote
l8Wolkan, op. sit., I, No. 126; Voigt, op. cit.. No. 262, p. 404.
19A. Weiss, Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini als Papst Pius II. Sein 
Leben und Einfluss auf die Ljterarische Cult.ur Deutschlands (Graz,
1897), p. 35.
20See Wolkan, op. cit.. I, Nos. 112, 121, 136.
21Wolkan, op. cit., 2, No. XIII.
22In a letter to the Pope he noted* MWe will be at that place 
during that time unless we are detained by important business*1 Weiss, 
Briefe No* 104,
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a letter to Carvajal advising him to accept the appointment. 23 Aware 
of the latter*s unwillingness to participate in a German Congress, 
Aeneas suggested to the Pope that either the Cardinal-Bishop of Augs­
burg or Nicholas of Cusa might well fit the position.
As the date for the Regensburg Congress approached Frederick 
decided not to attend. Frederick not only lacked the necessary funds, 
but he was also afraid that Austria or Hungary might attack his lands 
during his absence. The Electors had previously demanded Frederick's 
appearance at a Diet presumably to attain certain administrative re­
forms within the Empire. Frederick did not wish to face the Electors, 
lest under the cover of reform in the Empire, they should diminish the 
imperial power to an even greater extent. "It is hard," he told his 
counsellors, "to take care of the common good at one's own cost. I
do not see any one who is more eager for the good of others than for
24
his own benefit." Frederick therefore sent an imperial embassy com­
posed of Aeneas Sylvius, the Bishop of Gurk and his two counsellors, 
Ungnad and George of WolkersdorfThe Congress was brought about ty 
the exertions of Aeneas, but his energies broke themselves against a 
barrier of indifference and inertia. From Italy no one came but the 
papal legate, the Bishop of Pavia. Venice sent ambassadors who only 
reached Gemany when the Congress was over. The summons addressed to
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22*Mansi, og. cit., Appendix, p. 9.
25Kraus, 0£. cit., I, p. 311.
the Kings of France, England, Scotland, Hungary, Poland and Denmark 
had been in the nature of a brotherly invitation; no one was inclined 
to show any interest, however. Casimir of Poland alone sent represen­
tatives, but they came to protest against the Teutonic Knights.^ The 
old system was breaking down, many lands were exhausted by war, and 
most rulers were busy consolidating their own sphere of influence.
No real union was achieved. An atmosphere of mutual suspicion domi­
nated. The German Nation was fairly well represented. Those present 
included the Archbishop of Trier, the Bishops of Regensburg and Wurz­
burg, the Emperor's brother Albert, the Elector of Saxony, Duke Lewis 
of Bavaria, and the Margraves Albert of Brandenburg and Carl of Baden. 
Ladislaus of Bohemia had sent Gregor Heimburg.
When the news reached Regensburg that Philip of Burgundy had 
decided to attend the Diet, the Bishop of Gurk decided to commence 
the proceedings in spite of the poor attendance. Nicholas of Cusa 
and the Bishop of Pavia opened the Congress with the customary orations. 
A quarrel between Cologne and Aachen preoccupied the Congress until 
May 9, when the Duke of Burgundy arrived in Regensburg.
While these events transpired in Regensburg, Frederick was 
busily negotiating with Archbishop Jacob of Trier on the demands sub­
mitted to him by John of Lysura just prior to the convocation of the 
Congress. The Emperor had sent the yoing Dr. Martin Mair of Heidel­
berg to Trier to represent the imperial interests. 27 Despite the
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competence of Frederick's diplanat, no agreement was reached. When 
these negotiations failed, Jacob of Trier sought to pursue his designs 
by sending John of Lysura to Regensburg. Lysura immediately began to 
employ tactics designed to hinder the work of the Congress. He pro­
posed that the Gennan members of the Congress meet separately at the 
house of Lewis of Bavaria. Then the German Nation would proceed to 
consolidate its power against the Turk. The imperial representatives 
saw in this a means of increasing the vulnerability of the Emperor and 
rejected the proposals. Lysura then went on to lament the distracted 
state of Germany and its need of internal reform. He advocated that 
the Emperor meet with the Electors before a general plan for a crusade 
was presented. Frederick's envoys lauded the wisdom of Lysura's pro­
gram, but declared that the crusade could not be postponed until Ger­
man domestic problems had been settled.
The Congress finally proceeded to the main issue on its agenda_
the organization of a crusade. Aeneas Sylvius attempted to solicite 
some enthusiasm for the venture by a stirring oration. 28 Unfortunately 
it had to be translated for the benefit of some German representatives 
and so lost much of its effectiveness. Then Cardinal Cusa gave an ac­
count of the fall of Constantinople and the might of the Turkish King- 
29
dom,' a speech which was translated by John of Lysura. Following an 
oration by the Bishop of Pavia, the assembled princes separated to
M^ansi, op. crt., Appendix, pp. 54-65.
29
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deliberate. On the following day the imperial legates were asked to 
present the Emperor's proposals. This was done in writing. It was 
demanded that by April, 1455, an array sufficient to overwhelm the 
Turks should be in readiness to serve for three years. A general was 
to lead this army under the banners of the Cross and Eagle. The im­
perial envoys suggested that throughout Germany every sixty men should 
furnish one horseman and two foot soldiers equipped for the field. In 
addition to this, the cities were to provide all necessary ammunition 
and means of transport. The Pope, Naples, Venice, and other maritime 
cities of Italy should prepare a fleet, while the land army, joined 
by the Bohemians and Hungarians, was to cross the Danube. All enemies 
of the Turk in Europe and Asia were invited to join.;the venture. A 
five-year peace was to be proclaimed throughout Germany beginning at 
Christmas, 1454. Whoever violated it should be put under the ban of 
the aipire. In the meantime, the administrative problems of the Em­
pire were to be discussed on September 29 at Nuremberg, or, if the 
Emperor could not come there, at Frankfort."^ 0
This carefully formulated scheme freed the Emperor of any 
financial obligation in the enterprise. The Germans listened to the 
proposals but took no action. They continued to complain of the dis­
order within the Empire and stipulated that no war could be undertaken
PP. 69-70; Voigt, OS cit TIPP* 39?;?9? cMa"S1* ^  Appendix,
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until an internal reform of the Empire had been completed.^ On this 
occasion John of Lysura presented some new proposals in the interests 
of his master. With patriotic eloquence he pictured German disunity. 
Coming to the defense of the Emperor he stated that the latter could 
not be expected to rule the entire Empire with the taxes collected 
in Styria and Carinthia. He declared that the Germans were respon­
sible for extinguishing the torch of the Empire, a torch for which 
their forefathers were willing to give their lives. Lysura recommended 
that the Emperor establish an imperial treasury by which both the court 
and the aray be financed. Moreover, Frederick must agree on a uniform 
scheme for internal reform with the Electors. No action was taken on 
the proposals at this time. Lysura1s oration represented the presen­
tation of a new scheme for reform. It could not have been formulated 
by the imperial legate Martin Mair. Mair, even though he suddenly 
joined the ranks of Frederick's opponents, serving first Jacob of Trier 
and then the Archbishop of Mainz. Nevertheless to him belonged the 
dubvious honor of conspiracy.
31C. Hofler (ed.),
32,^ At a later date he advocated +.Via+. Pv>4n^ __
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In view of the impatience of Philip of Burgundy the Congress 
decided to terminate its deliberations# An official answer was given 
to Frederick’s proposals for a crusade. Albert of Brandenburg spoke 
on behalf of the Germans. He praised the Emperor's zeal, but deferred 
all criticism of his scheme till the forthcoming Diet. Nothing could 
be done until Germany was at peace. To achieve this the Emperor would 
have to negotiate with the princes on the state of affairs. 33 In es­
sence, Albert's speech did not deal with the religious issue, but in 
harmony with the current temperament stressed only German affairs. 
After this speech, the Bishop of Toul, the Duke of Burgundy's trusted 
advisor, extolled the Christian virtues of his lord. He declared his 
master s zeal for the crusade and his willingness to take part in any 
expedition which might be agreed upon by the Emperor or any other
manigerlai weise anczaigt und gearbait hat, ytzo den herczogen von 
Burgundie, damach herczog Albrechten von Osterreich „ . ." A. 
Kluckhohn, Ludwig der Rejche, Herzog von Bavem. Zur Geschichte 
geutgchlands im 1$. Jahrhundert (Nordlingen, 186577"pp. 369-372. 
Although the letter was written to discredit Mair, it still sub­
stantiated the fact of his conspiracy. Other sources indicate that
flatLScneg°tiations with Burgundy commenced during 1455. G. Hassel- holdt-Stockheim, Urkunden und Beilagen zur Geschichte Albrecht IV 
22Q Bayern and s&irier £eit (Leipzig, I865), pp. 318-325. Since Mair 
only arrived at Trier in February, 1454, a switch of loyalties could 
hardly have occurred prior to the Regensburg assembly. Jacob of 
ner was actively engaged in diplomatic maneuvers throughout this 
P ^ .  However, there was no attempt to place Philip of Burmindy 
on the Roman throne prior to the Congress of Regensburg. The°Arch- 
bishop was careful to consider what concessions could be obtained 
from his present master before turning to another source. No pre­
conceived plan determined the course which the Electors followed at 
Regensburg. Bachmann, 0£. cit... P. 290.
pp. 23-26K°nig V°n K’6nigsthal» PP* 39-42; Hofler, 0£. cit..
Christian princes.^ Aeneas thanked the Duke of Burgundy for his en­
thusiasm for a cause in which his ancestors had distinguished them­
selves. He also extended his appreciation to Albert of Brandenburg. 
Aeneas indicated that a new Diet would be summoned shortly and assured 
the delegates of the Emperor's personal presence. Albert then assured 
the assembly that the Emperor and the Duke of Burgundy would not be 
alone in their struggle against the Turk."^  The Congress separated at 
the end of May with every outward appearance of satisfaction and hope.
Aeneas was not deceived as to the true nature of the Congress. 
Shortly after the Diet concluded he wrote to Leonardo de' Bentovigli,
What ground do you have for hope? Christendom has no 
head whom all men will obey. Neither the Pope nor the 
Emperor receives what is due to him; reverence and obedi­
ence are nowhere in evidence. Pope and Emperor are merely 
dignified but empty names. Each state has its own ruler, 
and each ruler functions according to his own interest.
at oratory could unite such antagonistic powers, and 
persuade them to take up arms under a single standard?36
The rulers of Europe were only willing to give lip service to 
the old religious ideals. True enthusiasm for religion mainly animated 
the poorer classes who had no great earthly expectations. A genuine 
response to the proposed crusade would have re-established Frederick's 
authority once more. The combination of imperial-papal interests might
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Empire reform. In reality the Diet of Regensburg had rendered the
imperial cause hopeless. Frederick's position had now sunk so low
as to be desperate, and important affairs no longer centered around
him. Aeneas Sylvius, though homesick for Italy, decided for his own
37and Frederick's sake to remain in Germany.
The Empire had never made such a poor showing as at 
Regensburg. At this moment, when the people waited for 
the decisions of the assembly with grave apprehension, 
the prospects for the success of the Emperor's call to 
arms was very dim. The inner dismemberment of the Em­
pire, the weakness of its head, and the disunity among 
the constituents of the Empire was apparent to all.-®
The new Diet was scheduled for Frankfort. It was to commence 
in October, 1454. If the Emperor made his appearance it was felt that 
the Diet could be moved to Nuremberg. Aeneas knew that Frederick was 
determined not to go to the Diet personally. The causes of his 
hesitancy apparently revolved around financial embarrassment as well 
as the Hungarian situation. Frederick again sent Aeneas and the Bishop 
of Gurk as his representatives. Among the princes he nominated the 
Margraves of Baden and Brandenburg. The Pope was again content to
have led to a reassertion of Frederick's early plans for Church and
37
Aeneas' personal honesty was highly admirable. In a letter 
dated July 1, 1453, he wrote: "While I am with the Emperor, the Pope 
and cardinals yielded me same little honor; were I at Siena they would 
forget all about me. I know in how little esteem prelates are held by 
the Curia. Believe me, I made no mistake. I really cannot compliment 
you on your penetration in supposing that I should be more highly 
thought of if I dwelt nearer the Pope. The Roman Curia regards posi­
tion, not the man." Wolkan, erg. cit., I, No. 105, as translated by 
W. Boulting, Aenejys Sjlvius: Orator. Man of Letters Statesman, and 
Pope (London, 19081, p. 209.
OQ
Bachmann, 0£. cit., p. 286.
nominate the Bishop of Pavia. Aeneas and the Bishop of Gurk arrived 
in Frankfort on October 5, 1454. They found the Archbishop of Trier 
well in control of the situation, not because of a new found crusading 
zeal, but rather because of his personal interests. In due time Al­
bert of Brandenburg, the Margrave of Baden and the Archbishop of Mainz 
also arrived. No religious purpose motivated the assembly from the 
onset. It had assembled in a hostile spirit, and only concerned itself 
with the local quarrels of Germany. The princes were split into two 
parties. The Count of the Palatinate, encouraged by Jacob of Trier, 
led the one; Albert of Brandenburg, supported by Saxony, the other.
As at the previous meeting, the German princes were agreed that inter­
nal reform must precede any external efforts, but they were not united 
in their conception of reform. Essentially they were pursuing indivi- 
dual ends in the name of reform*
The demand for a crusade was widespread. The Hungarian envoys 
declared that they would accept terms from the Turk if no aid was sent 
by European Christendom. On the opening day Piccolomini arose and 
addressed the Diet with great eloquence. The subject of the crusade 
was as exhaustively and as prudently treated as possible. The speech 
asted two hours. The diplomats of the Congress were unmoved. The 
Emperor's ambassadors heard only complaints. They were finally told 
that the crusade was merely a pretext used by the Pope and the Emperor 
to obtain money and soldiers. When the Burgundians promised to uphold
Muller °fDth0 BiSh°P °f Pavia are to be fo™d in (R p# 73; Dommico Georgio, Vita Nicolai Qnin+i omae: Ex Typographia Palearinorum, 1742), pp. 1417*148. ----
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their pledge their zeal was sharply ridiculed.
All cursed the Emperor and the Pope, insulted their 
ambassadors, jeered at the Burgundians . . . and abused 
the Hungarians whom they accused of wishing to involve 
Germany in their calamities, since they were unable to 
defend their own kingdom.
Through the influence of Albert of Brandenburg, the Diet finally
passed a formal resolution that an army of ten thousand horse and
thirty thousand men would be sent to aid the Hungarians. This promise
was made on the condition that the Pope equip a fleet of twenty-five
galleys to attack the Turks in Greece. Meanwhile Emperor Frederick
was to confer with the princes about the dispatching of the army.
Throughout this period, a universal two year peace should be strictly 
42enforced. The Frankfort Diet also deliberated upon the financing of 
the venture. The maximum tax which the Papacy could impose upon Ger­
many was set at one-twentieth. In addition to this, it was stipulated 
that the bishops and the archbishops should furnish most of the troops 
since they were exempt from taxation. All the money collected was to 
remain in Germany. Papal collectors would not be tolerated.^
The hollowness of the pompous resolutions of the Diet was evi­
dent to all in attendance. Fra Capistrano, who had sought to awaken
Gragg, op. ci£., p. 72. Aeneas overemphasized his personal 
role at the assembly, nevertheless his evaluation of princely motives was very accurate.
42
)Q 2E._Sii.t PP. 36-37; Konig von Konigsthal, od. cit.,pp. 4o-51. ’
^^Hofler, op. cit., p. 34.
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enthusiasm for the crusade by his preaching at Frankfort, wrote to 
Nicholas V on October 28, 14-54.
Many believe that great things have been decided at this 
let. It seems to me, however, that little or no good has 
come out of it . . . All the nobles and lords say, and the 
whole world says: Why should we give our sweat, our goods 
and the bread of our children to fight the Turk, when the 
highest bishop spends the wealth of St. Peter on lime and
of°the’faith°^rS ^  mighty walls* instead of on the defense
The pretencious proceedings culminated with the proclamation that a 
new Diet should meet at Neustadt on February 2, 1455, ostensibly to 
discuss the projected crusade> 5  Thus the Diet of Neustadt evolved 
from the Frankfort Diet in a similar manner as the latter evolved from 
the Regensburg deliberations.
At Regensburg Jacob of Trier had not attempted to consolidate 
the princely opposition against Frederick. During the Frankfort Diet 
Jacob was apparently in a better position to fulfill his plans. The 
Archbishop revived the electoral brief which had been presented to 
Frederick by John of Lysura just prior to the Diet of Regensburg.^
L. Wadding (ed.), Ann^les Minorum seu trium ordinum a S
1735). m .
45aAeneas ironically commented: "There will be an amnM+h*a+ ™  
erected „here there shall be Circensian games,^ J n ^ s K g ^ o s e  o f
S  I f o S S K -  1 d° "ot ■ " »  whether all’the animal? S l T b f  those native to Germany, or whether wild animals will be brought from o+hpr 
countries." Aeneas Sylvius, 2aaa, Epistolae 405. p! 9W.
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In a letter to Archduke Albert of Austria Jacob etatpH* nrT„j 
weren auch wir und eUliche unsere mitkurfiirrtm ?nar£it^a'sulche
duro^.“ns km'^rsten geneynllch an unsem gnedigen her- 
n den keyser bracht und m  sulcher maisse vurgenomen wurde, das zu- 
an sinen gnaden und damach uns kurfursten etc. friedde, ere, nucz
255
In order to strengthen his diplomatic weapons Jacob somewhat casually 
advanced the idea of a new imperial election.2*''7 This project exhibited 
some humane qualities, however. Frederick was not to be forcibly de­
posed. If possible he was to consent to the plan. Through such mag­
nanimity the Elector hoped . .to keep the way for an understanding
48with the Emperor open, and sell his services to him for a high price." 
Moreover the Archbishop wished to avoid the war that would most cer­
tainly climax a forceful deposition. Although Frederick himself posed 
no threat, the other princes of his house would not tolerate such 
humiliation. In addition to this the Electors represented no unified 
body. For Jacob the idea of a new election was no more than a politi- 
cal weapon. It was apparent to all that the yoke of Burgundy might 
be far more grievous than that of Habsburg. In the Archbishop's
und fromen ensteen muchte." J, Chmel, Materialien zur osterreichischen 
Geschichte (Vienna, I838), II, pp. 9I-92. “
^When the Diet of Frankfort commenced Mair was already on the 
payroll of the Archbishop of Trier. Hasselholdt-Stockheim, op. cit.. 
p. 318. Hair's political ambition now found expression in a whole 
hearted endorsement of the princely cause, but Mair's schemes for the 
deposition of the Emperor interested Jacob only insofar as it fitted 
his plan for self-aggrandizement.
^Bachmann, 2 2. cit,., p. 293.
49 „
"No unity existed among the princes. Jealously the one 
watched the plans of the other, alliance against alliance was concluded: 
everyone who endorsed a new Roman King forced his opponent under the 
banner of the Emperor. The Emperor's position was endorsed by tradi­
tional law, the authority of the Roman Kingship, and finally the 
weightly voice of his ally, Rome. These were reasons enough not to 
think of a deposition of the Emperor, and they even sufficed to ad­
monish to utmost caution." Ibid.. p. 294.
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opinion, a more feasible method of removing Frederick lay in electing 
Archduke Albert to the Roman Kingship.^  Albert proved a willing candi­
date. When Mair presented the plan to the Archduke the latter immedi­
ately accepted. The conspiracy had progressed considerably when the 
Diet of Frankfort met.^1 It formed the real basis of the electoral 
manipulations at Frankfort. The lack of success which marked the ef­
forts of both Albert of Austria and the Elector of Trier was mainly
due to the stalwartness of Albert of Brandenburg, who loyally defended
52imperial interests.
On the pretense of inaugurating the crusade endorsed by the 
Diet of Frankfort, the political heads of the German Nation journeyed 
to Neustadt— either personally or by proxy. One of the first to 
arrive was Archbishop Jacob of Trier. Empowered with the electoral 
votes of Mainz, Cologne and the Palatinate, the wily Elector was in 
an excellent position to pursue his own designs. He was determined 
to obtain the maximum benefit from the powers conferred upon him.
Jacob's visit to Vienna-Neustadt proved a bit disconcerting. He 
found that Albert of Brandenburg had not only won the complete con-
 ^Dietrich of Cologne informed Albert of the impending elec­
tion, a proceeding precipitated by the condition of the Empire. ". . . 
so doch unser herre der Romischer keiser eigener geschefte ind sins 
selfs vumemen halber das (reform) bisher niet gedain hette. . ."Chmel, op. £it., II, p. 93.
^The negotiations between the various princes and Albert of 
Austria finally concluded in January, 1455. Bachmann, op. cit., pp.
52
Albert's service to the Emperor was no act of pure humanitar- 
ianism. On September k, Frederick had declared that all imperial
interference in the affairs of the court of Nuremberg would be termi­
nated. Chmel. Regesta. No. 3237.
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fidence of the Emperor, but was the chief spokesman for the imperial 
position at the Diet. When Frederick's opposition towards a new elec­
tion was apparent, the whole project was hastily shelved by the Arch­
bishop of Trier.
The only other princes attending the Diet were the Margraves 
Karl and Bernhard of Baden. Both favored the imperial party. The 
Duke of Burgundy was represented by the Bishop of Toul, while the
Papacy sent the Bishop of Pavia. The King of Naples was the only
53foreign monarch to send a delegation. Ladislaus of Hungary as well
as George of Pod&brady remained in the proximity of Vienna during the 
54-proceedings.
When the Diet commenced, Jacob of Trier sought to utilize his 
position with manifold requests for concessions,Frederick refused 
to oblige. The Elector then sought to attain his ends by a private 
meeting with the Emperor. Only the Bishop of Siena and Philipp of 
Sirk were allowed to attend.^ All efforts to sell the loyalty of 
the Rhenish Electors to the Roman King proved futile for Frederick
53The delegation came to negotiate with Frederick personally, 
rather than to the Diet# Voigt, Pius II, II, p» 135*
5kBachmann, og# cit#, p. 306# Podebrady wished to obtain im­
perial assistance against Hungary*
^Aeneas informed Pope Nicholas V of the situation on February 
21, 1455. He noted that Jacob represented a source of potential trouble, 
and did not minimize the grave situation which Frederick faced. Voigt. 
I°2. cit.
er£
The only information regarding this meeting is found in a 
letter of Aeneas to Cardinal Carvajal written on March 12, 1455.Ibid.. p. 136.
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relied on the loyalty of Albert of Brandenburg. Angrily Jacob announced 
(February 24) that since the Diet had not yet officially convened, he 
and the other electoral envoys would consult with Ladislaus. Frederick 
forbade this excursion on the grounds that all problems of the Empire 
must first be discussed with him. A violent disagreement ensued. It 
was finally solved on the following day when a Bohemian legation ar­
rived in Neustadt. The Emperor immediately announced that the first 
session of the Diet could now commence. The proposed crusade was the 
Main item on the agenda. Jacob of Trier found no valid excuse for not 
attending.
The Diet of Neustadt convened on February 26, 1455. Following 
a dispute concerning rank, Aeneas Sylvius finally presented the open­
ing speech. The papal legate also commenced his speech, but owing to 
the late hour, it was terminated. Meanwhile Jacob of Trier again de­
manded permission to consult with Ladislaus in Vienna. Despite Fred­
erick's insistence on his prerogative in imperial affairs, Jacob left
for Vienna. Ladislaus was induced to sign an electoral scheme for 
57refonn. Somewhat later the Elector also won the support of a special 
delegation representing the imperial estates. 58 The stage was now set
57In answer to Jacob's proposals Ladislaus stated: "And if the 
illustrious Emperor does not accept the terms of the Advisamenta and 
whatever is in those terms, he must be deposed with our knowledge and 
consent. Also, we shall endorse and carry out that which we decide." 
Mftller, ob. cit., I, p. 515.
cro
Jacob had drafted an actual outline of the policies to be 
followed in the reform of the Empire. It was entitled "Ratslag, wie 
das heilige Riche wider uffgericht, und fride in Dutzschen landen 
moge gemacht werden." Ibid.. pp. 512-514.
for a clash between the Emperor and Jacob of Trier. A deceptive calm 
characterized the proceedings for some time. The Bishop of Pavia en­
couraged the delegates to be generous in view of the crusade. No men­
tion was made of the papal fleet. Next the plight of Hungary was pic­
tured by the Bishop of Wardein, John Vitez.^9 In answer to these 
speeches Aeneas reassured the assembly that he was seeking means 
whereby he might aid the besieged Christian lands.60
In order to gain aid for Hungary Aeneas held a private meeting 
with the Elector of Trier. 1 It was entirely unsuccessful. On April 1 
Martin Mair, now the chancellor of the Archbishop of Mainz, presented 
a statement of the electoral demands to the Emperor. He demanded the 
convocation of a new Diet within the Empire to deal with reform. 
Frederick was in no position to grant this request for the Turks were 
within four to six days march of his hereditary lands. Frederick's 
refusal to accept Jacob's scheme filled the latter with rage. He 
delivered an angry speech against the Emperor accusing him of indolence 
and procrastination. 62 Several other meetings were held in an attempt
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Marr*h ?? 11 > P* 142. The speeches were given onMarch 22, 1455. Aeneas answered on March 23.
°Hansit jffi. sii., I, pp. 316.329.
either ^ L ^ h ^ o ^ S !  h6M ** ^  ArohblshoP's
62.. %ttenbach and Muller, s q. £it., p. 334. The main points of
speech are also found in Ranke, or. £it., VI, pp. 18-22.
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to solve the problem of the crusade but no progress was made, for 
no one was really interested in paying the price which the venture 
demanded. There was a widespread desire to terminate the Diet and 
give at least a provisional answer to the Hungarian plea for help. 
Frederick was at the mercy of princely caprice. It seemed almost Im­
possible for him to extricate himself from the difficulties which 
beset him. If he gave way to the Electors, the scanty remnants of 
his power were gone; if he refused, the Diet would not vote troops 
for the crusade. Imperial policy, both religious and political, 
was in danger of receiving a blow from which it could not recover. 
This perplexity was solved circumstantially. On April 12, 1455, 
the news of the death of Nicholas V reached Neustadt. As this 
nullified the possibility of an Italian expedition to the East, the 
necessity for a German expedition was temporarily eliminated. The 
Diet concluded by postponing the levy of troops for the aid of Hun­
gary until the following spring.63 Meanwhile it proclaimed peace 
throughout the Empire for two years.^ The imperial throne was 
temporarily stabilized.6^
The bulk of Frederick's ecclesiastical policy during the 
pontificate of Nicholas V was determined by the ambitions of the
6%one, ojd. cit., I, p. 399ff.
64
See Hasselholdt-Stockheim, og. cii., if pp# i_j2.
, n®w found stability was connected with several conces
nitiontfCthIrDi^1Ckrraf  ^  the Archbish°P of Tri«r after the termi- nation of the Diet. Chmel, Regesta.. Nos. 3337, 33^ 3, 3344.
German princes. Partially, however, the character of the Papacy as 
it was formulated and created by Nicholas, had a direct bearing on 
the nature of the Emperor's religious policy. Nicholas had dreamed 
of leaving a great reputation as the restorer of Rome, the patron of 
arts, and as the inaugurator of a new era, in which the Papacy as a 
leader of European culture quietly reasserted its old prestige over 
the minds of men. On his deathbed the Pope recalled the glories of 
his reign— the ending of the schism, the celebration of the Jubilee, 
the coronation of Frederick and the pacification of Italy.^ In the 
ideal of Nicholas, Rome was to sum up all that was the best in Italian 
life; it was to be a missionary of culture to Europe. The more religi­
ous aspirations of Nicholas' reign had collided with the current at­
mosphere of reform. Since refonn was dangerous, Nicholas V answered 
the German demand for reformation by offering culture. With the initi­
ation of the new Pope's rule, Frederick III, exhausted by the massive 
princely opposition to his refonn programs, cast his lot with the 
spiritual ruler of the Empire. Together the two sought to set back 
the clock of time and check the forces fostering the disintegration 
of the old order. Superficially this alliance managed to maintain 
the symbolism of the old order.
'A’hen the Diet of Neustadt (1455) came to an end the outlines of 
a new institutional order had emerged. The pattern was the product
66See the Pope's speech in J. Manetti, "Vita Nicolai V. 
summi pontificis ex manuscripto codice Florentino," L. Muratori 
'ed.), Scriptores Rerum Italic arum. Ill, 2, p. 945.
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of the first half of the fifteenth centuiy and not any one Diet. This 
change was reflected in the contemporary and subsequent ecclesiastical 
policy of Frederick. A further elucidation of its essential character 
must be made in order to attain a proper perspective of the religious 
issue. At the Diet of Regensburg the Electors sought to work in har­
mony with the princes and estates. Therefore they informed these 
elements of the proposals they wished to present to the Emperor. The
answer which Margrave Albert gave was doubtlessly proceeded by united
68consultation of all groups. At Frankfort the Electors deviated from 
this procedure. Only after an agreement had been reached with the Em­
peror were the other estates of the Empire informed as to the nature 
of the deliberations. The Diet of Neustadt followed a similar pattern,69 
The relation between the Electors and princes was closer than that be­
tween the Electors and the cities. The initiative in matters relating 
to the German Nation became an electoral affair. At Neustadt the 
princely delegates refused to officially participate in the delibera­
tions. On April 7 they expressed their opinion, but as private citi­
zens of the Empire. Already at Regensburg Albert Achilles declared 
that the estates were only consulted as a customary honor.^ At
67H8fler, oe. cit., p. I8f.
68IMd., p. 23f.
69R. Bemmann, Zur Geschichte des Deutschen Reichstages im XV. 
Jahrhundert (Vol. VII of Leipziger Historische Abhandlungen, ed. E. 
Brandenburg, G. Seeliger, U. Wilcken. Leipzig, 1907), pp. 15-16.
70H. Keussen, Die politische Stellung der Reichsstadte mit. 
besonderer Berucksichtigung ihrer Reichsstandschaft unter Konig Fried- 
rich III. 1440-1457. Inauguraldissertation . . . Friedrich-Wilhelitis- 
Universitat zu Berlin (Bonn, I885), p. 57.
Neustadt Frederick requested the princes opinion of the Turkish prob­
lem and simultaneously demanded that the cities endorse the decrees 
drawn up at the Diet of Frankfort. The cities gave only a general 
reply, after which they presented their grievances. '71 The inherent 
nature of the Regensburg Diet was somewhat repressive to electoral 
predominance since the Pope and the Emperor wished to present their 
cause to Christendom as such. When the Turkish problem gravitated 
into the sphere of German politics, however, the electoral predomi­
nance became more obvious. In certain respects the Diets of Frankfort 
and Neustadt were of a transitional nature. They inaugurated an elec­
toral policy whereby the princes sought to use the other estates of 
the Empire as influencial agents of public opinion through which they 
could force their policies upon the Emperor.
When Otto the Great was crowned at Rome, the German King and 
Roman Emperor were united in one person. The connection of the two 
gave a longer life to the one and a feebler life to the other. At 
the same time it transformed both. When Germany was only one of the 
countries beneath their rule, the Emperors could distinguish their 
imperial authority from their royal power. The former was internation­
al and partially religious while the latter was national and feudal. 
When the rulers of England, France, Burgundy, Spain, Italy, Hungary, 
Poland repudiated imperial control, it was narrowed to Germany and 
ceased to have international implications. The Emperor now continued
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71Bemmann, 03. cit., p. 17.
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to play in a smaller theatre the part which belonged to him in the
larger. Germany instead of Europe became the sphere of his juris- 
72diction. This trend, whose roots went far into the past, was well 
exemplified in the ecclesiastical policy of Frederick III. In his 
early reign the Emperor, oblivious to the theoretical or practical 
ramifications of the new structure of Empire, convened international 
Diets and presented international schemes for church reform. His ef­
forts achieved a moderate response. However, by 1445 the religious 
problem was a German problem. In a blind attempt to foster an inter­
national church policy Frederick signed the Concordat of Vienna. This 
venture failed to pacify the animosity of the various countries which 
belonged to the Empire in name. The Turkish threat enabled Frederick 
to make another attempt at an international policy. The matter soon 
restricted itself to Germany. The pattern which had been formulated 
in previous centuries now asserted itself with renewed vigor. The 
Holy Roman &npire became a flexible confederation of states, united 
for some purposes of government, but separate and independent for 
others more important. In its ecclesiastical as well as civil organi­
zation Germany was becoming a miniature of Christendom. The Electors 
represented the supreme authority. The nobility of the prince-bishops 
and abbots was as essential a part of the constitution, and as influ­
ential in the deliberations of the Diet, as were the dukes, counts and 
margraves of the Empire. Religiously this change was very apparent, 
but never fully comprehended by Frederick, who could not see the
J. Bryce, The Holy Roman Empire (ftew York, 1905), p. 359
On April 8, 1455, the old spanish cardinal, Alfonso Borgia, 
was elected to fill the Apostolic Chair after prolonged deliberations 
in which Cardinal Bessarion received serious consideration.73 When 
Borgia assumed the pontificate as Calixtus III, the projected crusade 
was pressed upon international politics with renewed vigor. In spite 
of his years Calixtus soon showed that he was filled with a devouring 
zeal for prosecuting the Turkish war. Solemnly he wrote: "I, Pope 
Calixtus, vow to Almighty God and the Holy Trinity that by war, 
maledictions, interdicts, excommunications, and all other means in 
my power, I will pursue the Turks, the most cruel foes of the Christian 
name."' In short order the revenues of the Papacy were used for the
equipment of the papal fleet. The treasures of Nicholas V were sacri­
ficed to the same end.
Common enthusiasm for the crusade at once created a strong 
bond of union between Aeneas and the Pope. As broad as the appeals 
of Calixtus for a crusade may have been, the hopes for its realiza­
tion fell upon Germany. The events at the Diet of Neustadt did not 
inspire such optimism. The election of a new Pope provided the Elec­
tors with a pretext to urge their grievances against the Papacy upon 
the Emperor. The Archbishop of Trier called for a vindication of the
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forest for the trees.
from the 
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J 3!* Ill£  Id ja lg  Qrom. An Account of the Papal Conclaves
— £3£ teen,ii century to the PresentTPav (Londnn, 1935) f pp. 17_18. 
T n W i r , ^translated by Creighton, 0£. cit., Ill, p. i80 from Stefano 
Infessura, Diano della citta di Roma," L. Muratori (ed.), Scrirtores 
M m  Italic arum. III, 2, p. 1136. A somewhat longer v e r s i o ~ o T T h ^  
vow is found in Raynaldus, op. cit., ad an. 1455, No. 18.
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be rigorously enforced and the grievances of the German Church should
be reformed prior to the recognition of the new Pope.7'* Aeneas Sylvius
finally convinced the Emperor that his interests were identical with
those of the Papacy and furthermore, that a new Pope provided a new
opportunity for receiving favors. After some hesitation the Emperor
finally sent Aeneas and the jurist John Hagenbach to Calixtus III to
76lay before him the Emperor's demands. The two arrived in Rone on 
August 10 and a private audience with the Pope was requested.
Calixtus III stood in a more independent position towards the 
Emperor than his two predecessors. Eugenius IV had brought back Ger­
man obedience by secret concessions and promises of financial aid. 
Nicholas V paid Frederick the share that was designated to Eugenius' 
successor, but 25,000 ducats were still due.^ Calixtus refused to 
consider any requests until Frederick had sworn obedience. Aeneas 
commented s
We found ourselves placed in some perplexity by 
the Pope's reply. To depart without giving our obedi­
ence would set up a grievous scandal in Christendom; 
so we decided to yield our obedience and then proceed
liberty of the German Church. The Concordat made by Eugenius IV should
75Cragg, ajj. cit., p. 77.
76Ibid., John Hagenbach was a distinguished jurist at the im­
perial court. On several occasions he was a colleague of Aeneas on 
imperial embassies. He was also a historian to whom the latter en­
trusted the task of completing his Historic Friderici III.
77This is revealed in a letter of Gregory Heimburg. D\ix,
°E« cit., I, Beilage IV.
in doing what otherwise was impossible, that is, to 
present your petition. 78
The Papacy had obviously grown stronger since the day when Aeneas
first proffered the obedience of Germany to the dying Eugenius. The
power of the Emperor had waned, and no amount of tact could re-establish
the balance between them. The imperial alliance was no longer necessary
to stabilize the Apostolic Chair. Calixtus therefore declined to buy
it through concessions, and Aeneas ended the audience by renewing the
obedience of Germany without an agreement on the conditions Frederick
79had hoped to impose. John Hagenbach returned to Germany, while 
Aeneas remained at Rome. Frederick felt that in view of the attitude 
of the new Pope, Aeneas could do him more service there than in Ger­
many, especially if he were raised to the Cardinate. Consequently 
the Emperor plied the Pope with requests for his promotion.^0
When Aeneas had received the red hat he was not slow in expres­
sing his appreciation to the Emperor. He promised: "I shall work for 
you as before, with no abatement of zeal. I shall spare no effort, no
26?
t  . . .  ? ^ o s e Ph » s  Cugnoni, Aeneae Silvij Piccolomini Senensis: Opera 
Inedita (Roma, 1883), pp. 122-26 as translated by Boulting, og. cit..P#
79 ai, j Aeneas, at this time anxiously striving for a cardinalshio, 
had no objection to use his position as a means of showing his readi­
ness to please the Pope. Thus he offered the obedience of Germany in
TP col?si®tory» 811(1 raade a speech in which no mention was made of the Emperor s demands. The speech was complimentary to both Pope and 
Emperor and encouraged war against the Turk. Mansi, op. cit., I.
*a a  M a a ta s te - j a m
lhc, J8°Th® coveted honor was finally granted Aeneas on December 18,1456, when Aeneas entered the Sacred College as Cardinal Priest of 
banta Sabina. Gragg, ,o£. cit., pp. 85-86; Voigt, Pius II, II, p. 192.
pains, on behalf of your Majesty and the sacred imperial rule, and 
all that lies close to your heart. So far as my efforts may serve you, 
your interests will never be overlooked. " 81 For Aeneas the best inter­
ests of Germany lay in the support of the monarchy. The Church in Ger­
many needed reform, but it requested more than the Cardinal felt was 
due it. The demands of the German Church hid secular and personal 
ambitions. Moreover, no practical reforms could yet be effected with­
out gravely influencing the authority of the Roman See.
Meanwhile the initiative in ecclesiastical affairs was taken ty 
Calixtus. He had no faith in Congresses, but preaching friars were 
sent through the length and breadth of Europe, selling indulgences, 
collecting tithes, and enlisting recruits for the crusading army, 
finally he issued a proclamation of war, imposed a tax on all the 
clergy throughout Christendom, and fixed March 1, 1456, as the day on 
which a combined fleet and antiy was to set forth against the Turks. 
Special priests were appointed to say daily mass, in behalf of the 
holy war; processions were inaugurated for its success; special 
prayers were instituted and those who said three Aves and Paternos­
ters for victory against the Turk earned an indulgence for three 
82years.
The papal summons met with no real response in the Empire.
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Alfonso of Naples equipped a fleet, but sent it against Genoa instead
of the Turks. The Duke of Burgundy rested on past laurels. Charles VII
was concerned with England and Burgundy. Germany and England did 
83
nothing. In the presence of such overwhelming difficulties the
fortitude of Calixtus did not waver. He continued to urge the Christian
princes and potentates to make peace among themselves, and take arms
against the enemies of God. The papal fleet under the direction of
Scarampo was sent against the Turks in 1^ 56. The forces were inadequate
for any serious undertaking and Scarampo was not the hero to risk his
life in a rash attempt. His only aim was to cruise about and make a 
decent show of activity.
Hungary was the power most dreaded by the Sultan and hence it 
was his chief aim to cripple it. In April, 1456 the news came that the 
Turks were on the march against Belgrade; in July the city was complete­
ly surrounded. Only the valor of John Hunyadi and John Capistron saved 
Belgrad. Both died shortly after of the plague. Meanwhile the guardian 
of Ladislaus Postemus, the Count of Cilly, was murdered by Hunyadi‘s 
son Ladislaus Corvinus. The latter was soon siezed ty Ladislaus Post­
emus and beheaded as a traitor.8^  Shortly thereafter, however, Ladis­
laus Postemus himself died.
The abortive naval expedition of Calixtus III and the Hungarian 
victory at Belgrade had relatively little influence on internal German
Oq
tured in the call to arms is well pic- 
Mittel»lth/('p J°r’ Sasgtaahis der Papste seit dan Ausgan., des Mittelalters (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1925), I, pp. 703-711. --
84
HI, pp. 201-206?ge1’ ~~ chichte ^  t e lschen, Rejc^ (Wien, I8I3),
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politics. Frederick III, imbued though he was with the crusade spirit, 
was helpless in the face of electoral intrigue. Although the leader­
ship of a united crusade would have restored his prestige immeasurably, 
the matter proved a practical impossibility. German opposition to all 
internal religious schemes continued unabated. In June, 1455, at a 
provincial synod at Aschaffenburg, the Archbishop of Mainz caused a 
whole list of complaints against the Court of Rome to be drawn up. All 
the grievances listed were to be solved by the summoning of a great 
German Council, whose object was to confirm the decrees of Basel and to 
take precautions against the burdens laid upon Germany.When each of 
the princes had been informed of the plan the whole affair was to be 
discussed at a Frankfort meeting scheduled for July 12, 14-55. No 
record exists as to whether the plan was carried out or not, neverthe­
less the contents of the Aschaffenburg proposals were soon reasserted.
The anti-papal sentiments of the Electors were manifested in a 
most decided manner at a synod held at Frankfort-on-Main during Feb­
ruary and March, 1456. The Rhenish Electors dominated the delibera­
tions. The Electors of Brandenburg and Saxony refused to attend the
86meeting.personally. Their chancellors were only empowered to act as 
observers. All of the active participants were motivated by the desire 
to curtail papal influence in Germany. Calixtus1 demand for the tithe 
was used as the main pretext for all anti-papal proceedings.
85Voigt, op. cit., II, p. 199, footnote 3.
8^Bachmann, oe. cit., p. 312.
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"They all found themselves in sweetest harmony when it was neces­
sary to state that the Electors did not feel obligated to give any aid."®? 
This unity even remained firm when it was decided to draw up a petition 
and present it to the Emperor* The document stipulated that any princely 
participation in the Turkish war was dependent upon the Emperor 1s accep­
tance of the reform proposals which were presented by Jacob of Trier at 
the Diet of Neustadt. Frederick was allowed three weeks to answer the 
proposals. 88 Even Saxony endorsed the petition. Not long before it had 
aided the Emperor in resisting the electoral intrigues at the Neustadt 
Diet. The procedure was endorsed by all because it freed the parties 
concerned from their obligations. When the assembly proposed further 
measures against Frederick, the Saxon and Brandenburg envoys withdrew 
their support. Thereupon the radical elements of the assembly formed
a protective alliance. The Electors of Mainz and the Palatinate signed
89a pact of eternal friendship. Refonn was only possible, they declared, 
by opposing all manifestations of imperial or papal power. The actual 
results of the Diet were few. Frederick responded to the princely peti­
tion by assuring each Elector that the matter would receive careful at­
tention. The promise to answer each Elector personally was never kept.^
8?Ibid.
88Hasselholdt-Stockheim, OE» Sit... PP. 32-40.
„ . . .89c-_J* Kremer (ed.), Urkunden zur Geschichte des Kurfiirsten 
Iriedn-ch? I yoq der Pfalz (Frankfurt und Leipzig, l?65),~No. XLV.
,9°In a letter written on September 10, 1456, the Electors 
complained, Daruff hat ewr Onad vnser yedem tun schreiben, das ir 
wollet den sachen nachgedenken vnd vns des bei ewr aigen botschafft 
ewr antwurt wissen lassen, des wir bissher gewarttet haben, vnd aber 
noch zurzeit nit geschehen ..." Ranke, og. cit., VI, p. 19.
2?2
The assembly was interrupted by the death of Archbishop Jacob 
91of Trier on May 28, 1456. A papal-electoral struggle concerning the
filling of the vacant Archbishopric soon ensued. Despite the energetic
efforts of the Count of the Palatinate to resist papal interference,
92the vacancy was soon filled by John of Baden.
The news of Hunyadi's victory had not yet reached Germany when 
the representatives of the five Electors, together with the Bishops 
of Salzburg and Bremen met again at Frankfort on September 30, 1456.
The cathedral chapters of Mainz, Trier, Cologne, and Bremen all sent 
envoys to this assembly. Following a general criticism of the Roman 
Curia, the delegates were unanimous in refusing the tithe which Car­
vajal was about to request. They declared that the war against the 
Turk was a pretext to solicite undeserved funds from Germany. The 
assembly's report contained the usual complaints of the burdens im­
posed on the German Nation. A series of resolutions were passed for 
the redress of these grievances and the relief of the German Church. 
Then an appeal against the exactions of the Roman officials was drawn 
up and approved. Moreover, a league was formed whose members vowed 
mutual support in case excommunication, war, or ecclesiastical levies 
were threatened against them. They also agreed to make no separate
91Eubel, 2E. Sit., II, p. 255.
9 F^or the bulls of confirmation see A. Goerz, Regesten der
___ ____L£e zu Trier von Hetti bis Johann II. 814-1503. (Trier,
1861), II, p. 205.
secret treaties. More important, the Frankfort assembly resolved 
to apply to the Emperor and see if he would not make common cause with 
the princes in an attempt to find a remedy for the problems of Germany. 
Disregarding the grave threat which still existed despite the victory 
at Belgrad, the princes at Frankfort ordered Frederick to come into 
the Empire and take charge of their program. The document closed with 
the threat that if Frederick would not attend the Diet
so wollen wir doch, alsdan mit der Hilff gottes 
daselbs bey einander sein, zu Ratslagen zu Handeln 
und zu besliessen alles das uns zu furderung des 
kristenlichen zugs als kurfiirsten des heilign Reichs 
zu tund gepiirt und not sein wiirdet— 94
The imperial-papal bond held firm. Frederick met these demands with 
a blunt refusal. Calixtus III expressed severe displeasure at the 
proceedings in a brief to his nuncio. The Pope's zeal did not even 
spare the Emperor. He exclaimed "0 hearts of stone which are not 
moved by this I" in reference to the Belgrade victory. "Our fleet 
with the legate has sailed for Constantinople, and the Emperor sleeps. 
Arise, 0 Lord, and support our Holy enterprise."^ The uncompromising 
attitude of Calixtus led to the further political isolation of Fred­
erick and at the same time began to separate the two forces which might 
have preserved a partial international religious policy.
93Gebhardt, ojo. cit., pp. 19-20. The assembly scheduled a 
further meeting for Nuremberg in November, 1456.
^Ranke, op. cit., VI, p. 21; "Speyerische Chronik" in Mone,
•2J2* I. pp. 413-415; J. Janssen, Frankfurts Reichs-corresoondence
nebst andereR ven&ndten ActenstUcken von 1326 Ms 1112 (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1866), II, p. 131.
^aynaldus, OE.crt., ad an. 1456, No. 40.
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The presumptuous directive which ordered Frederick to attend
the Nuremberg meeting was answered in kind. 96 Frederick asserted that
the electoral changes of incompetence and neglect in the prosecution
of the Turkish war were entirely unfounded. The meeting was not to be
held. "Dorum bigeren Wir an Uch, bevelen Euch auch von Romisher
Keiserlicher Macht, dass Jr solche Samenung und taghaldung giitlichen 
* 97abestellit. ..." The Emperor informed the assembly that Margrave 
John of Brandenburg, the imperial marshal, Henry of Pappenheira, as 
well as the Bishops of Augsburg, Bamberg and Eichstadt would soon 
journey into the Empire to expound the imperial position. The source 
of Frederick's confidence was apparent— "in Rome and the bishops com­
mitted to Rome, then also in the Brandenburg party. " 98
The Nuremberg meeting was held in direct violation of Fred­
erick's orders. Even a papal legate, probably the Bishop of Pavia, 
attended the hearings. At this point the Electors could possibly 
have counted on some papal support if only they had joined in the 
Turkish war and dispensed with their criticism of the Papacy. The 
papal participation in the Diet was a partial betrayal of imperial 
confidence. It reflected the temperament of the pontificate of Calix- 
tus III which was apparently moving away from an imperial alliance and
274
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the <*«.
97 ••Muller, 0£. cii., I, p. 552.
98Bachmann, loc. cit.
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functioning upon the fifteenth century basis of ecclesiastical poli­
tics— expediency. On the other hand, the whole episode may have been 
an unintentional by-product of the aged Pope’s crusading zeal, but in 
view of the other activities of the Roman Curia this possibility ought 
to be minimized.
The anti-imperial party was led by the Archbishop of Mainz.
It was actively concerned with substituting Frederick I of the Palati-
99nate for Frederick III. The presence of a pretender might have been 
discerned in the course of the previous deliberations for the same pro­
posals were reformulated and presented time and again. The presence 
of Lewis of Bavaria and the anticipated arrival of Ladislaus of 
Bohemia added to the plausibility of the scheme, especially since the 
Electors of Mainz, Cologne, Bohemia and the Palatinate formed a majority. 
The enemies of Frederick limited their activities to a sharp criticism of 
Frederick's indolence in the Turkish War, and the formulation of an ulti­
matum which ordered Frederick to appear at the new Diet scheduled for 
Frankfort in March, 14-57• If Frederick failed to appear, a new
The new plan was advocated by none other than Martin Mair. 
Frederick I of the Palatinate spearheaded the anti-imperial group. 
Distinguished by an energetic and military spirit as well as a firm 
domestic policy, Frederick exhibited many qualities desirable in an 
Emperor. The Elector had no scruples about usurping the Roman King- 
ship* The magnificant retinue which accompanied him to Nuremberg 
already suggested imperial dignity. "Und man meinte, sie wolten einen 
omschen Konig machen, wann der deiser der waz ein unnutzer keiser, 
er understunt nit krig und messhelunge in den landen nyeder zu legen . 
. . er pfaltzgraff hertzog Friedrich von Heidelberg der meint ein 
Romscher konig zu werden, wan er reit gar kostlichen gein NUraberg." 
bpeyersche Chronik," in Mone, o£». cit., I, p. 410.
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Emperor would be elected.10® Aware of the limited influence which 
such a memorandum had upon Frederick, the Electors formulated a second 
document in even stronger terras.^ 01
The termination of the Nuremberg meeting ended the possibility 
of a new imperial election. During the course of the electoral delib­
erations at Nuremberg Frederick had been busily corresponding with the 
major cities of the Empire and soliciting their support for his cause.102
The supoort of Brandenburg and Saxony was ensured by the bestowal of 
103further favors. Despite the Emperor's efforts no fewer than four
Electors attended the Frankfort assembly when it convened in March,
1457. These were the Electors of Mainz, the Palatinate, Saxony and
Brandenburg. Cologne and Bohemia were apparently not represented.
John of Trier was only accepted into the electorate in May of the same 
104
year. Even at this point Trier held to the imperial party. 5
10(1..-. .Muller, o£. crt., I, pp. 555-558. The Electors addressed a 
stern warning to the Emperor. "Dann wo Ir alsdann also zeu Franckfurt 
nicht irschynen werdet, so mussen wir von solchir pflicht und Umbt 
wegen, domitte Wir Gote dem Allmechtigen, der Cristenheit, dem heiligen 
iche und gemeynen Nutze gewand sin, dorczu ged.encken tun und auch be-
frlii ?aS heilige Rich nuczlicher unde redelicher gehandiltwerde, und wolien dorumb solchir Eide, als Wir uwir Person geton haben, 
t v /  ledig und ouch vorbas nicht mehir verbunden sin ..."Aisisl* 9 P* 562#
101"Dann wo Ihr dem so nicht tun wirdet. ... so mag uwir K.
-1. wissen dass dem heiligen Romischen Rich und Uns, von vorpflicht
wegen, . . . furder an eyn Haupt nicht lenger steet zusein, sunder 
umb ein andir Haput Uns vorsehen.1' Ibid. t p. 562.
1 0 2 *  V,Bachmann, op. cit., pp. 324-325.
103■'Chmel, Regesta, No. 3527.
10 M^uller, op. cit., I, p. 593.
1.0 5™ . .Frederick had strengthened his personal bond with John of
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Frederick I of the Palatinate saw his ambitions thwarted at the meet­
ing, for the Archbishop of Mainz was his only supporter. In an attempt 
to consolidate their precarious position the two electors signed a pact
on March 26, 1457.^  This attempt to force concessions from the Em-
107peror proved unsuccessful, ' and the Diet culminated with the defeat of 
Frederick's opponents. The opposition to the Roman See, however, did 
not terminate with Frederick's victory.
The current attitude towards the Papacy was typified in several 
letters sent to Aeneas Sylvius by Martin Mair. The most famous of 
these was dated August 31, 1457. Another, since lost, contained a 
private offer of Mair to serve Aeneas and procure certain sums for 
him. The letter of August 31 congratulated Piccolomini on his acces­
sion to the cardinalate, but also presented a powerful indictment a- 
gainst the Papal dealings with Germany. He charged that the Pope ob­
served neither the decrees of Constance or Basel, and treated Germany 
as a slave. Elections to bishoprics were arbitrarily annulled and 
benefices were reserved for the cardinals and secretaries of the Curia. 
In every way the German Nation, once so glorious, was treated as a
Trier by forcing the cities provinces of the Archbishopric to renounce 
their treaties with the Palatinate and Mainz. Ibid... No. 3550.
_ Kremer, op. cit., No. LI; J. C. Kremer, Geschichte des Kurfiir- 
iiriedrichs des Ersten von der Pfalz (Mannheim, 1766), pp. 93-94.
107Frederick's prestige suffered a setback when the Emperor's 
party was captured on April 29, 1457, by John Witowec, a noble of the 
illian lands. Frederick managed to escape but had to redeem the rest 
of the party._ See the report of Hans Taufkircher in J. Chmel, "Bericht 
uber die von ihm im Fruhjahr und Sommer I850 unternommene literarische 
Keise,  ^^jtzungsberichte der Philosonhisch-Historischen Classe der 
ka-i_s_erlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften. V 6k8-6k9
handmaid by the Pope, For years she had groaned over her slavery, now 
her princes felt the time for freedom had come* Aeneas answered 
the charge with his usual skill,  ^ He knew German politics well and 
sensed the essential spirit of Mair's letter. After answering the 
individual charges he asserted that Germany had steadily grown in 
wealth and importance due to its relations with the Papacy. The Car­
dinal wisely observed that everybody objected to the payment of money, 
and that the grievance was as ancient as it was universal. Neverthe­
less he assured Mair of the Pope's readiness to redress any grievances 
which the electors would point out. Aeneas realized that the Arch­
bishop of Mainz had some conditions to propose to the Pope.110
He was not wrong in his conjecture for hardly three weeks had 
passed before Mair made private overtures towards an understanding 
with the Pope.111 The Archbishop was prepared to forsake the Electors 
if he were granted the right of confiming bishoprics throughout Ger­
many. Aeneas expressed his delight at the Elector's reorientation,
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100Printed in M. Freher (ed.) and B. G. Struve (ed.) Renim 
Germanicarum Scriptores (Argentorati, 171?), II, pp. 686-687.----
109
Cit I Dohe60^ S  t0A Aenea! ls.dateJ Au&'ust 8. 1^ 57. Muller,
836 8^ 0 Tn i i 5l t6?efS Sylvius. tea, Epistolae, No. 369, pp. eous. Probability the dates on one of the letters is erron-
By the end^ of i X ^ A l W  Arc^ bi^ op of Mainz grew steadily worse. 
Frederick I of th! i l l of/ ran*enb^ g had succeeded in alienating
-
to Z & T " *  “  ^  ^  te»bishopric
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but noted that the Archbishop was too modest a man to have made such 
a request, a request which could not be presented before so wise, up­
right, and incorruptible a Pontiff as Calixtus. 112
This courteous yet sarcastic reply to Dietrich of Mainz did 
not reveal the true nature of the German problem. The anti-papal 
agitation north of the Alps caused grave concern in Home. Danger was 
threatening and all the diplomatic power of Aeneas was set to work to 
avert it. He wrote a conciliatory letter to Mair assuring him that 
the Pope was ready to grant all the minor requests which the Archbishop 
had made. The apprehension that a Oeman Pragmatic Sanction might be 
formulated led Calixtus towards closer collaboration with the Emperor. 
The brief which Calixtus addressed to Frederick was drawn up ty Aeneas. 
Since this document was a partial, if opportunistic, clarification of 
imperial-papal relations, its content proved rather important. Calix­
tus denied the charges that he was disregarding the Concordats and 
neglecting to appoint bishops. He noted that the authority of the 
Roman See was absolutely independent, and could not be limited by 
contract. However, in token of his aMent desire for peace and good­
will towards the Emperor, Calixtus promised to allow the Concordat to 
continue in force and not to permit its violation during his rule.
The Pope then informed Frederick of the unreasonableness of the German
112
answer "USt deduced from the
M W .  Printed in Muller, cu V ^ o T ^  * 7 * * ?  2°' was written on October 12. 606-608. Aeneas' letter
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complaint, especially in view of the great expenses which he incurred 
on behalf of Christendom. 113 Aeneas also wrote to the King of Hungary 
and to several ecclesiastical leaders. He encouraged Cusa and Carvajal 
to exert all their influence in Germany. Confidential letters were 
sent to many former friends of the Cardinal of Siena who occupied Im­
portant posts at the different German courts. Messages were sent to 
Peter Knorr, the councilor of Albert of Brandenburg, Henry Leubing, 
Procopius of Rabstein, Henry Senftleben and John of Lysura. In his 
effort to leave no stone unturned the energetic Italian sent the 
clever theologian and diplomat Lorenzo Rovarella to Germany. He was 
given instructions to warn the Archbishops of Magdeburg, Trier, Riga 
and Salzburg to abstain from uniting against the Pope. The German 
princes were asked to send their complaints to Rome and to trust the 
Pope's judgement. In all his efforts Aeneas was procuring delay,
and delay was as fatal to princely intrigue as to the hope of 
114German reformers, 1
To culminate his efforts, Aeneas wrote a tractate called “De 
rttu. situ, conditione et morlbus Germaniae. "U ?a masterful picture 
of German life in the middle of the fifteenth century. In this work 
he defended the action of the Holy See and appealed to the prosperity
113
ilfiQ iB Deatsshlaid (Frankfurt und Leipzig, 1788), i l f S T S S t f f
llifBoulting, op. cit., pp. 228-229.
11 P^iccolomini, Opera, PP. 1034-1086.
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of Germany as a refutation to Mair's complaints of Roman extortation. 
While it was frankly a political pamphlet, it still surpassed many 
other descriptions of the day, for no one knew Germany as intimately 
as Aeneas. The conclusion of the matter— the pleadings of Aeneas and 
the diplomacy of Rovarella stayed the united opposition of the German 
princes till circumstantial developments forced a new combination. At 
the beginning of 14-58 alarming reports of the excited state of Germany 
again reached Rome. A Diet met at Frankfort in June, 1458, and it was 
agreed to send an embassy to the Pope. Nevertheless, the back of Ger­
man anti-papalism was broken. The proposed embassy was little more 
116than a formality. When the Electors were scheduled to meet in 
Frankfort on September 8, 1458, in order to again express their op­
position to Calixtus, the death of the latter had removed him from 
any further threats.
The massive religious upheaval during the reign of Calixtus 
reveals little documentary evidence for the active participation of 
Frederick III in the ecclesiastical problems of the realm. The con­
ciliatory attitude displayed by Calixtus III in 1457 did not neces­
sarily indicate that Frederick had attained a new status in ecclesi­
astical matters. While conditions in Germany were very similar to 
those in 1448, two factors prevented Frederick from attaining the
Although the Bishops of Liittich, Verden and Eichstadt 
had joined the anti-papal movement, the Diet of 1458 saw the ab­
sence of the Count of the Palatinate as well as the prelates from 
Salzburg and Bremen. J. G. Droysen, Geschichte der Preussischen 
Politik (Berlin, I858), II, 1, p. 196.
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vantage point which the Concordat of Vienna had previously given him. 
The bargaining position of the Papacy had substantially progressed 
during the pontificate of Nicholas V. Administratively, this position 
was not upheld in the reign of Calixtus III. If he was inconsiderate 
and narrow-minded in despising the work of his predecessor, the same 
qualities aided his success in the goals which he had set for himself. 
The Papacy, by summoning Christendom to defend its ancient limits 
against the Turk, regained by zeal what it had disregarded materially 
and culturally. Calixtus accomplished few permanent results as Pope, 
nevertheless the immediate advantage of the Turkish problem combined 
with a personal obstinacy which was determined to execute the accumu­
lated passion of a lifetime, gave the Pontiff a definite advantage over 
the Emperor. Secondly, the Roman Curia was not faced with the concil- 
iar threat. Ecclesiastically, Frederick could only negotiate with one 
party. He was not devoid of all authority, however, for Calixtus 
feared the possibility that he might make common cause with the Gentian 
princes, an improbable venture, yet one which could have doomed the 
Papacy.
CHAPTER VII
FREDERICK III AND PIUS II:
STABILITY AND RECIPROCITY
With the pontificate of Pius II the "institutionalized" relation­
ship between the Pope and the Emperor took on a substantially modified 
form. The traditional, juristic theological and historical connotations 
governing the interaction of these two heads of Christendom become sub­
ject to considerations of human friendship and individual aspiration. 
Unlike the previous pontificates, the basis of unity rested upon indi­
vidual aspiration. The historical events vfcich characterized the im- 
perial-papal bond were further conditioned by a significant relationship 
preceding the present one, whose precepts found application when the 
servant became an equal of his lord#
The twenty years which Aeneas Sylvius spent in the various 
areas of the Empire and his personal participation in the functional 
aspects of the institution itself, afforded him an opportunity to study 
the spirit of his age unequaled by any other pope of the fifteenth cen­
tury. When Aeneas Sylvius ascended to the Apostolic Chair as Pius II 
his ideological framework concerning the imperial-papal tradition was 
a product of the major crosscurrents of his age. Therefore prior to 
any analysis of the events transpiring during his actual pontificate 
a brief evaluation of his concept of Emperor and Empire as it developed 
during his sojourn at the imperial court must be made.
The most significant expressions concerning his views on the
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imperial institution of his day found expression in two tracts of a 
political nature. The first, entitled Pentalogus1 appeared in 1443 
while the second, de sEili aactoritate imperii Romani.2 was published 
three years later. In view of the multiple interpretations as to the 
motives in the composition of the latter pamphlet, 3 its application to 
the subsequent discussion must be clarified. It is necessary to demon­
strate the inherent sincerity of Aeneas Sylvius in the composition of 
this tract, for only then can the expressed views be compared with the 
later pontificate of the state secretary. All considerations of 
methodology, historical setting and even content are secondary to this 
purpose.
The tract was not written in the traditional style of the 
times. Its content and procedure cannot traced to a single legalis­
tic or canonistic source, ancient or contemporary.^  Aeneas simply
Printed in B. Pez, Thesaurus Anecdotorum Novissimus (Augustae 
Vindelicorum, 1723), IV, 3, p. 639ff.
2The latin text with a German translation is given in G. Kallen, 
fsneas Silvius Piccolomini als Publizist in der Eoistola de Orta et 
Auctoritate Ipiperii Romani (Stuttgart, 1939), pp. 51-97. An early latin
fort*°1614)PI*II ^  11558ff°ldaSt’ ~ - ^ CjA Imperii (Frank-
3
^  been advocated that the document was written from purely 
selfish motives: A* Meusel, Snea Silvio als Publizist (No* 77 of Unter- 
suchungen zur deutschen Staats-und Rechtsgeschichte, ed# Otto Gierke* 
Breslau, 1905J, p. 13; that a genuine political interest was also in-
ZpS iL w I01? ’ —  ^ issolomini als Paast Pius II und sginZsita^gr (Berlin, 1856), I, pp. 351-54; and finally that it was a 
where the personal interests of Aeneas coincided with those of the Em­
pire; C. M. Ady, Flys II, Humanist Pope (London, 1913), p. 284, foot- note 3*
, A G* Oengler, ]|bgr Aeneas Silvius in seiner Bedeutung fur diedeutsche Rechtsgeschichte (Erlangen,~86oJt p. i6ff.
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combined the concepts and opinions of his times into a political tract 
worthy of a state secretary, and simultaneously demonstrated the genius 
of his adaptability. The complete frankness and lack of polemic which 
typified his procedure validates the honesty of his intention.
The historical framework which gave birth to the pamphlet proved 
flexible and transitory. In 1443 Aeneas had published his Pentalogus. 
Throughout this tract he conformed to Dante's and Petrarch's italiani- 
zation of the Emperor.^  In this tradition he begged Frederick to re­
claim his Italy.^  Somewhat earlier he had expressed his enthusiasm
nover Sigismund's proposed Italian expedition. This Italian orienta­
tion was again evidenced in a letter to Albert II prior to his imperial
Q
coronation. By 1446 political circumstances had led Piccolomini on 
towards broader horizons. Nevertheless, he was true to the conditions 
of his time in both tracts.
In conformity with his traditional ability to make the best of 
every situation, Aeneas set out to initiate a course of action designed 
to regain imperial prestige. He was not interested in a general politi­
cal scheme, but wished to influence the political orientation of the
A^n excellent study of the similar concepts of Dante, Petrarch 
and the early Aeneas regarding the Roman Kingship is found in Kallen, 
op. cit., pp. 14-16.
...petendamque suam Italian." Pez, op. cit.. p. 639.
7R. Wolkan, Dgr Briefwechsel d§£ Eneas Silvius Piccolomini (Vol. 
61 of Fontes Rerum Austriacarum, Dipiomataria et Acta. Wien, 1909) I,
1, No. 25.
g
G. Beckmann, Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Konig Albrecht II 
(Vol. XIII of Deutsche Reichstagsakten. Gottingen, 195?T, No. 42.
Cited hereafter as RTA, XIII.
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Emperor directly. This attempt to strengthen the monarchy entailed 
little personal advantage for Piccolomini. In reiterating the origin 
of the Empire the scholastic method and supplementary medieval theo­
logical suppositions were entirely bypassed. Aeneas made no mention 
of the Donation of Constantine. The entire tract centered upon the 
absolute competence and power of the Emperor. Frederick III was not 
bound by law and was limited only by the common good. Moreover there 
was no appeal from an imperial judgment. The tract was intended 
solely as a political memorandem for it appealed solely to Frederick's 
sense of power. In essence Aeneas showed Frederick his powers and 
asked him to do something about it. Such brazen honesty was not 
designed to procure an advancement but reflected the true intent of 
the writer. While its sense of urgency suggested some exaggeration, 
the ideological concepts which he portrayed were true representations 
Piccolomini's particular views. This did not exclude any subse­
quent alterations that varient circumstances might demand, however.
Although the composition displayed transitional qualities its 
views on the nature of the Empire governed the course of action which 
the state secretary pursued in the service of Frederick III. As a 
political realist Aeneas left something to be desired. The oligarchi­
cal imperial concepts of the time were based on territorial considera­
tions. Even the court of Frederick functioned on this basis. Never­
theless for Aeneas the Emperor remained Lord of the Empire, an Empire 
which encompassed the western world: orincens est dominus mundi. 
Historically this order had two origins— Augustus and Charlemagne. 
Aeneas presented one variation from conventional medieval assumptions.
28?
Natural right, and not God, now became the basis of the imperium and
9the Emperor's authority. The new order: "ex jure naturae fundatum 
constet imperium." 10 The Roman people were the true bearers of the 
lex regia. The adherence to this belief did not make the author a 
champion of popular sovereignty, however. For Piccolomini the lex 
regia was not a compact or covenant but a judicial act which relin­
quished rights in and of themselves inalienable. The government and 
people were not yet two separate parties, consequently the sovereignty 
of the ruler was unrestricted and irrevocable. His sole responsibility 
was to increase his own power. According to Aeneas sovereignty implied 
". . . a sovereignty which externally and internally remains unified, 
indivisible, irrevocable, unlimited." 11 While Aeneas bypassed the 
traditional definitions of the Roman Kingship, his approach was novel 
only in the sense that it rejected the traditional juristic compli­
cations in favor of a simple and straightforward presentation. He 
made no mention of a political system which spake of both private 
and public rights or saw the state as a legal entity separate from its 
subjects. Piccolomini1s humanistic style reformulated medieval politi­
cal theory, but added no contribution in terms of basic suppositions.
He simply proposed a new application of an old form. The imperial 
secretary was not the founder of a new monarchical concept or a new
9Kallen, o^ . cit., P. 40.
10Ibid.r de ortu et auctoritate Imperii Romani, p. 72, line 275. 
11Ibid., p. 41.
political literature. The tract was distinguished by its humanistic 
style and personal character rather than by its content. "In the D§ 
.Srfcu we have an early example of a classical political work in Germany. 
It is classic in a double sense: as an early example of the future 
and as a legacy of the clear, perceptual simplicity of ancient litera­
ture."1-^
The pamphlet betrays Aeneas' medieval political orientation, a 
bearing which remained consistant throughout his life. In view of the 
new situation which faced Aeneas as Pope the transfer of the plenitudo 
Eptes.tfltig back to the Papacy involved no conflict of principle. Can- 
pared with the actual status of the Empire the arguments of the de ortu 
were not applicable and even ridiculous.lif Thus Aeneas' firm reliance 
on medieval traditions in matters connected with the church and state 
constituted the major problem of his pontificate. Both Frederick III 
and Pius II operated upon principles that were out of context with 
the times. Nevertheless, for the last time the medieval world saw 
the imperial-papal alliance function with some facility. Yet the 
success of the venture was circumstantial and a product of personal 
friendship rather than a successful reassertion of ancient principles. 15
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12w , R.C. Dales, "Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini: His Historical 
orks and His Influence on German Historiography" (unpublished Master's 
thesis, University of Colorado, Boulder, 1952)f p# 65*
13Kallen, o^ . cit., p. 49.
14-Voigt, op. cit., II, pp. 255-56.
15
1 ■» Sisioria, Frederici III, while especially concerned
with the details of Frederick's relations with the Church from 1440-
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The eighteen Cardinals who were at Rome entered the Conclave in 
the Vatican Palace on August 10, 1458. Rarely did a papal election 
present more perplexing problems. The death of Alfonso of Naples had 
left the kingdom in turmoil. The French party in the Sacred College 
threatened to elect a French cardinal to the Papacy. Piccinino, the 
condottiere, had advanced into the Papal states. The Roman mob, anxious 
and armed, closely watched the conclave. Everywhere the pontifical 
authority was lowered. Germany was on the verge of revolt. Taking ad­
vantage of a ticklish international situation which made the election 
of any other man exceedingly dangerous, Aeneas, by great personal 
astuteness and cunning, broke down all the opposition to himself and 
on August 19, 1458, he became Pope Pius II.
"Among all the purposes he had at heart none was dearer than
that of raising the Christians against the Turks and declaring war 
17upon them." While the new Pope was well known to most of the princes
1448, is an attractive though diversified narrative. It does not 
present a formalized or even a casual expose of the author's attitude 
towards the Empire as is found in the de ortu.
l6M. Creighton, £ History of Papacy from the Great Schisn 
ia tha Sack of Rome (London, 1903), III, pp. 202-207; F. A. Grage,
^ e  Commentaries of Pius II," Smith College Studies in History. XXII 
(October, 1936 - January, 1937), 93-105.
17P^ragg, ojd. cit., P» 115© Although anxious to gain the papal 
throne Aeneas was fully aware of the problems which came with this 
honor. When he was congratulated on his successful candidacy he ex­
claimed: You may rejoice because you do not think of labors and the 
dangers. Now I must show to others what I have so often demanded from 
them." Johannis Antonii Campani, "Vita Pii II Papae," L. Muratori, 
led.), Rerum Italic^ rum Scriptores (Mediolani, 1734), III, 2, p. 974.
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and republics, his new lot would not be any easy one. Physically he
suffered from gout. Furthermore, European opinion was still suspicious
of his views, since it remembered him as an extreme conciliarist.
Therefore he launced upon a political policy which was both in harmony
with his personal convictions and would serve to divert the multiple
interests of the European powers into a single channel. On October 12
he announced his intention of summoning a Congress of Christian powers
to Mantua in order to plan a crusade. The next day the bull Vocavit
18M  Pius was read in a public consistory. A few days later Pius II 
sent letters to the various kings of Christendom, requesting their 
presence at this great undertaking.
On August 20, 1458, the new Pope informed the Emperor of his
19election to the Apostolic Chair. Although no official reaction of 
Frederick to this event can be found, the newly elected Pope observed 
that "Among the transalpine princes the Emperor Frederick was especi­
ally gratified since it was from his service that Aeneas had been 
called to the cardinalate and had finally ascended the throne of St. 
Peter. " 20
A problem affecting both the Papacy and the Empire arose 
shortly after the papal election# The Bohemian question became
Reproduced by Leodrisii Cribelli, "De Expeditione Pii Papae 
ecundi in Turcas," L. Muratori (ed.), Rerum Italicarum Scriptores 
(Mediolani, 173*0, XXIII, pp# 70-?6; Gragg, og# cit., pp. 116-18#
19J. Chmel, Regesta Chronologico-Diplomatica Friderici III. 
Romanorum Imperatoris (Wien, I859), No. 36I8.
20Gragg, 22. cit., p. 107.
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became important to the Papacy and to Frederick when George of Pode­
brady was elected to the Bohemian crown after the death of Ladislaus. 
Calixtus III, hoping to recruit an additional warrior for his cause, 
managed to persuade Podebrady to swear a secret oath promising to 
bring his people back into the Catholic Church. Calixtus believed 
George to be a secret, though true, son of the Church. Pius II was 
well aware of the true nature of his oath, but judged it best to look 
upon the oath as a promise of complete submission. 21 He sent him an 
invitation to the Congress, and gave him the title of king, but he 
sent the summons through the Emperor, saying that Bohemia was a fief 
of the Empire, and that the Pope recognized as king whom the Emperor 
recognized. Frederick III, who had been humiliated by Hungary and in 
Austria, saw in George a possible ally. A formal agreement between 
the two was signed on October 11, 1458.22 On July 30, 1459, Frederick 
again met Podebrady at Briinn, and in return for promises of help 
against Matthias of Hungary, conferred on him the imperial investiture 
Of the Bohemian kingdom.23 Meanwhile George had sent ambassador to 
Pius II who professed their King's obedience to the Pope. Since the 
Bohemian monarch had not yet disavowed his heresy, Pius, in a secret
1861), p!Ki6f>rdan’ 542 SonlRthum Ogorg's von Podiebrad (Leipzig,
II, No. CXXX.
23
Seiner7voT viflV + d -; a — ke.org s von Podiebrad: 1450-142 
I860),“ o! 19*  tasta-iacarum. Diplomataria et AotaTWiST
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consistory, received the personal obedience of George but refused to 
give him the rank of a king until he had publicly confessed Catholicism.
Another political event brought the former first secretary and 
his Lord together prior to the convocation of the Congress of Mantua 
which was scheduled for June 1, 1459. Pius II, on his way to Mantua, 
reached Siena on February 24. Here embassies from Bohemia, Castile, 
Germany, Portugal and Hungary appeared to offer their obedience to the 
new Pope. Since Frederick III still urged his claim on Hungary and 
refused to recognize Matthias, the envoys of Frederick at Florence 
refused to present themselves when they heard that the Pope had re­
ceived the envoys of Matthias.2^  The Pope was quick to seek peace.
On March 20, 1459» he explained his action in a personal letter to
25Frederick. On April 2 the Pontiff again pleaded that Frederick 
should better his relations with Hungary for the benefit of all Christ- 
endom. Another letter on the subject followed on April 13.27 At 
Siena Pius assured the imperial delegation that in such formal matters 
he only dealt with the existing state of things, and treated as king
24 t
q • r/ Mans^ -» II. £. M. olijn Aeneae Sylvii Piccolominei 
Seneqsis QrajaimegJLoIlticae, et Ecclgsj-asticae (Lucae, 1755), II,
+£* t Z?'v* pe S glorification of Hungary as a bulwark againstthe Turkish menace doubtlessly aggravated the imperial envoys when they heard of it in Florence.
25Chmel, Recesta. No. 3683.
26 „
Chmel od. sil., No. 3689; J. Mailath, Geschichte der Mag- 
i&Xen (Wien, 1829), HI, Anhang, No. 3. --- L~ ~
No. 6 2?Chme1’ N°* 3699; Mailath. oe. Pit., Ill, Anhang,
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28him who held the reins of government. The imperial delegation, led 
by the German jurist Hinderbach soon modified their concept of Fred­
erick's dignity. Hinderbach delivered an eloquent speech in honor of 
Pius and only casually mentioned the Hungarian problem. The jurist 
also declared that the Emperor was prepared to do his part in the fight 
against the Turk. 9 The subsequent negotiations were held in secret and 
culminated in two bulls which Pius II issued on April 30, 1459.3^  In 
these Pius confirmed the privileges of the Concordat of 1448. The Pope 
could not do less than confirm to the Emperor the provisions of the 
secret agreement which he himself had negotiated, and for which the Ger­
man obedience had been sold to Eugenius IV. Moreover Pius II was per­
sonally indebted to Frederick III for his good fortune. The efforts of 
the Emperor had given him the Cardinalate of Siena and enabled Pius to 
secure the good graces of the princes of Europe by sending him on in­
numerable diplomatic missions. Whether or not the declaration of the 
Pope was related to the unrest of the German princes which manifested 
itself during this period cannot be precisely determined. 31 It may be 
assumed, however, that the tradition which the Electors had established 
was not set aside during the pontificate of Pius II.
28Mansi, 0£. cit., II, pp. 195.98.
29 .
fol. 168r-173^rbaCh'S Spe6Ch 1S found in C°dex Monacensis lat. 3786,
210-ll.3°Chme1’ N0S’ 37°3’ 37°^ Voi^  22. £it.. HI. PP. 39.
There is a suggestion of German unrest in the documentary 
evidence presented in Senckenberg, op. cit., IV, p. 315.
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The next great period of imperial-papal cooperation came with 
the Congress of Mantua. Pius II arrived at Mantua on May 27, 1459, 
but found no one to meet him. He waited for several weeks before the 
first envoys arrived. On June 1, the opening day of the Congress, a 
special service was held in the cathedral, after which the Pope addressed 
the prelates. He lamented the lukewarmness of Christendom and asked 
those present to pray that God would give men greater zeal for His cause. 
The Christian powers regarded the crusade as an excellent cause, but one 
for which they were not prepared to make sacrifices. They wished to 
avoid attending the Congress, lest their approval should involve prac­
tical consequences. The Emperor had determined to pursue this course 
of action as early as January, 1459. His envoy gave a variety of ex­
cuses to Pius as an explanation for his lord's absence. Pius rejected 
these outright. After commending Frederick for his faithfulness to 
the Holy See and thanking him for some information with which he 
recently supplied Pius, he wrote:
Your answer does not meet our expectations nor the 
necessities of the matter. If you stay away, there will 
be no one who will not think himself excused. For the 
honor of the German nation and the glory of your name, 
for the welfare of the Christian religion ... we ask 
you to reconsider the matter, and incline your mind to­
wards attending the assembly. 32
Pius probably knew Frederick would not come to the Congress in 
person, but hoped that he might persuade the Emperor to send a
32piug jj Frederick IH, January 26. 14*59 Printmi in t 
astor, Gesschichte der Papste seit dgn Ausgang d_es Mittelalters 
(Freiburg in Breisgau, 1925), II, Anhang 5.
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distinguished embassy. The Pope1s pleas for peace with Hungary went 
unheeded. Hostilities had erupted between the two kings. Frederick 
made an alliance with the Hungarian magnates who were hostile to Cor- 
vinus, and on March k, 1459, proclaimed himself the King of Hungary. 
Internationally Frederick followed a course which weakened Europe in 
the face of the Turkish onslaught. 33 Territorially Frederick's policy 
was defensible, however, for Corvinus was a prince who threatened his 
position as Emperor; later developments were to prove the validity of 
Frederick's concern. During the four months before the Congress of 
Mantua Pius desperately sought to assuage the strife between these two 
princes, which seriously interfered with his hopes to enlist them both 
in the war against the Turks. Cardinal Carvajal was sent to Hungary 
to procure a truce for the summer, but his efforts were in vain.3^
Pius II was to experience still another setback in his dealings 
with Frederick. The imperial embassy which arrived at Mantua was 
headed by three court officials, the Bishop of Triests, Hinderbach, and 
Henry Senfllehen. These men were highly capable but possessed neither 
the rank nor the influence which Pius had anticipated. The Pope hence 
dismissed them and requested Frederick to send personages fitted by
3 %
m i ) .  (Freiburg Breisgau,
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their rank to give a decisive voice at the proceedings,A demand
that properly qualified ambassadors be sent to the Congress was again
06made on June 2, 1459• On June 11 another letter was forwarded to 
Frederick, Pius wrote:
We have preceived that our beloved son in Christ, 
the illustrious King of France, has negotiated with 
you to relocate the present Congress of Mantua to a 
spot in Germany, If this is true we consider the pro­
posal unnecessary and the effort futile ... We en­
treat your highness to give no heed to such insinua­tions. Ji
Pius persisted in his efforts to stir up Frederick. On July 6 
the Pope admonished the King to appoint suitable ambassadors for the 
Congress, especially in view of the presence of the Hungarian envoys. 
All these efforts proved fruitless, however, since no imperial envoys
OQ
arrived in Mantua. The German princes received repeated admonish­
ments to attend the Congress, but such envoys as finally came had dis­
honorable or selfish motives.3  ^ In view of Frederick’s continued
35•+ TTTPif , XI to Fre2erick June 1, 1459. See Mailath, 00. fiji., Ill, Anhang No. 8; Voigt, <&, cit., Ill, p. 50. Pastor, 0£. cit., ±±9 pp# 52-55*
"^ Pastor, Oja. cit., II, p. 54, footnote 1,
37Mailath, op. cit*, Anhang, No* 11; Chmel, op* cit«T No* 3711*
JWxlath, 02. Anhang, No, 13; Voigt, og, cit,, III,
P. 51; Chmel, £|. cji.. No. 3721; 0, Raynaldus, Annales EcclesiaRt.ir.-i 
(Barn-Ducis,, 1874)/ad an, 1459, No, 44, -------- -
39Voigt, loc, cit. The difficulty which Pius had with the 
Gernan princes is well illustrated in the reports of Heinrich Leubing 
to Duke Ludwig of Bavaria. Dated at Mantua June 13, 1459. See A. 
Kluckhohn, Ludwigdeg Reiche Herzog von Bavern. Zur Geschichte 
-gutschlands m  15. Jahrhundert (NnrHlinyn _ I865), pp. 367-372.
silence Pius attempted to appeal to him by another method. Graphically 
he pictured the concern of the entire Congress for the imperial envoys, 
especially since the representative of far-off Spain had already ar­
rived. There were many rumors asserting that the Papacy and the Emper­
or were at odds, that the latter was afraid to make a public appearance, 
and finally that Frederick was financially unable to come to Mantua.
Due to the prevalence of such multiple views Pius requested Frederick 
to reconsider his policy in the light of their mutual honor. Finally 
on September 6 another messenger was sent to the Roman King.1*0 Some 
measure of success was achieved, but not on the level Pius had antici­
pated. Frederick added the Bishop of Eichstadt to his former delega­
tion. The action only came in December when the main sessions of the 
Congress were completed.1’'1
The persistance of Pius II in assembling the Mantua Congress 
was directly related to the political-ecclesiastical advantages he 
hoped to derive from it. The sincerity of his crusading zeal was 
beyond question. Nevertheless his motives also included the practi­
cal overthrow of the conciliar ideology. The Pope also wished to 
establish a new order in international affairs by which the princes 
of Europe, under the leadership of the Pope, decided the affairs of 
Christendom. His program was essentially an attempt to restore the 
ideals which governed the founding of the Holy Roman Empire. Pius*
- ...
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^Voigt, 02. cit., Ill, p. 51.
concern for imperial representation was not divorced from this scheme.
If even a partial success was wrought by his plan, it would result in 
complete papal restoration. The Roman See hoped to show its superiority 
over the unproductive Diets of Germany, and establish its authority high 
above the Empire as the undisputed centre of the state system of Christ­
endom. While the success of such a program would have raised the pres­
tige of the Emperor immeasurably, Frederick's realism as regarded the 
political tenor of the day excluded his personal participation in the 
Diet and explained his hesitancy in sending properly qualified envoys.
On September 26, nearly four months after the official opening 
of the Congress, the first formal meeting was held. At this opening
oervice Pius delivered a speech which was regarded as a masterpiece of 
42oratory. "If an appreciation of eloquence had borne any practical 
fruit the Turk would soon have been driven back into Asia.Many 
praised the Pope’s speech, but few were prepared to act upon his ex­
hortations. The Hungarian envoys, when given an opportunity to speak, 
complained loudly of the Emperor's interference in Hungarian affairs 
at a time when they were gravely threatened by the Turk. The imperial 
envoy, the Bishop of Trieste, made no reply. Pius II stated that this 
was not the place for general political discussion. He noted that he
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M^ansi, ojd. cit., IIf pp. 9-29. An excerpt of the speech is 
also printed in F. A. Gragg, "Enea Silvio Piccolomini, Pius II." Latin 
Writings 2f toe Italian Humanists. (New York, Chicago, Boston, Atlanta, 
f927), PP* 80-85. When the Pope had ended his oration 
ardinal Bessarion also addressed the assembly. His speech is summa-
238-239° ”  Cardinal Bessarion, 1403-14Z2 (Paris, 1878), pp.
-'Creighton, oq. cit., Ill, p. 224.
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had sent a legate to heal their quarrels and in view of the fact that 
both the Emperor and the King of Hungary were just and upright, the
/fJj-
matter would surely be satisfactorily solved.
The Congress contented itself with decreeing war against the 
Turks in general terms. The moment the assembly became concerned with 
formulating a definite plan for the Turkish war the delegates became 
very reluctant to participate. When Pius proposed that the cost of 
the troops could be paid for by a tax of a tenth of the revenues of 
the clergy, a thirtieth on those of the laity, and a twentieth on all
45the possessions of the Jews "all approved the Pope's plan," but most 
of these refused to sign it. In spite of its failure, Pius II rightly 
assessed the Congress. On November 5, 1459 he wrote to Carvajal, "We 
do not find, to confess the truth, such zeal in the minds of Christians 
as we hoped. We find few who have a greater care for public matters 
than for their own interests."2^
The Pope's only real contact with the Holy Roman Empire as a 
political force came in his negotiations with the German envoys. But 
even here it was a matter of the individual prince and the Pope rather 
than the Emperor and Pope. Near the end of the month the envoys of 
Archduke Albert of Austria, the Emperor's brother, reached Mantua. 
Except for the discredited imperial delegates, they were the first
J|J[
Gragg, Commentaries, pp. 252-253.
45IbM-, P. 257.
46Raynaldus, op. cit., ad an. 1459, No. 78, as translated by 
Creighton, og. cit., Ill, p. 228.
Germans to appear at the Congress. Gregory Heimburg, the old opponent 
of the Pope, was the chief representative of Albert Both the imperial 
and Austrian delegates were called together in an attempt to reach a 
common understanding. Frederick's envoys were ready to accept the 
Pope's proposals, but Heimburg staunchly refused. He claimed that the 
Pope's proposal of levying a tenth and granting indulgences was merely 
a scheme for enriching himself and the Emperor. The problem could only 
be settled by private negotiations with each embassy.48 Pius submitted 
to this course, but all that could be obtained from the Germans was a 
renewal of the promises made at former Diets. All the preliminary 
problems were to be settled by representatives of the German nation 
and the papal legate at a Diet to be held in N u r e m b e r g . ^  Cardinal 
Bessarion, one of the few whole-hearted supporters of the Pope's cru­
sading policy, was appointed the papal legate for this purpose. The 
proceedings were enhanced when Pius nominated Frederick as the supreme 
general of the crusading army.50 The Emperor was empowered to appoint 
another prince in his stead if he could not accept the position. The
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• U B« gravamina der Deutschen Nation gegen den
lauA9l895)^~p j|?itr3g ZUr Vorgeschichte der Reformation (Bres-
„ Brockhaus, Gregor von Heimburg. Ein Beitrag zur deutschen
Geschichte des 15. jahrhunderts, (Leipzig, lS5l), pp. 141H 43.
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Raynaldus, 02. ci£., ad an. 1459, No. 72; ad an. 1460, No. 18.
Pi'°Ce^ re ?2curred near the end of the Congress (Janu- fSoSn ^  when Pius II was frantically seeking to formulate the 
theoretical support of the delegates into a working reality. Mailath 
-2I2* HI, Anhang, No. 22; Chmel, op. cit., No. 3781, '
substitute Pius hoped to use was Albert Achilles of Brandenburg, who 
arrived in Mantua at the close of 14-59. As head of the imperial party 
he was anxious to be on good terms with the Pope. The crusading zeal 
Albert displayed was immediately utilized by Pius who hailed him "the 
German Achilles" and bestowed on him a consecrated sword with which 
to do battle against the Turks.^
Meanwhile another event not unrelated to imperial-papal 
problems transpired. On November 10, 1459, Sigismund of Tyrol ar­
rived in Mantua. Sigismund brought with him an ecclesiastical quar­
rel of ten years duration, and one which was destined to provide 
Pius II with many problems. In 1450 Nicholas V had given the Bishop­
ric of Brixen to Nicholas of Cusa. This action was an infringement 
of the conditions established by the Concordat of Vienna which gave 
the right of appointment to the Bishopric to Frederick III. The 
Chapter of Brixen made their own election and then turned to Sigis­
mund, Count of the Tyrol, for protection. The pressure from the Pope 
and Emperor proved too strong for Sigismurri and the latter did not 
prolong the contest, and since Frederick agreed to Cusa's appointment 
the matter was allowed to rest. Cusa now applied his strong reform
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51Gragg, oe. cit., p. 276.
52tr- x. deutsche Cardinal Nicolaus von Cusa und die
Kirche sgine^  Zeit (Regensburg, 1847), II, pp. 106-115; A defi^ iti^ e 
monograph which relates to the struggle is A. Jager, Per Streit des 
_ardina^ s Nicolaus von Cusa Sit dem Herzoge Sigmund von Osterreich 
&Lfi vsn m p l  Ein Bruchstuck ^ us den jgjmpfen der wTim^en
fe^chUchen few^t ngch dan. Concilium von Basel (Innsbruck, l86l), 
7 v° .* J®fer also published a register of the entire struggle. See 
A. Jager, Regesten und urkundliche Daten Uber das Verhaltniss des 
Cardinals Nikolaus von Cusa, als Bischof von Brixen, zum Herzoge
ideals to the monasteries within his own diocese. Conflict soon arose 
as to the limits of the Bishop's power and the temporal jurisdiction 
of the Count of the Tyrol as the protector of the foundations within 
his dominions. The Benedictine nuns of Sonnenburg in the Pusterthal 
resisted the Bishop and appealed to Sigismund as the protector of 
their monastery. The quarrel assummed serious proportions and conse­
quently Pius invited both Cusa and Sigismund to come to Mantua. Since 
Pius II did not intend to favor one side or the other nothing was perma­
nently decided and Sigismund departed from Mantua completely dissatis­
fied. Although the Bishopric: of Brixen lay directly within Frederick's 
jurisdiction no record exists of his participation in the deliberations 
at the Congress of Mantua. Frederick's action might well have been due 
to indolence, nevertheless one factor must not be overlooked in passing 
judgment upon him at this point. The Congress of Mantua, though a 
product of honest zeal of the Papacy, was a desperate attempt to re­
assert some form of papal supremacy. Chronologically it conflicted 
with the territorial struggle in progress between Matthias Corvinus and 
Frederick III. The opposition of the German princes was uncompromising. 
In order to save the last remnants of his crumbling Empire Frederick now 
turned to the East, an unwise move in view of the international situa­
tion. The magnitude of this undertaking consumed all of Frederick's
Sigmund von Oesterreich und zu dem Benedictiner-Nonnen-Munster Sonnen­
burg im Pusterthale. Von 1018-1465," Ar^ hiv fur Kunde osterreichiscW 
Geschichts-Quellgn, VII (I851), 147-172; A. JHger, "Regesten und ur- 
kundliche Daten uber das Verhaltniss des Cardinals Nicolaus von Cusa, 
als Bishof von Brixen, zum Herzoge Sigmund von Oesterreich und zu dem 
Lande Tirol. Von I46l-lii64," Archiv fjjr Kunde Merrelchischer 
Gegchichts-Saellen, VII. (1851), 173-186.
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time and resources and allowed no opportunity for interference in the 
relatively minor struggle concerning the Bishopric of Brixen.
Since the appeal to conciliarism was continually used as a 
threat against the Papacy, it was pardonable that Pius II should wish 
to nullify this threat to his position. If the Congress of Mantua 
had not been successful in raising the prestige of the Papacy, it might 
at least be made memorable as the occasion of a firm assertion of the 
papal authority. Pius II knew that the conciliar movement was dead for 
all practical purposes, and that its principles had become mere instru­
ments of obstruction in the hands of a self-seeking opposition. Thus 
he seized the opportunity to strengthen the monarchical constitution of 
the Church and to vindicate papal authority. The bull published on 
January 18, 1460, was the famous "Execrabilis et priscis inauditus temp- 
oribus." Among other things, it made appeals to a general Council in­
valid, and any person who made or in any way promoted them was declared 
excommunicated. ^
On January 19, 1460, the Congress of Mantua came to a close.
At the conclusion of High Mass in the Cathedral, bulls were read 
decreeing a three year crusade against the Turks and ordering pray­
ers for its success to be offered every Sunday in all Christian 
churches. In a farewell speech, Pius admitted that he had not achieved 
all he desired but nevertheless expressed his appreciation of what had
54been done. After exhorting the faithful to do their utmost, Pius
53Gragg, 0£. cit., p. 276. For a discussion of the date see 
Pastor, oe. £it., II, p. 80, footnote 2.
-^ Mansi, oe. cit., II, pp.78-86.
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concluded the Congress by chanting a Litany he had arranged for the 
occasion.
The Congress of Mantua had invoked only a limited response from 
the imperial house. As previously indicated, this lack of communica­
tion may have been due to the zeal with which both Pope and Emperor 
pursued their private designs, for no one incident existed to reverse 
the imperial cordiality which accompanied the ascension of Aeneas Syl­
vius to the Apostolic Chair. In spite of Frederick’s non-participation 
in the Congress business as usual was apparently maintained on a local 
level.^ The Mantuan deliberations were too closely related to the 
tradition of the German Diets to appeal to Frederick. He had no desire 
to witness displays of princely power and independence, especially at 
his own expense. Frederick, like the other princes, was frankly un­
interested in a crusade. His careful schemes in previous years to 
avoid financial obligations in a venture of this nature have already 
been indicated. Had he attended the Congress personally, the various
states would have demanded his complete participation in the crusade
t
and thus partially relieved themselves of their responsibility in the 
venture. In Frederick's case the Congress of Mantua did not display a 
non-ecclesiastical orientation in his policies. On this occasion the 
Emperor was motivated by political expediency— quite in keeping with 
the spirit of the times.
The Congress of Mantua manifested the particular interests of
55see chmel» SB. £&«, No. 3770; Chmel, Materialien. II, No.
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the states and the political complexity which faced the European commu­
nity. French designs upon Naples continued unabated. German political 
fragmentation was not stopped, and Germany would continue to have such 
individualists as Sigismund of the Tyrol. The Congress of Mantua es­
tablished certain precedents in Italian politics and gave the Pope a 
commanding voice in Italy. As an Italian political figure, Pius could 
not hope to satisfy France. The panorama of this new international 
situation did not escape the Emperor.
Amid the irresolution and inefficiency which constitutes the 
history of the Empire at this period one tendency remained constant—  
namely, the process by which the territorial nobles transformed them­
selves from feudatories into sovereign princes. In this setting the 
ecclesiastical problems involving Pope and Emperor became aspects of 
larger political situations— the degree of involvement depending on 
the nature of the individual case. This situation was not a post- 
Mantuan development. It had risen to prominence and abated repeatedly 
within the preceding century but its intensity reached a new height in 
the last half of the fifteenth century. Some of the most vivid mani­
festations of this ecclesiastical-political complex occurred during 
the pontificate of Pius II. Consequently, an analysis of imperio- 
papal affairs must proceed from the particular to the general, and the 
treatment of the material must relate to such major events as exerted 
a definite influence upon these institutions.
The first sphere of investigation involves Germany. In many 
ways Pius' intimate knowledge of German politics was a definite asset 
to him. Personal experience enabled him to evaluate the true nature
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of the imperial diets and the electoral leagues, and he was not alarmed 
by their transitory natures. One disadvantage attended the papal posi­
tion. Pius II had formerly belonged to the imperial party and could 
not dissociate himself from the friendships and enmities of past years. 
His connection with German affairs was partisan by virtue of circum­
stance.
In Germany the imperial-papal union experienced a systematic
and united opposition. Shortly after the Congress of Mantua rumors
of proposed electoral and princely diets were manifold. Even before
the Congress, a meeting held in the Rhine area revealed strong anti-
papal-imperial sentiments. As already indicated Pius II honored the
terms of the Concordat of Vienna; more than ever before the essence
56of this agreement tended towards a defensive alliance. The alliance 
represented the struggle for survival of two institutions which were 
theoretically acceptable but in reality non-applicable in their exist­
ent spheres of operation.
Two princely factions were dominant in Germany. At the head 
of the party which pursued its own personal ends under the banner of 
reform were the two princes of the House of Wittelsbach, Frederick I, 
the Count of the Palatinate, and Lewis the Rich, Duke of Bavaria-
_ Voigt in his study of Pius II suggests that the basic motive 
of the imperial-papal front was self-enrichment and self-aggrandizement. 
The crusade was simply a pretext for the plundering of the German 
Church. In this joint enterprise one was indispensable to the other. 
Such an assessment is unworthy of the character of the men concerned.
It reveals no appreciation of the religious mind of the fifteenth cen­
tury nor of the long historical tradition which surrounded the imperial- 
papal union.
307
Landshut. The champion of the second party, Albert Achilles, Margrave 
of Brandenburg, found it convenient to pursue his independent designs 
under the shelter of the imperial authority. With the help of Pope and 
Smperor he wished to obtain the chief magistracy of the Empire.^ The 
fortunes of the House of Wittelsbach were at an all time low when the 
Emperor outlawed Duke Lewis of Bavaria for having violently seized upon 
the free imperial city of Donauworth. Albert Achilles undertook to 
carry out the sentence, but a temporary peace lasting the duration of 
the Congress of Mantua was achieved by papal arbitration at Nuremberg 
in July, 1459.^
The beginning of 1460 saw renewed hostilities between the houses 
of Wittelsbach and Hohenzollern. Simultaneously Bessarion was sent to 
Germany to promote the Turkish war and work for peace within the Em- 
59pire. On February 20 Bessarion arrived in Nuremberg and a Diet was 
scheduled for Mantua on March 2, 1460. The Cardinal of Augsburg and 
the Bishops of Speier and Eichstatt attended as the imperial envoys. 
Albert Achilles was the only German prince in attendance. Lewis of 
Bavaria sent his councillors merely to complain of the bad faith of 
the Margrave.6  ^ Bessarion's eloquence made little impression and in 
spite of the Turkish advance while the Diet was in session, no definite
57R. Koser, Geschichte der brandenburgjschen Politik bis zum 
Westfalischen Frieden von 1648(Stuttgart und Berlin, 1913), p. 135.
58„Kluckhohn, op. cit., pp. 104-106.
59pastor, fip. cit., II, p. 125; Vast, op. cit.r pp. 243-254.
6°Kluckhohn, oe. £ii., p. 137.
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action was taken. All the Cardinal could do was to induce than to
agree that another assembly should meet at Worms on March 25th, 1460. 1
Since war had already begun when the meeting at Worms was held, it
62proved as fruitless as the previous Diet. In addition to the Mar­
grave of Baden and the Bishop of Speier, only the advisors of the vari- 
ous princes appeared. Bessarion soon returned to Nuremberg. Since 
Hungary could expect no aid from Germany, Pius attempted to free her 
own forces for use against the Turks. In this venture he requested 
the King of Bohemia to use his influence to restrain the Emperor from 
all attacks on Hungary. On April 20, Bessarion received a brief from 
the Pope containing an express charge to use all possible diligence in 
supporting King George. Moreover, Pius II now sent the able jurist, 
Francis of Toledo, to the imperial court.
A Diet at the imperial court had originally been scheduled for 
March 30, but in view of the territorial Diet to be held at Worms on 
March 25, the Diet was postponed until May 11. Cardinal Bessarion
^"Speierische Chronik," as published in F. J. Mone (ed.), 
Quellensammlung der Badischen Landesgeschichte (Karlsruh, 1848), I, 
p. 439. Bessarion's complaints of German disinterest are preserved 
in a letter which he addressed to Podebrady. Palacky, op. cit..
J. Janssen, Frankfurts Reichscorrespondenz nebst andem 
verwandten Aktenstucken von 1376 bis 1519 (Freiburg, I872), II, 
pp. 144-146.
6*5
Palacky, loc. cit.: A. Bachmann, Bohmen und seine Nachbar- 
lander unter Georg vor* Podiebrad 1458-1461 und des Konigs Bewerbung 
um die Deutsche Krone. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Versuche 
einer Reichsreform im XV. Jahrhundert. zum Theil nach ungedruckten 
^.ellen (Prag, 1878)7 PP. 184-85; Voigt, o£. cit., Ill, p. 222.
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reached Vienna on May 7 but the Diet could not be held since only a 
few envoys had arrived, and these were not furnished with adequate
64-instructions. The Diet was again postponed to September 1. Although 
both the Papacy and the Emperor issued urgent letters of invitation to 
this assembly none of the princes appeared on the appointed day.^ The 
Diet finally commenced with a latin oration on September 17.^ Two 
days later the first session was held. Discord was soon evident. The 
German envoys were suspicious of the credentials of Cardinal Bessarion 
which empowered him to carry out the papal decrees rather than function 
merely as a papal legate at the proceedings. Excommunication was threat­
ened against all who resisted the papal will. Pope Pius II lessened the 
possibility of any positive accomplishments by this unwise action. Bes­
sarion stood before the Diet as one seeking a favor, not as one in com­
mand. In a special speech addressed to Frederick, Bessarion lauded the 
efforts of Pius to attain peace in Christendom. In his answer Frederick
Bessarion complained bitterly to the Pope of the hopeless 
situation. Pius II attempted to console him, but could do little more 
than point out that Bessarion was not to blame in the matter. Two un­
dated .Letters are preserved in Raynaldus, op. cit., ad an. 1460, Nos.oo, 88.
No. 85; Palacky, cjfi. cit., No. 223.
. ^ Th® documents of this Diet are preserved in G. G. Konig von 
Konigsthal (ed.), Nachlese ungedruckter Reichstags— und reichsstad- 
ilgp: iQlle^ iapiandlungen unter Kaiser Friedrich III (Frankfort, 
1759/, pp* 126-128. The record of a member of the princely dele- 
gation is given in Senckenberg, sit., IV, pp. 334-368. In addi­
tion see J. J. Muller (ed.)t Dgg Heiliger Romischen Reiches Teutscher 
Nation. Reichstg,p;stheatrum wie selbiges unter Kevser Friedrichs V. 
allerhochsten Regierung (Jena, 1713), pp. 775-789.
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declared himself a Prince who desired to gather an army against the
Turks and to collect the necessary tithe for its support. Frederick's
reply, and the previous reading of the bull conferring plenary powers
upon Bessarion only aggravated the bad dispositions prevalent in the
assembly. The envoys felt called upon to defend their right and to
take counsel together in view of the proposed expedition against the
Turks and the accompanying war tax. The princely envoys thus requested a
temporary postponement of the proceedings until the arrival of Henry 
7^Leubing, the representative of Archbishop Dietrich of Mainz. In the 
meantime the envoys of the Duke of Burgundy announced that their mas­
ter was prepared to send four thousand foot-soldiers and two thousand 
knights for the crusade. On September 24, 1460, Leubing presented the 
princely reply to the imperial-papal proposals. He declared that a ven­
ture of such proportions must first be considered by the Emperor as well 
as the Electors. To facilitate this Leubing proposed a new diet. Bes­
sarion 's efforts, both privately and publicly, were doomed to failure. 
Frederick refused to attend a diet within the Empire despite the plead­
ings of the Cardinal. In order to excuse his action the Emperor pointed 
to the impediments which his territorial administration presented.
7^Henry Leubing appeared at the Diet as an opponent of the 
-mperor and the Pope. The opportunistic Dietrich of Mainz had defected 
from the cause of Albert Achilles after the latter had been forced to 
sign the treaty of Roth in June, 1460. The Archbishop's motives in 
changing sides from the Hohenzollern to the Wittelsbach party was the 
hope that these princes would afford him more support against Pius II 
than he could have obtained from his former friends. K. Menzel.
1877VV,Vpp. 164-170’" -1-lgemeine 2§litscll§ Biograohie. (Leipzig,
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Frederick, however, did promise than an Imperial delegation would be 
sent. In a concluding speech Bessarion disclaimed any responsibility 
for the failure of the Vienna Diet and noted that any future action 
would be determined by the Pope.
The failure of the Vienna Diet lay mainly in the historical 
tradition which had come to surround imperial-electoral assemblies.
The insincerity which characterized purely political diets promised 
even less for those of a religious nature. An additional hindrance 
faced the Vienna deliberations— Cardinal Bessarion. Convinced of the 
purity of his own motives, the Greek Cardinal became more and more em­
bittered by the obstinate opposition of the envoys. Blindly he poured 
forth menaces and invectives against the German princes and assumed a 
superior bearing which endeared him to no one. The delegates present 
answered in a similar tone and left the Diet. Frederick gained nothing 
from the Diet. His readiness to comply with the Pope's demands only 
turned the delegates against him.
On October 11, 1460. Pius II made a bold proposal to Bessarion.
He advocated that the Count of the Palatinate, Frederick, should, receive 
the banner of faith and accept the generalship of the crusading German 
princes. If all failed he must search for soldiers from door to door 
and pursue this course as the last possible hope. Meanwhile Bessarion 
was to formulate schemes for carrying out his mission as best he could




cooperation in this infringement upon his authority the Pope addressed 
a brief to him explaining his action.
If such expectations come to nothing, Germany shall 
be without honor. Your highness shall be held in dis­
repute if, after the acceptance of the generalship, you 
do not produce something worthy of such an office, either 
by yourself or by another. If domestic worries remove you 
from the public ones, you must reckon with the fact that 
you must allow another to do what you are not able. Nothing 
is as disgraceful as allowing nothing good through a n y o n e .
No record of Frederick's reaction to the new papal policy exists. The 
affair, like most of Bessarion's efforts, was doomed to failure. The 
designated prince refused the proffered honor,^ and worse, the Cardi­
nal refused to follow the papal schemes. He continued his attempts to 
arbitrate between Frederick III and Matthias of Hungary. In vain he 
attempted to raise an army against the excommunicated Sigismund of 
Tyrol. Vfhen Bessarion sought to disuade Albert of Austria from attack­
ing Frederick III for the sake of his fatherland, the former curtly 
replied that he wished to preserve the peace within his domains.?1 His 
appeals to the princes and the cities fell on deaf ears.?2 Early in 
1461 Bessarion finally left Germany, happy to leave the barbarians who
March 29, 1461, and contains the Cardinal's justification for his 
proceedings, especially in regard to the question of the tithe. 
Pastor, op. ci£., II, p. 134, footnote 3.
69Raynaldus, 22* cit., ad an. 1460, No. 89.
?°Ibid.. No. 90.
Ebendorffer, "Chronicon Austriacum," H. Pez (ed.), 
Scriotores Rerum Austriacarum (Lipsiae, 1725), II, p. 937.
72 op« cit«, pp• 3^ *7 •
did not respect Greek and Latin learning.
While Bessarion was still concerned with the Turkish war and
the tithe general politics followed radically different lines. A new
force now entered the picture. Bohemia had finally become stabilized
through the efforts of George of Podebrady. On April 15, 14-59, he
74signed a peace treaty with the Count of the Palatinate. A similar
treaty with Brandenburg was signed on April 25, 1459.^ Podebrady
soon became the symbol for the restoration of peace within the Empire.
Frederick III granted him his official recognition and soon after
George arbitrated between the Emperor and Matthias of Hungary with
considerable success.^ Pius II, who had previously recognized Pode-
77brady as King of Bohemia, esteemed the Bohemian King very highly. 
Following the Vienna Diet, the latter had ordered a crusade preached 
throughout his lands. The September meeting did not see the appear­
ance of any Bohemian delegates, although a letter from Podebrady 




73The Cardinal probably arrived in Bologna on October, 1461. 
Chronica di Bologna," L. Muratori (ed.), Rerum Italicarum Scriptores 
(Mediolani, 1731), XVIII, p. 741. ----
?2fC. J. Kremer (ed.), Urkunden zur Geschichte d^ s Kurfiirsten 
Friedrichs des Ersten von der Pfal^  (Frankfort und Leipzig, 1765).No. LVIII. H r D'*
75
F. ¥. Sommersberg (ed.), Silesiacarum Rerum Scriotores ali- 
aiiot adhue inediti (Lipsiae, 1729), I, p. 1026.
76Palacky, op. cit., No. 193. The document indicates that 
definite financial interests played a part in Podebrady's efforts.
77Pastor, oe. cit.. II, Appendix 16.
7 3Konig von Konigsthal, op. cit., p. 150.
was ordered to negotiate a territorial settlement together with George
in order to settle the Hungarian-Austrian dispute. This document was
to be presented to both sides with the stamp of papal authority.
Spiritual and temporal punishment threatened any non-compliance with
79the established proposals.
Meanwhile Podebrady capitalized on Pius’ desire for a crusade 
by insisting that nothing of an official nature could be done by him 
until he had all his territories firmly in control.80 This had refer­
ence to the traditionally Catholic population of Breslau, who withheld 
tneir allegiance on the ground that George was a heretic. In reality 
he was probably more hated as a Czech than a heretic. Pius II finally 
sent envoys to Bohemia who did much to secure George's recognition by 
his Catholic subjects. Even the people of Breslau consented to a three- 
year truce, on the expiration of which they would do homage to Podebrady. 
The truce was officially signed on January 13, 1.460. George was loud in 
his praises, and Pius anticipated the arrival of a Bohemian embassy 
which would bring the affair of Bohemia to a triumphant conclusion. 81 
After months of anxious waiting the King reassured the Pope that he 
adhered to his oath, but that he had been unable to send an embassy due
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Bohraen «  5alrt?nis3 des George von
*1 a n * ,
aa an. ^  ^
to Circumstantial difficulties.82
In reality Podebrady's plans gravely affected both the politi­
cal and religious order of the tine. The Bohemian ruler was not ad­
verse to attaining the imperial crown should circumstances allow. 83 
In an effort to achieve this he entered into a close alliance with the 
anti-papal party in Germany. When this project aroused the suspicions 
of the Roman court,** George conceived the idea of becoming Emperor with 
the help of the Pope. In reality his religious convictions, as far as 
they had any meaning, were secondly to the demands of his personal 
policy and plans. 85 George now offered his services to Pius II against 
the German opponents of the Papa^, for he car* as little ataut ecclesi­
astical affairs in Germany, as about the reformation of the Empire. 
PodSbrady plan called for notMng less ^  ^  ^  ^
with the Church. He declared himself ready to consent that the Pope 
should appoint an Archbishop of Prague. If Pi„s n  would send , ^
fied legate to Bohemia, the King would 'ft* means to restore the uni* 
of the faith in his realm. He would profess obedience to the Holy See
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cation of Silesia-1459 '^Th^TTn^ Podfbrady ^  Bohemia to the Pacifi- 
I. 285-286. 1459’ 2 *  te^rsitz of Calox^ do Stu^, Series B,
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as his predecessors had done before him.
ihe course of events had placed new obstacles in the way of a
reconciliation. The Bohemian nation was still torn by internal strife.
Procopius pictured the dilemma quite correctly when he explained to
Bessarion that George was lord over two kinds of people in Bohemia, and
that it was impossible for him to favor one party without shaking the
8*7loyalty of the other. In spite of Podebrady1s explanations of the
delay in sending the embassy, Pius grew more and more suspicious of the
good faith of his spiritual son. At the same time the position of the
Papacy was steadily improving, for in the very week when the Bohemians
arrived in Rome, a French embassy arrived to surrender the Pragmatic 
Sanction.88
Finally, after a delay of three years, Podebrady sent an embassy 
to Rome. It sou^ it to do homage to the Pope and simultaneously ask for 
the confirmation of the Compacts. On March 20, 1462, the Bohemians had 
their first audience with Pius II. In a two hour oration regarding the 
Compacts, the Pope stated that it was not a matter of confirming them, 
but of setting them aside.8? Pius was prepared to treat the Compacts as
86T, .
treating a document Called "Instruction foreating with the Pope. The draft was never seen by Pius II. Bachmann,
p?*53ff.’’ Hofler, Urkunden zur Geschichte Bohmens (Prag, I865),
and ^
88P
I T  unrf t * ° r  vTdetai^ ed discussion °f this event see C. Lucius, "Pius J-I und Ludwig XI von Frankreich 1461-1462 " HeideO akv,
zur Sittleren und neueren Geschichte r 41 (19I3) 52-78---
89„




a pure temporary concession* The period of papal concessions was over*
The claims of Rome must be upheld for the sake of an undivided church#
In a final audience on March 31 the Bohemian envoys were informed of
the Popefs position* On this occasion the papal procurator declared
that the Pope had terminated the Compacts granted by the Council of
90Basel to the Bohemians*
Podebrady's reaction to the papal decision was slow in coming* 
Nevertheless, in spite of Pius1 optimism for the submission of Bohemia, 
George repudiated his coronation oath, disregarded his repeated promises, 
and took his stand openly and decisively on the side of the Hussites. In 
a speech before a Diet meeting at Prague in August, 1462, he declared 
that the Bohemians would continue to hold fast to the Compacts.91 George 
now enlisted the services of a Frenchman, Antoine Marini, who proposed 
a coalition between Bohemia, Burgundy, France, Hungary, Poland and Ven­
ice against the Turks. The object was to keep the Papacy from partici­
pating in the exploit and then, by an ecumenical Council depose the 
Pope and settle the disputes of Europe. Frederick III was to be elimi­
nated by araed force. In his momentary triumph George even imprisoned 
the papal legate, Fantino. The action sealed the failure of papal re­
lations with Bohemia. From this time forth George, by diplomacy and dis­
simulation, made every effort to keep the Roman Curia from initiating any
90
alacky, Urkundljche Beitrage. No. 2?6B.
91Ibid., No. 281B.
decisive a c t i o n . ^
Circumstances soon forced George to reformulate at least a part 
of his project. Austria was a prey to bands of plundering soldiers 
whom Frederick III was helpless to repress. The people of Vienna rose 
in rebellion against the Emperor and on October 5 called in his brother 
Albert and beseiged Frederick in the citadel. Podebrady negotiated a 
peace between the two brothers. Albert was to govern Austria for eight 
years while Frederick was allowed to depart in safety. Frederick with­
drew to Neustadt, but with the understanding that he would intercede on 
Podebrady1s behalf with the Pope. Through Frederick's efforts Pius II 
agreed to suspend all the ecclesiastical proceedings against the Bohemian
go
King. The Pope was too consummate a statesman not to perceive the 
folly of pressing his advantage too far. George chose to understand 
the settlement as including an approval of the Compacts, an interpreta­
tion immediately repudiated by Pius II. Pius thereupon declared that 
the city of Breslau was under his protection; George answered by re­
verting to his project of a European Confederation. If he had previously 
sought to win the Pope by promises, he now hoped to intimidate him ty
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1’ - 1 arkgraf* b^er Ge0rses von Podiebrad Project eineschnstlichen Furstenbundes zur Vertreibung der Tiirken aus Europa und 
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the threat of opposition.9^  Pius was forced to recognize that the
Bohemian King's professions of friendship were mere attempts to
gam time. Even an appeal by the Pope to the Emperor was of no
avail since the latter was in no position to force the hand of 
his protector.9'*
An indication regarding the status of imperial-papal affairs 
during the Bohemian controversy was given by Pope Pius II in an 
audience with a legate from the city of Breslau. 96 In the course 
of the conversation the Roman Pontiff asked Johann Weinreieh97 if 
had heard of the latest action of the Emperor in relation to the 
Bohemian situation. Referring to his restraint in dealing with 
George of Podebrady he observed:
, have done this for the Emperor out of love for 
tM^littl*ten and requested mercy for him. We must do 
^  f°r the brer's sake, since he L eorgej aided him in his trouble, and if the Smperor 
did not submit to his wishes he would become his enemy.98
Pius II was well aware of Frederick's vulnerable political
^oigt, oe. sijb., Ill, p. k87.
95Chmel, oe. ci£., No. 3992.
was published under the title*"!)3 edlt®d frora the Breslau archives 
Johann Weinrich S o t o n J a ^ L  5 nach Rom deputirten Magisters,
Bericht an den Rath," S c h l e s i e n ™ ° h f d ™ S^ i cus von Breslau. 169-183. —  en, Jiedgm jet£, (Januar, 1806),
97
shortly °ity'S "tentative
he was suspected of Bohemian'sympathies! lre’,ent canM ab°ut “hen 
98T, .,
— M., p. 177; Markgraf, oe. cit.r p. 2^ 5.
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position. The threats which several Electors had expressed recently 
against Frederick were still fresh in his mind." Nevertheless he 
chose to honor his ties with the Emperor and gave heed to his request, 
even though it was not to his immediate advantage. More than in any 
previous or subsequent pontificate, personal friendship constituted 
the basis of imperial papal relations. Contemporary opinion confirmed 
this. A statement probably made by Albert of Brandenburg and possibly 
overestimating the status of the Emperor read:
Item den babst zu enthalten, durch was ursach mocht 
es bass gescheen denn durch den keyser, der sein ge-
In w-i!!v 3iS V^ *Wyund eines hasens, nachdem der babst 
ist?ioo er2°Sen Und dem ytzmidlgen keyser
Frederick's efforts cn behalf of Podebrady were hindered by
the Bohemian monarch himself. When Pius II requested the Emperor to
notify him of George's proposals cn October 2, 11b63,101 Frederick
could not reply for he had not received any. Podebrady finally agreed
to send a delegate to Neustadt in March, UtM, with the intention of
initiating direct negotiations with Rome. The action apparently came
in response to pressure exerted by Frederick 111. A contemporary docu- 
ment stated:
dJkBni* ab?ma}S d®  kayser geschriben von
99cSee the subsequent discussion. 
Palacky, o^ . cit., No. 312.
verkundt und hat der konig geantwurt, er woll sein bot- 
schaft in kurz zu dem kayer darumb schicken, solcher 
botschaft man wartet, und als ich verstee, so wil den 
babst die ding nicht lenger ruen lassen.102
When Podebrady1s delegates reached Vienna in mid-March the 
Roman Cirria was requested to send a legate with whom George could not 
only settle all disputes but before whom he could clear himself of 
all false accusations. The Bohemian King promised to reveal to both 
heads of Christendom that he was a good Catholic. Everything humanly 
possible would be done to unite Bohemia and the Church. The late date 
k^is profession was excused on the basis of circumstantial diffi­
culties.103 The Bohemian proposals were presented by Procop of Rab- 
stein in the presence of Frederick III and the Bishops of Torcello and 
Lavant. The Bishop of Torcello protested that George's proposals were 
only a form of procrastination. He stated that all subsequent negoti­
ations would be dependent on Podebrady1s complete agreement with the 
104atholic faith. On his return to Bohemia Procop seriously urged 
his lord to submit to Roman jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the time when 
Frederick could sever his connections with George had still not 
arrived. Thus the Emperor assured him of his support through Johann
321
102 .
1 “°P-er» -22* £it., p. 103. Although the document is not 
precisely dated, Kluckhohn, o£. cit., p. 244 feels that it was formu­lated in the first half of December, 1463.
103
jr. ?• S£ler» gegchicfrtsQhreiber der Husitischen Beweeum in
( ° K ? F  f  uF°nteS Rerum Austriacarum. Scriptor^  Wienf  1866), part III, Anhang, No. 1. ’
104Palacky, og. cit., No. 315.
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Rohrbacher, who accompanied the Bohemian legates back to Prague. Fred­
erick also sent the Bishops of Lavant and Torcello to Rome in order to 
prevent the organization of any alliance against Podebrady. Pope Pius 
refused to be deterred from the course he had set for himself. In the 
last consistory held at the Vatican (June 16, 1464) during Pius' ponti­
ficate it was decided that Podebrady should be summoned to Rome, and 
the bull of citation was drawn up before the death of Pius.10-*
A superficial examination of imperial-papal relations during 
Bohemia's controversy with the Roman See suggests a waning of interest 
in the defensive alliance which united the two parties. The obvious 
fact that each party was negotiating with Podebrady from different 
points of view would support the conjecture. In order to clarify this 
perspective, it must be argued that the papal disregard of imperial 
consideration in seeking to reconcile Bohemia with the Apostolic Chair 
was an immediate product of the Pius' desire for unity in Christendom, 
in order that a crusade might be launched. Pius II, as always, was 
convinced of the grave importance of his present mission and, character­
istically, did not attempt to relate his contemporary position to a har­
monious pattern. Indeed, the entire career of Aeneas Sylvius revealed 
no real overall consistency, although he was true to the inner motiva­
tions of a given moment. In his dealings with Podebrady, Pius acted in
• Markgraf, ”Das Verhaltniss des Konigs Georg von Bohmen z 
rfof^PiUS I^Io’ li|,62-l464," Forschungen zur Deutschen Geschichte- IX 
UB69;, 256-58. The bull of citation is published in J. Cugnoni, 
^ene^ e Silvii Piccolomini Senensis gui postea fuit Pius II Pont. Max. 
Qsexa, Inedrta (Roma, 1883), pp. 145-54.
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good faith, even though he insisted upon the unequivocal supremacy of 
the Roman See. During the preliminary negotiations the Pope failed to 
ascertain the true intents of the King of Bohemia, but was quick to 
deal more harshly when he suspected George’s motives. The relative 
positions of Pope and Emperor were not unrelated to the respective 
policies they pursued. During this time Frederick's political posi­
tion was of no consequence. His hereditary lands were badly ravaged 
by marauding bands, while administratively the dual role of Prince and 
Emperor proved disastrous. Consequently Frederick's dependence on 
Podebrady was a survival tactic and did not indicate the termination 
of his friendly orientation towards the Papacy. Since it was a matter 
of expediency or extinction Frederick followed the accepted fifteenth 
century practice and chose the former. Although Pius was concerned 
with submission of Podebrady, while Frederick was required to appease 
the Bohemian monarch, Pius II never took advantage of Frederick's awk­
ward position by demanding that Frederick relinquish his control over 
the religious establishments in his hereditary lands. The Bohemian 
situation failed to indicate the true dimensions of Frederick's con­
nection with the Papacy. Several ecclesiastical-political events in 
Germany revealed additional aspects of this relationship.
Frederick's alliance with Podebrady was also conditioned by a 
grim struggle within Germany itself. On March 1, 1461, the Electors 
of Mainz, Brandenburg, and the Palatinate scheduled a Diet at Frank­
fort and ordered Frederick to attend. The action was a direct challenge 
to imperial authority.
Wo aber ewer ma,jestat auff die zeit nit erscheinen, 
sonnder aussbleiben wurde— so bedingen wir gen gotte
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und der gantzen welt daz der gepruch zu all on gut an 
mis nit erwenndet noch erwennden sol nach unsern ver- 
miigen, und wollen alsdann nichtz destraynnder hanndeln, 
ffirnemen, betrachten und besliessen, was die gemein 
kristenlich, des reichs und Teutscher lannde notdurfft 
heischet und tun als wir Gott dem herrn, dem gemeinen * 
niitze und uns selber wol schuldig und pflichtig sein.106
Frederick responded to this threat by ordering the city of Frankfort 
to refuse its facilities to the Diet.10? In submitting to the Emper­
or's request the city council wrote to the Electors.
. . . und biden dieselbe uwer furstliche gnade under- 
teniclich mit ganczem fliss daz uwer gnade die vorgemelte 
schrifft und die pflicht, domyde wir sinen keiserlichen 
gnaden gewant sin, gnediclich innemen und besynnen wullet 
und uns zu disen zyten domyde ubersehen . . .108
In answer to a request for a more definite commitment, 109 the city 
replied that in view of their obligation to the Emperor the electors 
would be barred from its gates. 110
This action was not a concession to Frederick's might. A 
dispatch which was never sent to the Emperor had requested the with­
drawal of the order and somewhat casually noted that the deposition 
of an Emperor always took place in Rense and not Frankfort. The city 
assured the Emperor, however, that no such a move was contemplated. 111







The Electors finally transferred the Diet to Mainz on May 21, 1461.
TIPTwo days later Frankfort informed the Emperor of this action. Less 
than a month later Frederick thanked the city for its obedience and re­
quested that it never allow an assembly of princes and Electors within 
its gates without the express knowledge and will of the Etaperor.^ 3
In view of the multiple difficulties facing the Emperor, Pius II 
forwarded a personal letter of sympathy to him, as a tribute to their 
personal friendship.
The world hates quiet rulers. They love the robbers, 
the blood-thirsty, the baseness of every wicked man, and 
infidels similar to themselves. Because you are gentle 
and wish to live quietly and comfortably, you are opposed 
to the world and the world is opposed to you. You feel 
your wounds. Let not your soul be disturbed. Blessed 
are they, the Lord says, who suffer persecution on account 
of righteousness.
In 1459 Archbishop Dietrich of Mainz died.^^ When Diether 
of Isenburg was elected to succeed him Pius II attempted to persuade 
Diether to agree to the levy of the Turkish tithe in Germany. To 
facilitate further progress on the subject Diether was invited to the
112Ibid.. No. 257.
113£bid., No. 259. Frankfort's action was in accordance with 
a time honored policy. In past centuries the city remained true to 
the oaths it had sworn if an attempt was made to elect an anti-king. 
If a double election occured, the city remained neutral. G. Beckmann, 
"Das mittelalterliche Frankfurt am Main als Schauplatz von Reichs- 
und Wahltagen," Archjv fur Frankfurts Geschichte und Kunst. Fol^ e
II (1889), 119. ----------------
114Dated December 31, 1462, Jordan, o^ . cit., PP. 157-58.
1:L%is death occured on May 6, 1459. C. Eubel, Hierarch la 
£atholica Medii Aevi (Monasterii, 191*0, II, p. 84.
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Mantuan Congress. Instead, the Archbishop sent a proctor to arrange 
about the payment of annates. When these obligations were repudiated, 
Diether was summoned to Rome to account for his actions. In order to 
gain support for his obstinacy the Archbishop attempted to capitalize 
on the anti-imperial and anti-papal sentiments in Germany. Following 
his refusal to go to Rome he summoned the previously discussed elec­
toral Diet, ordered the Emperor to appear in the Empire, appealed 
against tithes and indulgences and advocated a general Council. The 
excommunicated Gregor Heimburg also found refuge at his court. When 
the judges of the papal Camera excommunicated Diether for refusing to 
pay his debts the latter again appealed to a future Council. The Arch­
bishop doubtlessly desired to intimidate the curia and escape the 
financial commitments he had made. For this action he was placed under 
church censure.11^  Podebrady1s scheme to usurp the Reman Kingship and 
overthrow the Pope soon found an eager ally in Diether of Mainz. 11'7 In 
general, however, German response to the Archbishop's radicalism wa.s 
strangely lacking, in part due to the loyalty which the Archbishop of 
Trier and the Elector of Saxony as well as the Margrave of Brandenburg 
retained for the Emperor.
ll6The Pope warned Diether throu^ i the Margrave of Albert 
randenburg and indicated that he would soon take definite action. Raynaldus, op. cit., ad an. 1461, Mo. 18.
117
T h,w  eo+Th6 JrchJlsh°P announced, "There are two objects upon which
f J +T + if’V  Can aCGQmPlish them I shall die happy. Oneis that we should depose our feeble Emperor and put a better man in
his place. The other is that we free ourselves from the yoke of the Apostolic See." Cugnoni, op. cit., p. 207.
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The immediate threat of Diether's pronouncements alarmed both
the Pope and the Emperor. Frederick designated Diether as his most
dangerous enemy. In a letter to Pius Frederick pointed out the
factionalism which characterized the Empire. To avert this menace
he urged a united policy on the part of Pope and Emperor, especially
as concerned ecclesiastical investiture. The Emperor gravely warned
118the Pope against allowing Diether to be consecrated Archbishop.
Both the Einperor and Pope soon consolidated their programs to meet 
the new threat. Frederick began to negotiate peace with Hungary 
while Pius wrote letters to all the German princes defending his 
action in the matter of the Turkish tithe. The preparations for 
Diether's downfall were made in utmost secrecy. Pius reaffirmed his 
union with the Emperor, a matter which was possibly facilitated by 
Margrave Charles of Baden, who was married to Frederick's sister. 119 
Pope Pius appointed Werner of Flassland as his personal agent and dis­
patched him to Germany with the authorization to initiate a new elec-
120tion for the Archbishop of Mainz. In case a new election was 
impossible circumstantially, Werner was to negotiate with one of 
the chief authorities of the Cathedral Chapter in view of a direct
Birk, "Urkunden-Auszuge zur Geschichte Kaiser Friedrich 
des III in den Jahren 1452-1467,” Archiv fur Kunde osterreichischer 
Geschichts-Quellen. XI (1853), 158-60.
119The Elector of the Palatinate accused him of this in a 
letter dated April 9, 1462. Kremer, oe. cit., No. LXXXIII. Previ­
ously the Margrave had denied his implication in the matter. Ibid.. No. IiXXII.
120Raynaldus, ££. cit.. ad an. 1461, No. 20.
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papal appointment. In consultation with Adolf of Nassau a secret
meeting was held in Cologne which was attended by Archbishop John of
Trier, his two brothers Bishop George of Metz and Margrave Charles of
Baden, Count Ulrich of Wurttemberg and Lewis of Hessen. The friends
of Adolf pledged their support should the Papacy appoint him to
Diether's post. Meanwhile Pius, in agreement with five cardinals,
121decreed Diether's deposition. The necessary bulls and briefs for
122such an action were secretly prepared. The officials of the Mainz
Archbishopric were absolved of their vows to Diether, and were ordered
to give their allegiance to Adolf of Nassau under threat of excommuni- 
123cation. Armed with these documents, Werner of Flassland returned to 
Mainz.
In the meantime the Diet of Frankfort was forbidden to meet
12kat that location by Emperor Frederick. The Diet was therefore 
transferred to Mainz. The only Electors who attended were Diether 
and the Count of the Palatinate. The Pope also sent representatives
121Gragg, o p . cit.. p. 420. The undignified character of the 
whole procedure reflected the flavor of typical fifteenth century 
papal politics.
122The bulls for the deposition of Diether are published in 
Raynaldus, og. cit., ad an. 1461, Nos. 21-25.
123The bulls to the officials of Mainz are given in V. F, de 
Gudenus (ed.), Codex diplomaticus anecdotorum res Moguntinas illus- 
trantium (Francofurti, 1758), IV, No. l6l; Muller, 0£. cit., p. 37. 
Regarding the bull threatening excommunication see Ibid., p. 36.
12kThe Emperor not only forbade Frankfort to host the Diet, 
but sent his Marshal, Henry of Pappenheim, throughout the Empire to 
dissuade and threaten those who might have been disposed to attend 
the Diet.
The deliberations largely concerned ecclesiastical matters, but the
assembly separated without any definite conclusions.
Much of Diether's support was lost when the papal legates
attending the Diet declared that it had never been the intention of
the Pope to burden the German Nation in opposition to the wishes of
its princes and prelates.12^  Once the princes were convinced that
they were free from the financial burdens of the crusade they forgot
their grand projects of a general Council and left Diether to his 
fate.126
On October 2, 1461, Diether's deposition by the Pope was pub­
lished in Mainz. 127 Diether, taken by complete surprise, made his es­
cape and called on the Count of the Palatinate for help. Prior to
leaving Mainz however, he issued an apology in which he defended his
128
case. Both sides gathered their forces aM prepared for war, 9
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while Heimburg came to plead the wrongs of Sigismund of the Tyrol.
125p , , „ _alacky, Geschichte von Bohmen, IV, 2, p. 184.
126
Gebhardt, o^ . cit., p. 51; K. Menzel. Diether von 
Erzbischof von Main*, 1452-1463 (Erlangen, 186l)7"p. 146“--------
127Pius had informed Frederick of Diether's impending deno 
siUon on August 21 M l ;  this was perhaps an W i S n r f  
gravity with which both parties viewed Diether's threat.
128Muller, oe. cit., pp. 38-46.
129Adolf forwarded the Papal 3uns to all the neutral princes
S  -ivJneinaS ^ 16rUeSted tIieir His letter t0 Vilhelm, of Saxony, , ” ? “ ®r' °P* cit., p. 46, and one to the city of Speier -in the SEeierische Chronik. See Mone, q q . cit., I, p> 45?. P in
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although the respective allies showed little enthusiasm for the venture,
Nevertheless, on November 19, Diether made a new alliance with the
Count of the Palatinate for the vindication of his claim to the Arch- 
130bishopric. A fierce conflict ensued involving all the country bor­
dering on the Rhine. Pius was quick to act. On January 8, 1462, he 
published a severe bull against Diether. All lands belonging to the 
Archbishopric were to be given up within eighteen days. In the event 
of his disobedience the gravest penalties would be inflicted upon his
party, and all places in which they might sojourn were to be laid under 
131an interdict. On February 1, the proceedings against Diether were 
justified in a detailed memorandum which insisted on the execution of 
the papal censures. In view of Diether's continued obstinacy, a fresh 
encyclical was issued on May 1, 1462, which called upon all the estates 
of the Empire to assist Adolf of Nassau.1^2 Diether's star began to 
descend when the city of Mainz was captured by enemy forces on October 
28, 1462. Finally in the spring of 1463, Rupert,1^  the brother of 
the Count of the Palatinate, succeeded in obtaining a truce from
130Menzel, op. cit.. p. l65f.
131The bull, wrongly dated 1461, is published in C. F. Sattler, 
Geschichte des Herzogtums Ifortenberg unter der Regierung der Graven 
(Ulm, 1767), II, Beylagen, pp, 194-8. On January 18, 1463, the German 
clergy were commanded to publish the bull against Diether. Raynaldus, 
°E* Sit., ad an. 1463, No. 88.
132Gudenus, 2 2. cit., IV, pp. 150-53.
•Rupert' s election as Archbishop of Cologne was confirmed 
on May 25, 1464, by Pius II. T. J. Lacomblet (ed.), Urkundenbuch 
fur die Geschichte des N.tederrheins (DUsseldorf, I858), IV, No. 324.
April 24 to November 11, 1463. In October, 1463, Diether finally 
entered into an agreement with Adolf.^ In return for retaining a 
small piece of territory, Diether renounced the Archbishopric, while 
Adolf promised to be responsible for all his debts, and bring about 
his reconciliation with the Pope and the Emperor. In a special cere­
mony not long afterward he received absolution from the sentence of 
135excommunication. The Count Palatine Frederick wa.s received back 
into the communion of the Church at a Diet at Worms in March, 1464.x36
The episode involving Diether of Mainz, the Papacy and the Em­
pire indicated that the Concordat of Vienna still functioned upon its 
original basis— that of a defensive alliance. The diverse ends pur­
sued by the Papacy and the Emperor in the contemporary difficulties 
with Podebrady of Bohemia were conditioned by individual aims. The 
personal friendship which existed between Pius II and Frederick brid­
ged the international tensions rather well in this case but the basic 
sphere of operation remained on a territorial level. The affair with 
Archbishop Diether was no exception. In this particular episode an 
international threat comprising two forces strengthened the imperial- 
papal bond. Pius II was only too anxious to wield the sword of the 
Holy See against the ugly though at this time artificial serpent of 
conciliarism. Frederick faced a monster potentially even more
1^enzel, op. cit., p. 213f.
135Gragg, 2B. cit., p. 839.
•^Kremer, o£. cit.. No. XCIII.
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dangerous— a Diet of the Empire dominated by the German princes. The 
common danger produced a unified international policy. This oversimpli­
fication best defines the essence of imperial-papal relations at this 
point, but probably minimizes the historical subtleties involved.
For Frederick the deposition of Diether eliminated a threat to im­
perial stability, for Pius it marked the silencing of rather serious 
opposition to the rule of the Reman See in Germany. The Concordat of 
Vienna was now little short of a purely political instrument. Pius 
saw that the basis of his triumph lay within the political structure 
of his day. The appeal to apostolic authority or the threat of papal 
excommunication meant little in actual practice. Only when these 
forces were combined with the remnants of imperial authority and the 




THE DECLINE OF IMPERIAL-PAPAL SOLIDARITY
The termination of the imperial-papal struggle with Diether 
represented only a part of the German crisis. The previously men­
tioned quarrel between Cardinal Cusa and Sigismund of the Tyrol had 
been temporarily settled at Mantua only to break out afresh after 
Cusa's departure to his Bishopric. In the course of subsequent nego­
tiations between Cusa and Sigismund in April, 1460, at Bruneck, the 
town was surrounded by the Duke's forces and Cusa was forced to sub­
mit to Sigismund's demands.1 As soon as he could, Cusa fled to the 
Pope at Siena and requested aid. The latter could not overlook the 
affront given the Cardinal. The Pope sent a letter to Sigismund in­
dicating that his action had involved him in the penalty of excommuni­
cation. Pius stipulated that prior to any papal action in his case, 
he would, hear him personally at a consistory to be held on August 4,
1460. In his reply Sigismund listed his grievances in detail and
3appealed to a well instructed Pope. While the Duke revealed a
J^. Chmel, Materialien zur osterreichischen Geschichte. Aus 
Archiven und Bibliotheken (Wjenf I838), II, No. CLXIIa; F. A. Sin- 
nacher, Beytrage zur Geschichte der bischoflichen Kirche Saben und 
Brixen in Tyrol (Brixen, 1828), VI, p. 491.
T^his decree was issued on May 19, 1460. J. M. Dux, Der 
deutsche Cardinal Nicolaus von Cusa und die Kirche seiner Zeit 
(Regensburg, 1847), II, Beilage III.
3The first appeal of Duke Sigismund was dated July 14, 1460.
A. Jager, Per Streit des Nicolaus von Cusa mit dem Herzoge Sigmund 
von Osterreich als Grafen von Tirol. Ein Bruckstiick aus den Kampfen 
dgr weltljchen ijn£ kirchlichen Gewalt nach dem Concilium von Basel 
(Innsbruck, 186l), II, pp. 76-99; Sinnacher, 03. £ii., VI, p. 498.
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conciliatory attitude, he stood on the ground of the conciliar move­
ment when he declared himself against the arbitrary action of an indi­
vidual Pope. Since a similar trend was being fostered by the Archbishop 
Diether of Mainz, Pius was determined to use all his powers against Sig­
ismund. Imperial interests were even more in evidence than in the 
Mainz dispute. Sigismund's excommunication was not purely a papal ges­
ture but also an expression of imperial territorial policy. From the 
Emperor's standpoint, the Duke of the Tyrol had usurped the Austrian 
hereditary lands and his excommunication and deposition could only 
serve Frederick's interests. The imperial-papal alliance against Sig­
ismund proceeded cautiously lest rapid action betray their innermost 
motives.
Prior to issuing the official decree of excommunication Pius 
officially requested the Emperor to excuse any further action of the 
Papacy against Sigismund if it were necessitated by religious con­
siderations. After explaining the events which had transpired Pius II 
tactfully presented the position of the Papacy in the matter.
e^, however, to whom an insult of our cardinals is nothing 
new, are deeply grieved over such a transgression. If we 
could ignore the offense, we would do so for the sake of the 
lords of Austria, who have done such great services for us.
The nature of the crime, which was in and of itself great, 
impious and against the Apostolic Chair, and whose perpetra­
tion represents a grave sin in terms of example rather than 
act, demands suitable censure from our hand. The College of 
ardinals and the Roman Curia demand their rights; the entire 
hurch of God, which sorrows over its insult, demands the 
same, and we, much though we should like to, could not ignore 
such notorius boldness without bringing dishonor upon our 
name. Therefore we must excuse our present position before 
your -ordliness, which we love above all else in this world 
and request that you, when you hear of our severe treatment
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of the case, attribute this to the fulfillment of our duty 
in upholding the righteousness and honor of the Apostolic 
Chair. ... Your majesty, which has always symbolized a 
guardian of righteousness, ought therefore to allow it to 
consider the punishment of a member of your House higher 
than the welfare of the Church in general, especially since 
it concerns the betterment of one gone astray. . . . Although 
we do not expect your participation in this action, we ur­
gently request that you excuse us in our position,^
Thus the entire papal position towards the trespass of Sigis­
mund was laid bare. For the Papacy, the Bruneck episode constituted 
a severe attack upon its honor, the College of Cardinals and the 
Church as a whole. It was a signal for anyone who so desired to at­
tack the Church; it was an attack upon the freedom of the Church and 
upon the inviolability of its members*
Pope Pius had nothing to fear from the Emperor. It was quite 
probable that he had heard of the Bruneck affair at the same time as 
Pope Pius was informed of it. In April, 1460, Frederick sent Sigis­
mund an admonition to restore the property he had seized and to make 
his peace with Cusa.^  Frederick wrote:
Since we as Emperor and Prince of Austria are the founder 
and protector of the church at Brixen, and since the Bishop 
of Brixen as a cardinal of the holy Roman Church and as a 
prince of the Empire is very close to us, we were not happy 
to hear of your action, and must confess that it seems very
Jager, op. cii., pp. 4-7-48.
I^n his report to the Pope on June 3, 1460, Franz of Toledo 
informed Pius that the Emperor had been aware of Sigismund1s trespass 
before the papal brief arrived. He had been told of the episode by 
the Bishop of Gurk and had immediately sent Sigismund an admonishment. 
F. A. Scharpff. Dgr Cardinal und Bishof Nicolaus von Cusa. Ein Bei- 
i£ag -SUE Geschichte der Reformation innerhalb der Katholischen Kirche 
is p mfashn^ en Jahrhund^ rt (Mainz, 1843), p. 327; Jager, op. cit..P. 49.
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strange to us. Therefore we commend ourselves to your 
love, and by our imperial might order you to return the 
castle and everything else which you forcibly took from 
the Bishop of Brixen.®
A spirit of resentment against Sigismund of Tyrol soon perme­
ated the imperial court. The influence of Cesarini, who was located 
at Ofen in the interests of a crusade, cannot be overlooked in this 
connection. Thus on June 6, 1460, he sought to persuade Cardinal Bes- 
sarion in Vienna to admonish the iSnperor to free the captured eccles­
iastical princes. In a second letter written on the same day Cesarini 
attacked the indifference of the Archbishop of Salzburg for failing to 
act in the face of such sacrilege.? The Emperor's favorable reaction 
to the brief of Pius II was a foregone conclusion. Peter of Toledo 
who had delivered the Brief to Frederick III reported:
Almost all of the councils of his Majesty endorse the 
action of the Holy Father. ... The Emperor has read the 
brief even though it was difficult for him, and has listened 
to it with great attentiveness and approval. He regrets the 
insult which has been committed against the Church, especi­
ally since it was directed against a Cardinal whom he loved, 
and honored for his virtue. Duke Sigismund may be my next of 
kin and a member of the House of Austria, but righteousness 
and religious freedom are above blood-relationship; I have 
sworn to uphold these concepts to the best of my ability.®
With Frederick unofficially committed to the papal cause, 
Sigismund*s humiliation could be pursued with greater confidence. At 
first the Cardinal attempted to proceed by intimidation. He claimed
J^ager, ap. cit., pp. 49-50.
'Ibid.. p. 50. 
g
5Md., pp. 51-52. See also Scharpff, op. cit., p. 327.
he had prevented the Duke1s annihilation by an unidentified array of 
sixty thousand men. Furthermore, he let it be known that all the 
lands of Sigismund would be seized by the Emperor in the event of his 
excommunication. 9 Cusa was probably aware of the general status of 
imperial-papal relations and was anxious to make the best use of his 
alliance. He made every effort to reinstate himself in his Archbishop­
ric. When the cathedral chapter requested the necessary authority to 
maintain a semblance of order its plea was unequivocally denied, even 
though the Cardinal had agreed to this in the Bruneck agreement.1  ^ Cusa 
simultaneously continued to insist that the Duke restore all the terri­
tory to him which he extorted by violence. 11 If the Duke refused, CUsa
threatened to nullify the agreement which the Duke had forced him to 
12sign.
Blumenau, as Sigismund«s proctor, appealed his master*s case 
before Pius II at Sienna on August 4, 1460. He was not even granted
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The letter to an unknown addressee was written fran Siena 
sometime in May, 1460. It is published in E. M. Lichnowskv. Geschichte 
dgg Hawses Habsburg (Wien, 1842), VI, Undated Letters, No. 6; jLer op. cit., II, pp. 58-60. ’ B »
10Cusa sharply attacked the presumptousness of the Chapter in 
a letter written on June 19, 1460. Sinnacher, op. cit.. VI, p. 493* 
Scharpff, o£. cit., p. 322; Jager, oe. cit., II, pp. 66-67.
i:LThis was the main burden of Cusa's letter (June 20, 1460) 
to Sigismund s later procter before the Papacy, Blumenau. Scharpff,
EE. Sit., p. 321; Jager, oe. cj£., II, p. 68.
12 t~ •2E* PP« 70-71; In Scharpff, loc. cit. the letter is dated July 6, 1460. --
the litterae aRP.stoljoae.1^  In a hypocritical act of benevolence 
Sigismund was given four days of grace in which to repent. Thereupon 
Blumenau was seized and imprisoned as a heretic.1^  To Pius II, still 
pulsating with the ideology which had given birth to the Bull Execra- 
bilis, any appeal was obnoxious. On August 8 he excommunicated Sigis­
mund and all who had joined him against Cusa.1^
On August k Cusa was required to prepare a report for the Em­
peror, informing him that since Sigismund had not appeared on the ap­
pointed day, he would be excommunicated on August 8. Frederick was 
further informed that the Brixner Church was now under papal juris- 
diction* Cusa continued:
t v,Si£?e the Wi!h 0f the Holy Father is an honorable one, humbly request that your Majesty will order the captain 
of Ortemburg and other authorities to make sure that the 
wishes of our holiest Father are not disregarded by Duke 
lgismund, . . . May it please your Majesty to make a
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The term has been described as "die dem Anwalt Prthoii+o tu 
14a
Monac 21?  fol0U??7°f *5® PrOCef?ings was Preserved in Cod. lat.,. * .p* 32?, and was published by Chmel
c.lesj,astici (B a r r i - D u c S ^ l S ^ ) ^ L^ leS — “ entirety in M. Goldast (Li ) p ‘.No* 34 * given in its
1612), II, p. i583 a sttnJi (Francofurti,
all contact with Sigismund? D c^ o50rci+e ^  * ? * ? * * 5  Duke*01"Bull related to t h e ^  £ g £  f.
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decision on the matter, and inform his Holiness of your 
will as quickly as possible.
Cusa's letter also contained a Brief of the Pope directed to the
Emperor. Pius informed Frederick that he had taken over the control
of the Brixner Church and in view of administrating the sane proposed
that both a papal as well as an imperial military contingent be placed
in the city of Bruneck to protect it against Sigismund.^ A letter
was also sent to the captain at Bruneck informing him of the Pope's
intentions.1®
In view of the steadfast loyalty of the inhabitants of the
Tyrol, Heimburg was encouraged to formulate another appeal to the
Papacy. On August 13, 1460, he issued his classic defiance of the
Papacy which was calculated in its every phase to render the breach
19with Rome irreparable. This new appeal was disseminated throughout 
Germany and Italy. It formed the prelude to a war of words between 
the Pope and Heimburg which gave rise to a great display of literary 
talent, but contributed little to the dignity of the Holy See. Heim­
burg appealed to a future Pope, an ecumenical Council and to all who
Jager, oe. cit., pp. 85-86. Written at Siena on August 4,
1460.
Ibid. This is one of the few letters which Cardinal Cusa 
wrote in German.
19The pamphlet is published in M. Freher (ed.), and B. G. 
Struve (ed.), Rerum Germanicarum Scriotores (Argentorati, 1717), II, 
pp. 203-206.
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loved justice. The document was meant for general publication and 
was addressed directly to the public opinion of Christendom. Heimburg 
never forgot the Aeneas Sylvius who was the first secretary of Fred­
erick III, and now wished to pit German public feeling against the
20papal hierarchy. Pius responded in kind, but entirely to his dis­
advantage. By his attack on Heimburg the Pope made a serious mistake, 
for he gave a private person an opportunity of making a personal on­
slaught upon the Papacy. When Heimburg wrote in Sigismund's name he 
could only speak in terms of general ecclesiastical grievances, but 
when the Pope became involved with him as an individual, he exposed 
himself to the indignity of a private attack, which was beneath his 
ecclesiastical dignity to answer. The dispute with Sigismund involved 
the Papacy with a multitude of hostile forces, but in all these diffi­
culties Pius could still count on the Emperor's loyalty.
The first month of 1461 found Pius in a precarious position.
The Pope appealed to all sides for some one to defeat Sigismund, but
even his ally the Duke of Milan refused to move and would not allow
the excommunication to be published in his dominions. The Emperor's
moral support did not produce an array. Pius vainly tried to incite
the Swiss, but they used the occasion to make a peace which satisfied
21their own interests. In order to open a new stage in the dispute
20A good discussion regarding the nature of the controversy is 
given in Voigt, QJ2* .cjt., HI, pp. 375-88; also M, Creighton, A History 
sf ihg. Papacy frora t^ e Great Schism t&e Sack of Rome (London, 1903),III, pp. 258-261. ---
21Voigt, cit., HI, PP. 390-92.
Pius issued a citation to Sigismund on January 23, 1461, and ordered 
him to appear within sixty days and stand trial on a charge of heresy. 
Sigismund and Heimburg answered the citation by continuing their policy 
of appeal. They issued another major manifesto on March 16, l46l.^ 3 
The contest now entered upon its last stage. The exasperation of both 
parties was still intense and the verbal battle continued. The concili­
atory efforts of the Venetians were frustrated by the intensity of the 
quarrel.^
Throughout the crisis, a definite solidarity still characterized 
imperial-papal relations. In the course of reporting the failure of 
his diplomatic mission Bessarion wrote:
I have the highest respect for Frederick III because 
I know how much your Holiness and the Emperor support 
each other. For this reason those men [the German princes] 
are dissatisfied, and are quite open in admitting it. 25
Frederick's unfeigned support of the Papacy was apparent when 
he made an effort to obtain three thousand soldiers from the Swiss in
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Partially published in Raynaldus, op. cit.. ad an. 1461,
No. 11, completely in Goldast, op. cit.. II, p. 1579.
23Goldast, cit., II, p. 1580. It is also listed in J. 
Chmel, Regesta Chronologico-Djplomatica Friderici III. Romanorum 
Imperatoris (Wien, 1859), No. 3860.
24A detailed account of the Venetian mediation is given in 
Jager, 2E. cit., PP. 274-402.
25As translated by Pastor, op. ci£., II, p. 135 from the Secret 
Archives of the Vatican, Lib. brevium 9, f. 233b.
early April. These were to be used against Sigismund and Albert of 
Austria. The negotiations with the Swiss were unsuccessful. In his 
relationship with Frederick, Pius was careful to respect the interests 
of the House of Austria in his interdicts. Both the Emperor and his 
brother Albert were given the liberty to seize the Tyrol. Moreover, 
Pius specifically promised that the splendor of the Austrian House 
would not be obscured by the censures against Sigismund.2?
Pius II and Heimburg continued their verbal battle throughout 
1462-63. All attempts at settlement were rejected by the partici­
pants, who were deeply engrossed in plotting each other's downfall.
As late as February, 1463, Pius renewed all the censures which he had 
previously drawn up against Sigismund. Some modification in papal 
methodology was discernable, however. Instead of relying on threats, 
Pius formulated an indulgence for all who would pray for the repent­
ance of Sigismund, and his return to the Church. 28
The imperial decision to arbitrate in the dispute was not con­
ditioned by any foreign influences. During the month of August, 1463, 
Frederick's legate, John Hinderbach, appeared in Venice with the pro­
posal that the arbitration of the entire dispute be given over to the
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„ , , 26J. Birk, "Verzeichnis der Urkunden zur Geschichte des Hauses 
Habsburg E. M. Lichnowsky, 0£. cit., IV, Reg. for April 6, 1461;
H. Bett, Nicholas of Cusa (London, 1932), pp. 71-72.
2?Raynaldus, oj3. cit., ad an. 1461, No, 34.
tt p TheT5ulL was issued on February 24, 1463. DSx, o£. cit..II, Beilage IX; Jager, og. cit., II, p. 366.
King of the Romans. 7 The Venetians accepted the offer without any 
hesitation. Frederick's initiative in arbitrating the dispute was not 
conditioned by an unfeigned love of the Church. The modification of 
political circumstances rather than the efforts of Pius proved to be 
the final solution of the dispute. Frederick, who had been directly 
connected with the censures against Sigismund, had managed to strengthen 
his overall position considerably. On August 24, 1463, he had been re­
conciled with Hungary. The death of Albert of Austria in December,
1463, paved the way for a reconciliation between Frederick and Sigis­
mund, since Sigismund had lost an ally whose continual pressure upon 
Frederick had made the Emperor virtually helpless. In Germany Adolf 
of Nassau had surprised Mainz by night and driven out Diether. This 
event did much to restore the balance of power in Germany. Negotiation 
was again possible on the basis of equality.
On February 2, 1464, Frederick formally undertook the initiative 
in the dispute. In a letter addressed to Pius II he wrote:
Most Holy Father, it is time that this matter be settled.
The authority of the Church, as we see, is too little 
respected. In consideration of the times in which we live 
a little indulgence is necessary. We beg your Holiness to 
consent to the con tinuation of the negotiations and to 
commission the Bishop of Lavant to return to us. When the 
matter is settled and absolution is sought, we request you 
to give him authority to grant it together with the removal 
of the interdict and whatever else may be necessary for the 
complete restoration of peace. As soon as the matter of the 
restitution and things relating to it has been settled, We, 
in the name and place of our cousin, and in accordance with 
the mandate which we shall receive, will beg of your Holiness 
or your Commissary, absolution, removal of penalties, resti­
tution, and every-thing that is required.30
343
29
29Jager, op. cit.., pp. 403-4. 
3°Jager, ojd. ci£., II, pp. 414-15.
344
On February 2, the Emperor also informed Cusa of his proposal 
to the Papacy and expressed the hope that the dispute might soon be 
solved. Frederick III further asked that Cusa send an authorized pro­
curator to Neustadt for March 11, 1464.31 On February 24 Cusa notified 
the Roman King that he was sending his friend, Simon of Welen, to him. 
The Cardinal freely expressed his deepest concern to the Emperor.
After so many lengthy atrocities and personal injuries 
I demand of the Emperor, the founder and protector [of my 
Bishopric], my most respected judge and mediator, nothing 
else but that my church and its subjects may not suffer, 
even though I as a sinner deserve no h e a r i n g .32
A solution to the problem had now been found. Pius II could 
not express dissatisfaction with the new situation for the authority 
of the R can an See was duly recognized. On his part, Sigismund avoided 
the unpleasant task of personally prostrating himself before the Pope.
Pius II hesitated to accept the Emperor's proposals and gave 
the impression that he could not consent to Frederick's scheme. While 
he granted the Bishop of Lavant the authority to nullify the ban and 
interdict against Sigismund,33 he seriously questioned Frederick's 
proposal. "Shall we withdraw our censures,” Pius demanded, "shall we 
accuse ourselves of justice in order that he [Sigismund] may not have 
to confess his faults at absolution."3^  In spite of these objections 
to the imperial plans, Pius instructed his nuncio to accede to this
31Ibid.. p. 415.
32Ibid.. p. 416.
33Brief of March 1, 1464. Dux, ap. cit.. II, Beilage X.
3^ *Drief of March 1, 1464. Jager, op. cit., II, p. 417.
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demand if necessary.
A meeting designed to settle the Brixen dispute was held in 
Vienna-Neustadt in April, 1464. Besides the papal legate, Bishop 
Rudolf of Lavant, Cardinal Cusa sent Simon of Welen and John of Wel- 
dersheim, while Duke Sigismund was represented by Parcival of Annen- 
berg, Jacob Trapp and Leonhard of Weineck. On the imperial side the 
negotiations were carried on by Bishop Ulrich of Gurk. Others in­
cluded John Hinderbach and John Roit. The course of the proceedings 
cannot be precisely determined, but such records as exist indicate
3*5that considerable disinterest and procrastination was in evidence.-'-' 
Gradually the various counter proposals were agreed upon and in the 
middle of June, 1464, the Emperor was enabled to present a number of 
articles aimed at solving the dispute.^ In the main, Frederick pro­
posed that the Bishopric be returned to its former status and that all 
the persons who had joined Duke Sigismund be absolved and all the proc­
esses, interdicts and censures against them withdrawn. As for Duke 
Sigisraund personally, the Emperor advocated that the solution be left 
to his jurisdiction.
The imperial proposals were mainly adapted to suit the desires 
of Cusa and Pope Pius II. Sigismund^ submission to the proposals can 
be explained by two factors. One, that the Duke was willing to go to 
any lengths rather than submit to a personal humiliation before the
•^Ibid.. pp. 419-421. 
36Ibid., pp. 421-424.
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Papacy. Secondly, the fact that the Emperor undertook to aid Sigis­
mund in his territorial dispute with the Swiss Federation probably 
aided in modifying the disposition of the Duke.
Frederick III now took up the Duke's cause in earnest. With 
his head uncovered he sought pardon and absolution for Sigismund from 
the papal legate, the Bishop of Lavant.
Nevertheless our cousin, Duke Sigismund, believes what 
he has perpetrated upon the Cardinal, the Bishop of Brixen, 
he had to do on account of his position, and in order to 
facilitate the administration of his government. Thus he 
claims that he deserves no punishment. Disregarding all 
this, and for the sake of the Apostolic Chair in Rome and 
our Holy Father, the Pope, and in order that our cousin 
achieves a complete reconciliation with his Holiness, ... 
he requests that he be absolved from his sin. This, insofar 
as it is not against the honor, dignity and rank of his per­
son, and all others, of either ecclesiastical or secular 
station, within or outside of the land, who supported and co­
operated with him.37
On August 11, 1464, Nicholas of Cusa died and was followed 
three days later by Pius II. After the death of the Pope the negoti­
ations in Vienna-Neustadt progressed rapidly. In spite of the reti­
cence of Rudolf of Lavant, the efforts of Frederick had finally re­
sulted in a number of moderate proposals which satisfied both sides. 
These had been accepted prior to the death of the Pope and the Cardi­
nal. Sigismund had also given his official seal to a document declar­
ing his willingness to seek absolution from the Pope, arc! Frederick 
had officially requested the same from the Bishop of Lavant. The 
latter therefore refused to allow the deliberations to cease when 
Pope Pius died. The attending delegates undergirded the Emperor's
37Scharpff, og* cit.. PP. 377-78.
position by declaring that the authority invested in the papal dele­
gate was not erased with the Pope's death. Thus on August 25 the
38articles of reunification were formally accepted. The Bishopric of 
Brixen was to be returned to its rightful possessor and all ecclesi­
astical and secular persons were to be reinstated in their former pos­
sessions and ranks.
On September 2, 1464, the papal legate absolved Duke Sigismund 
and all his adherents from excommunication and all ecclesiastical cen­
sures. The events of the day constituted the basis of tw3 reports one 
of which gave rise to certain misrepresentations. The one was drawn 
up by Cardinal Jacob of Pavia who had not been present at the meeting 
and probably obtained his information from Simon of Welen, who had 
been present at the assembly, but had not witnessed the events of 
September 2.^ The Cardinal's report noted that the Emperor had
prostrated himself before the papal legate and did not rise until the
40latter absolved Sigismund.
The report of the papal legate, the Bishop of Lavant, related 
nothing which would suggest a prostrate, pleading Emperor. Rather, 
it stressed the simple dignity of events which were witnessed by only 
a very limited number of individuals. The document read:
3®Chmel, Regesta. Anhang, pp. CLXIV-CLXIX; Sinnacher, op. 
cit.. VI, p. 524.
39The embellishment of the narrative was rather natural for 
one whose party had not fared too well in the negotiations.
40Raynaldus, oq. cit.. ad an., 1464, No. 35.
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After this we spoke with Duke Sigismund in the person 
of the Roman Emperor Frederick, who, out of respect for 
the Apostolic Chair, arose from his throne and with un­
covered head humbly and reverently bowed and requested 
forgiveness and absolution for Sigismund, as well as an 
end to his excommunication and other censures. He also 
requested that the interdict which had been placed upon 
his lands, and those of his adherents, be lifted.
Following Frederick's plea Duke Sigismund as well as all his 
adherents were absolved. On the same day the Bishop of Lavant noti­
fied the canon of the Brixen Bishopric, Michel of Natz, to proclaim
hothe event in all the churches of the realm. Thus one of the major 
struggles involving imperial-papal participation was successfully 
concluded after the death of Pope Pius II.
The obvious solidarity which characterized the imperial-papal 
bond in the Tyrol dispute was not entirely free of the strain of ex­
pediency, evident in the other events of the time. The Emperor1s 
dedicated opposition to Sigismund in the early stages of the struggle 
was based upon the political threat which he represented, especially 
as a potential participant in an alliance with Albert of Austria. 
Without a doubt there was still some religious motivation in Fred­
erick's adherance to the Papacy but a strong note of indifference 
overshadowed the religious sincerity and reasonable purity of motive 
which had characterized Frederick in his early reign. The Emperor's 
negotiations with the Swiss for a small mercenary army were not a 
propagandistic display, but indicative of Frederick's real need.
41Jager, op. cit., p. 427.
^2Ibid.. p. 428.
Since the territorial interests of Frederick concurred with the papal 
desire to restore authority in Brixen, this unsuccessful effort of 
Frederick may be said to have been wrought in the interests of the 
imperial-papal bond. Frederick's participation in the termination of 
the dispute was not energized by any convictions gained by a careful 
examination of the perspectives governing the operations of Pius II. 
His role as the arbitrator in the matter was an expression of his im­
proved international position. Pius had little choice but to accept 
his entreaties for Duke Sigismund.
The Pope could not demand or expect anything more.
The imperial majesty offered itself in substitutionary 
humiliation and satisfaction, which, since it presupposed 
Sigismund's consent, carried within itself his confession 
of guilt and his request for pardon. The authority of the 
papal Chair was satisfied and the honor of Sigismund was 
saved from a direct and personal a p o l o g y . 3^
A final dimension in the imperial-papal relations during the
pontificate of Pius II lay in the crusade projected by the latter.
The Pope's desire to reconcile Sigismund with the Church was a part
of his attempt to facilitate the launching of the crusade. A major
step in this direction was taken in the spring of 1463, when Pius set
about to establish peace between Frederick III and Matthias of Hun- 
44gary. It required four papal legates to arrange the terms, but 
peace was finally made in July. The details of the deliberation are
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uncertain but the general account left by the Pope in his 
indicates that a distinctive reluctance on the part of both rulers 
hampered the proceedings.^ Following the death of Albert the city of 
Vienna submitted to the Emperor's rule once more. One of the papal 
legates active in the negotiations, Rudolf of Rudesheim, Bishop of 
Lavant, remained in Neustadt after the conclusion of peace. He soon 
proceeded to advocate the projected crusade at the imperial court.
The bull of Pius II announcing the crusade was read to a special 
assembly of barons and prelates at Frederick's court. The presenta­
tion included the bulls concerning indulgences and the tithe. The 
Emperor praised the noble aspirations of the Pope and allowed the 
bulls to be circulated and published throughout Germany. All who so 
desired, were allowed to join the ranks of the crusaders. The tithe 
was imposed upon the clergy of Frederick's domains, although his per­
sonal contribution was to be determined only after special consulta­
tion. The nobility of the Empire were ordered to join the papal ven­
ture both by land and sea, nevertheless Frederick carefully avoided 
any concrete commitments as to the participation of his hereditary 
lands. The Pope and Emperor also agreed upon the men that should lead 
the armed forces of Europe in the crusade. Their choice for commander- 
in-chief in order of preference included the Margrave of Brandenburg,
A- Gragg, "The Commentaries of Pius II," Smith College 
(1957), 801-802. The f i n a l l ^ e " ^ m t h e  
papal ratification is given in Raynaldus, c^t., ad an. 1463.
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Duke Wilhelm of Saxony, the Margrave Charles of Baden and Count Ulrich 
of Wurttemberg. All declined the honor.^
The negotiations between the Ikperor and the Bishop of Lavant at 
Neustadt was Frederick's last communication with a representative of 
Pius II. The meeting marked an ironic and uneventful conclusion to 
the international drama in which the two men played leading roles. 
Although Pius was doubtlessly the dominant of the two; his rise to 
prominence would have been impossible except for Frederick's good 
pleasure. Both were most illustrative of the changes that were gradu­
ally passing over Europe. In both the modern and medieval spirit meet 
and each gave his distinctive emphasis to the ecclesiastical-political 
pattern. Ideologically, however, each remained committed to the medi­
eval image of Papacy and Empire. When Pius formulated his great reform 
bull following the failure of the Congress of Mantua he was extremely 
careful lest he infringe upon the dignity and freedom of the Apostolic
47
Chair. The enigma which characterized Frederick III also had its 
roots in this commitment. On the one hand he was required to repress 
territorial separation for the sake of the crumbling imperial tra­
dition, while on the other hand he had to disregard that ideology and 
its identification with the Papacy in order to pursue his own separatism 
and prevent his extinction. Pius represented the epoch in the history
46,,
, Grass* 22* £ii», PP. 846-47; E. Hocks, Pius II. und der Halb- 
morri (Freiburg 1m Breisgau, 1941), pp. 191-192.
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of the Church when reform was declared impossible, yet simultaneously 
the papal monarchy was careful to secure itself against such a revolu­
tion. Once more the Papacy was thrust into the forefront of European 
politics only to find no consistent pattern to which it could adapt 
itself. Momentarily both the Emperor and the Pope embraced the old 
institutional structure, although both were aware of its crumbling 
foundations. The bonds of friendship and religion could not control 
the unrest of ecclesiastical and political flux. Thus Pope and Emperor 
were held together by the dangers which threatened the institutions
40
they personified. Frederick's dual role presented a dilemma which 
no man could solve. Internationally he was forced to cling to the 
old; territorially, to follow a course which was destined to shatter 
his international commitment. Therefore both Pius II and Frederick III 
followed a policy keynoted by expediency and immediacy, which sought to 
retain the momentary gains and did not dare plan a permanent ecclesiasti- 
cal-political pattern.
During the pontificate of Pius II political circumstances had 
allowed considerable cooperation between the Pope and the Roman King. 
Personal friendship had given additional stability to the bond uniting 
Vienna and Rome. In Frederick's relations with the new Pope, Paul II, 
this aspect was virtually non-existent. Contemporary political develop­
ments were mainly instrumental in determining the Emperorfs policy to­
wards the new Pontiff. A brief survey of the salient features of the
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political structure of the day is therefore essential.
A secret meeting aimed at stabilizing the state of affairs with­
in the Empire was held at Prague during November, 1463. The partici­
pants included the representatives of Frederick III, Duke Lewis of 
Landshut, Margrave Albert, the Count of the Palatinate and George of 
Bohemia. A unified policy was finally agreed upon. The details of 
this new scheme were officially formulated at Eger on February 26, 
1464.^9 A new head tax, applicable to every inhabitant of the Empire 
over fourteen years of age, was to be initiated. Most of the revenue 
would go to the Emperor. In the event of any resistence to the new 
reforms, the five princes would effect their implementation by force.
While these princely deliberations lacked some decisiveness, a 
sympathetic attitude towards administrative reform within the Empire 
prevailed. Mutual suspicions socn destroyed the good will which the 
Eger proposals had proported. In July, 1464, the dissolution of a 
Diet at Neustadt marked the end of all reform projects as well as the 
temporary leadership which Frederick had enjoyed.
The death of Pius II on August 15, 1464, coincided with a per­
iod of relative serenity within the Empire. This political peace was 
based upon a momentary balance of power. On January 22, 1465, a three 
year peace between Lewis of Landshut, Sigismund of Tyrol, the Duke of 
Munich, the Cardinal of Augsburg and the cities of Augsburg, Ulm, Aalen, 
Giengen and Memraungen had been established. Frederick III, who had
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been excluded from this organization formed a similar alliance with 
Sigismund of Tyrol and the Swabian states. On July 18, 1465, Frederick 
III proclaimed the reform proposals made at Frankfort on August 14, 1442, 
as imperial law. Since Frederick's confidence was based upon his good 
relations with the house of Wittelsbach, Austrian and Bohemian influences 
were soon at work undermining the newly established alliance. These 
efforts brought almost immediate success. Towards the end of 1465 a 
new scheme was put forward by which the leading princes of Bavaria,
Saxony, Brandenburg, Hessen and Bohemia formed a league against all 
other powers, including the Pope and Emperor. A yearly meeting at 
Nuremberg would promote good government within the Empire.Emperor 
Frederick and Margrave Albert of Brandenberg quickly organized their 
defenses. On February 2, 1466, the Reman King announced a territorial 
Diet at Ulm.^1 An unprecedented response resulted. The stately delib- 
©rations were attended by eleven bishops and at least thirty-seven 
estates of the Empire* The numerous proposals gradually converged 
tox^ ards a central loyalty— the Emperor, nevertheless a sense of expediency 
and self-interest mared the proceedings* At the conclusion of the delib­
erations at Ulm a new meeting was scheduled for May 18, 1466, at
°^Ibid.. p. 450.
_ . J* J* Muller, Des Heil. Romischen Reichs Teutscher Nation.
Reichstagstheatrum. wie selbiges unter Kevser Friedrichs V. aller- 
hochsten Regierung (Jena, 1713), II, pp. 197-205.
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Nordlingen. In June another meeting was held at Donauworth. Both 
were unsuccessful. In place of a territorial federation under imperial 
leadership, Frederick was again forced to relinquish his position to the 
great princes of the realm. An imperial Diet was therefore proposed.
It was to be held at Nuremberg on November 1 1, 1466.
Frederick's momentary display of independence and power was con­
temporary to the election and early pontificate of Pope Paul II.^ The 
latter was elected to fill the Apostolic Chair on August 30, 1464, but 
not before he had agreed to comply with a series of regulations drawn 
up by the College of Cardinals. His first act as Pope was to set aside 
this compact. Thus Paul swept away the last remnants of the conciliar 
principles and asserted that nothing could bind a Pope. Paul II did 
not display the political sophistication which characterized Pius II.
He had little desire to meddle with the affairs of Europe. When popu­
lar sentiment resisted his attempts to revive the crusading spirit of 
his predecessor, he was content to center his interests in Rome. At 
the beginning of his pontificate he seems to have seriously contemplated 
a reform of some of the worst abuses within the papal system, but his 
personal efforts were of no avail, especially since he could expect no
355
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help from the cardinals. All he could do by himself was to bequeath 
to his successors an example of personal integrity.
Internationally, Pius II had left one important question for 
settlement. The last thing he had done before departing for Ancona 
was to summon George of Podebrady to Rome. It was reserved for Paul II 
to terminate the Bohemian problem, and since the new Pope entertained 
no political projects of his own, he could concentrate entirely upon 
the ecclesiastical ramifications of Podebrady1s position. George's 
efforts to emerge from his utraquistic oriented isolation continued 
into the pontificate of Pope Paul II. Whm, under Pius II, he had 
advocated a scheme for the reorganization of international affairs by 
means of a parliament of European princes, all the forces which the 
Papacy could muster were brought to bear against him. With the death 
of Pius II, George enjoyed a short respite.
Several distinctive characteristics marked Paul’s approach to 
the Bohemian problem. An ardent devotee to the concept of papal 
supremacy, the Pope's governing philosophy differed decidedly from 
that of his predecessor. For Paul, an idea had little value if it 
could not be utilized for his own interests. Since each failure was 
considered to be of critical importance to the welfare of the Papacy, 
Paul rejected such enterprises of Pius II as yielded a poor return on 
the investment. His career revealed a complete absence of any care­
fully calculated or long range policy. Every problem was evaluated 
in terms of its immediate ramifications. Thus his dealings with George 
Bohemia envisa.ged no compromise and were executed with a sense of
intense concentration. In spite of the close connection between the 
Turkish threat and Bohemian stability Pope Paul chose to divorce the 
two situations entirely.
On August 2, 1465, Paul renewed the citation lvhich Pius II had 
addressed to George. His action coincided with grave internal dis­
order in Bohemia itself. The Bohemian nobles had become decidedly ad­
verse to the augmentation of their monarchs powers, and were ready to 
seek a political pretext which might bring them into an alliance with 
the Pope. When Hynek of Lichtenberg rebelled against his lord, he was 
forced to flee to Rome and seek the protection of the Pope. On the au­
thority of Pope Paul the Bishop of Lavant formulated a letter ordering 
all good catholics to withdraw from the siege of Hynek1s castle in
Zomstein, for Hynek, "qui verus et perfectus semper catholicus fuit 
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et est, ^ was under papal protection. The letter of Paul was meant 
to be a declaration of war and George was not long in experiencing the 
results of this policy. Under the leadership of Zdenek and Sternberg 
a league was formed against George of Podebrady, which carefully avoided 
the ecclesiastical issue aid functioned under the pretense of national 
patriotism. Officially George was given one hundred and eighty days to 
answer the charges of heresy, but on August 6th the Pope commissioned 




Jordan, o e . cit.. pp. 184-185.
o . —  kundliche Beit rage zur Geschichte Bohmens und 
2g.l.ner Ngchbarlander im Zeitalter Georg's von Podiebrad. 14^0-1/4.71 
(Wien, I860), No. 321. ------  — ----
his subjects or allies,^
Podebrady soon saw that papal policy tended to isolate him, not 
only in Europe, tut in his own kingdom. In November, 1465, an envoy 
bearing the Bohemian monarch's proposals for reconciliation arrived in 
Rome, The general content of these was entirely overshadowed by 
George's offer to lead a crusade against the Turks. Pope Paul II had 
no taste for such daring and adventurous schemes. He flatly rejected 
the offer. No diplomacy was possible between the Pope and the King,
Paul took no immediate action against Podebrady for the league of 
Bohemian nobles signed a truce with George. Moreover, he could not 
declare the King deposed until he saw some means of enforcing the 
sentence.
Pope Paul II apparently had little faith in the bonds of imperial-
papal friendship. Although Frederick had sworn an oath of submission
57
and fidelity Paul chose not to rely on Frederick's goodwill, or the 
support of the German Nation. This was partially conditioned by the 
Emperor's participation in the confederation movements which character­
ized 1464—66, but more fully the product of the Pope's own temperament. 
Imperial—papal interaction during the Bohemian struggle was limited to 
local affairs with the exception of Frederick's visit to Rome. On 
January 20, 1466, Paul requested the Florentines to issue Frederick 
the necessary letters of safe conduct for his proposed j ourney to
56Ibid.. No. 336.
^Chmel, Regesta. No, 4120,
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Rome. In the early summer of the same year Frederick requested some 
funds for the canons of Herzogenburg which had been destroyed by f i r e . ^9 
Somewhat later the Emperor sought spiritual sanctions against the cities 
of Amsterdam and Leiden as well as a number of individuals in view of 
several robberies at Magdeburg.^0
With the death of Pius II the internationalism of the Papacy 
was severely curbed. Furthermore the personal ties which had connected 
Pope and Emperor were also broken. During the early pontificate of 
Paul the alliance between the two men was virtually ncn-existent and 
even the presence of mutual interest was difficult to find. Only a 
few official forms still remained. Pope Paul's insistence upon the 
advantage of the moment made the Emperor little more than an emergency 
tool. Paul II possibly lost a valuable ally in Frederick by his politi­
cal independence, for at this time Podebrady*s relations with Vienna 
had substantially declined due to the territorial threat which George 
represented. These prelirainaiy contacts during the pontificate of 
Paul II, while partially conditioned by the new atmosphere dominating 
the Roman Curia, revealed the status of the Papacy and Empire with con­
siderable precision. The relative importance of these two institutions 
had been veiled by the dignity and diversity which the diplomatic ven­
tures of Pius II displayed. Under his successor each party went its
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own way, only to exhibit its weakness. Frederick III was forced to 
function almost solely as a territorial prince. On the other hand, 
the political-religious complex of Europe did not entirely reject the 
commands of the Vicar of Christ in the deposition of Podebrady, Paul II 
still managed to strike a sympathetic cord in a conscience struggling 
for self-identification, but conditioned by centuries of indoctrination.
Bohemian-Roman tensions increased considerably during the summer 
of 1466. The fact that the excommunicated Gregor Heimburg was taken in­
to George's service notably increased the unrest. On July 28, 1466, 
Heimburg published a manifesto in defense of the honor and innocence of 
George, which naturally contained a sharp indictement of the Papacy.^
The Roman Curia now centred all of its attention upon Bohemia. The an­
xiety of Frederick III and the wrath of Paul II culminated in the summon- 
ing of a Diet at Nuremberg in November, 1466. The agenda listed two 
main problems: internal peace and the Turkish War. The Diet was not 
committed to solving any problems. Rather its chief concern lay in 
instigating a definitive reaction against Bohemia that would serve as 
a point of reference for subsequent papal action against Podebrady.
The Bohemian monarch proved equal to the occasion. Instead of in­
sisting on Bohemian religious separatism, his representatives, Albert 
Kostka and Benes of Weitmil, advocated a program very similar to that 
presented to Emperor Frederick at Neustadt in 1463. George was
duller, oe. cit., II, pp. 250-258.
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presented as the glorious leader of a new expedition against the Turk. 
The diplomatic advantage achieved by this action was of minor impor­
tance, since the European nations had learned to interpret the policy 
of Podebrady rather accurately. The sympathy of the princes lay with 
the Papacy, especially in view of the fact that Paul had made no 
monetary demands upon them. The Diet terminated without the observa­
tion of customary formalities. Its deliberations had produced heated
argumentation but not concrete legislation on the grave problems which 
faced it.
The proceedings of the Diet and Bohemia's proximity to Austria 
left Frederick with no alternatives but to strive for closer relations 
with the Papacy. Throughout the deliberations, Frederick displayed a 
decidedly negativistic attitude towards Bohemia.63 Near the end of 
the year, however, the Emperor's adversion to Bohemia was intensified 
by another apology which Heimburg wrote for King George, in which he 
gave vent to his violent hatred of the two heads of Christendom. A 
variety of false charges were brought against both Pope and Emperor, 
including that of immorality. The manifesto put a final end to the 
friendly relations that had existed between George and the Reman King.62*' 
Pope Paul II still lacked the consent of any one prince for the 
deposition of Podebrady. Nevertheless, the events of the Nuremberg 
Diet as well as the modified Bohemian policy of the Emperor fortified 
Paul in his decision to take action. In spite of the obvious sympathy
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declared George of Bohemia a heretic in an open consistory held on 
December 23, 1466. With his deposition the imperial-papal alliance 
which had been momentarily non-existent with the commencement of 
Paul's pontificate emerged once more. Both desired all the political 
security possible against Bohemian might. On January 1, 1467, Paul 
sent Frederick a copy of the bull which he had issued against Pode­
brady A decree releasing the princes of the Empire from all obli­
gations to George was formulated on May 15. The decree provided the 
Emperor with a pretext for renouncing his Bohemian loyalties.67
Meanwhile Podebrady, acting on Heimburg's advice, met the 
Pope's bull by a formal appeal published on April 14, 1467,68 and 
sent to all the German princes. George appealed first to the Roman 
See, then to a Council and finally to Paul's successor and to all the 
institutions in Christendom which loved justice. This action was 
based upon a realistic appraisal of his position. In short order the 
baronial opposition would erupt into a short but devastating war.
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Moreover, the Turkish threat forced Matthias of Hungary to seek an 
alliance of one type or another with the European powers. Since an 
alliance with Bohemia meant isolation from the rest of Europe, Matt­
hias decided to cast his lot with the Papacy. By uniting himself with 
the cause of the Roman Curia, Matthias could convince Europe that his 
war against the Turk was fought in the interests of Christendom. 
Furthermore, the possibility of obtaining the crown of Bohemia and 
thereby uniting the resources of the two countries could not be ig­
nored.^
The decision of Matthias had a direct influence on imperial- 
papal interests. During 1467 Emperor Frederick had been engaged in 
an active program of territorial consolidation. For the first time 
in many years Frederick left his hereditary lands to attend a territori­
al Diet at Linz in January, 1467. With the support of Albert of Saxony 
he came to obtain revenge on Bohemia, for Podebrady had accepted one of 
Frederick's rebellious subjects, Jorg of Stein, into his service. A 
spirit of bitterness prevailed at the meeting. Frederick concluded 
the deliberations by declaring that he would no longer tolerate Bohemian 
presumptuousness. On February 20, 1467, Frederick officially recognized
the Bohemian baronial league, an action which the Curia followed exactly
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one month later. Podebrady's appeal on April 14 was a direct result 
of these procedures. Again the controlling principle of the fifteenth
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century religious-political complex emerged to reveal its territorial
orientation and its independence of moral or religious principles.
Austria's obligation to Bohemia for its action before the gates of
Vienna some years before received no consideration at the Diet.
By the summer of 1467 circumstances had become increasingly
favorable for the inauguration of a unified policy between the Pope
and the Emperor. Thus a Diet of considerable importance commenced
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at Nuremberg in the beginning of July. The Papacy attempted to use 
the occasion to implement its policy against Bohemia and worked fever­
ishly to assure a large attendance. The Bishops Lorenz of Ferrara and 
Ulrich of Passau soon arrived at Nuremberg as the papal legates. The 
agenda was similar to that of the previous year— the Turks and internal 
peace. The political connotations of the meeting were especially en­
hanced by the presence of a Hungarian delegate, the Bishop of Weiss- 
briinn, who had been invested with considerable authority.
The personal interests of Saxony and Brandenburg figured
7?
heavily in the deliberations. ~ They opposed every suggestion of a
7 The source materials for this Diet are well represented in 
A. Bachmann, Deutsche Reichsgeschichte jyn Zeitalter Friedrichs III.
Mid Maximilian I. Mjt besonderer Berucksichtjgung der osterreichischen 
Staat.engeschichte (Leipzig, 1884), II, pp. 91-98; MUller, op. cit.. 
p» 260ff.
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The Brandenburg delegation seemed especially remarkable for 
its obstinacy. In giving advice to his representatives the Margrave 
wrote Ir wollet auch u.h.v. dem babst ein entdecken then, eins ver- 
dris vnnser halben, das s.h. vns zw dem nechstgehalten tag zu Nurmberg 
nicht geschriben hat, das wir halten vns zw eyner versuchung von s.h.. 
aber nichts dester minder sind wir auff demselben tag als ein gehor- 
samer furst des reichs erschienen v. haben vns angeboten, vnnsern 
alten fussstapfen nach gegen seinen legaten im von s.h. wegen zw
possible crusade and were dedicated towards establishing a guiding
principles for their own national policies. Only the appearance of
the Bohemian delegates -brought the deliberations into the proper
channels. The two delegates, Hllarius and Kocowsky, presented the
Bohemian case from the traditional point of view. Since Bohemia was
a bulwark against the Turk, it should be given all the aid possible.
The Bohemian plea provided the legates of Saxony and Brandenburg with
an excuse to execute their plan for removing all princely support from
the Pope and Emperor. The plan was relatively simple. By proposing
arbitration in place of war the legates hoped to isolate Paul II and 
Frederick III. 73
This trend towards princely neutrality threatened to play direct­
ly into the hands of Pod^brady, nevertheless the latter refused to join 
because he was suspicious of the intentions of Brandenburg and Saxony. 
Pope Paul H  remained entirely aloof fra, the proceedings. Simultane­
ously George made his participation dependent on the withdrawal of the 
papal censures against him. He insisted that eveiy aspect of the
struggle was to be considered in the negotiations. In crder to pursue 
their plans the prlnces left (lureinberg ^  ^
wer vnnser"a lt f O T d e r L ^ m n L ^ d ie n ^ r f it  "n<i.hett?n gehofft, s.h. 
schaden nicht so leicht verees^nl^H verdurplichen unserm
zw smehen, zw bewegen gewest 11 A<? mmf u ,Sac!l» nichte vns 
286-287 from C. Hofler n A\ quote? . Jordsn, cit., pp.
41-brecht Achilles, 1^*0-l&o’ ^  ^ ^ rafen
73
365
Jordan, 02. cit., p. 289.
Landshut, but the absence of any imperial or papal delegations led 
George to reject any further negotiations. The proposals of the Ger­
man princes affected Podebrady*s internal autonomy, and he could not 
tolerate this under any circumstances. Moreover, he had no intentions 
of entering a league in which he would be treated as an equal of the 
German princes.
In accordance with a time-honored tradition, imperial-papal 
interests were soon unified when the cry of neutrality was heard. 
Although the Nuremberg Diet had terminated with the complete rejection 
of the proposed war against Bohemia,?^ Pope Paul, instead of maintain­
ing a defensive position, now launched upon an offensive of grandiose 
proportions. The Duke of Burgundy was to be granted a royal crown and 
the title of King of the Romans— a title applicable to all his posses­
sions east of the Rhine. Both the Emperor and the Pope saw in him a 
possible ally against Podebrady, and were commited to a policy of 
appeasement. Frederick III was so devoted to the papal scheme that he 
forgot the scorn with which the Duke of Burgundy had rejected his 
claims to Habsburg hereditary lands in the latter's domains. Further­
more, he was also willing to allow the honor of his nominal sovereignty
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The Nuremberg Diet apparently had no official termination 
and seems to have faded into oblivion once the policy of arbitration 
with Bohemia had been decided upon. R. Bemmann, Zur Geschichte des 
Reichstages im XV. Jahrhundert (Vol. VII of Leipziger Historische 





east of the Rhine to be officially conferred upon another individual.
The plan violated the sacred though theoretical tradition which sur­
rounded the Emperorship. It involved "dem frechen Eroberer die An-
weisung zu geben auf das deutsche Gebiet jenseit des Rheines und dem
77
Ubermachtigen das Recht der Einsprache in des Reiches Regierung." 
Although the plan was an emergency measure formulated under severe 
political duress it was an outrage upon the freedom of Germany and up­
on the dignity of the imperial crown.’'7® In essence it was a direct 
violation of the very ideal of national integrity which Frederick sought 
to uphold, and in its own sphere of operation proved as threacherous as 
the designs of Podebrady and the German princes. This act probably re­
presented the crudest expression of the expediency which dominated the 
imperial-papal partnership during the second half of the fifteenth 
century.
Meanwhile political events moved rapidly towards a showdown. 
George regarded Frederick III with growing animosity for he saw in him 
a centre for papal intrigues which might unite Germany as well as Hun­
gary against Bohemia. In October, 1467, the King of Poland offered to 
arbitrate a truce between Podebrady and the princes of his domains. 
George was quick to accept the offer and in doing so contrasted the 
honesty of Casimir with the faithfulness of the Papacy. The rebellion 
of the Bohemian princes had been initiated on pretext of restoring 
orthodox Catholicism. The revolt displayed essentially the same spirit
77
Jordan, op. cii., p. 298.
368
as the policies pursued by the German princes; it was simply a case of 
territorial self-aggrandizement under the cloak of religious fervor*
When his internal problems temporarily abated, the Bohemian King re­
sumed his international diplomacy* George now resolved to revenge the 
hostility which the Emperor had shown towards him. He hoped to intimi­
date Matthias Corvinus into a Bohemian alliance by his defeat of Austria€ 
A declaration of war soon followed.?? In the beginning of 1468 George's 
son, Prince Victorin, defied Frederick as Duke of Austria, and invaded 
his territory. The Austrians managed to offer some resistance. Fred­
erick immediately Implored aid from Matthias of Hungary. The Emperor's 
request was endorsed by the Papacy as well as the Bohemian baronial 
league. Matthias Corvinus, convinced that such support would bring 
him the Bohemian crown declared war on Podebrady on March 31, 1468.
The news of Matthias* decision evoked diverse response. Cardi­
nal Ammonnati wrote to the Pope* "On reading today copies of two 
letters of the truly most Christian King of Hungary, I raised my eyes 
and hands to heaven, and gave thanks to God's goodness which at length 
has regarded us, and raised us to a hope of salvation, and kindled the 
spirit of Daniel who will tread down Satan under our feet . . .,,8° For
79 n
- , * • • °£ Sprung des Romischen Reiches, in dem das Ir nit 
insunderheit als Furst in dem Reich oder erblich, Sunder allein als 
aiser versorgen solltend, verkiindigen wir Euch, das wir Ewer Fursten- 
‘ Jrie2s-Recht und rechter Erholung, so uns durch Toiler
Voiv^r R ’ anfec^ en» abziehen uns zu eygnen und nach altem
j ! j ^ , R,eCh$ ery n"en ?ollen • • • Solichs alles auch Raubes, Brandes 
slacht oder Montlichers, das darum ergeen mochte wir vnser u* aller 
vnser Heifer, Diener u. Underthan Ere Glimpf u. Rume durch diese Be- 
waung wollen verhuet haben." Jordan, o£. cit., p. 311.
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the moment the war with the Turks was forgotten. The Apostolic Faith
was deemed to be in imminent danger unless the Bohemian King should
voluntarily abandon his schismatic position, or be forcibly deprived 
Si
of his position. On April 20, 1468, Paul II pronounced the severest 
penalties upon the adherents of Podebrady and simultaneously promised 
a number of indulgences to those who would contribute to the war effort. 
All the resources of the Papacy were applied in the effort to check the 
ambitions of the Bohemian King.
From an imperial-papal viewpoint, the war with Bohemia was 
basically a territorial dispute with latent religious motivations.
For Frederick, it simply meant a defense of his hereditary lands, and 
since papal security was momentarily dependent on Austrian strength, 
the alliance could function in perfect harmony. Pope Paul II, in ac­
cordance with his limited orientation, thought only in terms of the 
immediate security of the Roman Curia and cast to the winds all thought 
of the real interests of Europe. Thus he plunged into a war which 
could only end in the destruction of two rulers whose territories were 
the natural bulwarks against the advance of the Turk. Although Pode­
brady initiated the war as a political ruse, its implementation would 
have come even sooner if Pope Paul had his way. The only real insight 
into the sheer insanity of the situation ironically came from the pen 
of Gregory of Heimburg. Although still a keen critic of imperial- 
papal policy, Heimburg had reverted to a defensive position— the only
8i
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possible method to fight a more powerful foe. Gregoiy, unlike most
leaders of his day, had disoemed the essence of the new spirit which
had permeated the international diplomacy of Europe and now appealed
for Papal toleration in religious and political matters. In his final 
apology for Podebrady in 1467 he wrote:
sheepP? f k e ^ V ? i f 0leaftbofTlS’/°S-?naVB "0t the
V Tn ™ S S natlacera S StT :i °f^°e Sng 0*
£ £ £ j s r d:
cil. *ioh you ^ 5  the anpero^suppressed6 t m l f  C°Un;
reveal your filth to the world v S  ! ^  anew and
for if so much blood is shS that *h* n ^ 8 d° y0U hope
Of peace be restored? But, Ocd^ill prokdTthe testf§? S 
Matthias waged his war against Bohemia with considerable suc­
cess. As his victories progressed, the Emperor became alamed at his 
powerful au y. The iaslo issue of ^  ^  ^  ^
erick had hoped to regain the Bohemian crown ty the elimination of Podg- 
brady. Matthias, on his part, aimed not only at the throne of Bohania, 
but for the Roman Kingship itself. It was in this tense atmosphere 
that Frederick detained to undertake a pilgrimage to Roms, osten­
sibly in fulfillment of a vow which he had made in „hile a 
prisoner in the Castle of Vienna. The matter had been repeatedly post­
poned, although several letters were exchanged between the Emperor
alacky, oE# cit., No. 647, pp. 658-660.
Uchnowsky, o^. cii.., VII, p. 113#
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and the Pope on the matter.®*4' Two distinct motives influenced the 
final inauguration of the journey. Frederick desired closer ties with 
the Papacy in view of the threat represented by Matthias. Ironically 
he placed Austria under the protection of Matthias, whose interests 
he professed to have at heart in seeking his interview with the Pope. 
The Emperor's own religiosity must also not be discounted in the mat­
ter. The ascetic ideology surrounding a pilgrimage still enjoyed a 
considerable vogue in the fifteenth century. This situation, combined 
with the compartmentalized views on religion and public morality which 
characterized the era, gave Frederick's intention a sense of validity
Or
and truthfulness. In the main, however, Frederick's pilgrimage to 
Rome was a political venture.
On his pilgrimage Frederick was accompanied by a suite not ex­
ceeding seven hundred individuals. 6 All were in mourning garb on ac­
count of the death of the Empress.®'7 Frederick traveled the same route 
wnich he had followed sixteen years before. The stops along the way
371
84
5165 5522UniS’ T* PP* *WS2"1131; Chmel» Segesta, Nos. 4350,
8Viiller, oe. cit., p. 319.
86a
One source speaks only of five hundred horsemen, accompanying 
the Emperor. "Diario Ferrarese dall' anno 1409 sino al 1502, di autori
Mur^°ri ’ R-?nj^  Ifr.alicarum Scriptores (Mediolani,
1737), aXIV, p. 215.
87_
Concerning the last years of Leonora see F. Krones, "Leonor von 
r?r^gS'^2?mahiln*TKaiser Friedrichs III., des steirischen Habsburgers 
(1436-1467;. _Ein Lebens- und Zeitbild," Hjttheilungen des Historischen 
vereines fur Steiemark. XLIX (1902), 85-90.
included Padua, Ferrara, Ravenna, Rimini, where the inhabitants rose
up in anus at his approach, and finally Milan. Pope Paul's reaction to
Frederick's visit evidenced the superficial bond which united the two
leaders of Christendom. As early as August 16, 1467, the Venetians
had cautioned Frederick to appear in Rome with no more than four hund- 
89
red horsemen. When Frederick's actual arrival drew near, the Pope 
called his troops into the city, and awaited the Emperor with some ap­
prehension.^ On December 24, 1468, Frederick entered Rome. The late 
hour of the arrival made it difficult to carry out the processional 
order which had been arranged by Pope Paul,91 nevertheless the Emperor 
was welcomed by the cardinals and led to St. Peter* s where he was re­
ceived by the Pope. Frederick than sat upon a chair no higher than 
the Pope's feet while lauds were sung. 92 On the next day Frederick 
attended Christmas mass and sang the Gospel attired as a deacon. The 
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subsequent activities the King of the Renans payed due respect tc his 
lord, who treated him with patronising condescension.^
Frederick's ceremonial obligations ended when the Emperor con­
ferred knighthood on one hundred and twenty-five Germans in the middle 
of the bridge over the Tiber. When the pageantry had been completed 
Pope and Emperor began a series of deliberations. The first problem 
on the agenda dealt with the war against the Turks and the Hussites.
In a public consistory held on December 29, Frederick's representative 
declared that it was not merely his vow that had brought the Emperor to 
Rome, but also his concern for the common good. The Emperor had come 
to hear the counsel of the Holy Father on the Turkish problem and lean, 
what measures he hoped to adopt against the Infidel. Paul responded ty 
listing the exploits of the Curia to this point and noted that as its 
resources were now exhausted, it had become the duty of the Emperor to 
counsel and to act. In answer to Frederick's objection that he had 
come to receive and not to give counsel, the Pope reiterated what he 
had just said. Thereupon the imperial party withdrew for a period of 
deliberation following which it was proposed that a general assembly 
should be held at Constance under the joint supervision of Pope and 
Emperor. Some disagreement as to whether this should really be con­
sidered an expression of imperial policy occured but forced no real 
change in the political orientation of the Papacy. The Pope and the 
Cardinals, in view of past experience, agreed that the present state 
of affairs did not warrant such action. Since a Constance centered
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assembly carried with it the ominous overtones of conciliarism, the 
Curia was quick to propose another course. It was finally stipulated 
that the representatives of all Christian nations be invited to a 
Congress to be held at Rome in September, 1469. The invitation was 
made in the name of the two heads of Christendom. Before the negoti­
ations terminated Frederick made a concession of a territorial nature, 
an action probably prompted by his respect for the Reman See. It was 
agreed that the Venetians should be allowed to levy a tenth part from 
the clergy, the twentieth part from the Jews, and the thirtieth from 
the laity in their dominions.^
A definitive interpretation of Frederick's sojourn in Rome 
would be extremely difficult. Some allowance for genuine religious 
devotion must be allowed, but this was not sufficient to justify the 
great risk Frederick took in leaving his hereditary lands. Moreover 
the general nature of the deliberations in Rome overlooked such person­
al political aims as Frederick might have had. Frederick probably 
gained none of the political ends he had sought after, except the 
honor of being the chief participant in the traditional spectacle 
which accompanied an imperial visit to Rome. A plausible solution 
suggests that the Emperor sought, but did not obtain, the confirmation 
of the succession Hungary and Bohemia for his son Maximilian. Pope 
Paul listened to the proposal presented by the King of the Romans, but 
did not commit himself to an actual policy, even though he was well
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aware of the designs of Matthias Corvinus as concerned both the Empire 
and the Papacy. The Habsburg alliance offered the best potential for 
the successful execution of Roman policy, but since Matthias was the 
momentary champion of Christendom, the Pope had to proceed cautiously. 
Frederick1s proposals to the Papacy may have been premature but not 
politically unsound. The Hungarian King had no intentions of remain­
ing a military adventurer in the pay of the Curia. Conversely, the 
latter had no thought of being subserviant to the Hungarian King.
Meanwhile the Bohemian war continued its devastating course. 
During 1468 Matthias experienced considerable success but early in the 
following year he was surprised by PodSbrady in the narrow passes of 
^ilemow and forced to agree to a truce. Subsequent negotiation at 
Olmutz failed due to the intrigue of the papal legate, Roverella.?6 
Thus in July, 1469, the war broke out afresh but no decisive advan­
tage was gained by either party during that year or the next. Pode- 
brady managed to hold his ground, paying his partisans out of the
spoils of the Church. Finally on March 22, 1471, George of Podebrady 
died, unreconciled with the Church. 97
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The superficial quality which characterized Frederick's visit 
to Rome remained unchanged until the death of Paul on July 26, 1471.
For Paul II, Bohemia was the abiding memorial of papal degradation and 
he was resolved that it should be obliterated. In accord with this 
resoluteness, Paul remained committed to Matthias, for at this moment 
he represented the only power capable of implementing the policy of 
the Holy See. Pope Paul failed to inaugurate a constructive program 
since he lacked the force necessary to give a decisive effect to his 
intentions. Thus he often acted- tenatively, yet with a sense of re­
solve which bordered on stubbornness. His one great undertaking was 
the reduction of Bohemia, and since Habsburg impotence obstructed such 
a policy, Paul II did not hesitate to turn to Matthias of Hungary. 
Frederick's visit to Rome was an effort to seek a closer identification 
of international policy between the two heads of Christendom. Paul II 
proved noncommittal in diplomatic matters and only concerned with the 
ceremonial ramifications of the imperial visit. During the pontificate 
of Paul the imperial-papal alliance was limited only to such administra­
tive functions as were conventional between Pope and Emperor. Paul pro­
crastinated even in these matters. Frederick's privileges in the Bishop­
rics of Trient, Brixen and Gurk as well as his rights of nomination to
the Cathedral Churches in Vienna and Neustadt were only renewed by Pope
98
Paul on June 5, 1469, while his right to one-tenth of the ecclesiasti­
cal revenue was confirmed on June 29, 1469." During the rule of Paul II
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the fifteenth century trend towards utilitarianism continued to domi­




The death of Pope Paul II was entirely unexpected. Only seven­
teen out of the twenty-six cardinals were present at the Conclave on 
August 6, Finally on August 9» 1471, Francesco of Savcna was elected 
to fill the Apostolic Chair. On August 25 he was crowned under the 
title Sixtus IV. 1 Althou^i a man of broad learning and a strong char­
acter, the sphere of the Pope's political activity was narrowed to 
Italy. Under his jurisdiction the Roman See became an Italian power 
which pursued its own political career with force and dexterity.
Through untiring efforts he won the Papal States, but lost his influence 
in Europe completely. Whereas Pope Paul II had attempted to uphold the 
concept of papal supremacy and ecclesiastical internationalism which had 
been fostered ty Pius II, Sixtus IV left the affairs of Bohemia and Hun­
gary to settle themselves. The terminology concerning the two rulers of 
universal Christendom was no longer heard. Although Pope Paul II had 
regarded Frederick with his characteristic Venetian caution the ancient 
doctrine of sun and moon was still theoretically endorsed, even if it 
was not practically applicable.
The Italian orientation displayed by Pope Sixtus IV terminated 
the political basis of the imperial-papal alliance, some aspects of
(transl^frorfhrS^ ^ 11^ 2 ^  *  Sfl* &  Middle AgesUransl. from the fourth German edition by A. Hamilton, London, 1900)
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which were still operative in Paul II's Bohemian policy. With due 
consideration to the long preparatory process which led to the final 
disintegration of the concepts underlying the Holy Roman Empire, it 
must be stressed that the pontificate of Sixtus IV brought about an 
accelerated development of the final stages of that dismemberment.
This was not the product of an active policy, but the result of neg­
lect. The political exigency which had united Pope and Emperor thus 
far during Frederick’s reign was conditioned by an active international 
policy of the Papacy. When the Roman See reverted to a purely Italian 
policy, the action produced a noticeable modification in imperial- 
papal relations. In view of the gradual tendency which led to this 
change, it was not immediately discernable for the new political- 
ecclesiastical orientation of Sixtus IV did not presuppose an absence 
of contact between the two institutions, but only a requalification 
of underlying operational principles. It must be recognized that a 
distinct flexibility still remained. A future Pope, by emphasizing 
papal supremacy and ecclesiastical internationalism might reactivate 
the alliance. The consequences of Sixtus' policy manifested a certain 
degree of permanence, however. Henceforth an Emperor may be a Catholic 
prince and pursue a course favorable to the interests of the Roman
Curia, but such a policy was usually accidental and not the result of 
mutual international interests.
The early pontificate of Sixtus IV promised a temporary 
European orientation in papal politics. As was the case with Paul II, 
Sixtus soon proposed a great crusade against the Turk. Somewhat 
earlier several Venetian envoys had appeared in Rome. A speech by
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one of them, Bernardo Giustiniani, vividly pictured the deplorable 
situation of eastern Christendom.2 It was not necessary to remind 
the Pope of this danger. Sixtus issued an encyclical letter in which 
he envisaged the formation of a league of European powers to be 
directed exclusively against the Turks. 3 A great ecclesiastical 
assembly was to facilitate the implementation of the program. There 
was some disagreement concerning the location of the assembly. Such 
cities as Florence, Piacenza and Pavia were suggested.4 At a special 
consistory held on August 30, 1471, Bessarion together with several 
other Cardinals sought to deter the Pope from leaving Rome.^ Others 
suggested Pisa or Mantua as possible locations. Emperor Frederick III 
requested that Udine be selected, but the Duke of Milan and other 
Italian princes refused to consider the city. Pope Sixtus then pro­
posed Mantua and Ancona, but to no avail. 6 The negotiations were un­
successful. The princes showed no sympathy for the aims of the Holy 
See. ^
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well as circumstances permitted.'" In Germany Barbo was faced with a 
more difficult task. The war against the Turk required the aid of 
Hungary, Poland and Bohemia. At this conjucture all efforts at recon­
ciliation proved futile. The internal quarrels of the continent could 
not be halted by any one individual. The papal legate was carefully 
instructed about his interview with the Emperor.
If his majesty should not allow the congress which the 
Pope has requested, it may be mentioned that, as is well 
known to the Emperor, an Italian Congress is useless.
What can be done has been done, namely, the equipping of 
a fleet. Therefore it is neither necessary nor beneficial 
to hold such an assembly, except through the universal con­
currence of the princes, by which all joined together for 
the sake of the faith .1 "^
Circumstances forced Frederick to cooperate with a second papal 
legate. A meeting was held between the waring powers at Neisse in 
February, 14-72, which proved unsuccessful. When the Turkish raids 
on Frederick’s hereditary lands increased in intensity the Emperor 
turned to Matthias Corvinus for aid.1^ Through the arbitration of 
another papal legate, Rovarella, a compact was concluded in which 
Frederick promised to proclaim Matthias King of Bohemia in April,
1^73, at Augsburg. In return the Hungarian King promised to aid the
13
Pastor, op. cit., II, pp. 469-470. 
14
Sebhardt, 2£. £it., p. 55.
On March 1, 1472, Pope Sixtus IV declared Matthias Corvinus 
the only true King of Bohemia. He released the Bohemian estates from 
their oath to Wladislaw and drew up an interdict against the bishops 
who had crowned him. The episode was an early indication of the later 
favoritism which the Pontiff showed Matthias. Raynaldus, op. cit.. 
ad an. 1472, No. 30. --- ’
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Emperor in his current difficulties.^
Sixtus did not allow his zeal to falter in view of the indif­
ference of the European powers. During the first months of 1472 he 
sought to establish peace in Italy. At the same time much energy
was spent in equipping the fleet. Repeated pleas were addressed to
17the princes of Italy and Germany. Twenty galleys were readied 
against the Turks. They were sent to join the contingents of Venice 
and Naples. The combined fleet plundered the Turkish coast, but in­
flicted few loses upon the Turks. In January, 1473, Carafa returned 
to Rome with several camels and a small number of prisoners. "It was 
a novel spectacle, but a scanty return for the expenses of the oraa-
■JO
ment." Frederick III was not unsympathetic to Sixtus1 plans, but 
carefully avoided any practical aid. The directives for an imperial 
envoy at Rome between 1471-1473 called for imperial-papal deliberations 
on the mobilization and equipping of a crusade army, but the importance 
of the subject appears to have been minimized by a lengthy list of 
other topics on the agenda.^
J. A. Fessler, Geschichte von Ungam (Zweite, vermehrte und 
verbesserte Auflage, bearbeitet von Ernst Klein. Leipzig, 1869), III, 
p. 100.
17
A special ambassador, aside from Barbo was apparently sent 
to the Emperor during the fall of 1471 to infora him of the prepara­
tion of a crusading fleet by the Pope. L. Ermen, Quellen zur Geschichte 
£er Stadt Koln (Koln, I869), III, p. 307.
13
Creighton, 0£. cit., IV, p. 68.
19
J. Chmel, Actenstucke und Briefe £ur Geschichte des Hauses 
Msfesburg im Zeitalter Maximilian's I. (Monumenta Habsburgica. Sammlnng 
2on Acteftstucken und Briefen zur Geschichte des Hauses Habsburg in dem 
ZfijLraume von 1422 bis 1576. Wien, 1854), I, No. 108, pp. 326-328.
Cited hereafter as Monumenta Habsburgica.
Frederick also presented a special petition to Sixtus. He
called for an active papal policy in view of the condition of Christen-
20
dom and the threat of Turkish invasion. A distinct sense of insin­
cerity and formalism characterized the procedure.
The universal apathy which greeted the proclamation of a 
crusade convinced Sixtus that he had given sufficient attention to 
the political traditions of the Papacy— at least for the time being. 
Before a crusade was possible, many years of diplomacy and ecclesi­
astical reform would be necessary. Sixtus chose the role of an Italian 
prince rather than a religious reformer. The Emperor was interested in 
a crusade only when his hereditary lands were threatened, or when 
political exigency made such a plan feasible.
The projected crusade therefore did not constitute the pivotal 
point of imperial—papal relations at this time-—European and territorial 
politics as well as the administration of the Church itself determined 
both the intensity and sincerity of the diplomatic intercourse between 
Frederick and the Papacy. Internationally, the relations between the 
Emperor and Matthias Corvinus of Hungary provided the impetus for oc­
casional expressions of crusading zeal as well as the active arbitra­
tion of Pope Sixtus IV.
The advantage which Matthias gained by his pact with Frederick 
III was shortlived. The Emperor made no mention of the Hungarian
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2°IbicU HI, pp. 431-434
King's Bohemian lordship at the Augsburg Diet held in 1474.21 Matthias 
now decided to go to war. Undaunted by Turkish and Polish-Boheraian 
pressure, he marched into Austria and came into the vicinity of Augs­
burg. Following this show of power Matthias defeated a much larger 
army of Poles and Bohemians. A truce resulted in 1474.22 The general 
feeling that Matthias would now renew his war against the Turks was 
soon thwarted. His relations with the fimperor steadily worsened.
Matthias felt especially offended by the fact that 
Frederick stubbornly hesitated in bestowing the 
Bohemian crown and electoral privilege upon him, and 
instead allied himself with Wladislaw and publically 
recognized him as King of Bohemia.23
In addition to this, Frederick's intentional disregard of the Hungarian 
Monarch aggravated the situation.2*1'
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21
A documentary survey of this Diet is available in J. J.
Muller, Deg Sfiil. Romischen Reichs Teutscher Nation. Reiehstags- 
jhe&trum wie selbiges anter Kevser Friedrichs V. allerhochsten 
Mierung (Jena, 1713), p. 6l9ff.
22During 1474 Archduke Sigismund and the Emperor concluded a 
treaty with the Swiss Federation. Meanwhile the Swiss carried on their 
war with Charles of Burgundy, a war from which the Emoeror gained more 
than the Swiss. Fessler, 0£. cit., Ill, p. 117.
23M m  P. 118.
2h
■ n * frederick had made a secret agreement with a Silesian offi­
cial of Matthias* court, Johann Beckenloer, by which he promised the 
latter the Archbishopric of Salzburg in return for his loyalty. Dur­
ing a military campaign Beckenloer left Matthias for Neustadt with 
many secret documents and a large sum of money. E. M. Lichnowsky,
^ b ^ r g  (Wien, 1843), VII, Regesten, No.
1/ + ?  6 breach between the two kings became even wider
when the two kings became even wider when the Hungarian Monarch 
undertook to protect some of the rebellious Lords in Styria and 
Austria. Palacky, op. cit., V, 1, p. 142.
Meanwhile Pope Sixtus again sought to arouse some interest in 
a crusade. On June 28, 1475, he ordered that a holy war against the 
Turk be preached and the necessary funds gathered for its execution.25 
Eleven days previous to this he had admonished the King of France and 
the Duke of Burgundy to keep peace with Frederick III because of the 
Turkish danger.26 A special brief addressed to all the rulers of 
Christendom was published on September 12. It requested that proper­
ly authorized delegations be sent to Rome by all states, in order to
discuss the contemporary problems of the Church and especially the 
eastern question.27
During the course of 1476 some efforts were still made to 
reconcile Frederick III and Matthias. In November, 1476, Frederick 
had made some proposals for peace,28 but these were characterized by 
gross insincerity. In December of the same year Frederick began 
military talks with Wladislaw of Poland. In return for military aid 
Frederick promised to proclaim the Polish Monarch king of Bohemia.29 
At a Diet held at Prague on March 17, 1477, Wladislaw granted large
386
25..
agfluinenta labsburgica, I, No. 121, pp. 349-354.
26Ihid., ill, p. 437.
27Ibid., Ill, pp. 437-438.
2£W . ,  II, pp. 93-96.
II. p. IV (Wien. 1812).
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funds to Frederick in order to aid him in his military campaigns. 30 On 
June 7, 1477, Wladislaw arrived in Vienna. Three days later Frederick 
conferred the Bohemian crown upon him in the Church of St. Stephen, 
despite the objections of Sixtus IV. All ties with Hungary were now 
broken. On June 12 Matthias declared war upon the King of the Romans. 31
Frederick fared poorly at the onset of the conflict. 32 The
rebellious Austrian nobles made common cause with Matthias and soon
forced the Emperor to sue for peace. The papal offer of arbitration
was eagerly accepted. Sixtus TV appointed the Bishop of Forli for
33
the task. Through the efforts Matthias finally agreed to renew his
30Palacky, op. cit., V, 1, p. I49ff.
31A. Bachmann (ed.), Urkundliche Machtrage ZUr ObbCireimi* 
i^-2§!iischen Qaapfaicfrte m  Zeitalter Kaiser Friedrich III (Vol.
ontes Rerum Austriacarum. Diplomataria et Acta, Wien, 1892). 
No. 416, pp. 422^424. *
tv Hasarn, transl. M. Darvai,
(Wien, 1900), I, pp. 464-465.
33
The Bishop of Forli was used rather extensively in imperial- 
papal negotiations. As early as June 17, 1475, Sixtus complimented the 
Bishop on his negotiations with the Emperor. Monuments Habsbureica 
III, pp. 435-436. On May 30, 1477, Sixtus IV ordered the Bishop of* 
Forli to attend a diet called by the Emperor . . . "and diligently 
give heed, in order that nothing might transpire which would strive 
against the honor of the Apostolic Chair . . .» Ibid., p. 447. Late 
in the summer of the same year Sixtus made mention of a legate who had 
been on repeated missions in an attempt to establish peace between 
redenck and Matthias. Chmel, Regesta, No. 7145. This was possibly
f m n ^ T f 106 ■ iS^  0f Forli• Forli seeras t0 have f^ored the
sati^ffii S?v+ in h +e 5ati°nS* His Procedure apparently dis- 
a? Sixtus who stripped him of his powers on December 20 1477
At the request of the Emperor he was allowed to retain his position *
gabsburgicfr, III, p. 447. The Bishop was rein-' 
vested with his authority on March 15. 1478 Ibid n LLP. • +
wiTthTS8 ^er-  ^e"terclthe dl" ‘ Sfc.VS
ar r SS10n-- r ™ - ’ P- **• to achievemore influence at the imperial court Sixtus specifically requested the
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negotiations with the Emperor and sent a delegation to Krems. The 
Hungarians presented a long list of grievances against the Roman King 
and demanded a large endemnity as the prince for peace.Frederick 
claimed the complaints were entirely insincere and thus unaccept-
OC
able.-''-'’ The war continued its devastating course. When the Hungarian
armies threatened Vienna, Frederick appealed directly to the Pope. He
requested that the Pontiff should order Matthias to stop the war.
Political circumstances finally led to a truce. The Turks were
threatening the Hungarian frontier. Moreover both Sixtus IV and the
city of Venice threatened to withdraw the subsidies paid to Matthias
for the Turkish W a r B o t h  parties agreed to a fourteen-dav truce on 
37
November 10, 1477. When Matthias again demanded an indemnity in the 
subsequent deliberations, Frederick had no choice but to submit to 
these terms.
Some negotiations of a more personal nature were also carried 
on between Pope and Emperor. Sixtus had presented two requests to 
Frederick. The first concerned the lack of imperial efforts in the
Bishop to support the cause of the Roman Curia in Vienna. The request 
was issued on December 1, 1478. Ibid. The Bishop was retired from 
his position in imperial-papal relations by Sixtus IV on August 27.
1480. Ibid.. p. 462.
34
Presented on August 3, 1477. Ibid., II, pp. 110-115.
3522id., pp. 115-117.
36
Fessler, o£. cit., Ill, p. 125.
37Monumenta Hab?burgica, II, pp. 117-122. On December 18,
1477, Matthias issued a proclamation freeing all Austrian prisoners 
of war. Kurz, og. cj£., II, Beilagen, No. 44, pp. 262-263.
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Turkish war. Secondly, Sixtus demanded the protection of Frederick, 
who, in the final analysis, was the temporal executor of papal policy. 
In answering the papal demands the Roman King claimed that he had made 
mainfold efforts to create an interest in the crusade, but had received 
only a limited response. The papal demand for imperial protection was 
entirely absurd in Frederick's estimation, since Sixtus had done noth­
ing to warrant such action. He had begun the Italian war without con­
sultation or careful deliberation. Consequently, the Pontiff had no 
choice but to make peace in Italy and convoke a general congress to 
deal with the crusade.
The advance of the Infidel augmented the already existing fear 
concerning the welfare of eastern Europe. Throughout 1475 and 14?6 
the Turks continued their relentless advance into Styria, Carinthia 
and Carniola. When a special offensive was launched into Carinthia 
in 1478, the endangered areas called for a special meeting at Landshut 
in Bavaria to consider the problem. Those in attendance included the 
Archbishop of Salzburg, the Bishops of Eichstadt, Freysingen and 
Regensburg, as well as Duke Albert of Bavaria and representatives from 
the cities of Augsburg and Nuremberg. Although the meeting could boast 
imperial and papal participation, it achieved no concrete results.39 
"The meeting ended by proposing to send a delegation to the Emperor, 
which was to warn him of the Turkish threat, and seek aid from him."40
38M2nm§n£a Hakgburgica, I, pp. 380-383. Although the document 
cannot be precisely dated, its contents best describe the political 
atmosphere of 1477.
39Muller, op. cit., II, pp. 722-726.
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The hard pressed Republic of Venice was forced to sign a peace 
with the Turks on January 28, 1479. Both Frederick and Sixtus IV were 
exceedingly apprehensive of this treaty.41 In order to forestall any 
further Turkish gains another meeting of a territorial nature was held 
at Freysmgen early in 1479. The presence of Dukes Albert and George 
of Bavaria and the participation of a well authorized imperial repre­
sentation gave an official character to the deliberations. Since 
Islam’s peace with Venice gave it easy access to the Empire, the 
assembly resolved to set up a joint system of border defense with 
Matthias Corvinus. The details of the plan were to be solved at an 
imperial Diet to be held at Nuremberg later in the year,42
The Papacy revealed a renewed interest in a crusade during 
1479. Already in January of that year Sixtus received a brief from 
Frederick III urging him to awaken new interest in the Turkish war, 
and to end the conflict in Italy itself.*3 Sixtus proved quite willing
41
, . , ” March 21 Sixtus addressed a letter to Frederick in which 
he lamented the action of Venice and exhorted the Emperor to uphold 
the cause of Catholic Christendom. Msnumenta Habsburgica. Ill, p .  457.
Hluller, 2e. cit., II, pp. 726-729.
D ^ v J ^ S S F ^  fcbgfapica, HI, pp. 6-7. At the beginning of 
^ecember, 1478, Sixtus IV, with the object of counteracting French 
intervention in his contest with Florence, sent two nuncios to the 
Emperor requesting his mediation and assistance. Louis XI sourfit 
to pressure the Pope by sending special envoys to Rome, who demanded 
that a general Council be summoned. A special consistory was held 
on February 15 to deal with the problem. The Emperor's envoys, who 
had meanwhile arrived, staunchly defended the rights of the Roman
J"n+KUmin?ning aT?ouncil» stated that no such move was neces­
sary at this time. It was recommended, however, that Sixtus should
f  Florent^ es and conclude a peace, especially 
554 ger fr0“ ^ 6 Turks* pastor, sat., II, p p .  553_
to cooperate on the eastern issue. The Diet of Nuremberg which was 
scheduled for September 29, 1479, saw active papal participation. The 
Diets agenda revolved about "die sweren Einziige der Turken."^ Both 
the imperial and the papal legations arrived in time for the Diet. 
Since no princely representatives had yet arrived, the proceedings 
were temporarily postponed. When the Diet finally convened the dele­
gates were informed of the great victory over the Turks wrought by 
Bathory at Brodfelde. The Hungarian envoys urged an immediate and 
united campaign against the Turks. Both papal and imperial delegations 
joined the rest of the Diet in rejecting the plea. No help could be 
sent, they asserted, because the Empire was so poorly represented. The 
conclusion of the Diet was uneventful. "At this prorogued Diet there
was much deliberation; few matters were settled, however, and even less
, , „46 
executed."
The international situation probably contributed to improved 
personal relations between the two heads of Christendom. A friendship 
pact was signed sometime during 1479. Its terms were rather presump­
tuous in view of recent imperial-papal history. Friend and foe of the 
one were to be friend and foe to the other. Sixtus vowed to defend
391
duller, 22. cit., II, p. 730.
I nn ^ \ i f i rVaMhZ ^ r2g?f^SS -^§ (Budapest, 18?6),
?£9q “j * Matthias ^formed the Pope of his victory on October
t t  l the COurse of the letter the Hungarian monarch accused
the Pope of being more concerned with Italy than with tte Turk. Sixtus
that such a thought had been given Matthias by an evil spirit 
and assured him of his unfeigned support. Fessler, o£. cit., HI, p.135.
it &L46
Muller, ojD. ci£.., II, p. 732.
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Frederick against a i  attacks. Considerable liberty in the administra­
tion of ecclesiastical establishments within the Austrian hereditary 
lands was also granted the Emperor.4?
Meanwhile the relations between Hungary and Austria once More 
deteriorated. Frederick 111 refused to fulfill his monetary pledges 
to Matthias. All protests sent to the Apostolic Chair were politely 
ignored. The Pope's complacency was badly shaken, however, when the 
Turks landed twenty-thousand troops at Apulia on August 11, IWo, 
captured Otranto. Sixtus immediately requested military aid from 
garian King, promising him adequate recanpense for his efforts, 
h great persistance did Sixtus succeed in rousing the Italian 
states to arms. The subsequent efforts to oust the Tur* from Otranto 
revealed the crusade spirit to be at an all time low.48 A n
delegation sent to Ra» in the fall of USD was s^oifioally concerned 
with the Turkish problem. The envoys were instructed to convince the 
Pope of the many sacrifices whi* the Snperor had made, and was daUy 
makinOI for the war. Ho less than twaity six meetings had been held 
in Germany concerning the matter. Frederick then informed Sixtus of 
the impending imperial Diet to be he3d at Nuremberg later in the
47
Monument,Habgbtirgisa, I H  pp 27 ?Q q-s + t 
was further evidenced on March 1*5 liJto* u u us goodwill 
control over such Bishoprics as Brixn^’ ? C h® confi™ed Frederick's
P P .  30-32. -Brixner, Gurk, Triest and Trent.
48
Pastor, oe. ITi pp^ 560-571.
year. The Emperor expressed the hope that the Holy Father as well 
as the other princes of Europe would attend, so that the necessary 
means for the war could be provided. The imperial representatives 
were also instructed to protest the behavior of Matthias of Hungary, 
who was using the funds granted him for the Turkish campaigns to attack 
Austria.5*^
Frederick's fears were entirely justified. In the spring of 
1481 Matthias decided to force Frederick into submission. Mahomet II 
had died and a struggle for the succession momentarily weakened the 
Turk. The Hungarian King did not miss his opportunity and made pre­
parations for an offensive. Strangely enough, Pope Sixtus IV allowed 




The Nuremberg Diet of 1480 resulted in no startling develop­
ments. It was attended by such dignitaries as the Electors of Cologne 
Saxony, Brandenburg and the Palatinate, Duke George of Bavaria, Count 
Ulrich of Wurtemberg and several bishops. Papal participation was not 
in evidence. The assembly dealt with Frederick's conflict with Hun- 
5 ** simultaneously attempted to recruit an army to fight the 
lnlidel. These efforts were almost entirely unsuccessful. "In the 
end neither Frederick III and Matthias, nor the German princes and 
cities cared about the formulated resolutions." K. KUffner. Der Reichs- 
tg£ vsn t a t o  3Q20 1480. Inaugural-Dissertation . . . Heidelberg
4 Un urg’ 9 * P* **ee also ^ ller, £2* cit., II, p. ?39ffj
~ ^ sche SflijfoMeschichtft Zeitalter Friedrich III, und 
~  bgspnderer garucksichtigur^ der osterreichischen Staaten-
tt?ZAg’ n 9 1X* PP‘ 69°-704. The significance of the 
assembly for the developmental pattern of imperial Diets in general
j S ^ n d e r t ^ V o f 3??; ^  %schichte des Deutsc^en Reichstages m  
(Vol# VII of Leipzig er Historische Abhandlungen, ed.
E. Brandenburg, G. Seeliger, U. Wilcken. Leipzig, 1 W ), ppf36-Si
^ o m w o n t a . Habsburglca. Ill, pp. 50-53.
funds for the war against the Turk.51 The shrewd King was therefore
in an excellent bargaining position when he sent the Bishop of Gross-
wardein and Johann Pruiss to the imperial Diet held at Nuremberg in
1481.
With the fall of Otranto in 1480, Pope Sixtus became vitally- 
interested in settling the conflict between Austria and Hungary. At 
first Sixtus had sent Prosper of Ascali to arbitrate the dispute, but 
the latter was no match for the keen diplomacy of Matthias. Frederick 
bluntly expressed his opinion of the papal legate. "If he was some­
what brighter and would tackle the problem with greater courage, the 
matter might be solved.”52 The willingness of both sides to accept 
papal arbitration did not presuppose an innate eagerness to see the 
hostilities terminated. Matthias accused both the Pope and the Emperor 
of unfair practices. Frederick answered by accusing the Hungarian 
Monarch of aggression. A new papal legate, the Bishop of Teano, Ursus 
de Ursinis, was finally appointed to deal with the dispute.53 Matthias 
rejected the legate as unworthy for so great a task. Only a man of 
Cardinal rank was acceptable. Sixtus persisted in his appointment, how­
ever, and Matthias finally accepted the Bishop*s candidacy. The dis­
trusted legate could accomplish very little. When Bishop Wilhelm of 
Eichstadt was asked to continue the negotiations, he fared a little
51Fessler, cit., Ill, p. 142.
52Bachmann, 0£. cit., II, pp. 707-708.
iass. pp!°^2%2fiCial endorsanent *oh«JUaiidli^ t o -
39^
better. Following Matthias1 capture of Radkersburg^ Bishop Wilhelm 
was able to get Frederick to agree to a truce. Subsequent negotiations 
extended this truce from June 11 to June 25, 1481. 55
Papal arbitration was also in evidence at the Diet of Nuremberg 
held in 1481. The Hungarian envoys, the Bishop of Grosswardein and 
Johann Pruiss, had been authorized to make a general peace with the 
Emperor and establish an alliance against the Turks. The efforts of 
the papal legate, Ursini, were of no avail. The proposals of the 
Hungarian King were not even presented. Instead, many of the imperial 
estates pledged to support the Emperor against Matthias, rather than 
Matthias against the Infidel. 56 Matthias bitterly blamed the Papacy 
for having sent a legate who allied himself with the Emperor. 57 Sixtus 
answered that he desired nothing more than to be able to make peace 
between him and the Emperor. The Hungarian Monarch accepted the Pope's 
proposal but requested that Sixtus use all of his apostolic power in 
forcing Frederick to abide by the peace terms. Emperor Frederick, try 
a variety of excuses, gradually withdrew fran the negotiations. Late 
m  1481 Matthias again presented seme proposals for a peace to the
395
i ^ description o£ Matthias* advances during this time is given
s . smisssr
7468.’ g t0 llve 111 harmony with Matthias. Ibid., No.
duller, oe. cit., II, p. 75Sfft 
57Fessler, o£. cit., Ill, p. \kZ.
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papal legate. The imperial failure to answer would be considered as 
an ultimate rejection of the Hungarian terms. Frederick, depending 
on the promises of the imperial estates, refused to renew the negoti­
ations. Since Matthias despaired of intimidating the Emperor into an 
alliance, he pursued the war in earnest early in 1482. By the end of 
December he was at the western borders of Austria.'*8
During the course of 1483 Sixtus continued his efforts to estab­
lish a truce. 59 A new papal legate, Bishop Castelli, was sent to the 
Hungarian court for this purpose. Although the Bishop sought to con­
vince Matthias of the folly of the war, he was entirely unsuccessful. 60 
The Hungarian Monarch's distrust of the Emperor could not be overcome.
In the main I found that he was of the opinion that he 
could not trust the Emperor. When I sought the cause 
he neared his mouth to my ear and said in a subdued 
voice: If I was not in this war against that unjust
he^hates^you. ecclesiastics would sense it that
58
Novf»mK*T. atterrlpted to terminate the conflict. On
to finH +ho * <?-he ^patched a special letter requesting Matthias 
tunes of Austria Fred*rick co*ld 0"ly hope to restor^the for!
6CU
«ith a Ktogether
& £ f s s  sszi™ 0 ^ -
61TV^Ibii.
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Despite such expressions of discard, a program for the establishment 
of a truce was finally drawn up.
This new plan62 was the joint product of the Bishop of Castelli 
and the Archbishop of Colocza. It stipulated:
1) That Sixtus IV was to issue a bull reiterating his stead­
fast opposition to the Turks, and announcing that he had sent forth
a number of dignitaries to appease the contending parties and unite 
them against the common danger.
2) That the Bishop of Castelli be empowered to summon a Diet 
of the Geraan princes in order to find a means of averting a Turkish 
invasion. Since the meeting was to be of a religious nature, it must 
be summoned by the Pope and not the Emperor. 63
3) That special briefs were to be sent to all the princes urg­
ing their attendance at the Diet.
The plan proved partially successful. Towards the end of Sep­
tember, 1483, the Bishop of Castelli came to Gratz bearing letters from 
the Pope which advocated peace. They were addressed to both Matthias 
and the Emperor. On October 16 the legate journeyed to Ofen to consult 
with Matthias. The Bishop admonished the latter to make peace with the 
Emperor in view of Frederick's age and weakness. A compromise was finally
^2Ibid.
63 „
voke the assembl^ bUl1 ^  ^ ich your Holiness must con-
. . ■ J f V E S E S ,  & £ •  " e e t i n g  is relig i°“s - “
64 '
had left w S f  **” approachinS Matthias,
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reached. It was agreed that the Pope would convene a Diet of German 
princes whose express purpose centered about the reconciliation of the 
two Kings. The assembly would grant military aid to Matthias. In 
return, the captured Austrian lands would be placed under papal super­
vision for three years. The legate then left for Gratz in order to 
persuade Frederick to accept the above conditions.^ Frederick did not 
comply. Instead he sent the Bishop back to Ofen with a new set of am­
biguous proposals. Matthias only increased his demands. The papal 
legate was now convinced that peace between the two monarchs was im­
possible, nevertheless he presented the Emperor's proposals. The 
Bishop's apprehensions were entirely justified when he received the 
Hungarian reply through the Archbishop of Colocza. In his report^ to 
Sixtus IV he wrote* "There will be no one, who does not think and con­
clude that he is completely opposed to a peace, and that it is a matter 
little honor for his majesty." Following another audience with Cor- 
vinus, the legate was completely convinced that no peace could ever be 
established between the two men. He left for Gratz on December 13,
1483, to inform the Emperor of the latest developments in the negoti­
ations.
Despite a letter sent by Pope Sixtus to Matthias on March 4,
65Fessler, o£. cit., Ill, pp. 147-148.
66
+», p* u Maila-th, OE. £ii*» HI, No. XLI, pp. 179-187. In his report, 
the Bishop of Castelli alluded to the contemporary status of imperial- 
papal relations. In reference to Matthias' proposals he noted: "One 
thing pleases me in these points, namely the answer that he does not 
wish to blame your Holiness with all that the Fmperor does, and yet 
ought to blame himself." Ibid. *
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1484, which urged him to make peace with the Emperor, the Hungarian 
King continued his conflict with Austria.67 A momentary lull oc­
curred when the Turks again advanced into Hungary* Matthias accepted 
the Sultans' apology for the incident, even though the new Pope, Inno­
cent VIII, warned against any such action. Vienna remained under siege
67
Frederick's sense of confidence despite such a grave humili­
ation was probably related to the periodic negotiations which had been 
held with the Duke of Burgundy since 1473. The deliberations were 
purely political in nature and involved territorial designs. Papal 
participation was entirely absent. The engagement of Frederick's son,
' aximilian, with Maria, daughter of Duke Charles of Burgundy, consti­
tuted the basic issue of the famed meeting held between the two princes 
at rier in the fall of 1473* The subject had already been discussed 
during the early years of Frederick's rule. H. Fichtenau, Der Junge 
Maximilian. Hfc52-1482 (Munchen, 1959), pp. 21-22. The marri^e between 
Maximilian and Maria of Burgundy finally took place on August 19, 1477. 
Politically, this meeting and the subsequent negotiations between the 
two princes were efforts to fortify their positions against Matthias 
orvinus in the east, and Louis XI and the Swiss Federation in the west, 
he entire venture was a tribute to the astuteness of Habsburg diplo­
macy, especially in view of the odds which it faced at this time.
hat the road towards mid— and west European greatness lay via Bur— 
gundy must have been sensed by both Frederick and Maximilian. . . .
His LMaximilianJ tenacious struggle for the heritage of Burgundy 
showed itself to be a highly profitable policy. . . . The belief in 
the future of the Austrian House was fantastic, but it aided in over­
coming the defeats of the contemporary struggle and finally came to 
fruitation despite all opposition." M d . ,  p. 49. The most signifi­
cant literature on the subject includes: F. Lindner, Die Zusammen-
tj}S£^  ^ |Ser - -TdriCh  ^—  ^  & 2 1 dem Kuhnen vqq Bursrund im Jahre 
i4Z2sH2jl§r. Inauguraldissertation . . . Greifswald (Coslin, 1876);
iftof) T° ner! —  52 £arl de Stoutz te Trier 1473 (Groningen,
n  L * K  ^  3°  neuerTBericht uber die Zusammenkunft Friedrichs 
S  I teS /u Trfer 1473» Westdeutsche Zeitschrift. fur
S w S  1 F *  (1911), 419-430; K. Schellhass, "Eine Kaiser-
3 IV (I893)rei6l ?ll £ r  Q^SSkichte und Kunst. Folge
93), 161-211, T. Liebenau, Zur Stellung Kaiser Friedrichs IV
(187^877) ^  ^ e^rjscfte Qssm s h te, II
: 224-226; R. Bibra, "Kaiser Friedrich III. in Wurzburg.
burg* 65^(1926)^ 1^ ^  ~ terfrank^  ^  Aschaffen-05 T, * 51. The last article is especially important in that
tminraCJS+^ h^e detaiied political involvanents which finally led to the
ion of the houses of Habsburg and Burgundy in 1477. In this connection
and was finally starved into submission.
Meanwhile Frederick III journeyed to Nuremberg in an attest to 
obtain aid against Matthias. The Duke of Bavaria declared that he could 
do nothing without the Pope's consent. Likewise the Electors of Saxony 
and Brandenburg refused to promise any aid against Hungaiy. Frederick's 
son, Maximilian, was engaged in protecting the Habsburg positions in the 
west. Imperial support was nowhere to be found.68 Frederick's sojourn 
in the Empire was conditioned by another matter *ich was to have wide 
implications in subsequent imperial histoiy. This „aS the election of 
his son, Maximilian, as King of the P-anans on February 16, 1487.^9 <jhe 
energetic yonng ruler embued imperial politics with a new vigor.
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Oegcfoichte und Kungt, XV (1896^ 60.106^ ^ 328? ^ sc^rift ^
m ,  pp. a / a i f lin> Sssfiusiis (Stuttgart, 1856), 
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The one sees the electio^a^thf the of Maximilian prevail,
ning, while the other asserts thafth Frederick's careful plan-
Emperor's intentions The fn™ 0».J procedure was contrary to the
article entitlS S  D ^ L £ T £ o ^  *  A* Baotaa™> “ ®
osterraioh^^. Oesohicht*. ■?(. axmilians I.," Archly fiir
Emperor did not Strive aslinst th» 557-605.. He eoncluded: "The 
bring it abcut; n a t u r a l ^  ^  °‘10n °f M s  son. but wished to 
stances . . .  he support^ t h f ^ l £ S o n  f ^  ”? U"d*r 3uitabl? circuin-
summer of 1485 he personally .«.«*,+ + 4 a g time 311(1 since the
Two other schol^s^ok excentSfJ it*" J U H -  P. 605.
F. Priebatsch insisted that "As strong S P^on°u“ee,aent» The first 
may have been, Frederick did not reauL?S+£ 1intffests of.h±s house 
cause he feared a eo-reeent irroja • , e C n  of his son, be-
beeause it was supported bv’cir c S  £ "ot want the election
tion might sharply reduce support for°th*t hl1?’ the elec-
and because Maximilian had the best chanL^f^K? •W^* ^  HunSary»
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401
The combined rule of father and son did not produce a marked 
change in the immediate situation, however. Austria still fared badly 
in her conflict with Hungary. Maximilian's election to the Roman 
Kingship so embittered Wladislaw of Poland that he renewed his alli­
ance with Hungary. 70 No help was forthcoming from the German Nation. 71 
The Emperor had no choice but to agree to a cease-fire. A peace treaty 
was signed soon afterwards. It stipulated that the final decision in 
the dispute would be made by Pope Innocent VIII within a year. Fred­
erick now called a Diet at Nuremberg (1487) in order to discuss the 
terms which Matthias offered. The assembly marked the first official 
participation of Innocent VIII im m rU 1 affairs. 72 Considerable
XIX (1898)^324^32?9tThis?vf^' ^ §terreic^ i Geschichtsforschnry
had already Plotted H  i n ^  I ? f S° ° 2 endorse^ *  H. Ulmann 2 2 ?’ 
1884) T L - j p u  .M1 hls ^SiSer Maximilian I. (Stutteart
Emperor's attitie att * pting t0 deduct'the
misinterpretation of certain f s error also lay in a
S f r ly del 0n3tratad as late "s i S f l ^ d S T r ^ a t n r r  •
Maximilian. H. Ulmann "Kaiser Fr?Art?\CTTT to..the election of 
Konigswahl in den Jahren 1481-1486 " His+nJ? pgenuber der Frage der 
(1900), 410-429. 1406* -^storische Zejtschrift. LXXIV
^Palacky, 22. cit., V, 1, p, 287ff.
Haodten AktenSS^p Bg£st mdern. Ver-
2, No. 621, p. 450.” ~~ reiburg im Breisgau, 1872), II,
through normal diploma tic Channels ^f^De c a?SenC®, ?5 a11 c°ntacts
were sent to Frederick III and Maximil? ? ’ 6’ two legates 
to all expectations, both p S n c e f S s W d  C°ntra^
for a crusade. J. Schneider Dtp u ope s proposals
Jaii daa Lenten Raimund Peraudtr 1486^505^ 3^ +£2-14 tis^  SkMai-
f T ^ e S l ' d
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tension existed between the new Pontiff and Frederick III. The imperial 
estates asked the Emperor whether any aid against Matthias and the Turks 
had been requested from the Papacy. In his response to this question 
Frederick chided Innocent VIII for his indolence. The Holy Father had 
promised to aid Frederick only when the Turks were actually encamped 
upon Austrian lands. The Diet voted to send a special delegation to 
Rome. Innocent responded by dispatching a legation to Nuremberg.^
The Pope had little intention of supporting the imperial case. Instead 
his legates attempted to implement the papal demand for a tithe in Basel 
and Salzburg.^
During the remainder of Frederick's reign Austrian-Hungarian 
relations retained a considerable amount of stability.^ The relative
(Halle, 1881), p. 10. On May 27, i486, he published a bull in which 
he expressed his determination to arouse all Christendom to a crusade.
was decreed that a tithe of one year's revenue should be levied 
on all churches and ecclesiastical persons throughout the Empire.
This brain-child of the Pope, like so many before it, died, of neglect.
73Muller, OB. cit., Ill, pp. 122-123.
.^£feid., pp. 128-131.
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•4- x. • 2®^, fac^ors contributed to this stability. The domestic 
situation in Matthias realm had become progressively worse. In order 
o preserve the heritage of his house, the aging King now busied him­
self with his son s succession. The second factor concerned Frederick's 
diplomatic ventures. Abandoned by Poland, Frederick had begun negoti­
ations with the Prince of Moscow. Although the alliance was only for-
SSwT ? the Diet of Nuremberg held in April, 1491, Matthias'
ig® °f ^Pending Austrian-Russian alliance made him tread
vipwrvH n + 5° t0 flght a two front war* From a Russianviewpoint, this rendezvous with Austria was possibly a part of Ivan's
tion/at "?®teT?lzatlon* ^or a good analysis of Austrian-Russian rela­
tions at this time see P. Karge, "Kaiser Friedrich's III. und Maximi-
D e S ^ h I L  ihre Beziehungen zu Moskau 1486-1506,"
Deutoche Ze.itschrj.ft. fur Geschichtswissenschaft.. IX (I893), 259-272
calm which characterized 1489 allowed Innocent VIII to concern himself 
with the projected crusade. In an effort to improve his relations with 
the Emperor, Innocent addressed a brief to him. It stressed the fact 
that during the Austrian-Hungarian dispute, the Pope had ordered his 
nuncio to do nothing against the will of the Emperor. 76 In the autumn 
of 1489, Innocent was busily occupied with the preparations for the 
crusade. His letter of May 8, 1489, proposing a Congress, had met with 
widespread response. The Pontiff had consequently sent legates to all 
the major European courts, imploring them to lay aside their quarrels 
and join in the crusade. Innocent especially attempted to establish a 
more stable bond between Frederick and Matthias. He adjured Frederick, 
by the mercy of Christ, to be a pious King and comply with the papal 
plans. At Frederick's request the actual business sessions of the 
Congress began considerably later than the official opening, which 
took place on March 25, 1490. On June 3 Pope Innocent delivered a 
long address stressing that the political disputes among the Turks 
made the crusade an immediate necessity. After the usual disputes, 
an answer was given to the Pope through the persistence of the imperial 
envoys. It called for three armies to fight the Turk. For the moment 
the Emperor would be considered the Commander-in-Chief. A battle plan 
was also outlined. Innocent thanked the members of the Congress for 
their response. Nevertheless, "in the end he expressed his astonish­
ment that despite all their suggestions, the representatives constantly
403
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Dated May 9, 1489, Chmel, Regesta. No. 8411.
appealed to the final decision of their princes." 77 The Pope's curi­
osity regarding the matter was soon satisfied. With the death of Mat­
thias on April 6, 1490, the entire venture faded into obscurity. Maxi­
milian and Frederick seized the opportunity to recover the Habsburg 
positions in Hungary. As on previous occasions, the imperial endorse­
ment of the crusade was entirely conditioned by territorial interests. 
The crusade still played a dominant role in the last official contact 
between a papal legate the Frederick III at the Diet of Nuremberg 
held in 1491. The legate also attempted to arbitrate in the dispute 
between Maximilian and Hungary. His presence at the Diet provided 
a sad but realistic epitaph for the contemporary state of imperial- 
papal relations. The princes in attendance supported Turkish war 
with the customary expressions of enthusiasm.78 No attempt was made 
to implement these resolutions.
The obvious lack of cordiality between Frederick III and the 
Papacy in the last quarter of the fifteenth century centered around 
a second area— the investiture and control of several dioceses.
Though the benevolence of previous pontiffs Frederick had gained
the right of investing such Bishoprics as Trient, Brixen, Gurk, Trieste,
Chur, Piben and Vienna. Pope Sixtus confirmed these privileges on
rpq
April 8, 1473. In defiance of the wishes of the Roman Curia, the
77
Pastor, op. cit., Ill, p, 273.
78Miiller, op. cit., m ,  pp. 195.195,
79
668kt M m a e a i a  Ha.bsburgj.ca, X, pp. 316-318; Chmel, Regesta, No.
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Emperor also attempted to enforce his rule in such areas as Cologne, 
Salzburg, Bamberg and Passau. One of the most intensive struggles in 
this connection occurred from 1474-1480 and involved the Bishopric 
of Constance. The conflict saw the participation of the Emperor, the 
Swiss Federation, as well as a number of other princes and cities.
The Bishop of Constance, Herman of Breitenlandenberg, passed 
away on September 18, 1474. On September 30 the Chapter of the dio­
cese elected the canon of the cathedral, Count Otto of Sonnenberg, to
Q0
fill the position. At first two, then four members of the Chapter 
opposed the election. They supported the church-patron of Ehingen, 
Lewis of Freiberg. On the wish of Bishop Herman, Sixtus IV appointed 
Lewis as the coadjutor of the Bishopric with the right of succession
On
without election on September 2. The Chapter of the diocese was 
well aware of this when it elected Otto.
Both parties soon enjoyed considerable support. Lewis was 
supported by Duke Sigismund of Austria and Count Ulrich of Wurttera- 
berg while Otto could rely on the sympathy of the Swiss Federation. 82
Q a
Otto was the son of Count Eberhard, the Lord High Steward of 
«aldburg. The definitive work on this princely house was probably pro­
duced by J. Vochezer, Geschichte des furstlichen Hanses Wald burg in 
Schwaben (Kempter, 1888) 2 vols.
t i "Sixtus IV. und der Konstanzer Bistumstreit
(1474-1480)," Freiburger Diozensan-Archiv. Neue Folge, 25 (1924) 
Beilagen, Nos. 1-3. *
T3. a discussi°n of the political relations between the
Bishops of Constance and the Swiss Federation see J. Gisler, "Die 
Stellung der Acht Alten Orte zum Konstanzer Bistumsstreit 1474-1480," 
Zeitschrift fur Schweizerische Kirchengeschichte. Beiheft 18 (1956)]
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The city of Constance tended to side with the Cathedral Chapter, but 
at first remained neutral. The geographic area which the dispute en­
compassed was considerably extended when Emperor Frederick III entered 
the struggle. On January 5, 14?5, he issued a statement which denounced 
the appointment of Lewis as an infraction of the Concordat of Vienna.8-* 
The envoys of both parties now appeared in Rome to plead their respec­
tive causes. On February 27, 1475, Sixtus issued a bull expressing
84
his verdict on the matter. The Pope annuled the election of Otto and 
confirmed Lewis anew. He threatened the Cathedral Chapter with severe 
penalties if they did not submit in six days. The Roman Curia clarified 
its position in a brief issued on March 15.8* It promised excommunica­
tion unless the investiture of Lewis was recognized. 86 A brief of simi­
lar content was also sent to the Emperor, the Swiss Federation and Sig- 
israund of Austria*
Frederick III refused to yield to papal pressure.8'’ An imperial-
83
. . ,Thf bfief Yas fomulated at Andernach, where an imperial con­
vention took place during 1474.75. Its deliberations centered 
contemporary international politics. Muller, xdJt.. pp. 675-697. 
8k
Goller, Beilaget No. 4.
85,.
IfeM., Beilage, No. 5.
86T . ,
i-ewis showed no hesitation in accepting: his position a*
s r s t i r i f n o r 4  t o L
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A staunch but little known supporter of Frederick in +v»o r ™
h i * S L S S S * Kas Bi5h?p Danenico de ^
i t e ^ ^ i a-Pa?finrePr !SentatiTe 1,1 the negotiations with Sigis- 
O e o r g e o f In 1AA. g  
as X,73 Frederick 0 ^ ^ ^ ^ . ^ ^
mandate was issued at Cologne88 on April 8, 1475, which stipulated the 
Pope's acticn in the Constance dispute violated the terras of the Concor­
dat of 1448. A special letter was sent to one, Henry of Randegg, order- 
ing him to protect the castles arid cities of the Bishopric in the in- 
terests of Otto of Sonnenberg. 9 In addition to this, a brief was ad­
dressed to the clergy of Constance, commanding them to ignore the papal 
letters sent to Lewis of Freiberg.90 Meanwhile the Pope's second con­
firmation of Lewis arrived in Constance. In view of the recent imperial 
mandate, the Chapter sent an appeal to the Roman Curia, in which the 
current situation was portrayed.
Frederick now wrote to Sixtus assuring him of his compliance 
and suhraissiveness-as far as this was compatable with the honor of 
the Empire. Nevertheless, he staunchly defended the election of Otto. 91 
Frederick then proceeded as if the dispute was entirely an imperial af­
fair. On June 19 he forwarded a mandate to the Bishop of Augsburg which 
announced that the dispute between Otto aid Lewis would be settled at a
407
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h i  « T ^  1301363 in various administrative capacities,
ee H. Jedin, Bischof Domenico de Domenichi und Kaiser Friedrich III
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5. ahrhundert, Mittgilungen des osterreichischen St^a+.sar^hiv Rr 
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tt. ftto 00ncerne? Orbing the influence of
uke of Burgundy. Muller, op. cit., pp. 698-718.
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Chmel, Monurnent.a Habgburgica. I, No. 115, pp. 338-339.
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Diet to be held in Schaffhausen. The Bishop was requested to attend 
personally in order to aid in deliberations and support the imperial 
candidate. "Daran tust du unser ernstlich meynung und sunder geuallen." 92 
On the same day Frederick sent another letter to the city of Constance 
requesting them to obey Henry of Randek. None of the supporters of 
Lewis of Freiburg were to be allowed in the city.93 This imperial initi­
ative soon invoked a papal response. Four briefs were drawn up by the
95Roman Curia on July 10, 1475. One was addressed to the Emperor, 
and another to Duke Sigismund of Austria. The other two were sent to 
the clergy and monasteries of the Bishopric. 96 When the Burgundian 
war ended in 1475 Frederick entered the Constance dispute with renewed 
vigor. On October 30, 1475. Frederick invested Otto with the royal
reich haben, . . . ob ew der genant doctor Ludwig von Freib^ r-r in
S f  tHSOll? en bebstli=he'' kirfen  ersuchen^
p 340 L  ?afauf zuSesagt noch tut." Ibid.. No. 116,
tlel of the areat t0 * ^  °f 1116 °ities ^Principalil
91Goller, oe. cit., pp. 9_io.
92
Chmel, op. cit., I, No. 119, pp. 347.3/18.
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IbM., No. 120, pp. 348-349.
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him to take control of the castles. To insure adherence to the imperial
decree Frederick ordered his hereditaiy marshal, von Pappenheim, into
the area. Frederick's power politics bore fruit. In the summer of 
14?6 Sixtus IV allowed the consistory lawyer, John Tuscanis, to negoti- 
ate with the Emperor.
Up to this point the entire imperial position Has based upon an 
alleged violation of the Concordat of Vienna. The imperial viewpoint 
at that time found expression in two anonymous tracts written by some- 
closely connected with the Chapter.?? The first of these was written 
in the spring of 1475. The author, an avid supporter of imperial 
might, viewed the dispute from the standpoint of a contract between 
two parties. The contract could not be broken at the disgression of 
the Pope.98 In his second tract the author endorsed the validity of 
Otto's election and pictured Frederick as conscience bound to defend 
the rights of the Roman taperium. The election of Lewis without the 
consent of the cathedral Chapter was a violation cf the Concortat.
The writer maintained that the Constance investiture struggle was of 
greatest importance to the Semen Nation, the Emperor and the entire 
system of ecclesiastical administration.
prerogatives usually granted to the Bishopric of Constance, and ordered
Druckgeschichte der Schwei^^Zentrllbl *Beitrage zur alteren 
XXV (1908), 126ff. An attempt~To~dttV th ^  --b^ 0tek'swissftnqnl-n^ -, 




This record of the motivation behind the election of 
Sonnenberg, which manifests extreme bitterness and out­
spoken opposition against papal activity, is characteristic 
of the agitated, attitude evident against curial investiture 
and taxation in the bishoprics of the time. The air which 
one breaths is that of the Council of Basel. The idea of 
a national Council again makes its a p p e a r a n c e . 99
The legal aspects of the struggle saw the emergence of two 
main viewpoints. The first, championed by such men as Savageti, en­
dorsed the concept of papal supremacy. The second concerned itself 
with the dispute from the standpoint of contrast. Both parties were 
not especially concerned with adhering to the terms of the Concordat.100 
Savageti was careful to point out that the Concordat allowed the investi­
ture of benefices to the Pope during the odd months of the year. Fred­
erick III, by special petitions had repeatedly violated these terms.101 
Although Savageti was wrong in accusing Frederick of a fanatic desire 
to invest all bishoprics, the Emperor himself had little reason to 
complain since Sixtus had been especially generous in this regard.
On April 24, 1476, Frederick informed Otto of Sonnenberg and 
the Chapter of Constance that no further appeals to Rome were neces­
sary, since he intended to negotiate with Rome personally.102 On
"Ooller, 0£. cit., p. 20. The papal party did not lack 
supporters. An elaborate tract expounding the legal aspects of the 
dispute was written by a certain Joachim. He argued that a pope had 
supreme spiritual and temporal powers and could not be limited by 
any law. Thus from a legal viewpoint Sixtus IV was not bound by the 
terras of the Concordat. Ibid.. pp. 21-25.
10°Bachmann, Dgjttgcte Reichsgeschicht*. II, p. 647.
101Goller, 0£. cit., pp. 25-26.
102Vochezer, op. cit., p. 840.
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May 4 the Roman King sent a letter to Sixtus in which he extolled his 
faithfulness to the Church, especially during the pontificate of 
Eugenius IV, He stressed especially the position of the Empire in 
relation to the other lands of Europe. ^ 3
Pope Sixtus IV found himself in an awkward position, Louis XI 
of France had become increasingly independent in ecclesiastical affairs. 
During April he had dared to invite Sixtus to a synod of the French 
Church. The Pope had no choice but to seek closer cooperation with 
the Emperor. The subsequent negotiations"^*" between the papal nuncio, 
Cardinal Franz of Gonzaga, and Rudolf von Pappenheim concluded when a 
temporary agreement was reached on September 26, 1476. All the proces­
ses inaugurated by both sides were suspended for one year. The adminis­
tration of the Bishopric was temporarily placed under the jurisdiction 
of Bishop Wilhelm of Eichstatt,^^
Wo final solution was found to the Constance dispute during 
the next year. On July 26, 1477, the Pope extended the agreement for 
another year.10^ Meanwhile a new papal nuncio, Ardicino della Porta,
103I]2id., p. 841.
104I£M., P. 847ff.
^Tuscanis returned to Rome to become auditor of the paoal 
court of appeal but died in 1478. W.A.C. Hofmann. Forschun
106r"m
1477 Lewis *’ Beilagen» N°. 12. During the winter of
LeSs found g P?rscn*n y Ca*e *> to plead his case.
m  e financial straits since his income from
^ t n suspended. The Pope, still supporting the
candidature of Lewis, stated that anyone attacking 2 8 2  for J v
reason whatever, would be subject to excommunication. Ibid., No. 13.
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the Bishop of Aleria, was appointed to negotiate with the Emperor. The
papal directives 7 stipulated that if the issue were settled, the
losing candidate should be granted a pension. Apparently Sixtus was
anticipating the rejection of Lewis of Freiberg. Nevertheless on
December 20, 1477, he addressed a brief to the Swiss Federation urging
them to support the candidacy of Lewis at their Diet which was sched- 
108
uled for January. The Pontiff observed that he could no longer 
tolerate the wanton misuse of the property of the Constance Bishopric 
and hope that the Emperor would support him in his course of action.
A similar letter was sent to Duke Sigismund of Austria. 109 On December
22 the papal legate, Cardinal Franz of Gonzaga, requested Ulrich of 
Wurttemberg to support Lewis. The legate expressed the hope that Fred­
erick III would also reverse his position after receiving a conciliatoiy 
brief frcm Sixtus IV. The papal optimism was of a short duration.
The Swiss Federation returned an evasive answer. When Frederick heard 
of the Pope's proposals to the Swiss he regarded it as a breach of 
faith. He recalled that in his negotiations with "unser lieber an- 
dechtiger Hanns Aloui^y" it had been agreed "daz der bemelt erwelt 
bey dem bistumb zu Constenz bebleiben und durch unsern heiligen vater
107
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Her* op. ci£., Beilagen, No. 14. 
109Ibid., No. 15.
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den pabst sol bestet werden . . ."m  Frederick expressed his intention 
to abide by the agreement and support the election of Otto. 112 The 
Swiss were encouraged to remain loyal to the imperial candidate. Since 
Frederick's letter was written early in 1478, the new papal nuncio had 
apparently accomplished very little in the way of a reconciliation be­
tween Pope and Emperor. Frederick had probably learned of Sixtus* deal­
ings with the Swiss when he sent Archbishop Andrea Zamometic of Granea 
to Rome in mid-March.113 The investiture of Constance was included in 
the list of problems to be discussed. The directives given to Zamo- 
metiS consisted of a series of questions. No definite policy on in- 
vestiture dispute was included
Frederick's determination at last produced results. Sixtus 
announced that, with the consent of the Cardinals, he was transferring 
the entire matter into the hands of the Emperor. 115 The final solution 
now lay in the power of the Roman King. A final solution was not 
achieved, however. In the fall of 1478 Zamometic was sent to Rome a
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second time. 116 The imperial envoy noted that Frederick had been un­
able to arbitrate between the two parties since Lewis had remained in 
Rome. 117
On March 12, 1479* a papal brief was sent to Frederick lauding 
his efforts in attempting to arbitrate the dispute and exhorting him 
to bring the matter to a conclusion.11® In answer to the Pope's re­
quest, Frederick declared that a special Diet would be held on April
23 in Graz to deal with the subject. In order to hasten the conclu­
sion of the matter Sixtus sent Bishop Prosper Camogli of Caithnetz 
to the Emperor. The Bishop's directives indicated that although the 
Pope was anxious to terminate the dispute, he still supported the candi­
dacy of Lewis.119 The nuncio was instructed to ascertain whether any 
progress had been made by the Bishop of Aleria. If so, he was not to 
interrupt the proceedings. Moreover, the Bishop was to inform the 
Roman King that the Pope was deeply grieved by the sufferings of the 
Constance Church, and would welcome a quick solution to the problem. 
Sixtus went on to justify his support of Lewis of Freiberg. The Pon­
tiff indicated that he sought to please the Emperor by his action,es­
pecially since Frederick had previously presented two other candidates
414
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one of which was to be elected the coadjutor of Constance and have the 
right of succession after the death of the Bishop. Sixtus observed 
that in a second letter Frederick had endorsed the candiditure of Lewis 
of Freiberg. 120 The shrewd Pope had reserved his trump-card for the 
crucial moment. He could now assure Frederick that he had only acted 
in accordance with imperial wishes. After pointing out that the suc­
cession of a coadjutor was in harmony with the order of the day, it 
was suggested that the dilemma was best solved try allowing Lewis to 
remain in his post. Otto of Sonnenberg could be retired with a hand­
some pension. If he withdrew of his own free will, the Roman Curia 
would not forget his generosity. In the event that Frederick should 
reject the papal plan, the nuncio was to assure Lewis an adequate pen­
sion as well as the benefices which his rival now held. With Lewis' 
consent, Otto could then have sole control of the Bishopric. Although 
this procedure stained the honor of the Apostolic Chair, it would never­
theless be accepted by Sixtus if the Emperor so desired.
The Emperor proved to be a stubborn man. When the legate met 
with Frederick at Graz on April 15 the carefully calculated scheme of 
Pope Sixtus was rejected in short order. 121 Otto of Sonnenberg was to 
be elected as the Bishop of Constance. The Papacy would ratify this 
move within three months. During ttis time the benefices of Otto would
415
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be transferred to his rival. The details of the settlement were en­
trusted to a special commission. If these failed in their obligations, 
the Emperor and the papal nuncio would effect the final settlement.
The agreement was proclaimed in the cathedral at Constance on 
July 9, 1479. Since the consent of Lewis had not been obtained fur­
ther difficulties soon developed. Lewis appealed to Rome on the basis 
that the nuncio had violated his powers. The Papacy was completely dis­
satisfied with the pact. A special brief122 was sent to Austria to in­
form the Roman King of the Pope's displeasure. Its directives chided 
the Emperor for his laxity. 123 The Papacy had hoped the Emperor would 
have sympathized with the investiture of Lewis since he himself had 
recommended his election as coadjutor. Moreover the negotiations were 
typified by a distinct sense of illegality because the papal nuncio 
had overstepped his limits. Now the matter could only be solved by 
specially appointed arbitrators. If this proved unsuccessful the con­
tending parties must settle the dispute at Rome.124
Frederick finally lost his patience. Disregarding the plan
summer of a c U v H T S e  tt°.0? ! ™ ny durllW  th. 
Constance r ch were h ^ l n ^ S r  ? f \ t “S “ 8 S T S S *
hv + L  i P°S y have 13660 brought to Austria by him, and used 
by the papal representative during the deliberation^.
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set forth by Pope Sixtus, he ordered both Lewis and Otto to appear be­
fore him on October 18.^25 Cardinal Hessler, Bishop Alexander of 
Forli, and Archbishop Zamometic aided in the deliberations. Otto ap­
peared personally while Lewis sent a delegation to represent him. 
Frederick's decision was announced on November 24, 1479.126 The agree­
ment between Bishop Prosper and the Emperor was again ratified. Otto 
was empowered to receive more privileges than previously. All censures 
and threats previously made by either the Pope or the Emperor were nul­
lified. The Papacy's reaction to the imperial decision cannot be deter­
mined. Lewis refused to accept the proffered terms and went to Rome 
where he died in 1480. Otto of Sonnenberg was officially confirmed as 
Bishop of Constance on November 10, 1480.12? The Roman Curia only 
agreed to his election after the death of Lewis.128
In subsequent years the Bishopric of Constance continued to 
occupy a small but significant position in imperial-papal relations.
On May 27, 1480, Frederick granted Otto special custans privileges 
on the Rhein, in order to enable him to stabilize the financial aspects 
of the diocese. On August 1, Frederick ordered the inhabitants of the 
Bishopric of Constance to transfer their loyalty and support to Otto. 129
125,.
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The next year (March 9, 1481) Sixtus IV, in compliance with a request 
from the Emperor and Duke Sigismund of Austria, allowed Otto one-tenth 
of the income of monestaries and benefices of his Bishopric.1^0 In 
addition to this, Sixtus granted a complete indulgence to those who 
visited specific churches and made liberal donations.1-*1
The Constance investiture struggle even affected the pontifi­
cate of Innocent VIII, Prior to his election as Pope, Innocent was 
forced to sign an agreement promising not to alter the status of Con­
stance in any way, especially its investiture. After his election he 
demanded that certain revenues of the Bishopric be returned to the
lOO
Roman See, The outcome of the matter is not known.
Another dimension in imperial-papal affairs during the pontifi­
cate of Sixtus IV was the conflict between the Emperor and the Arch­
bishop from Salzburg from 1477-1481, Although the dispute saw less 
papal participation than was evident at Constance, it was nevertheless 
illustrative of the current issues influencing imperial-papal relations, 
Imperial interference in the investiture of dioceses, especially in 
Habsburg lands, had become something of a tradition with Frederick.
In the defense of his privileges of investiture Frederick gave a good
1‘*°lMd», No. 22.
^ No. 23. Despite all these liberal concessions
utto was never able to manage to regulate the finances of his Bishop- 
Pf* °“^° was fucceeded by Thomas Berlower on Sept,ember 9, 1491, C. 
kubel, ffierarchia Catholic a Medii, Aevi (Monasterii, 1914), p. 134,
? e. lat^fr* a fomer diplomatic agent of Frederick III, fared some- 
wnat better.
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account of himself.133
Since the Archbishop of Salzburg controlled such important cen­
ters as Gurk, Lavant and Seckau, Frederick was careful to keep it well 
in hand. Bernhard of Rohn was elected as Archbishop of Salzburg in 
1466. Frederick III, with the aid of Pope Paul II managed to curb 
Bernhard's jurisdiction quite effectively. When the Bishopric of 
Gurk became vacant, Frederick invested Lorenz Freiburger as Bishop, 
despite the Archbishop's efforts to secure the position for his nephew, 
Sixtus Tannberger.13**
The actual dispute between the Emperor and the Archbishop was 
initiated by a ritualistic dispute between the Cathedral Chapter of 
Salzburg and Bernhard. The Chapter secretly began negotiations with 
Frederick regarding the Archbishop's deposition.135 Thereupon the 
Emperor ordered Bernhard to end his controversy with the Chapter. 136
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133Frederick openly admitted that he was interested in having 
bishops and archbishops who were not only interested in the welfare of 
souls, but also thankful to both Pope and Emperor for their privileged 
position. As an expression of this position Frederick ordered the 
chapters of eighteen bishoprics and archbishoprics not to elect a 
personage not approved by both Emperor and Pope. Monumenta Habsburgica. 
II» PP» 386-388. This undated document was probably drawn up in 1478.
13ZfIbid., II, pp. 860, 865.
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Bernhard was informed of these negotiations by a special 
agent sent by Duke Lewis of Bavaria. F. M. Mayer, "Uber die Abdank- 
ung des Erzbischofs Bernhard von Salzburg und den Ausbruch des dritten 
^wischen Kaiser Friedrich und Konig Mathias vcn Ungarn (1477- 
1481), Archly £ur osterreichische Geschichte, 55 (1877), Beilagen,
13%onumenta Habsburgica. II, p . 342.
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Soon afterwards Bernhard came to Gratz and submitted a written state-
137
ment promising his resignation. The resignation was made dependent 
upon the approval of the Cathedral Chapter, however, Frederick then 
sent Cardinal George Hessler to negotiate with Pope Sixtus on the pro- 
posed abdication. Meanwhile a new Chapter leader, Christoph Ebran 
was elected in Salzburg. The latter firmly opposed the abdication of 
Bernhard.
Frederick had selected Johann of Gran to succeed in Salzburg.1^
The Cathedral Chapter, led by Ebran, refused to give its approval for 
Bernhard1s resignation. The Archbishop hesitated to break the premise 
given to the Emperor. Nevertheless, when he was assured of the support 
of the Cathedral Chapter, the citizens of Salzburg, the Dukes of Bavaria140 
and Matthias of Hungary, he declared his intention to remain in office.141
137
^Ib34., Ill, pp. 3-6.
ministerial 47^  fin?51'.* George Hessler was Frederick's foreign 
minister from 1474 to 1482 and proved to be one of the most important
statesmen of the later half of the fifteenth centuiy. He was instru­
mental in concluding peace between the Emperor and Charles of Burgundy 
r L  °J0f 17» 1475; Hessler then spent some time in Rome. As a
c!rS^ i n StJ nSeq?en^  S ploSatic missions he was granted the rank of 
Cardinal on July 1, 1477. Finally in 1479 he was appointed to the
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Frederick issued . specia! Manifesto in the wake of Bernhard's decision, 
Which reiterated the Archbishop's apparent willingness to resign and 
anticipated an imminent fulfillment of this promise.11*  Frederick had 
the full support of Pope Sixtus IT in the venture. On April 7 the 
Pontiff notified his German legate, the Bishop of Forli, that the Em­
peror had infomed him of the current status of the Salzburg contro­
versy. Frederick had requested him to persuade Bernhard to keep his 
promise, a service which Sixtus was apparently willing to perfonn
Archbishop Bernhard's position became increasing^ awkward.
The death of Le„is of Bavaria on January 17, 1479, marked a retum ^
Bavarian neutrality.^ Sals^rg now looked to Hunger Matthias, 
exasperated *  Frsderidc's procrastination in paying his indemnity 
siezed the opportunity to get back at him. In a letter written to
nek on October 8, M?9, Matthias announced that he had requested
Bernhard to retain his o f f i c e . 1 ^  F i v A  .
lve da^s Previous to this, the
ungarian King had taken the fortifications nf +>, ,»•
ions of the diocese under his
control. The Cathedral Chapter approved nf +h
, pproved of the move on April 10
^  ~  — n Austria and Hunga. wls
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again renewed.
The return of war brought a serious decline in the stability 
of the Salzburg Archbishopric. Towards the end of 1480 Bernhard 
sought to renew his negotiations with the Emperor, Although unsuccess­
ful at first, the cooperation of the citizens of Salzburg soon paved 
the way for a settlement of the dispute. As a reward for destroying a 
defensive tower erected by Christoph Ebran, the city was granted a 
special charter of liberties on October 8, 1 4 8 1 , The imperial loy­
alty which the city now manifested led towards Bernhard's abdication
148
in Vienna on November 19, 1481, Johann of Gran was appointed to suc­
ceed him. His oath of loyalty to Frederick was published on December 
13, 1481,
An investiture struggle contemporary with the Salzburg dispute
was also in progress in the Bishopric of Passau, On October 25, 1478,
Sixtus IV granted Frederick the right of investing either the Bishop-
149
ric of Passau or Polten, When Bishop Ulrich of Passau died in 
1479, the sknperor applied this privilege to Passau. Cardinal George 
Hessler was appointed as the new Bishop. Soon thereafter Pope Sixtus 
IV formally consecrated Hessler for the position, 1^0 while Frederick
lZ^ Ibid.. p. 214,
1 hf>
Ibid.. Beilagen, No, 21,
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T. Mayer, "Dreizehn Urkunden uber die Verpfandung von St, 
Polten und Mautern an den Konig Matthias Corvinus, 1481; nebst eini- 
gen andem Beitragen zur Geschichte der Stadt St, Polten," Archive fur 
feffide osterrelchischer Geschichts-Quellen. VI (1851), 413,
^°Schlecht, op, cjt., p. 70.
invested him with temporal powers. The Chapter of the Bishopric re­
fused to endorse the appointment and elected Friedrich Mauerkircher 
to oppose Hessler. Both parties now sought a champion. The cities 
of St. Polten and Mautera placed themselves under the protection of 
the Hungarian King. Matthias accepted the offer "auf vleissig vnd 
diemutig ersuchen der Erwirdigen seines besundem hern Fridrich's vnd 
Capitels. " 151 Fortunately for Mauerkircher, Hessler died on September 
21, 1482. Since Frederick was in no position to contest Matthias' con. 
trol over the Bishopric, he was forced to leave the matter rest.
A final sphere of active diplomatic concourse between Frederick 
III and Sixtus IV involved the city of Basel. Archbishop Andreas of
Krain had been sent to Rane as an imperial envoy on special business
152
in 1478. The exact nature of his mission cannot be ascertained. 
Towards the end of 1481 or early in 1482 he fell into disrepute at 
the Roman court and was imprisoned. 153 After his release Andreas 
left Rome deeply embittered and made his way towards Basel. On 
March 25, 1482, he made a public pronouncement in the city. Posing as 
a cardinal and an imperial representative, he heaped invectives upon
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Rome and announced the convocation of an ecclesiastical council for
the beginning of May. His appeal met only with a moderate response.
The Archbishop now wrote to Frederick III and explained his action. 155
The city council likewise appealed to the Emperor to provide seme
156
directives in the matter. Frederick responded by ordering Andreas 
to appear in Vienna. The city of Basel was ordered to steer clear of 
the issue until further notice. In a letter sent on July 21, the Em­
peror asked the Archbishop by whose authority he had made his pronounce­
ments. Two days later Frederick requested the city to inform him of all 
the participants in the movement.157 Andreas answered the Erapercr's 
letter on August 10. Rather emphatically he endorsed the view that the 
problems of Europe could only be solved by a Council. 358
The Archbishop's procedure was not instigated by the Roman 
King. The decisiveness of the plan did not harmonize with Frederick's 
character. Moreover, his position in contemporary politics allowed 
for no schemes of such grandiose proportions, since at this time Mat­
thias Corvinus was preparing his offensive against Vienna. Frederick's 
procrastination in dispensing with the affair was quite understandable.
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He realized that only the Roman King had the authority to convoke a 
council. The folly of initiating such an irreparable break with the 
Holy See was equally apparent. Nevertheless, "secretly he did not ob­
ject if the Pope was punished for the arrest of his envoy." 159
Meanwhile the Papacy prepared to squelch this afront to its 
authority. 160 As early as May a papal legate, Hugo of Land.enberg, 
was dispatched to the troubled area. He found little support in 
Basel, although the city declared itself willing to negotiate honor­
ably. A second legate, Gratia Dei, was then appointed. The latter 
had been sent to Rome as an envoy of Frederick, but now cast his lot 
with Sixtus IV. After his consultation with Archduke Sigismund at 
Innsbruck, Gratia Dei proceeded to Vienna. Two other legates, Peter 
of Kettenheim and Anton de Rupe, accompanied him. On July 21 another 
legate, Angelus, Bishop of Suessa, was sent to Basel with a bull of 
excommunication for Archbishop Andreas. Sixtus, possibly out of respect 
for the Emperor, did not demand the Archbishop's transfer to Rome, but 
only requested his imprisonment. The papal appellation received only 
limited response. Even the clergy of Basel joined with the city council 
in politely ignoring the matter. When city of Basel was finally placed 
under an interdict, the city council appealed to the Pope and to the
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Meanwhile the efforts of Gratia Dei and his associates finally 
roused the Roman King to act. In a special decree issued on October 19 
and 20 Frederick condemned the action of Andreas in Basel. He was 
careful to list the circumstances under which the Archbishop could be 
arrested. The city council, firm in its opposition against Roman 
interference, took no action against him.162 The Archbishop's position 
was completely hopeless, however, Frederick now submitted himself to 
the papal verdict in deciding the issue.l6^ Subsequent developments 
revealed the insincerity of the pledge. When Gratia Dei arrived in 
Basel to arrest Andreas and take him to Rome, he found that the im­
perial decree on the matter was carefully observed.
The controversy between Pope and Emperor as to the method of 
procedure in the case produced considerable diplomatic intercourse 
between the two rulers until the death of Archbishop Andreas in 1484. 
The imperial and papal delegations at Basel held an open hearing con­
cerning the fate of Andreas on December 21, 1482. Frederick's repre­
sentatives declared their willingness to follow the dictates of the
4 26
Emperor.1^1
l6lBurckhardt, ojd. cit., pp. 32-48.
., ^Basel's confidence was not unfounded. During this time the
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1888 L S' f  privilege grated the city in August,
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bably explained the city s boldness in ignoring the threats of Sixtus
D u  ^ T h e  papaqy answered this gesture by a very fatherlv lett e r  
Raynaldus, oe. cit., ad an. 1483, No. 25. ^neriy letter.
Papacy provided that all censures and interdicts against the city of 
Basel be withdrawn. Thereupon Andreas was siezed and imprisoned. 1^4
The main issue between Frederick III and Sixtus IV still remained 
unsolved. The former still opposed the Archbishop's extradition to 
Rome. In an effort to minimize the tension of the situation, Sixtus 
addressed a flattering letter of thanks to Frederick and his son Maxi­
milian early in 1483. ^ Apparently minimizing Frederick's interest 
in the matter, Sixtus now threatened Basel with an interdict unless 
Andreas was brought to Rome. The city immediately appealed the ruling 
on February 4, 1483. It based its case on a recent brief which it had 
received from the Emperor, whereby Basel was warned not to send Andreas 
to Rome until Frederick had reached a satisfactory agreement with the 
Pope. Meanwhile the interdict was placed upon Basel by the papal 
legate, Bishop Angelus. 166 The city united against this threat to its 
liberty and refused to submit to the Pope, Its confidence was bolstered 
by a circular letter which Frederick directed to the Empire on March 21, 
In it the Emperor bitterly complained against Angelus, who desired the 
extradition of Andreas, In view of this threat to the integrity of 
the Empire the Reman King threatened all who obeyed Bishop Angelus or 
attacked the city of Basel in any way with a severe fine. Angelus
4 27
1 Burckhardt, op. cit., pp. 73-75.
l65Raynaldus, op. cit., ad an. 1483, No. 27,
, . Burckhardt, 0£. cit., pp. 79-82. The interdict was pro-
claimed between February 4 and 12. Strangely enough, a bull of ab­
solution for Basel was formulated on February 7 by Sixtus, but was 
never published.
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stubbornly pursued his designs. On May 3, 1483, all the clergy of 
Basel were ordered to go to Mainz and give an oath of fidelity to 
the Catholic faith. It met with limited response. ^ 7
Sixtus refused to give up his quarry. Together with Angelus 
he set about to undermine Frederick’s authority by monetary conces­
sions to some of the estates of the Empire. Force was to be used to 
bring Basel to its knees. On August 24 Frederick sent two plaintive 
letters to the Archbishops John of Trier and Herman of Cologne. He 
noted that never before in the history of imperial-papal relations
had the Pope displayed such audacity. Frederick did not minimize 
his predicament.
But h“der this [papal audacity] without your
love and the help of other princes. If the activities of 
the legate are allowed to continue, a precident will be 
S+fc !0pe 311(1 foreiSn nations will daily appear
A r c h M ^ i ^  ^ ds; If the Pope purposes to punish the
W€ f1Ve our approval so long as a correct 
judicial procedure is observed.168
No mention of the prisoners possible extradition to Rome was made.
Following a stalemate of approximately eight months the con­
troversy took a new turn when Basel directed an appeal to the College 
of Cardinals instead of the Pope. Included with the appeal was an 
appellation issued by Frederick III against the methods employed in 
the prosecution of the case thus far. Early in 1484 Archduke Sigis­
mund sent a special petition to the Reman Curia on behalf of Andreas 
It mentioned a special delegation sent by Basel to consult with the
^.Ibid., pp. 83-84. 
l68Ibid., p. 89.
Emperor on behalf of the Archbishop. Sixtus reiterated his position 
to both Sigismund and the Snperor without success. Finally on April 
30 he directed a brief to the Roman King.16? Little came of the mat­
ter for Pope Sixtus IV died on August 12, 1884. On the day of his 
coronation (September 12, 1884) Innocent VIII drew up a bull of abso­
lution for the city of Basel. It was only published in December, how­
ever. The controversy now came to an uneventful conclusion. Archbishop 
Andreas committed suicide in his prison. The city of Basel and the 
Emperor had won their struggle against the Pope.
During the pontificate of Sixtus IV and Innocent VIII a joint 
imperial-papal ecclesiastical policy was out of the question. Both 
Popes were Italian princes rather than the rulers of universal Christen­
dom. Politically, the Austrian-Hungarian conflict provided the only 
major area of contact between Pope and Emperor. Even at that, papal 
arbitration was largely conditioned by personal interests. The appeals 
for peace in the struggle usually coincided with Turkish advances, or 
with the misfortunes of Pope Sixtus in his Italian wars. Similarly, 
the periodic concessions to the papal demands for a crusade made by 
Frederick were usually dependent on the current imperial interests.
If latent convictions concerning the necessity of a crusade occasion­
ally troubled Frederick, they remained a matter of the soul, for no 
practical efforts were ever made to initiate one.
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The investiture controversies during the last quarter of the 
fifteenth century established no fixed pattern in imperial-papal 
relations* Cooperation remained dependent on mutual interests. The 
Papacy bitterly contested Frederick's interference in Basel and Con­
stance, but supported Frederick's policy in Salzburg and Passau since 
the fortifications of these areas were an essential bulwark against 
the Turk. Current political tendencies also entered the picture. At 
a time when there was a widespread demand for secular investiture, the 
Pope chose to bequeath this power to the Emperor rather than to the 
territorial prince. During the pontificates of Sixtus IV and Innocent 
VIII, the interaction between the Papacy and the Emperor was based 
upon mutual respect rather than personal friendship. Each man was a 
prince of his own realm and functioned primarily upon a territorial 
level. Even such an international project as the crusade emerged as 
the product of a national policy.
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CONCLUSION
When Duke Frederick V of Austria ascended to the throne of the 
Holy Roman Empire as Frederick III in 1440, the principles governing 
the operation of the contemporary ecclesiastical and political struc­
ture had become antiquated and inapplicable both in theory and practice. 
The actual authority of the Emperor was dependent upon the position he 
occupied as a territorial prince, and the duties he could still perform 
were chiefly limited to the confirmation of privileges and the bestowal 
of minor rights. In his role as ruler of Austria the Emperor proved an 
intelligent ruler, but here too his authority was drastically curtailed 
by the fragmentation which had come to characterize fifteenth century 
Europe. Frederick possessed neither the ruthlessness nor the military 
strength to assert his power over the Empire he had been asked to rule. 
As an individual, his disposition disqualified him for the role he was 
called to play. Nevertheless, his place in history cannot be judged 
by his performance as a military leader or by his personification of 
thirteenth centuiy imperial traditions. The one area best suited to 
Frederick's temperament, the field of imperial-papal relations, provides 
a new perspective of this Emperor, 1*0 has so often been the object of 
superficial judgment and intentional disregard.
Frederick's attitude toward the ecclesiastical problems which 
faced him at the beginning of his rule revealed an intelligent grasp 
of the basic issues at stake. Entrusted with a religious tradition 
which included imperial arbitration in the schism, secular neutrality, 
as well a8 considerable sympathy for conciliar sentiments, the new
Emperor soon formulated the chief tenets of his subsequent ecclesias­
tical policy. He endorsed an imperial neutrality which he was careful 
to distinguish from that assumed by the College of Electors. Moreover, 
since a solution to the church problem was basic to the implementation
of any further reforms, he accepted another feature of his heritage_
the convocation of an ecumenical Council to restore order within the 
Church. Deeply convinced of the validity of these principles, the 
young ruler set about to bring religious peace to his realm. The first 
efforts at inaugurating these policies occurred at the Diet of Mainz 
held in 1441,
The Diet of Mainz saw the emergence of a movement, which in the 
final analysis, was to successfully hinder Frederick in achieving a 
solution to the church problem. A short time after the Diet commenced 
the Electors formulated the so-called Ayisament* Moeuntina. which in 
essence subscribed to conciliar supremacy, but also called for complete 
secular independence in all matters relating to the administration of 
the Empire. Despite this affront to imperial authority, Frederick and 
the Electors still envisaged the same basic policies in regard to the 
religious issue. The difference was one of methodology. Whereas the 
Electors desired the recognition of Eugenius IV prior to the convoca­
tion of a new Council, Frederick insisted that the Pontiff could only 
be recognized after his case had been heard and evaluated by the Coun­
cil. Frederick differed from the Electors on another issue. He was 
strongly opposed to all solutions which eliminated the participation 
of the European powers in general, and enhanced the position of the 
German princes in particular. Several months after the termination
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of the Diet of Mainz, the ecclesiastical problem was again discussed 
at a Diet held in Frankfort. The electoral opposition against Frederick 
was now consolidated and found expression in a manifesto issued on July 
23, 1^2. It bluntly requested the Emperor to agree to the policies 
advocated by the Electors. Frederick countered with a diplomatic 
masterstroke by submitting the electoral demands to the decision of 
the imperial estates. The Electors were completely discredited when 
these rejected their plans, and formulated a new ecclesiastical policy 
that was essentially in agreement with the one endorsed by the Smperor. 
It called for a new Council which would judge the cases of both 
Eugenius IV and Felix V, and stipulated that secular neutrality was to 
be continued until its convocation. Thereupon Frederick announced his 
adherence to the policy of neutrality as it had originally been drawn 
up by the Electors on March 17 - 18, 1438. The delegations which the 
Diet sent to both the Council of Basel and Eugenius IV marked the end 
of Frederick's good fortune, for the obstinacy of Eugenius IV nullified 
the progress which had been made thus far.
The Nuremberg Diet of 1444 was of utmost importance to the 
future course of Frederick's church policy. The assembly revealed a 
strong aversion to neutrality and advocated an immediate solution to 
the dilemma by the secular authorities. In order to staisfy this 
demand, Frederick announced that a united policy had been formulated 
by the Emperor and the Electors. This was, however, little more than 
a vague promise to end neutrality. To avoid participation in any prog­
ram which might curb their independence or require their financial 
assistance, the Electors again chose to disagree with the Emperor on
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a point of methodology. Instead of advocating the convocation of a 
new Council, they insisted upon a reactivation of the Council of Basel. 
Meanwhile the increasing bitterness between Eugenius IV and Felix V 
provided the Electors with an excuse to pursue their designs apart 
from the Emperor. The individuals who had initiated the practice of 
neutrality now insisted on its termination in favor of the Council of 
Basel, while Frederick, who had never endorsed it, felt it should con­
tinue until the new Council met. This continual pressure from the 
Electorate forced Frederick to initiate a basic change in his ecclesi­
astical policy, a change which saw the abandonment of internationalism 
in favor of particularism. When the Electors continued to hold special 
meetings in an attempt to solve the schism independently, the Emperor 
decided to cast his lot with Eugenius IV. On September 13, 144-5, 
Frederick sent Carvajal to Vienna to negotiate the terms for a future 
union with Pope Eugenius. The action was directly related to the 
current political atmosphere. Impatient with the electoral obstruc­
tionist tactics, Frederick intentionally began to make his contacts 
with Eugenius IV "non-neutral." Religious conviction played little 
part in the Emperor's policy reversal, and its expedient nature can­
not be denied, especially when viewed in the light of subsequent 
developments.
During the course of 1446 Frederick attempted to counteract 
electoral intrigue by his negotiations with the Papacy. Although he 
intended this flirtation to be of a temporary nature, the force of 
immediate political circumstances led him to conclude a permanent 
pact with the Roman See. By affixing his signature to the Concordat
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of Vienna Frederick acknowledged the failure of his previous ecclesi­
astical policy, and recognized the futility of stemming the contemporary 
institutional dismemberment by legislation. While the Concordat was 
ostensibly an effort to foster an international religious policy, the 
subsequent course of events soon indicated that Frederick had chosen 
to inaugurate a new policy. He now ceased to draw up ecclesiastical 
programs for the Empire as such, and concentrated on gaining the best 
advantage of a given circumstance. Frederick's coronation in Rome was 
cniefly instrumental in establishing the basis for friendly relations 
between Pope Nicholas and the Emperor. As if to characterize subse­
quent relationships the first topic of their deliberations ironically 
concerned a political and not a religious event— the Austrian revolt.
The coronation demonstrated the fundamental unreality of the Reman 
Kingship as well as the recently formed imperial-papal alliance, es­
pecially since Frederick, as the secular arm of the Papacy, was politi­
cally powerless. The events from 1445 to 1450 squelched and almost ex­
tinguished the idealian which had governed Frederick's early ecclesi­
astical policy. Henceforth private and territorial interests received 
more attention than the affairs of the Church. Frederick purposely 
withdrew from the issues of the contemporary religious scene, partially 
because a solution had supposedly been found, but mainly in protest 
against the insincere princes with whom he had sought to negotiate.
During the remainder of his reign, Frederick initiated no 
religious policy of any consequence, and it is perhaps more correct to 
speak of his attitude towards a given issue rather than of his ecclesi­
astical policy. The second half of the fifteenth century gave Frederick
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ample opportunity to express his views on church affairs. An avid 
crusading consciousness manifested itself at the papal court immediately 
after the fall of Constantinople. For more than a decade the problem 
of the projected crusade was to play a major part in imperial-papal 
relations. Since the advance of the Turks directly affected his heredi­
tary lands Frederick took a very active interest in the crusade planned 
by Nicholas V. That Frederick's religious disposition was seriously 
disturbed by the advance of the Infidel cannot be denied, nevertheless, 
the pacification of princely unrest within the Empire received prior 
consideration, and the crusade was never eally accepted as a part of 
the current imperial program. W h e n  Pope Calixtus ascended to the 
Apostolic Chair the possibility of imperial participation in the cru­
sade became extremely remote. Although Frederick was still imbued with 
the crusade spirit, current electoral intrigue concerned itself with 
the election of an anti-king, and the curbing of these ambitions re­
quired all of Frederick's energies. In his relations with Calixtus, 
the Emperor could not utilize the vantage point which the Concordat of 
Vienna had given him. The bargaining position of the Papacy had im­
proved substantially during the pontificate of Nicholas V, especially 
through the zeal which it had manifested for the crusade. Added to 
this was the fact that Frederick had also lost the advantage of bar­
gaining with both parties of the schism. The only diplomatic lever 
open to him in his relations with Calixtus was collaboration with the 
German princes--an extremely improbable venture.
Imperial-papal, relations were substantially improved when 
Frederick's friend and former secretary, Aeneas Sylvius, was elected
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as Pope on August 19, 1^ -58* The unity between the heads of Christendom 
was now enhanced by an additional feature— personal affection and friend­
ship. The cordiality which typified the relationship between Pius II 
and Frederick III had few precedents in the history of the two institu­
tions they represented. In their political ideology, both rulers mani­
fested an essentially medieval orientation, but still managed to carry 
out their schemes with a remarkable degree of success. Nevertheless, 
mutual respect did not presuppose any radical reversal of the principles 
by which Frederick performed the duties of his office. The Emperor still 
chose to place his personal and territorial well being before the welfare 
of the Empire, and the papal exhortations from Mantua for imperial par­
ticipation in the crusade fell on deaf ears. If promises could have 
driven the Turks out of Europe, Frederick would have been an internation­
al hero in a short time. The Papacy proved as independent as the Em­
peror. When George of Podebrady seemed to offer the best prospect for 
the success of the Turkish War, Pius had few scruples against Hussite 
hereby• Later, when Pius wished to place papal censures upon Podebrady, 
Frederick found it expedient to come to the defense of the Bohemian 
King. In their negotiations with Podebrady both parties were condition­
ed by the respective policies they pursued, but at the same time Fred­
erick and Pius exercised extreme caution lest one commit a grave of­
fense against the other.
Pope Pius II and Frederick III followed a policy of close co­
operation when the authority of one or the other was challenged.
Every artifice at the command of the Pope and Emperor was utilized 
to depose Diether of Mainz. The action revealed that the Concordat
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of* Vienna still functioned upon its original basis— as a defensive 
alliance. When Sigismund of the Tyrol seized control of the Bishopric 
of Brixen, papal and imperial jurisdictional powers over the area were 
seriously challenged. Both rulers hastened to the defense of their 
rights, but the obvious solidarity which typified the imperial-papal 
bond in this dispute was not entirely free from the stain of expedi­
ency. Frederick chose to mediate in the dispute only when it was to 
his personal advantage. The diplomatic intercourse between Frederick 
and Pius II, despite its superficial sincerity, was carried on in the 
traditional style of fifteenth century diplomacy, in which goodwill 
was usually related to personal advantage. The selfish tendencies 
which occasionally characterized imperial-papal relations during the 
pontificate of Pius II became much more evident with the election of 
Pope Paul II. Whereas Pius attempted to strengthen the international 
ramifications of the Papacy, Paul was content to restrict his interests 
to Italy. Although Paul issued the customary papal pronouncements con­
cerning ecclesiastical reform and the projected crusade at the beginning 
of his rule, he soon subordinated these sentiments to the demands of 
Italian politics. The new Pope chose not to rely on imperial goodwill 
or support, and the alliance between the two institutions almost lapsed 
into non-existence. Paul preferred to use the aid of the Emperor only 
as a last resort, and by this attitude possibly lost a valuable ally 
in his conflict with George of Podebrady. More than ever before, 
Frederick now played the role of a territorial prince in his contacts 
with the Papacy. Only at the Diet of Linz held in 1467 did the politi­
cal circumstances produce a semblance of unity between the two rulers,
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for both desired to obtain support for the war against Podebrady. The 
Emperor's visit to Rome in 1468 was designed to strengthen this bond 
of common interest, and was an effort to seek a closer identification 
of international policy. Frederick gained none of the political ends 
he sought after, for Paul proved noncommital in deiplomatic matters 
and was only concerned with the ceremonial aspects of the imperial visit.
The trend towards utilitarianism and self-interest became more 
pronounced during the last two decades of Frederick's reign. The Ital­
ian orientation displayed by Pope Sixtus IV all but terminated the 
bases of the imperial-papal alliance as it had been established by the 
Concordat of Vienna. This event was not immediately discernable, and 
revealed itself in a change in the operational principles governing 
the relations between the two institutions, rather than in an absence 
of contact between Frederick and the Papacy. The new state of affairs 
was not inflexible, however, and the possibility that international 
tensions might reactivate the alliance still existed. The resultant 
policy would be conditioned by mutual need and not mutual interests. 
Sixtus IV and Innocent VIII both paid their respects to the crusade 
spirit, which had become such a convenient diplomatic tool of the fif­
teenth century Papacy. Then, in keeping with the papal tradition es­
tablished by Paul II, they applied their talents to regional politics.
By this time Frederick had become quite skilled in dispensing with 
papal appeals for a crusading amy. During the last quarter of the 
century imperial-papal relations were limited to the investiture of 
several dioceses. Cooperation remained dependent on personal inter­
ests. The Papacy bitterly contested Frederick's policy in Basel and
Constance, but endorsed his actions in Salzburg and Passau because 
these areas represented a bulwark against the Turks. Each man was a 
prince in his own realm, and political rather than religious issues 
determined the bond of unity between the traditional heads of Christen­
dom.
The history of Emperor Frederick Ill's relations with the Papacy 
brings to light several notable aspects of his character that have 
usually been overlooked. In his early administration of Austria and 
the Empire, Frederick revealed a diligent preoccupation with the ecclesi­
astical problems of his day, both on a territorial and international 
level. Frederick proved an excellent and energetic administrator in 
such areas as were fully under his control. This was especially true 
of the Austrian ecclesiastical complex, but also of his political rule 
of Austria. By the end of his reign he had managed to create a semblance 
of order in the chaotic dukedom which had been entrusted unto him. His 
distrust of arms and ability to endure insult were largely responsible 
for his survival in an age so addicted to violence and war. The first 
years of his reign as Emperor indicated his ability to pursue an active 
and intelligent religious policy, in the implementation of 'which he 
distinguished himself as an accomplished diplomat. When his program 
collapsed due to the pressures exerted by the Electors he reverted to 
a policy of immobility. The policy was soon confused with the personal 
character of Frederick, even though it was only an expression of the 
basic philosophy of his rule. This policy represented an attempt to 
save the Habsburg House as well as its territories from extinction, 
and was the product of a careful appraisal of the cross currents of
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the age. The switch from internationalism to territorialisra in Fred­
erick !s ecclesiastical policy was calculated to consolidate the rem­
nants of imperial authority9 and save Austria and the Empire from the 
ignoble death which an assertion of supremacy would have brought with
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